
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An HISTORICAL

ACCOUNT

OF THE

BRITISH TRADE

OVER THE

CASPIAN SEA;

WITH THE

Revolutions of PERSIA.

VOL. III.

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OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC

THE REVOLUTIONS OF PERSIA:

Containing the REIGN of

SHAH SULTAN HUSSEIN,

WITH THE

Invaſion of the Afghans,

And the REIGNS of

SULTAN MIR MAGHMUD

AND HIS

Succeſſor SULTAN ASHREFF.

To which is prefixed,

A chronological abridgement of the PERSIAN monarchy from its firſt foundation.

VOL. I.

By JONAS HANWAY, Merchant.

LONDON.

Sold by Mr. DODSLEY, in Pall-mall; Mr. NOURSE, Mr. MILLAR, Mr. VAILLANT, and Mr. PATTERSON, in the Strand; Mr. WAUGH, in Lombard-Street; and Mr. WILLOCK, in Cornhill. M DCC LIII.



To the RIGHT HONOURABLE

GEORGE LORD ANSON,

BARON of SOBERTON,

Vice-admiral of ENGLAND, firſt LORD COMMISSIONER of the admiralty, and one of his MAJESTY's moſt honourable privy-council.

MY LORD,

WHEN the various events were known of the famous expedition to the SOUTH SEAS, under your LORDSHIP's direction, your calmneſs and conſtancy, in circumſtances

cumſtances ſo diſcouraging, and oftentimes terrible, naturally excited a reſpectful idea of your character: but we have ſince been indebted in great meaſure to your LORDSHIP for more eminent ſervices. You had the command in the firſt truly ENGLISH day, which gave a turn to the late war, and diverted the blow aimed at an important branch of our commerce. That day gave the firſt mortal wound to the maritime power of FRANCE, and compenſated for the little ſucceſs of our arms in FLANDERS. And here, my LORD, affection for my brother, who did his duty under your auſpices, as well as the love of my country, demand the tribute of my particular thanks.

The deſire of diſtinction, ſo deeply implanted in our nature, can have no principle more noble than that of advancing the happineſs of the ſociety. The higheſt offices of life, neceſſarily create a pre-eminence in toil; the poſſeſſors of them are therefore intitled to the greater veneration. Men of active ſpirits are ever looking forward. The ſame genius which has hitherto conducted your LORDSHIP will ſtill lead you on to the increaſe of your fame, and the acquiſition of new honour. On that board at which your LORDSHIP preſides, depends in a very great degree the welfare and ſafety

of this nation. The ſplendor of this monarchy is ſupported by commerce, and commerce by naval ſtrength. Whilſt the ſeveral ſtates of EUROPE accumulate maritime power, your LORDSHIP's charge receives an additional weight; and in proportion as your ſervices prove inſtrumental to your country's welfare, your glory will increaſe.

In the following ſheets, which I have the honour to preſent to your LORDSHIP, we have a remarkable inſtance of the pomp and ſplendor of one of the greateſt eaſtern monarchies, humbled even to the duſt by the iniquitous conduct of miniſters. How great the contraſt between theſe and the nearer examples with which we are furniſhed by our own country! Purſuits actuated by honeſt motives, directed by wiſe laws, under a juſt and legal ſovereign, ſhould they erect no other trophy than an honourable tomb, muſt be incomparably preferable to the proudeſt monuments of ſucceſsful villainy.

But providence has been indulgent to your LORDSHIP: your endeavours for the ſervice of your country, have been brought to a ſucceſsful iſſue, and your wiſhes accompliſhed in the reward of thoſe ſervices. May that providence ſtill

pro-

protect you in all the important concerns of your ſtation, and in all the circumſtances of your private life. I am, with great reſpect,

MY LORD,

Your LORDSHIP's

moſt obedient

London,
January, 1753.

humble ſervant,

Jonas Hanway.

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VOL. III. PART I.

A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE PERSIAN MONARCHY,

FROM THE FIRST FOUNDATION BY CYRUS TO THE REIGN OF HUSSEIN, THE ELEVENTH AND LAST KING OF THE SEFFIE DYNASTY.

CHAP. I.

A chronological account of the PERSIAN *empire, from its foundation by* CYRUS *the* GREAT, *in the year of the world* 3426, *to the invaſion of* ALEXANDER *the* GREAT.

CYRUS *the* GREAT, *A. M.* 3426.[a]

THE PERSIAN empire, founded by CYRUS the GREAT, was the [b] ſecond of the four antient monarchies which have been eſtabliſhed in the world. It is remarkable that this wiſe and formidable prince was mentioned by name in the ſacred ſcriptures two hundred

[a] It muſt be obſerved there are very few dates in which hiſtorians agree exactly.

[b] The firſt was the ASSYRIAN.

years before his birth; for GOD was pleaſed to declare that he would be his guide, and lead him by the hand to ſubdue all nations before him.

This prince was the ſon of CAMBYSES king of PERSIA, by MANDANA daughter of ASTYAGES king of MEDIA. CYAXARES, who ſucceeded his father ASTYAGES, being threatened with an invaſion by the king of BABYLON, entered into an alliance with the king of PERSIA, and ſeveral other princes bordering on his dominions, for their mutual defence; on this occaſion CAMBYSES ſent CYRUS with 30,000 foot to join the MEDES. CYRUS entered the enemy's country, gained a complete victory over the BABYLONIANS in the firſt engagement, in which their king fell in battle: he then marched up to the walls of BABYLON; but finding that the garriſon conſiſted of 100,000 men, he retired with CYAXARES into MEDIA, to ſtrengthen their alliance and augment their forces. CYAXARES, ſenſible of the merit of his nephew CYRUS, gave him his daughter in marriage, and made him heir to his MEDIAN dominions; upon which CYRUS marched towards BABYLON, leaving CYAXARES in MEDIA. CYRUS ſurpriſed the BABYLONIANS before they joined their forces, and, marching with the utmoſt expedition, gave them battle, and was a ſecond time victorious. He took SARDIS, and making CRÆSUS king of LYDIA † priſoner, poſſeſſed himſelf of all his treaſure and the wealth of that opulent city; but reſtored CRÆSUS to his throne.

After ſubduing the LESSER ASIA, SYRIA, and part of ARABIA, CYRUS marched a ſecond time to the walls of BABYLON. He cauſed a number of canals to be made, and on the evening of the feaſt, cutting the banks of the TIGRIS, the water of that river being let into the canals, fell ſo low that he marched ſeveral bodies of forces on both ſides of the city, along the bed of the river. The BABYLONIANS were then ſolemnizing a grand feſtival, ſo that he found an opportunity of entering the brazen gates which the drunken BABYLONIANS had left open; and taking BALSHAZAR the king and his whole court priſoners, put them to the ſword, fulfilling the prophecy of DANIEL, that the cruelties which the BABYLONIANS had exerciſed upon others, ſhould be returned upon themſelves.

CYRUS,

† Situated in the preſent NATOLIA.

CYRUS, after being 26 years general of the forces both of his father and uncle, at length recovered all the countries in AFRICA and LESSER ASIA, which had been in ſubjection to the ASSYRIAN empire. He then returned to BABYLON, and both his father CAMBYSES and his uncle CYAXARES dying, he became the ſole monarch of this vaſt empire of PERSIA.

In the firſt year of the reign of CYRUS [c], expired the ſeventieth year of the JEWISH captivity in BABYLON, and by the advice of the prophet DANIEL he publiſhed an edict for re-building the temple of JERUSALEM and re-peopling that city with its antient inhabitants: he reſtored all the veſſels of the temple, which NEBUCHADONOSOR had taken from thence and placed in the temple of BAAL at BABYLON. Upon this the JEWS returned to their own country under the conduct of ZOROBABEL. In CYRUS's time the PERSIAN empire extended from the gulph of ORMUS and the RED SEA and from ETHIOPIA on the ſouth, to the EUXINE and CASPIAN SEAS on the north; and from the river INDUS [d] on the eaſt, to the deſerts of LYBIA [e], the MEDITERRANEAN and EGEAN [f] SEAS on the weſt.

CYRUS made it the buſineſs of his reign to exerciſe juſtice, and to relieve the oppreſſed; governing the nations he had conquered with ſuch humanity and tenderneſs, that they became his faithful ſubjects. He reigned ſole monarch of PERSIA only ſeven years, and died in BABYLON leaving his ſon CAMBYSES his ſucceſſor.

CAMBYSES, *A.M.* 3433.

Soon after CAMBYSES aſcended the throne of PERSIA; AMASIS the tributary king of EGYPT, endeavoured to render himſelf independent of the PERSIAN crown. CAMBYSES invaded EGYPT, but AMASIS dying, he gave battle to his ſon PSAMENITUS, and entirely defeated him: this prince flying to MEMPHIS ‡ his capital, was taken priſoner, and the city ſurrendered; on which not only the EGYPTIANS ſubmitted to CAMBYSES,

[c] *A. M.* 3426. [d] Now called the SCIND. [e] The part of AFRICA bordering on EGYPT. [f] ARCHIPELAGO. ‡ A city of EGYPT in the iſland of DELTA.

but LIBYA, CYRENIACA *, and other diſtant countries ſought his protection. But the ETHIOPIANS, and the inhabitants of that part of AFRICA where ſtood the temple of JUPITER AMMON, refuſing to ſubmit, he invaded both at the ſame time. The army he ſent againſt the AMMONIANS ‡ was deſtroyed by a tempeſt, which raiſed the ſands in ſuch a manner that his troops were ſuffocated. In ETHIOPIA he ſucceeded but little better, the greateſt part of his troops were deſtroyed by famine and reduced to the neceſſity of eating human fleſh. With the ſmall remains of his army he returned to THEBES, where he plundered the temples of that opulent city of all their valuable moveables, and demoliſhed thoſe beautiful ſtructures.

CAMBYSES became ſo jealous of his brother SMERDIS, who had accompanied him in this war, that he ſent him into PERSIA, and there cauſed him to be murdered. His ſiſter MEROE, whom he had married, ſuffered the ſame fate, for making ſome reflexions on this act of cruelty. This prince had little ſenſibility of the laws of humanity, but ſubſtituted pride and cruelty in their place; he cauſed many of his great officers to be buried alive. He one day aſked PREXASPES what the people ſaid of him? That miniſter replied, they admired his many good qualities, but wiſhed that he had not ſuch an inclination for wine. "That is, returned "CAMBYSES, they imagine that wine deprives me of my ſenſes, but "you ſhall judge of that immediately." Having drunk more than uſual, he ordered his cupbearer, who was ſon to PREXASPES, to ſtand at the further end of the room, and taking a bow and arrow, declared he aimed at his heart; after he had ſhot him, he ordered the young lord to be opened, and his heart to be brought to him; the arrow having pierced it, he ſhewed it to his father, and aſked him if he had not a ſteady hand? The unhappy parent replied, with the flattery of the modern times to PERSIAN kings; "APOLLO himſelf could not have ſhot better."

In the eighth year of the reign of CAMBYSES, an impoſtor reſembling his brother SMERDIS who had been put to death, impoſing on the people, uſurped the crown. CAMBYSES who was then abſent reſolved to march

* Now called BARCA in AFRICA. ‡ Inhabiting a part of LIBYA.

march againſt the uſurper, but, as he was mounting his horſe, his ſword ſlipping out of its ſcabbard gave him a wound in the thigh, of which he died. This CAMBYSES is ſuppoſed to be the AHASUERUS mentioned in the ſcriptures.

SMERDIS, *A.M.* 3441.

The uſurper SMERDIS, the ARTAXERXES of the ſcripture, was the ſon of one of the MAGI, who was governor of BABYLON, and is therefore uſually ſtiled the MAGIAN. He endeavoured by all means to gain the affections of the people; and, to prevent his being diſcovered, concealed himſelf in the royal palace: but this precaution ſerved only to raiſe the ſuſpicion of the great men, among whom was OTANES, whoſe daughter PHEDYMA, SMERDIS had taken to his bed. This lady finding that her huſband had loſt his ears, which for ſome offence had been cut off by CYRUS, diſcovered the deceit; on which ſeveral of the nobility entered into a conſpiracy, and aſſaſſinated the uſurper in his palace.

DARIUS ſon of HYSTASPES, *A.M.* 3443.

The nobility then proceeded to the choice of a ſucceſſor, and DARIUS ſon of HYSTASPES was elected. This prince married two of the daughters of CYRUS the GREAT. In the third year of his reign, he gave orders that the building of the temple of JERUSALEM ſhould be carried on at the expence of the ſtate, requiring the JEWISH prieſts to pray for him, and to denounce curſes againſt all who ſhould obſtruct the work.

The PERSIAN court being removed from BABYLON to SUSA, the former city revolted. DARIUS in the fifth year of his reign marched his army and beſieged it. He met with but little ſucceſs for 18 months: at length ZOPYRUS, one of his generals, cut off his own noſe and ears, and then fled to the city, pretending that he had been thus mangled by order of DARIUS: this aſtoniſhing ſtratagem gained him the confidence of the BABYLONIANS, who readily entruſted him with the command of their troops in ſeveral ſallies, and in a ſhort time engaging them to confide entirely in him, he betrayed the city to DARIUS. When this prince

took poſſeſſion of it, he cauſed 3000 citizens to be impaled, and the walls to be demoliſhed.

DARIUS next invaded SCYTHIA with an army of 600,000 men; but the enemy retiring before the PERSIANS, drew them into a country covered with ſnow, where DARIUS loſt great part of his army, without fighting, and with great difficulty made his retreat. The SCYTHIANS ſoon returned this viſit, invaded THRACE, and plundered the country as far as the HELLESPONT. While DARIUS was engaged in his expedition againſt the SCYTHIANS, MEGABYSUS the PERSIAN governor of THRACE ſubdued the MACEDONIANS, and made them tributary to PERSIA.

He then invaded INDIA, and, as ſome hiſtorians ſay, made an entire conqueſt of all that country. He was ſoon after engaged in ſuppreſſing a rebellion of the IONIANS, who had drawn the ATHENIANS and other GRECIAN ſtates into the plot; but the IONIANS, being deſerted by all their allies, were entirely ſubdued. DARIUS reſenting the injury done him by the ATHENIANS in joining the IONIANS, who had burnt the city of SARDIS, determined to invade GREECE by ſea and land: he therefore ſent an army under the command of MARDONIUS a young lord who had married his daughter; this fleet meeting with a ſtorm in the EGEAN SEA, he loſt 300 of his ſhips and 20,000 men, and the army being ſurprized by the THRACIANS, it was with great difficulty MARDONIUS made his retreat over the HELLESPONT into ASIA.

After this, DARIUS again invaded GREECE, utterly deſtroyed the city of ERETRIA in EUBÆA †, and made himſelf maſter of all the iſlands of the EGEAN SEA. He then marched towards ATHENS; the ATHENIANS ſent to the LACEDEMONIANS to join them, but before they arrived they fought the famous battle of MARATHON ‡, in which MILTIADES the ATHENIAN general, tho' his forces did not amount to 10,000 men, not only repulſed the PERSIANS, but entirely defeated them; many thouſands fell by the ſword, and more periſhed in the ſea, endeavouring to get on board their ſhips.

DARIUS

† An iſland belonging to GREECE. ‡ A town of ·ICA in GREECE.

DARIUS now made great preparations for invading GREECE in perſon, and reducing EGYPT which had alſo revolted, but died before his armies took the field, and was ſucceeded by his ſon XERXES.

XERXES, *A. M.* 3479.

This prince no ſooner aſcended the throne than he marched with a powerful army into EGYPT, and compelled that people to ſubmit again to the dominion of PERSIA. To revenge the overthrow the PERSIANS had ſuffered at MARATHON, he made great preparations for conquering GREECE, and began his march with an army which ſome hiſtorians ſay amounted to three millions of men [g]. LEONIDAS, one of the kings of SPARTA, defended the ſtreight of THERMOPILÆ with 4,000 men. This ſtreight, which is only 25 feet broad, lies between THESSALY and PHOCIS; and was thought the only paſſage by which the PERSIANS could enter ACHAIA by land. Here, after loſing 20,000 men, XERXES was ready to deſpair of forcing his way, when a native of the country diſcovered to him a ſecret paſſage up the mountain which commanded the ſtreight. A detachment went thither; and the SPARTANS ſeeing the PERSIANS above them, and finding it impoſſible to defend the poſt, LEONIDAS commanding the reſt of his troops to retire, ſtay'd in the paſs with only 300 men, which after making an obſtinate defence were all cut to pieces except one man, who eſcaped to SPARTA, and was there condemned for cowardice.

The day the battle was fought at THERMOPILÆ, the GRECIANS with 400 ſail obtained a victory at ſea over the PERSIAN fleet of 1000 ſail: the weather being ſtormy, above 200 of the PERSIAN fleet were caſt away, and the GRECIANS falling upon them before their ſcattered ſhips were joined, obtained an eaſy victory at ARTEMISIUM a promontory of EUBÆA.

XERXES now dividing his army, ſent one part to DELPHOS, where they plundered the temple of an immenſe treaſure, and with the other he

[g] Some think it more conſiſtent to read three hundred thouſand; and this number is probable, conſidering they carried their wives and children.

he marched to ATHENS, which finding abandoned by the inhabitants, he plundered and burnt it.

A PERSIAN fleet was ſoon after ſent to SALAMIS in ſearch of the GRECIANS, but the joint fleet of the ATHENIANS commanded by THEMISTOCLES, and of the LACEDEMONIANS by EURYBIADES, totally defeated the PERSIANS. XERXES was diſpirited at the loſs of this naval battle, and returned into ASIA, leaving MARDONIUS behind him with 300,000 men. The following year this army was entirely defeated near PLATEÆ †, and the PERSIAN general killed in the field of battle. The ſame day the GREEKS obtained another victory over the PERSIAN fleet.

XERXES now diſguſted at foreign wars and averſe to buſineſs, abandoned himſelf to his pleaſures, and was murdered while ſleeping in his bed.

ARTAXERXES, *A. M.* 3500.

ARTAXERXES the ſon of XERXES aſcended the throne. In the beginning of this reign CIMON the ſon of MILTIADES, and general of the ATHENIANS, took ſeveral cities in THRACE, recovered and reſtored to their liberties moſt of the GRECIAN cities in the LESSER ASIA, obtained a ſignal victory over the PERSIAN fleet, defeated an army of 30,000 PERSIANS, and carried the plunder of it, which was extremely valuable, in triumph to ATHENS.

ARTAXERXES in order to make head againſt CIMON, made THEMISTOCLES, who had been baniſhed by the ATHENIANS, general of his armies on that ſide; but THEMISTOCLES choſe rather to die by a doſe of poiſon than fight againſt his country.

About this time the EGYPTIANS revolted, and choſe INARUS the prince of LIBYA their king; the ATHENIANS entered into an alliance with him againſt the PERSIANS, and ſent to his aſſiſtance a fleet of 200 ſail, which in conjunction with the EGYPTIAN navy ruined that of PERSIA. At land they defeated an army of 300,000 PERSIANS; but the next

† A city of BOEOTIA, [illegible] the defeat of XERXES's army.

next year ARTAXERXES gained a decisive victory over the confederates, reduced the whole kingdom of EGYPT, made INARUS prisoner, and put him to death. This being contrary to the articles of capitulation made with the PERSIAN general MEGABYSUS, he retired to his government in SYRIA, raised a rebellion there, and defeated the forces that were sent against him, so that ARTAXERXES found it necessary to come to an agreement with him.

This was that ARTAXERXES, who by an express decree permitted the JEWS to rebuild the walls of JERUSALEM; and the seventy weeks mentioned by the prophet DANIEL, after which the Messiah was to appear upon the earth, are said to commence from the date of this decree.

CIMON afterwards defeated the PERSIANS both by sea and land, compelled them to accept of peace on these terms, that the GRECIAN cities in ASIA should enjoy their liberties, be governed by their own laws, and that the PERSIAN fleet should not enter the GRECIAN seas. ARTAXERXES died in the forty-fourth year of his reign, and was succeeded by his only lawful son XERXES II.

XERXES II. *A. M.* 3544.

ARTAXERXES having had several sons by his concubines, particularly SOGDIANUS, OCHUS, and ARSITES, the first entered into a conspiracy with one of the chief eunuchs, and murdered XERXES II. in his chamber, where he had fallen asleep, after a drunken debauch, forty-five days after his accession.

SOGDIANUS.

SOGDIANUS then usurped the throne, on which his brother OCHUS raised an army under pretence of revenging his brother XERXES's death; great numbers of the nobility followed his banners; OCHUS was proclaimed king, and SOGDIANUS being abandoned, surrendered himself to his brother, who put him to a cruel death, after having enjoyed the title of king little more than six months.

OCHUS, called DARIUS NOTHUS, *A. M.* 3544.

OCHUS aſcended the throne, and changed his name to DARIUS. ARSITES, another of his brothers, diſputing the crown with him, obtained two victories over him; but the GREEKS in his pay being corrupted, ARSITES was forced to ſubmit, and ſurrendering himſelf was put to death, as was PISUTHNES governor of LYDIA, who afterwards endeavoured to make himſelf king of that province. Several others ſuffered the ſame puniſhment, particularly one of his eunuchs, who had the ambition to aſpire to the throne.

In this reign the EGYPTIANS revolted and choſe a king of their own, but DARIUS at length reduced EGYPT as well as MEDIA, which had alſo endeavoured to ſhake off the yoke of PERSIA. DARIUS died after a troubleſome reign of 19 years, and left the crown to ARSACES his eldeſt ſon. To his younger ſon CYRUS he gave the LESSER ASIA, of which he had before been viceroy.

ARTAXERXES II, *A. M.* 3563.

ARSACES, on aſcending the throne, took the name of ARTAXERXES, and from his extraordinary memory was by the GREEKS called MNEMON *. Under this prince happened the famous retreat of XENOPHON thro' moſt of the provinces of the empire, with only ten thouſand GREEKS. He reigned thirty-ſix years, and was ninety-four years old when he died, being worn out with the diſtractions of his family, and the frequent revolts of his ſubjects in the latter part of his reign.

OCHUS, *A. M.* 3599.

OCHUS, ſon of ARTAXERXES, concealed his father's death, and adminiſtered the government in his name near ten months; during which time he made a decree in the name of his father, for declaring himſelf king. When he found he was ſufficiently eſtabliſhed, he took upon him the

* [illegible]

the government in his own name. He was very cruel, but a valiant prince: he recovered EGYPT, ſubdued SYRIA and CYPRUS, and was at laſt ſlain by BAGOAS, one of the eunuchs of his chamber, who had the principal ſhare in the adminiſtration the latter end of his reign.

ARSES, *A. M.* 3625.

The power of the eunuch BAGOAS was ſo great, that he placed his late maſter's ſon ARSES on the throne; and four years after, finding that prince diſpoſed to call him to an account, he cauſed him and his whole family to be aſſaſſinated, and advanced DARIUS, ſurnamed CODOMANUS, to the throne.

DARIUS III, ſurnamed CODOMANUS, *A. M.* 3629.

DARIUS, governor of ARMENIA, and couſin-german to OCHUS, was made ſole monarch of PERSIA. BAGOAS ſtill expecting to have the entire adminiſtration of the government in DARIUS's reign, as he had in the reigns of ſeveral of his predeceſſors, finding this prince reſolved to take the power into his hands, prepared a doſe of poiſon for him, who being acquainted of the deſign, compelled him to drink it himſelf.

DARIUS had a beautiful perſon, was an accompliſhed prince, and the delight of his ſubjects. He had the proſpect of enjoying a happy reign, when the GRECIANS being all united, determined to revenge themſelves on the PERSIANS for the ravages they had ſuffered from them. They choſe PHILIP king of MACEDON their generaliſſimo in the intended war; but he being murdered before every thing was ready, he was ſucceeded by his ſon ALEXANDER then 20 years of age.

ALEXANDER the GREAT, *A. M.* 3631.

This prince having ſettled his affairs in GREECE, marched into ASIA with 30,000 foot, and 5000 horſe; with this force he paſſed the GRANICUS[b], though it was defended by 100,000 PERSIANS, and auxiliary

[b] A river in NATOLIA.

GREEKS; and having gained the oppoſite ſhore, he ſoon obtained a complete victory. After which SARDIS, EPHESUS, and many other cities opened their gates to the conqueror, and MITHRIDATES king of PONTUS, with ſeveral other princes of ASIA, ſubmitted to him, and joined him with their forces; his army daily increaſed as he advanced, ſo that the PERSIAN empire was not conquered by the 35000 GREEKS only.

ALEXANDER the next campaign poſſeſſed himſelf of an advantageous paſs in CILICIA; poſting his troops, ſo as to prevent his being ſurrounded by the numerous hoſt of the PERSIANS. DARIUS put himſelf at the head of a formidable army and marched to meet the MACEDONIANS: he had 20,000 GRECIAN forces in his ſervice; but his PERSIAN horſe having no room to act, he was defeated; and an incredible ſlaughter enſued. The PERSIAN camp was taken, and among the reſt of the priſoners were the mother, the wife, and ſome of the children of DARIUS.

From the death of CYRUS the GREAT, to the invaſion of PERSIA by ALEXANDER the GREAT, are about 209 years. During this period, the PERSIANS confiding in their numbers, and neglecting the arts of war, became the more eaſy conqueſt of the GRECIANS, by whom this formidable monarchy was ſubverted.

CHAP. II.

The GRECIAN *empire over the* PERSIANS. *The* ROMAN *conqueſt. The re-eſtabliſhment of* PERSIA *by* ARTAXERXES. *The* TURKISH *government in* PERSIA, *to the re-eſtabliſhment of that kingdom in the line of the* SEFFIES.

GRECIAN EMPIRE, *A. M.* 3635.

PERSIA now became a part of the GRECIAN empire, which was too formidable and extenſive to laſt long under one head.

ALEXANDER died, *A. M.* 3643, eight years after his conqueſt, and this and others of his vaſt acquiſitions were divided among the partners of his victories.

SYRIA formerly part of the PERSIAN monarchy, continued in the family of SELEUCUS the ſon of ANTIOCHUS, one of ALEXANDER's captains, about 250 years.

ROMAN CONQUEST, *A.M.* 3913.

From the conqueſt of ALEXANDER to that of the ROMANS, are computed 270 years.

Out of PERSIA aroſe the kingdom of PARTHIA, which included the ſouthern provinces of PERSIA, and the city now called ISFAHAN was the metropolis of that kingdom, ſituated in the heart of the preſent PERSIA. This kingdom ſubſiſted 470 years, which leaves the æra of the world, and comes 221 years into that more glorious of the birth of the Saviour of the world, when ARTAXERXES the firſt king of his race revived the kingdom of PERSIA, which included PARTHIA.

ARTAXERXES, *A.D.* 228.

The kingdom of PERSIA thus reſtored by ARTAXERXES ſubſiſted upwards of 400 years, when it was conquered by the SARACENS, and became a part of the SARACEN empire.

SARACEN EMPIRE, *A.D.* 628[i].

The ARABIANS under the SARACEN empire, the TURKS, TARTARS, and ARMENIANS, alternately poſſeſſed or divided PERSIA for 769 years, but this period ſeems to be left in great obſcurity.

TAMERLANE, *A.D.* 1397.

TAMERLANE chief of the OUSBEG TARTARS conquered BAJAZET, and ſubduing PERSIA prepared the way for another race. TAMERLANE died in 1402, leaving a ſucceſſion of kings till 1499, when the firſt of the SEFFIES or prophets began to reign.

The

[i] Six years after MAHOMMED, 622 of CHRIST, the firſt of MAHOMMED. The MAHOMMEDAN æra is reckoned by lunar years.

The SEFFIES, *A. D.* 1499[l].

This family cannot be ſaid to have exiſted longer than 227 years, when MAHOMMED chief of KANDAHAR invaded PERSIA, *A. D.* 1722. As the line of the SEFFIES includes the unfortunate reign of SHAH SULTAN HUSSEIN, we ſhall give the out lines of their reſpective characters according to the beſt accounts.

ISMAEL, *A. D.* 1499.

SCHEICH EIDAR a deſcendant of ALI, who had diſtinguiſhed himſelf for his piety and contempt of worldly glory; ſeparating from the TURKISH doctors, ſet up a new religion. He was murdered by RUSTAN, and left behind him three ſons; the two eldeſt fled to avoid their father's fate, and ISMAEL the youngeſt, who was then a child, was ſnatched from the danger by his father's friends, and ſecretly educated in the province of GHILAN, in the principles of the ſect of SCHEICH EIDAR; and as he grew up, he diſcovered a great zeal to ſupport them. He was handſome, eloquent and courageous.

Thoſe who by perſecution, had been obliged to abandon the religious tenets of his father, flocked to him. By their aſſiſtance he took ſeveral places, and led his forces to TAVRIS, where the gates being opened to him, he entered in triumph. ALVANTE the king, who had rendered himſelf odious to the people, flying at his approach, he became maſter of the city without drawing his ſword.

ALVANTE and his brother, who had been at variance, and engaged in a civil war, were now reconciled; while they were marching to join their forces, ISMAEL purſued the fugitive ALVANTE, and defeated him in a battle, in which he was killed. He afterwards obtained two victories over the brother of ALVANTE.

ISMAEL having poſſeſſion of the throne, marched againſt the IBERIANS[m], the ALBANIANS[n], and the TARTARS, and obliged them to pay tribute

[l] Some accounts make this 1508. [m] Now called the GEORGIANS. [n] ALBANIA is now called SHIRVAN.

tribute to PERSIA, which for ſome years they had refuſed. He then gained a ſignal victory over the king of SAMARCAND, and afterwards engaged in a war with the ſultan of EGYPT and the grand ſignior.

ISMAEL was reputed one of the greateſt kings that ever ruled in the eaſt. The PERSIANS were prepoſſeſſed with ſuch an high eſteem for him, that they conſidered him as a man altogether divine; therefore when they fought under his command, they braved dangers, and even death with the greateſt intrepedity. He died at 45 years of age, and left four ſons, of whom TÆHMAS the eldeſt, of 18 years old, ſucceeded to his throne.

TÆHMAS, *A.D.* 1525.

TÆHMAS had three brothers, each of whom had an appanage ſettled on them by ISMAEL their father, but of theſe only one died a natural death, one being killed for a revolt, and the other for fear he ſhould revolt.

TÆHMAS, tho' he had neither the capacity nor the intrepidity of his father, was a very able ſoldier; but ſo avaricious, that he committed very atrocious acts of injuſtice, for the ſake of the moſt trifling profit; and ſo averſe to buſineſs, that he abandoned the government entirely to his miniſters, and devoting himſelf to eaſe and pleaſure, ſhut himſelf up in his harram for many years, without going abroad. After having reigned nine years, without being engaged in any conſiderable war, he had the mortification to ſee his kingdom invaded by the TURKS, in which expedition, SULIMAN the TURKISH emperor made himſelf maſter of TAVRIS, took BABYLON, and cauſed himſelf to be crowned king of PERSIA. After this conqueſt, all the cities of ASSYRIA opened their gates to SULIMAN, who had alſo reduced COURDISTAN and DIARBECKIR. But TÆHMAS at length having laid waſte the country, the enemy's army was almoſt ſtarved, and obliged to leave PERSIA. He gave the command of his troops to an experienced general, and purſued the TURKS, who being ſurprized in the diſorder of a retreat, the PERSIANS gained a complete victory. PERSIA now enjoyed peace for fourteen years, when

SULIMAN, *A. D.* 1548, took the field with 200,000 men. TÆHMAS with 100,000 men and 10,000 PORTUGUESE, who at that time were very powerful in ASIA, engaged them the following year, and gained a complete victory, 130,000 TURKS being killed in the field of battle.

After this loſs SULIMAN concluded a peace with TÆHMAS, and affairs remained in that ſtate during 28 years, when the PERSIAN monarch died aged about 68. At his death he nominated his third ſon for his ſucceſſor, but the grandees, not approving his choice, offered the crown to KHODA-BENDE the eldeſt ſon; and he refuſing it, they gave it to ISMAEL the ſecond ſon of TÆHMAS.

ISMAEL II. *A. D.* 1575.

This prince was then 43 years of age, and was priſoner at the ſame time when his eldeſt brother KHODA-BENDE refuſed to accept the diadem. He delighted in war, and had been ſeveral years confined for the fault of raiſing troops and oppoſing the enterprizes of the TURKS, who contrary to the truces concluded with them, made frequent incurſions into PERSIA. TÆHMAS though he ſhut up his ſon ISMAEL in priſon, endeavoured to make his life as eaſy as poſſible, by ſending the moſt beautiful women to him; but ISMAEL refuſed their embraces, declaring that for himſelf he was eaſy under his impriſonment; but could not tell whether he ſhould have the fortitude to bear with the confinement, ſhould he have children, and that he had rather have none, than ſee them miſerable.

ISMAEL began his reign by putting to death that brother, to whom his father had left the crown. And being deſirous to diſcover which of the grandees had adviſed his father to keep him ſo long a priſoner, cauſed a report to be made that he was dead, when learning by his ſpies what had been ſaid of him, he appeared again; ſome of his domeſtic enemies he ordered to be ſeized, others who fled with the forces under them to the extremities of the kingdom, he purſued. The TURKS alarmed at his motions, took the field, and made incurſions into his dominions. ISMAEL being enraged at his diſappointments, put thoſe to death whom he

he moſt ſuſpected, and prepared for a war with his foreign enemies; but while theſe preparations were going forwards he was poiſoned, and died after a reign of two years.

MAHOMMED KHODA-BENDE, *A.D.* 1577.

This prince, who reſided in the province of KHORASAN, and had refuſed to accept the crown, after many ſolicitations, yielded, and was proclaimed king. Very different characters are given of him: ſome writers aſſerting that his deſire was to imitate thoſe kings who had the intereſt and honour of their country moſt at heart; and others, that his whole delight was to ſhut himſelf up in his harram, and ſpend his time with his women. But the latter account in all probability is falſe: it is true he had weak eyes, occaſioned either by a defect in nature, or by a fit of ſickneſs; and this alone probably made him ſhut himſelf up in his palace; but the tranſactions of this reign give no indications of the kingdom being governed by a very weak and effeminate prince.

Three of his brothers, who on his aſcending the throne fled to the TURKISH frontiers, he allured to court, with fair promiſes, and then put them to death. He obtained ſeveral very ſignal victories over the TURKS, who alſo took ſome towns from him, but not without the loſs of many of their forces.

He reigned eight years, and left three ſons; the two firſt reigned only a few months, but the third, ABAS the GREAT, governed PERSIA for many years.

EMIR HEMSE, firſt ſon of MAHOMMED KHODA-BENDE, in 1585.

This being KHODA-BENDE's eldeſt ſon, he ſucceeded his father, but ISMAEL his younger brother, cauſed him to be murdered in his chamber by aſſaſſins, who deceived the guards under the diſguiſe of women.

ISMAEL III, ſecond ſon of MAHOMMED KHODA-BENDE, in 1585.

ISMAEL the IIId no ſooner got poſſeſſion of the throne by the murder of his elder brother, than he thought to ſecure the poſſeſſion of it by diſpatching ABAS the youngeſt; but being prevented by his governor, meaſures were taken to remove ISMAEL. This buſineſs was entruſted to his barber, who while he was ſhaving him cut his throat. The lords then preſent, who were accomplices in the crime, inſtantly killed the barber, to preſent a diſcovery. The fratricide ISMAEL died the ſame year as his brother, and ABAS took poſſeſſion of the crown.

ABAS the GREAT, *A. D.* 1585.

This prince is generally eſteemed one of the greateſt kings that ever reigned in PERSIA; his memory is to this day held in the higheſt veneration; and ſeveral noble works of antiquity yet remain, ſome of which I have mentioned, as the cauſe-way on the coaſt of the CASPIAN. He was but eighteen years old when he began his reign, and had all the qualifications of a great prince, except one: for his inhumanity tarniſhed the glory of his good qualities. MURCHED-ḲOULI-KHAN, who in his youth had been his governor, and to whom he owed the crown, pretending to controul him, he cauſed him to be killed in his preſence, and the next day, all the friends and relations of this man, to whom he was under ſuch high obligations, ſuffered the ſame fate.

The TURKS, ſince the time of ISMAEL II, had conquered above 150 leagues in length from north to ſouth, and in breadth from the weſtern coaſt of the CASPIAN to the BLACK SEA; alſo BABYLON, with MESOPOTAMIA and ASSYRIA. ABAS ſoon recovered the PERSIAN dominions; made great conqueſts in TURKEY, and recovered ORMUS from the PORTUGUESE. He gave a martial ſpirit to the people; poliſh'd their manners; and applying himſelf to civil government, brought the governors of the provinces, who were before in a great meaſure independent, into ſubjection.

But

But in the midſt of his glory, his reign was rendered unhappy by an unjuſt ſuſpicion of his children. He had but three, of whom he cauſed the eyes of the two youngeſt to be put out. His eldeſt SEFFIE-MYRZA, whom he had reſerved for the crown, was a young man of great virtue, and filial affection: he even diſcovered to his father a conſpiracy which had been formed againſt him: but notwithſtanding this, giving way to his ſuſpicions, the SHAH ordered him to be put to death. SEFFIE-MYRZA was no ſooner murdered by his command, than he repented, ſhut himſelf up in the dark for ten days together, ſhed inceſſant tears, faſted and mourned for a year, and never after wore any ornament.

To revenge himſelf on the PERSIAN lords who had made him jealous of his ſon, he ordered them to be invited to a feaſt, and mixing poiſon with their wine, ſaw them with a ſavage pleaſure expire before his face. And the officer who had readily obeyed his commands, to bring him the head of his ſon, he commanded to cut off the head of his own ſon: when he brought it in his hand, and told the king that the reflection of what he had done would bring him to his grave; ABAS replied, that he was now capable of judging of his grief, and bid him comfort himſelf with the thought, that in this particular he was not inferior to his ſovereign. ABAS the GREAT died at ſixty-three years of age, and the forty-fifth of his reign, and nominated his grandſon for his ſucceſſor, ordering him to take the name of SEFFIE, which was that of his injured father, whoſe death ABAS ſo much regreted.

SEFFIE, *A. D.* 1629.

It is ſaid of this prince that he came into the world with his hands bloody, and that his grandfather ABAS the GREAT, had from thence predicted that he would live to bathe his hands in the blood of his ſubjects. This prediction was but too plainly verified: for he began his reign by ordering the eyes of his only brother to be cut out; and caſt from a rock his two uncles, who had been blinded by order of SHAH ABAS. The inſtances of his cruelty were innumerable: he buried alive forty-four women of his harram, tho' when he was not hunting or over his cups

he uſed to paſs his time with them. He interfered ſo little in the affairs of the government, that the PERSIANS would have ſcarcely perceived they had a king, had it not been for the frequent inſtances of barbarity which ſtained his reign with blood.

Before the time of SHAH ABAS, the children of the PERSIAN kings appeared abroad, and had governments allotted them on their coming of age; but after the death of SEFFIE MYRZA, ABAS entirely altered that method, and SEFFIE his grandſon was educated in the harram, which afterwards became a rule for the education of the kings ſons. SEFFIE being ſhut up in the harram, where he had enjoyed no converſation, except that of the eunuchs, was taught nothing more than to read and write, and was allowed no other diverſion, than ſhooting with a bow, and riding in the gardens on an aſs: it is therefore no wonder that he was ſo unfit to govern. This prince by his own folly loſt KANDAHAR and BABYLON, two of the moſt import places on his frontiers.

He had ordered a eunuch to run an iron over the eyes of his ſon ABAS; the purport of this commiſſion was well underſtood, but the eunuch having compaſſion on the prince, and recollecting that the king had no other heir to the throne, he made uſe of a cold iron; and the prince acted the blind man ſo well, that the king really believed he had loſt his ſight. When SEFFIE ſaw death approaching, and imagined that by depriving his ſon of ſight, he had deprived himſelf of an heir to the crown, he was extremely afflicted, and expreſſed with what ſatisfaction he ſhould expire if he had a ſon to ſucceed him. The eunuch aſſured him that he had a ſecret to reſtore ſight to the prince. Tranſported with this expectation, the king ſent one of the grandees with the eunuch to bring the prince to him, when finding that he could ſee, his joy, it is ſaid, prolonged his life till the next year. He reigned 12 years.

ABAS II, *A.D.* 1642.

This prince was but thirteen years of age when he began his reign. He was of a diſpoſition the reverſe of that of his father, for notwithſtanding his being too much addicted to wine, and committing ſome

A MAP of PERSIA,
with the Eastern Frontier,
and the Greatest Part of
TURKEY in ASIA,
As taken from the Map of Mons. de l'Isle
Also the Moghol's Empire, as
Taken from Mr. Frasier's with the
Addition of part of TARTARY.
From the MAPS in Vol. I. page 14
Degrees East Longitude from London
THE BLACK SEA
NATOLIA
ARMENIA MINOR
SYRIA
ARABIA DESERTA
INDEPENDENT TARTARY
ARAL TARTARS
OUSBEG TARTARS
KHORASAN
SEGESTAN
KANDAHAR
CABUL
HAZARIJAT
MULTAN
BUCKOR
MOGHOL'S EMPIRE
TIBET
AUDIH
SIRA
CASHMIR
NAGROWT
DEHLI
JAMBA
BACAR
VARAL
TATTA
JESSELMERE
AGRA
SORET
MALVA
CHITOR
GUZURAT
KHANDRISH
BERAR
BALAGATE
BUGLANA
DECAN
TALLINGAN
GOLCONDA
BAY OF BENGAL
K. of VIJAPORE
K. of CARNATA
K. of GINGI
K. of MADURA
MAMALA ISLANDS
CEYLON
PERSIAN SEA
Tropic of Cancer
THE EASTERN OCEAN
ARABIA
COUNTRY of THUMMUD
SHERIF of MECCA
JEMAMA
BAHARIA
K. of MASCATA
COUNTRY of MAHRE
GADTER
SEGER
K. of CARESEN
HADRAMUT
CHAULAN
ABASSINIA
Hours and Minutes of Time East from London

acts of cruelty, he was one of the beſt kings of the SEFFIES. He loved juſtice, and had no mercy on the public officers who abuſed his authority, and oppreſſed his ſubjects. He was kind to ſtrangers, and openly protected the chriſtians, declaring that he thought GOD alone was judge and maſter of the conſcience; that as for himſelf he was only the governor of externals; and all his ſubjects of what religion ſoever, being equally members of the ſtate, he owed equal juſtice to them all.

His troops were numerous: he recovered KANDAHAR which had been loſt in his father's reign: and found the ſecret of acquiring a good treaſury without oppreſſing his people. He reigned 24 years, and after languiſhing four months under the venereal diſeaſe, he died, leaving behind him two ſons, of whom the eldeſt SEFFIE MYRZA ſucceeded to the throne.

SEFFIE named SULIMAN, *A.D.* 1666.

SEFFIE was remarkable for his great ſtrength: but he had not been ſeated on the throne above two years, when his health being much impaired by drunkenneſs and women, his phyſicians were at a loſs what remedies to apply in order to reſtore it; and therefore laying the blame on the ſtars, pretended that the aſtrologers had not choſen a happy day for his coronation. This ridiculous opinion had its weight; the king was crowned a ſecond time, and took the name of SULIMAN.

Under this prince, PERSIA began to decline to that low ſtate in which ſhe now languiſhes. His reign was remarkable for nothing but a ſlaviſh indolence, a ſavage and inhuman cruelty. When he was intoxicated either by wine or anger, he often times ordered the hands, feet, ears and noſe of thoſe near him to be cut off, their eyes to be plucked out, or their lives to be ſacrificed, as if it was his paſtime. In this reign was born NADIR KOULI the great uſurper of PERSIA. SEFFIE reigned 28 years, leaving two ſons, of whom HUSSEIN ſucceeded to the throne, *A.D.* 1694.

Having thus given a chronological liſt of the PERSIAN kings, we proceed now to a more particular account of the reign of the unhappy prince ſultan HUSSEIN, as preparatory to the hiſtory of NADIR.

PART

PART II.

THE REVOLUTIONS OF PERSIA,

FROM THE

BEGINNING OF THE PRESENT CENTURY

TO THE

DEATH OF MIR-VAIS

IN THE YEAR 1715.

CHAP. III.

Origin of the different tribes of the AFGHANS, *with a general view of the revolutions of their country from the year* 1100 *to* 1701.

PERSIA never enjoyed a more perfect tranquillity, than in the beginning of the preſent century. The treaties ſhe had concluded with her neighbours were perfectly obſerved, and ſecured her againſt any foreign invaſions: whilſt the effeminacy and luxury of her inhabitants, the ordinary conſequences of a long peace, left no room to apprehend any danger from the ambition of her own ſubjects. This monarchy, which had ſuffered ſo many revolutions in paſt ages, ſeemed to be ſettled on a ſolid foundation, when the news of its ſubverſion ſurprized the whole world.

The authors of this amazing cataſtrophe, were a people, hardly known even to their own ſovereigns, and have now acquired a reputation only by the fame of thoſe nations which they brought under their ſubjection. Theſe people, who are comprized under the general denomination of

AFGHANS, are divided into three principal tribes, who like moſt oriental nations, derive their genealogy from NOAH. According to their relations, " JAPHET had three ſons, ARMEN, AFGHAN, and CARDVEL; " the former two continued in ARMENIA, which takes its name from " the eldeſt; as CARDVEL, which forms a part of GEORGIA, is ſo called " from the youngeſt, who ſettled in that province. The families of " ARMEN and AFGHAN having greatly multiplied in proceſs of time, the " deſcendants of the latter quitted their country, and went to inhabit " the foot of SULIMAN COUH [o], a chain of mountains, which ſeparates " the province of KANDAHAR from the MOGHOL's empire."

This nation was formerly divided into two principal tribes; one of which lived on the mountains under the general name of AFGHAN; and the other extended itſelf on the plains, and was diſtinguiſhed by the name of BALOUCHE: but in the reign of ISMAEL SAMANI, *viz.* towards the end of the ninth century, a numerous colony of AFGHANS having quitted the country of KANDAHAR, a third tribe was formed in HASARAI, the eaſtern part of HERAT. The latter took the name of ABDOLLEES, and ſoon after embraced the MAHOMMEDAN religion, which they communicated to the reſt of their nation, who, like themſelves, had till that time profeſſed the MAGIAN religion [p].

In the beginning of the eleventh century, the tribe of CLIGI [q], the moſt numerous and powerful of the three, was almoſt intirely deſtroyed by the celebrated MAHOMMED, founder of the dynaſty of the GAZNAVIDS *. This prince had eſtabliſhed the ſeat of his empire at GHOZNAVI [r], in order to be nearer the INDIES, which he intended to conquer. But having been obliged, in one of his ſucceſsful campaigns, to return ſuddenly to his capital, he took only a ſmall body of troops with him, and ordered the reſt to follow by ſlow marches. His army was returning in ſeparate

[o] The mountain of SOLOMAN: this is the CAUCASUS mentioned in the conqueſts of ALEXANDER. But the great mountain which runs from ARMENIA into INDIA, properly takes the name of CAUCASUS on the weſtern coaſt of the CASPIAN; as that part of it which is on the ſouthern coaſt, and runs eaſtward, goes under the name of TAURUS. [p] Worſhippers of fire. [q] A diviſion of the tribe of AFGHANS, who inhabited the mountain SULIMAN-COUH. * They derived their name from GAZNA a city in KHORASAN, and paid homage to the khalifs of BABYLON. [r] A city in KANDAHAR.

ſeparate detachments, loaded with the ſpoils of the nations they had ſubdued, when the temptation of booty raiſed him new enemies. The CLIGIS knowing that his troops muſt paſs thro' their mountains, waited for them in the defiles, and ſucceſſively defeated ſeveral different bodies of MAHOMMED's army.

Theſe AFGHANS were however no ſtrangers to the valour and power of the prince whom they had thus offended; but as the winter was near, they concluded that he would not attempt to revenge himſelf till towards the ſpring; when they determined to retire into that part of their mountains which was leaſt acceſſible: and if their enemy could reach them there, they ſhould at leaſt be able to oppoſe him the better. This reaſoning was plauſible enough; but MAHOMMED eluded the difficulty: for he no ſooner received the news of the defeat of his army, than he aſſembled the beſt of his tro s, and notwithſtanding the rigour of the ſeaſon, he entered the country of KANDAHAR with ſuch expedition, that the news of his march had not reached the enemy. The CLIGIS having been compelled by the ſeverity of the winter, their mountains being extremely cold, deſcended into the plains, where they divided their plunder. MAHOMMED attacked them briſkly on every ſide, and made ſo terrible a ſlaughter, that their whole race was nearly extirpated.

The country was at length re-peopled by a ſmall number of families, who had made their eſcape into the mountains, but it was ſo thinly inhabited for ſome ages, that ſcarce any mention was made of theſe people under the following dynaſty, and it was not till the reign of TEMUR-BEG[a], that they appeared as numerous and formidable as they had been before their memorable defeat.

The ABDOLLEES having quitted the country of KANDAHAR 200 years before, were not involved in the ſame calamity. Being free from any foreign yoke, they were yet governed by their own laws, till towards the beginning of the ſeventeenth century. The OUSEEG TARTARS having then made an irruption into the province of HERAT, this tribe, tho' amounting to 30,000 families, was obliged to have recourſe to ABAS, who

[a] TAMERLANE.

who then ſat on the throne of PERSIA. This prince, who by his conqueſts had already merited the ſurname of GREAT, took them under his protection, and putting himſelf at the head of his troops, marched againſt the uſurpers, and obliged them in a very ſhort time to retire. Whether it was owing to gratitude, or to neceſſity, the ABDOLLEES, who had been till then independent, made themſelves tributary to their deliverer. The only condition they inſiſted on was, that the government of their country ſhould be conferred on none but an ABDOLLEE choſen from among the chief men of the nation.

KANDAHAR was at that time under the protection of the MOGHOL. ABAS the GREAT having given ſome umbrage to the ſons of MYRZA-BOYRAM, governor of the province, theſe young lords entered into a ſecret treaty with AKBAR emperor of HINDOSTAND[t], and ſubmitting to his government, opened their gates to a body of 5000 horſe, which this monarch ſent to their aſſiſtance.

AKBAR kept poſſeſſion of this province during his life; but upon the ſucceſſion of his ſon GEANGHIR[u], SHAH ABAS returned thither with an army of 30,000 men, and notwithſtanding the vigorous reſiſtance of ASSOF KHAN, he made himſelf maſter of the capital, the government of which he committed to one of his generals. The CLIGIS followed the fate of their country, and the ABDOLLEES having ſubmitted, the whole nation[w] was united once more under the dominion of PERSIA. In this ſituation things continued for many years; till ALI-MERDAN-KHAN having by his immenſe riches excited the jealouſy and avarice of the cruel SHAH SEFFIE, grandſon and ſucceſſor of ABAS the GREAT, was obliged, for his own preſervation, to deliver up the fortreſs and country to the MOGHOL. SHAH SEFFIE, it is preſumed, recovered and again loſt this kingdom: Be that as it may, it fell once more into the hands of the INDIANS, at which time the CLIGIS were not leſs than 50,000 families, and formed the

[t] The proper name of the MOGHOL empire; from the word HINDOS, which ſignifies a ſwarthy people. [u] This word ſignifies the conqueror of the world. [w] The BALOUCHES having by their long ſeparation loſt the name of AFGHAN, it is preſumed were not included.

the principal part of its inhabitants: but they ſoon had reaſon to be diſſatisfied with their new maſters. Theſe people, according to their ancient cuſtom, lived for the moſt part in tents: their ordinary occupation was feeding their flocks; but ſuch as went into towns, were employed in the moſt menial and laborious offices. Theſe circumſtances, and the tribute which they paid for the right of paſturage, rendered them ſo contemptible, that the name of CLIGI became proverbial of reproach among the INDIANS of KANDAHAR.

Of all offences contempt is the hardeſt to be forgiven. Theſe AFGHANS not finding among people of the ſame religion as themſelves, thoſe ſentiments of humanity which had been ſhewn them by the PERSIANS, whom they conſidered as heretics, reſolved once more to change maſters. With this view they made a ſecret deputation to the court of PERSIA, to invite SHAH ABAS II, to take poſſeſſion of the province.

The ſituation of the province of KANDAHAR, renders it a ſtrong barrier between the empires of PERSIA and INDIA; and its capital [x] paſſes for the moſt conſiderable fortreſs in ASIA. Theſe circumſtances excited the ambition of SHAH ABAS; who immediately raiſed troops on every ſide, and putting himſelf at the head of a great army, after a ſiege of two months, he took poſſeſſion of the city by capitulation in 1650. SHAH JEHAN, who was then emperor of INDIA, endeavouring to recover his loſs, ſent two of his ſons, who ſucceſſively laid ſiege to this town. The firſt time ROUP, one of the RAJAHS [y], planted his ſtandards on the wall; and the ſecond the EUROPEANS, who had the care of the artillery, made a breach that was practicable: but the little vigor ſhewn by the PERSIAN lords in the MOGHOL's pay, on the firſt occaſion, and the jealouſy of AURING ZEBE [z] againſt DARAH SHAH [a] his eldeſt brother, on the ſecond, rendered both theſe expeditions abortive. It is ſaid, that five ſons of kings periſhed in the courſe of this war.

Thus

[x] KAND-DAAR ſignifies the habitation of ſecurity. Some hiſtorians think it is one of the ſeven cities founded by ALEXANDER, and that the name of KANDAR, which is given him by the old PERSIAN hiſtories, is an abridgment of that of ESKANDAR, by which this conqueror is known to the eaſtern nations. [y] A prince and chief of a diſtrict in INDIA. [z] Signifies ornament of the throne. [a] DARA in the PERSIAN language ſignifies ſovereign. The LATINS render this name by that of DARIUS.

Thus by the repeated defeats of the MOGHOL's troops, and the inteſtine troubles which ſoon after broke out in INDIA, the poſſeſſion of the province of KANDAHAR was ſecured to PERSIA. SHAH ABAS being now deſirous of acknowledging the ſervices which the AFGHANS had done him in theſe different expeditions, diſtributed rewards among their chiefs, and reduced the tribute which had been annually paid by thoſe people. They continued faithful to their new maſters till the end of SULIMAN's reign, and even during the firſt years of that of his ſon HUSSEIN, that is, ſo long as they were treated as ſubjects, and not as ſlaves: but the cruelty and avarice of the PERSIAN governors having alienated the peoples minds; in the beginning of the preſent century the AFGHANS were once more ripe for a revolt.

CHAP. IV.

Character of GURGHIN-KHAN *prince of* GEORGIA. *He is made governor of* KANDAHAR, *and oppreſſes that province. Complaints of the inhabitants.* GURGHIN-KHAN *ſends* MIR-VAIS *to court as a ſuſpected perſon. Character of* MIR-VAIS. *Deſcription of the court of* ISFAHAN. *Origin of the diviſions and parties in* PERSIA.

THE indolence and effeminacy of the PERSIAN court was now arrived to a great height, but SHAH HUSSEIN and his miniſters were in ſome degree awakened by the news, that the AFGHANS were diſpoſed to a revolt: whilſt they were thinking how to extinguiſh thoſe ſparks of rebellion, which might ere long blaze into a flame, the court was alarmed by a new circumſtance. The MOGHOL not being able to forget that KANDAHAR formerly conſtituted a part of his dominions, had ſent ambaſſadors to demand the reſtitution of that province, and there was reaſon to fear, leſt the male-contents ſhould favour that monarch in the enterprize, which he ſeemed to meditate.

There was then at ISFAHAN a prince of the family of BAGRATHIONI, which has often given ſovereigns to GEORGIA. GURGHIN-KHAN, for

ſo he was commonly called, having been raiſed to the dignity of VALI [b] of his province, had lately tried to aſſert the independency of his anceſtors. He had even ventured to make a ſtand in TEFLIS [c] againſt the PERSIAN armies; but being abandoned by moſt of the grandees of the country, who were bribed by the court, he ſoon came in perſon to make his ſubmiſſion to the king. Under a prince of leſs lenity, a ſtep of this kind would have proved his deſtruction: but SHAH HUSSEIN, who had ſtood engaged for him at his circumciſion, when he renounced the religion of his anceſtors, being ſtruck with an action that expreſſed ſo much confidence in his goodneſs, not only forgave what was paſt, but loaded him with favours, and confirmed him in all his governments.

The court being diſtreſſed what meaſures to purſue, laid hold of this opportunity to employ a prince, whoſe valour and other military virtues might render him dangerous in any other province. His brother LEVAN-KHAN was ſent in quality of his lieutenant into GEORGIA, and GURGHIN-KHAN, who, beſide the government of this province, had that of KHERMANIA [d], was nominated alſo governor of KANDAHAR; and as ſuch was commiſſioned to pacify the troubles that might ariſe, and to watch over the ſecurity of that frontier. This general ſpared no pains to put his orders in execution: for this purpoſe, he raiſed an army of 20,000 PERSIANS, and having reinforced it with a body of GEORGIANS, he made forced marches towards KANDAHAR, when the very news of his approach diſperſed the rebels.

So ſudden a calm gave him ſome ſuſpicion: he was not ſatisfied with having ſuppreſſed the inſurrection, but applied his thoughts how to root it up. With this view, he made a diligent enquiry after the authors of the paſt troubles, and being induced from the ſeverity of his diſpoſition, to think that theſe people would never be completely ſubjected without oppreſſion, he abandoned them to the diſcretion of his army.

It is hardly credible to what exceſs the violence and cruelty of the troops was carried on this occaſion. The chiefs of tribes, and the ſimple ſhepherds,

[b] VALI, a viceroy deſcended more immediately from the ſovereigns of the country over which he preſides. [c] Capital of PERSIAN GEORGIA, on a branch of the KURA. [d] Generally wrote CARMANIA.

ſhepherds, were equally in danger of their lives. They ſaw their tents and horſes taken from them, without daring to complain. Women were publicly ſnatched from their huſbands, and young virgins found no ſhelter in the arms of their mothers. Such horrid licentiouſneſs increaſing every day, the AFGHANS had private meetings, and ſent a deputation to court, to complain of the tyranny under which they groaned. Thoſe deputies ſet out unknown to GURGHIN-KHAN, and arrived ſafe at ISFAHAN; but this governor's friends having ſoon diſcovered the motive of their journey, prevented all acceſs to the SHAH, in ſuch a manner, that they were obliged to wait for the time when there was no poſſibility of hindering them from having audience.

According to an ancient cuſtom, the kings of PERSIA always appear in public at the vernal equinox, when even the meaneſt of their ſubjects have free acceſs. The AFGHANS embraced this opportunity to preſent their complaints: the petition which they brought with them was ſigned by the chiefs of the ſeveral tribes; it contained a very lively picture of the miſeries they ſuffered, and would undoubtedly have moved SHAH HUSSEIN, who was naturally of a mild diſpoſition, if the friends of GURGHIN-KHAN had not ſtifled thoſe favourable impreſſions, and engaged the prince to diſmiſs thoſe deputies as male-contents, unworthy of the royal clemency.

GURGHIN-KHAN having been informed of what paſſed, was not long before he ſhewed his reſentment. The AFGHANS of KANDAHAR are divided into ſeveral tribes [d], of ten or twelve thouſand families each. MIRVAIS [e], a chief of one of thoſe tribes, was alſo one of the moſt powerful perſons of his nation: his office of CALENTAR [f] added weight to his credit: but his birth, his generoſity, and a certain graceful and popular air, with ſome indications of an ambitious ſpirit, were the cauſe of his being ſuſpected as the author of the paſt diſturbances. The KHAN in order

[d] Which the TARTARS call HORDAS. [e] Sometimes wrote MIR-UVEIS, which ſignifies in ARABIC prince lion-whelp. The title of EMIR, of which MIR is an abbreviation, is conferred alſo on the CHERIFFS, ſucceſſors of MAHOMMED; but every EMIR is not a CHERIFF. There are ſome who are chriſtians, ſuch as thoſe of the DRUSES and the MARONISTS; theſe laſt are ſo named from MARON their head, and inhabited mount LEBANUS. [f] CALENTAR ſignifies the greateſt. This officer is however charged with collecting of taxes, and as already noted, ſometimes acts as a ſub-governor. Vol. I. p. 23.

order to revenge himſelf of his enemies, and at the ſame time by ſome ſignal piece of policy to over-awe the AFGHANS, ordered MIR-VAIS to be ſeized and ſent to ISFAHAN; informing the court at the ſame time, that he was a turbulent man whom they ought by all means to ſecure; that he was the only author of the paſt commotions, and of ſuch a diſpoſition as was likely to foment new troubles, which might hereafter be of dangerous consequence to the monarchy: a remarkable inſtance of ſagacity, which was afterwards juſtified by the event.

GURGHIN-KHAN having thus removed the only perſon, in whom he diſcovered all the qualifications neceſſary for the head of a party, began to be no longer afraid of the enterprizes of the MOGHOL, or of the murmurings of the AFGHANS. He therefore put a garriſon in the capital, and, ſatisfied with keeping his GEORGIANS about his perſon, diſbanded the reſt of his army.

MIR-VAIS, far from being dejected by his diſgrace, thought of drawing ſome advantage from it, by endeavouring to get a thorough knowledge of a court which was made the place of his confinement. The character of SHAH HUSSEIN[g] was too remarkable to eſcape him. This prince was born with that placid diſpoſition, which borders on weakneſs, and conſequently does not deſerve the name of virtue. He had a ſtrong attachment to his religion, and might be denominated an honeſt man, but ſo exceſſively indolent, and immoderately addicted to women and wine, as to be incapable of governing; thus unworthy of being a real, he was only a nominal king. It is eaſy to conceive then that the guardians of his pleaſures were his favourites, and a council compoſed of the principal eunuchs of the ſeraglio, were the depoſitaries of the ſupreme power. This council was eſtabliſhed by SHAH SULIMAN towards the latter end of his reign, who not content with rendering it ſuperior to that of the antient form of adminiſtration, at his death gave it the power, in conjunction with the great officers of the kingdom, of chuſing which of his ſons they

[g] CANTEMIR-HOSPODAR of MOLDAVIA, who fled for ſhelter into the territories of the CZAR, in 1715 drew the following character of SHAH HUSSEIN. "He is forty years old; of an indolent "diſpoſition; intirely abandoned to his pleaſures; terminating all his diſputes with the TURKS, "INDIANS, and his other neighbours, by the interpoſition of his governors, and by

they thought fitteſt to ſucceed him. It was by means of the votes and credit of theſe eunuchs, that HUSSEIN was preferred, on this occaſion, to his brother ABAS-MYRZA[h]: yet far from taking umbrage at the power which had raiſed him to the throne, contrary to the policy of arbitrary kings, thought only of ſtrengthening the authority of that tribunal; whether it was that he followed merely the impulſe of a grateful mind, without attending to any other duty; or finding himſelf incapable of holding the reins of government, he was glad to eaſe himſelf of a burthen, too heavy indeed for a prince of his character.

This ſenate thus inveſted with the ſupreme authority, were conſequently the only diſpoſers of the royal favours and employments. Merit became an empty ſound; all offices and dignities were given to thoſe who paid the higheſt price; money decided every thing; and the immenſe riches which were accumulated by this means, ſeemed rather to whet than to glut the avarice of thoſe baſe miniſters. Every part of the ſtate felt the effects of this diſorder. The troops being diſcouraged by ill diſcipline, and worſe pay, ſerved with reluctance. Robbers infeſted the high-ways, and interrupted commerce. Place-men, impoveriſhed by the purchace of their offices, tyrannized over the people, and were rapacious with impunity; in fine, juſtice was publicly ſold in the very capital of the empire.

SHAH HUSSEIN was perhaps the only perſon in his kingdom, that was ignorant of the diſorder of the government. As he was buried in the pleaſures of the harram[i], the cries of the oppreſſed could not reach his ear. The eunuchs had in a great meaſure brought the feudatory princes of the empire under their ſubjection, by inveſting the younger brothers with the ſovereignty, in prejudice to the elder; and as the grandees of the court were, like the reſt of the nation, divided into two factions, they received no umbrage, but paid an implicit obedience to this tribunal, which triumphed over the public calamity.

In

[h] MYRZA, an abbreviation of EMIR-ZADE, which in PERSIAN ſignifies ſon of the prince. The title of MYRZA put after the proper name, ſignifies a prince of the blood; but put before it, ſignifies writer; and is alſo a proper name, as MYRZA-MAHOMMED. See Vol. I.

[i] Harram, ſignifies prohibited to men. The womens apartment in PERSIA, INDIA and TURKEY,

In order to diſcover the origin of theſe diviſions, we muſt trace matters as high as the reign of SHAH ABAS I[k]. This prince, whoſe great grand-father had uſurped the throne, and who had lately added ſeveral provinces to his dominions, perceived that he could not long depend on the fidelity of his natural-born ſubjects, no more than on the ſeveral nations whom he had brought under ſubjection. He endeavoured therefore to ſet them at variance, that he might ſupport his ſovereignty by being their arbitrator. With this view, he peopled one half of every city and village of his empire with colonies choſen from among the nations moſt oppoſite in manners, cuſtoms, and character to the antient citizens; and that the equality which he had eſtabliſhed between both theſe parties ſhould be for ever preſerved, he forbid them to alienate to each other, under any pretext whatſoever, the lands which they already poſſeſſed, or thoſe which he might aſſign to them. This policy had the effect which SHAH ABAS expected. Jealouſy ſoon gave birth to two oppoſite factions, who not content with diſtinguiſhing themſelves by a particular name[l], and ſome external marks, would neither inter-marry nor have dealings with each other. Their hatred ſhewed itſelf in a very ſingular manner at the feaſt of HUSSEIN and HASSAN[m], for then they were allowed to come to blows, and tho' it was only with ſtones and ſticks, yet thoſe days of feſtivity ſeldom paſſed without coſting the lives of a great many people. Theſe combats were not only tolerated, but authorized by the prince, whoſe power they confirmed, inaſmuch as the animoſity which they fomented, produced a mutual jealouſy between the two parties, which contained them both alike within the limits of obedience.

A policy ſo little founded on the good of ſociety, could not but have ſome dangerous effects. The courtiers inſtead of uſing this artifice as a political engine, at length took a great ſhare in it, and it was eaſy to perceive at the court of ISFAHAN, thoſe ſentiments of averſion which divided the common people: every grandee, either for the glory of protecting,

[k] The beginning of the laſt century. [l] PELEUK and FELEUK. We may ſuppoſe them as mad as thoſe were in 1640, who adopted the tenets of the church of ENGLAND and the church of SCOTLAND. I have already mentioned this in a general way in my 1ſt volume, concerning the PERSIAN religion. [m] The ſons of ALI, whoſe death they commemorate.

tecting, or for the advantage of being properly ſupported, was of one party or the other; and the antipathy which always prevailed betwixt the white and black eunuchs, was, in regard to them, what the ſpirit of faction was to the reſt of the kingdom.

CHAP. V.

The intrigues of MIR-VAIS *at the court of* ISFAHAN. *He goes a pilgrimage to* MECCA: *Different ſects of* MAHOMMEDANS. *He propoſes political doubts to the* MOLLAHS *at* MECCA, *which are reſolved in his favour.*

SUCH was the ſtate of PERSIA, when MIR-VAIS came to court. This man had penetration ſufficient to unravel theſe myſteries, and to make a proper uſe of ſuch conjunctures as were favourable to his intereſt. He made it his firſt buſineſs to get acquainted with the party which oppoſed GURGHIN-KHAN. The ſteward of the king's houſhold, and FATEY-ALI-KHAN [n], grand veneur [o], and afterwards prime miniſter, were at the head of this faction. MIR-VAIS found no difficulty to engage their favour againſt their common enemy: he knew that intereſt is generally a more prevailing motive than hatred to a foe, or even compaſſion for a friend, and made uſe of the greateſt part of the money which the AFGHANS remitted him, to ſecure the protection of thoſe lords. The preſents which he made them on this occaſion, amounted to thirty thouſand tomans [p]. 1707.

The province of KANDAHAR was no longer divided like the reſt of the kingdom by this ſpirit of diſſenſion: the revolutions it had undergone, had inſenſibly extinguiſhed their animoſities. As MIR-VAIS was avowedly neither a PELEUK nor FELEUK; he made a dexterous uſe of this

[n] There was another KHAN of the ſame name, who is diſtinguiſhed in the hiſtory of NADIR SHAH.

[o] MIR-CHEKAR-BACHI. [p] 75,000 *l.* It is ſaid that this ſum was paid by the AFGHANS in thirty thouſand woolen ſaſhes of the manufactures of TERMAI, a city in the territories of the GREAT MOGHOL.

1707. this particular circumſtance: for each willing to believe him of their party, eſpouſed his intereſt. Having taken ſuch wiſe precautions, he was not afraid to demand an audience: accordingly he appeared before the divan, and juſtified his conduct with ſuch addreſs and eloquence, that the king already prejudiced by ſome of his miniſters, thought it juſtice not only to acquit him, but to grant him his favour and protection.

A man of common ambition would have been ſatisfied with this ſucceſs; but to a perſon of MIR-VAIS's ſtamp, it was not ſufficient to juſtify himſelf; he aſpired at the deſtruction of his accuſer. His noble birth, ſupported by a ſplendid fortune, with an artful and inſinuating turn of mind, operated ſo effectually on the miſtaken compaſſion of HUSSEIN, that he had now free acceſs to this monarch: and he availed himſelf of this favour, and of the credit of his cabal, to ſtrike the firſt blow. He always ſpoke of his enemy with reſpect, and a ſeeming ſincerity; but he gave his auditors time to reflect on the valour and power of that general: he artfully inſinuated that the government of GEORGIA, KHERMANIA, and KANDAHAR, with which the ſame perſon was inveſted, rather rendered him a formidable prince, than an opulent lord. He reminded them, on this occaſion, of his preſumption in holding out in TEFFLIS againſt the PERSIAN armies; in fine, taking every occaſion to raiſe the ſame ſuſpicions againſt the governor, as the latter had excited againſt him, the king now began to imagine, that GURGHIN-KHAN had removed him, only to get rid of an inſpector, who by his fidelity and credit, might baffle his projects.

But it was not a ſpirit of revenge only that excited MIR-VAIS to render the KHAN ſuſpected; this dangerous AFGHAN had more extenſive, and more exalted views. The king's effeminacy; the want of experience in his miniſters and generals; the confuſion and irregularity which neceſſarily followed from thence in the adminiſtration; and above all, that ſpirit of diviſion which excited one party continually to oppoſe the projects formed by the other; by means whereof their very beſt concerted enterprizes were fruſtrated: theſe circumſtances, at length, inſpired MIR-VAIS with the hopes of reſcuing his country from the PERSIAN yoke. His knowledge

and experience of the court had given him too mean an opinion of it, 1707.
to be afraid of any difficulty from that quarter, in the execution of his deſign; but he was too well acquainted with the valour and abilities of GURGHIN-KHAN, to neglect any method by which he might remove that general. But the moſt important point was to ſecure in his intereſt the different tribes of KANDAHAR. Tho' his ſuperior genius, his winning deportment, his great generoſity, had united the hearts of the chiefs, as well as of the common people, in his favour; yet he did not think this was enough to determine him to put an abſolute confidence in them, as if they would certainly join with him in an enterprize of this nature. In order therefore to cover his deſign with the ſpecious veil of religion, he took his meaſures to render a revolt legal, and according to the deciſion of the higheſt earthly authority.

It has been already obſerved, that the PERSIANS and the AFGHANS treat each other as heretics. The two ſects of the MAHOMMEDANS are diſtinguiſhed by the names of SUNNI and SCHIAS: as MAHOMMED is reputed both by the PERSIANS and TURKS as the true meſſiah, their difference is about the ſucceſſor of this falſe prophet, and the ſenſe of ſome particular texts in the khoran[q]. The ſect of SUNNI comprehends the TURKS, ſome of the TARTARS, the ſubjects of the MOGHOL, with ſome other nations of leſs note, and among theſe the AFGHANS, who are all followers of OMAR. The ſect of SCHIAS, includes the PERSIANS, and other nations of the ſame way of thinking, ſuch as part of the OUSBEG TARTARS, and ſome princes of the INDIES, who are followers of ALI, and diſtinguiſh their ſect alſo by the name of ADELIAH[r]. The AFGHANS, in ſubmitting to the dominion of the kings of PERSIA, had made it an article of their capitulation, that they ſhould not be moleſted on account of their religion; nor were they ever diſtreſſed upon that ſubject. But MIR-VAIS reſolved to make this difference in religion the baſis of his deſign of taking up arms againſt his ſovereign. With this ſecret view, he begged leave of the king to make a pilgrimage to MECCA, where he intended to conſult the MULLAHS[s]; as he was now no longer ſuſpected, and

[q] See this ſubject in Vol. I. Chap. 51.
[r] ADELIAH properly ſignifies the ſect of the juſt.
[s] MULLAH ſignifies a guide or director, the common name of prieſt.

1707. this pilgrimage removed him the further from KANDAHAR, his petition was granted without any difficulty.

He had not been long at MECCA, before he ſent to MEDINA to deſire the opinion of the chief doctors. The doubts he propoſed to them were: "Whether it is lawful for muſſulmen oppreſſed and cramped in the exer-"ciſe of their religion by heretics, to take up arms, and free themſelves "from the yoke." The other was much to the ſame effect, *viz.* "Whe-"ther thoſe muſſulmen were not releaſed from the oath of allegiance, "which the chief men of each family had been forced to make to a "ſovereign, who was a heretic, when this ſovereign did not obſerve the "conventions which he had ſworn to, but had made them ſlaves to in-"fidels[t]." After which, he expatiated on the ſufferings of the nation from the avarice and violence of the GEORGIANS; obſerving, that ſeveral AFGHANS had already changed their religion, merely to free themſelves from this tyrannical oppreſſion.

The MULLAHS did not heſitate long about their anſwer; for according to the principles of the MAHOMMEDAN religion, the ſword is one of the means enjoined to muſſulmen, in general, for the propagation of their faith. They decided therefore in the affirmative, and MIR-VAIS having ſecretly obtained the FETFA[u], diſpatched in the uſual forms, returned to ISFAHAN. Thus far things ſucceeded to his wiſh, but this holy authority for rebellion could be of no ſervice to him, till he ſhould return to KANDAHAR. Notwithſtanding the eager deſire he had to execute his project, he was too good a politician to apply for leave to go home. On the contrary, he affected an indifference, which entirely preventing thoſe ſuſpicions, which an impatience of returning might have revived, he waited to ſee what time would produce; when a circumſtance aroſe which greatly facilitated his deſigns.

[t] GEBERS. MIR-VAIS by this name marked out the GEORGIANS. This word comes from GHEBR, which in the PERSIC ſignifies an idolater, but more particularly a worſhipper of fire.

[u] FETFA, or rather FETVA, the deciſion of the mufti, when he is conſulted upon any point of law.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

The emperor of RUSSIA *ſends an embaſſador to the court of* ISFAHAN. MIR-VAIS*'s arts to alarm the court on this account. Character of the embaſſador.* MIR-VAIS *raiſes ſuſpicion againſt* GURGHIN-KHAN *governor of* KANDAHAR, *and is ſent back to his own country, under a notion of his fidelity.*

THE governor of SHAMAKIE, at this time, gave intelligence to the court, that there was arrived upon the frontiers an embaſſador from the emperor of RUSSIA, charged with letters from the pope, and likewiſe from the emperor of GERMANY, and attended with a more than ordinary retinue. Advice was brought, at the ſame time, that this embaſſador, who was born in CAPAN a city of ARMENIA, had given out that he was deſcended from the antient kings of that province, and had let drop ſome hints, that he did not renounce the rights which his birth gave him to that ſovereignty. Theſe reports concerning the lineal deſcent of the embaſſador, frivolous as they were, alarmed SHAH HUSSEIN and his miniſters: their puerile fears thus carried their apprehenſions beyond all the bounds of probability, for they concluded, that an ARMENIAN who was born a ſubject of PERSIA, and had preſumed to talk in that manner, did not come ſo well attended, and under the protection of three princes of the ſame religion as himſelf, to act merely as an embaſſador. The alarm was ſoon increaſed by thoſe, who ſuppoſing that ſome parts of the reports were true, thought it their intereſt to magnify the whole. A FRENCHMAN, who had been ſent to the court of ISFAHAN by LEWIS XIV, for the affairs of commerce; and ſome other EUROPEANS who were ſettled in that city, gave into this ridiculous ſtory. They had been informed, that this embaſſador threatened to cauſe all the miſſionaries to be expelled the kingdom, and therefore endeavoured to ſhew that the letters of recommendation from the chriſtian princes, by virtue of which he had met with a favourable reception, were ſuppoſititious pieces; uſing their intereſt at the ſame time to diſſuade the court from receiving the 1708.

1703. the embaſſador: alledging certain predictions preſerved in the archives of the ARMENIANS, which foretold that the kingdom of ARMENIA ſhould be re-eſtabliſhed one day under the protection of RUSSIA. And in order to impoſe on a people naturally credulous with regard to future events, they corroborated theſe predictions with a FRENCH anagram taken from the embaſſador's name, obſerving that in ISRAEL ORII *, were found the letters IL SERA ROI, that is, "he ſhall be king."

The artful inſinuations of MIR-VAIS made a ſtrong impreſſion on the minds of the courtiers. With thoſe of the ſame faction as GURGHIN-KHAN, he laid no great ſtreſs upon theſe circumſtances; but with thoſe of the oppoſite party, "the ſtate," he ſaid, "was in the moſt perillous "ſituation: for there was no reaſon to doubt, but the CZAR, whoſe power "and ambition were well known to all the world, had undertaken to "reſcue from the PERSIAN yoke, a nation who profeſſed the ſame reli-"gion as himſelf. That the embaſſador muſt be a ſecret emiſſary, who "under the ſanction of his character, was come to blow the coals of ſe-"dition even in the heart of the kingdom. Otherwiſe, why ſhould an "ARMENIAN have been choſen? Could thoſe princes have been at a loſs "to find in their vaſt dominions, ſubjects of their own, who were pro-"perly qualified for ſuch a function? And why ſhould this miniſter pre-"tend to be deſcended from the antient kings of ARMENIA, if it was "not to obtain more credit with the credulous part of his country? But "this was the ſmalleſt part of the danger. If the government had no-"thing to apprehend but the attempts of the MUSCOVITES and ARME-"NIANS, the brave inhabitants of GEORGIA, who are ſituate between "them, would be an inſurmountable barrier againſt the one; and as for "the others, it is well known that they are more diſpoſed to commerce "than war; and conſequently will not attempt to ſhake off their ſub-"jection to our invincible ſovereign. But who can undertake to anſwer "for the fidelity of thoſe very GEORGIANS? Is there the leaſt reaſon to "doubt, but they ſubmit with reluctance to a people of a different reli-"gion? Have we forgot the efforts they made ſome years ago, to with-"draw themſelves from their ſubjection, at the inſtigation of GURGHIN-

"KHAN,

* The name of the embaſſador.

" KHAN, who now is governor of three of the fineſt provinces of the kingdom? In fine, are we ignorant, that SANAZARLI-KHAN, this prince's couſin-german, is now at the court of ST. PETERSBURG, from whence perhaps he correſponds with him, while he continually ſollicits the CZAR, to free thoſe unbelievers from their ſubjection to our empire[x]. The RUSSIAN armies, reinforced by the troops of one of thoſe infidel nations, and paid by the other, may at any time without fighting march over the high mountains of ALBURTZ[y], croſs the KURA[z], and pitch their tents on the banks of the ARAS[a]. And when theſe formidable enemies ſhall have penetrated into the heart of the kingdom, are we to preſume that GURGHIN-KHAN, who has already attempted to aſcend the throne of his anceſtors, will ſacrifice his ambition and intereſt to his duty? Or is it to be imagined, that this prince, who is deſcended from the ſovereigns of GEORGIA, and a chriſtian in his heart, will employ the forces quartered in KANDAHAR and KHERMANIA, which he can bring together at a ſingle word, againſt his country, his religion, and the ſubjects of his anceſtors?" 1708.

Theſe arguments were very ſpecious and ſolid, to men who endeavoured to be frightened. In fact, every thing contributed to increaſe the general alarm; while MIR-VAIS was the only perſon at court, who ſaw into the falſity of theſe political viſions. This man had too much ſenſe and penetration, not to perceive immediately, that theſe chimerical ideas had no foundation; having been occaſioned only by ſome indiſcreet ſpeeches of the embaſſador, which ſhewed rather his folly and ſtupidity, than his having any deſign of this nature. For how prodigiouſly abſurd was it to believe, that the emperor PETER the GREAT, ſhould without any neceſſity deliver up the pretender into the king's hands, and that this miniſter, who had ſuch a perſonal intereſt not to be diſcovered, ſhould begin by

[x] This was a plauſible motive of fear. MILITETZKI, prince of GEORGIA, had been in RUSSIA, and his only ſon was general of the artillery to PETER the GREAT. Theſe princes were now dead; but as it was believed that the CZAR had promiſed MILITETZKI to re-inſtate him in his principality, as ſoon as the war with SWEDEN was ended: it was alſo imagined that this monarch ſtill perſiſted (in 1715) in his reſolution of diſpoſſeſſing the uſurper. [y] Mount CAUCASUS. [z] Formerly called CYRUS. [a] Formerly ARAXES.

1708. by a voluntary indiſcretion, the execution of his deſign, the whole ſucceſs of which depended on ſecrecy and circumſpection?

Nothing, indeed, could be worſe founded than this panic. The pretended ſucceſſor of the kings of ARMENIA, was an adventurer, who after having ſucceſſively ſold coffee, and ſerved as a common ſoldier, became a ſubaltern in the ſervice of the emperor LEOPOLD; but as he underſtood the ORIENTAL languages, he was, at length, choſen by the court of VIENNA, to ſound the diſpoſition of the TURKS, in regard to the peace which was afterwards concluded at KARLOWITZ. Upon his return from CONSTANTINOPLE, he paſſed into the ſervice of PETER the GREAT, who in conſideration of the ſame abilities, made him a colonel, and employed him alſo to negotiate a peace with the OTTOMAN port; to prevent his being interrupted by that power, during the war which he intended to declare againſt the king of SWEDEN.

ISRAEL ORII having diſcharged this important commiſſion to the CZAR's ſatisfaction, deſired as a reward for his ſervices, that his majeſty would gratify him with an embaſſy to ISFAHAN. He conſidered that this would be the ſureſt way to enrich himſelf in a little time: miniſters of this character enjoying great privileges in PERSIA, particularly that of not paying any cuſtoms. As ſoon as he had obtained his credentials, he took poſt to VIENNA, and thence to ROME, where he pretended to be capable of bringing the ſchiſmatic ARMENIANS into the pale of the ROMISH church, and having already obtained letters from the emperor, he procured alſo a brief from CLEMENT XI, for SHAH HUSSEIN.

Theſe were the particulars of an event, which gave riſe to ſo many idle ſpeculations. The numerous retinue which attended the embaſſador, conſiſted for the moſt part of ARMENIANS, who were proprietors of the goods he brought with him; except ſome RUSSIANS, who were going to BAKU, and had accompanied him to SHAMAKIE, in order to give the more luſtre to his embaſſy. So that the pretenſions of ſovereignty, and the deſign of turning the miſſionaries out of the kingdom, were idle words which this miniſter let drop on purpoſe, to engage his companions to join with him in the expences of the journey into PERSIA. [o] SHAH

7 HUSSEIN

HUSSEIN being ignorant of theſe circumſtances, was for ſome time dubious how to act: but the fear of giving PETER the GREAT any pretence for a rupture, prevailing over every other conſideration, he came to a reſolution, contrary to the general expectation of the EUROPEANS, to receive the embaſſador. ISRAEL ORII therefore ſet out from SHAMAKIE; and from the prejudice already conceived in his favour, the PERSIANS paid a yet greater regard to him, than is generally ſhewn to perſons of his character; ſo that he had reaſon to be ſatisfied with the honours and diſtinctions which he received during his ſtay at ISFAHAN. 1708.

In the mean time, the artful ſpeeches of MIR-VAIS had produced the effect which he expected. The court, continually terrified with chimeras, the natural conſequence of a diſtemper'd government, began to take umbrage at the exceſſive power of GURGHIN-KHAN; and the enemies of that prince, at the head of whom was the prime miniſter [b], taking advantage of theſe diſpoſitions, found no difficulty in perſuading the timorous SHAH HUSSEIN to join with them in ſuſpicions, which were authorized by the remembrance of what had paſſed ſome years before at TEFLIS. It is probable, that GURGHIN-KHAN would have been recalled, but that they doubted, whether he would not undertake to maintain himſelf there by force; or, after the example of ALI-MERDAN-KHAN, he might not betray the country to the MOGHOL: they reſolved therefore to purſue a leſs dangerous method; this was, to place near his perſon one whom they could confide in, who was capable of watching over his conduct, and at the ſame time able to make head againſt him, if he offered to create any diſturbance. They were not long deliberating upon the choice: this commiſſion was given to MIR-VAIS; and as it was of ſome conſequence, on this occaſion, to increaſe his credit with the people, he was honoured with the KHALAET [c], and reinſtated in his employment.

Thus

[b] ATHEMAT DOULET. In PERSIC, IKHTIMADOULET ſignifies ſupporter of the power. This poſt is different from that of the vizir-azem, or grand vizirs in TURKEY, inaſmuch as the latter being generaliſſimo's of the armies, their dignity anſwers to that of lieutenant-general of the empire.

[c] KHALAET ſignifies perfect or accomplished: a robe of honour which is given by the king's orders; it is alſo uſed for arms, horſes, or the like preſent from a ſuperior. The TURKS call this CAFTAN, and the RUSSIANS have the ſame word for a common coat.

1708. Thus Providence ordained, that a fearful apprehenſion, ariſing from the idle talk of an adventurer, ſhould bring about the invaſion of one of the moſt flouriſhing monarchies of the eaſtern world. MIR-VAIS, who from the very circumſtances of this ridiculous terror, had made a diſcovery of the weakneſs of the PERSIAN government; was no ſooner returned to KANDAHAR, than he applied his thoughts how to prevail on his countrymen, to embark with him in the enterprize he had meditated. He was wavering in regard to the manner in which he ſhould acquaint them with his project, when a favourable opportunity offered of commencing the execution of it. This was owing to an event, which to thoſe who are unacquainted with the difference of manners and laws between the EUROPEANS and ORIENTAL nations, may appear as a romance, though there is good reaſon to believe it true.

CHAP. VII.

GURGHIN-KHAN demands the daughter of MIR-VAIS. *The* AFGHANS *aſſemble and determine to revolt.* MIR-VAIS *by an artifice impoſes upon* GURGHIN-KHAN, *and gains his confidence. A conſpiracy concerted with the tribe of* TIRINS. MIR-VAIS *maſſacres the* KHAN *with all his retinue, and takes poſſeſſion of* KANDAHAR.

GURGHIN-KHAN made no doubt, but his conduct to the AFGHANS had been cenſured at court; but he ſtill continued to act towards them with his uſual ſeverity. Being now provoked at the return and juſtification of one of their chiefs, whom he had pronounced guilty, he determined to let theſe people know, that neither the favour nor honours which the king had granted to MIR-VAIS, ſhould ſcreen him from his reſentment, who knew him ſo much better than he was known at the PERSIAN court. With this view, he reſolved by ſome ſignal act to humble them all at one and the ſame time; and hurried by the impetuoſity of his temper, he choſe the moſt dangerous method he could have thought of; judging it the beſt adapted to his purpoſe, of making them feel the full extent of his power.

MIR-VAIS

MIR-VAIS had a daughter, who was eſteemed the moſt beautiful lady in the province. The KHAN now demanded her for his harram, and explained himſelf in ſuch terms, as ſhewed he was determined to be obeyed. This act of tyranny was more than MIR-VAIS expected, but his mind being already full of his favourite deſign, he made a proper uſe of this incident, to ſound the diſpoſition of the AFGHANS, in regard to the plot he was contriving. He acquainted the principal men among them, with his preſent caſe, by whom it was ſoon communicated to others. Thoſe people have an utter averſion againſt marrying their daughters to ſtrangers: but to give away as a ſlave, the child of one of the moſt powerful of their chiefs, and of a perſon who was a prince by his birth, to a man of a different ſect, was to them the greateſt mark of ignominy and reproach. There was no time to loſe: the KHAN preſſed the execution of his orders, and they were reduced to the alternative of either complying with his will, or reſolving to oppoſe it; they accordingly determined upon the latter. Some of the warmeſt and moſt zealous of the tribe aſſembled ſecretly in MIR-VAIS's tent, and one of them is recorded to have made a ſpeech to this effect: 1708.

" O MIR-VAIS! thy country-men thus cry to thee with one common " voice: judge from THY OWN ſituation, to what a miſerable ſtate we are " reduced. We no longer reckon among our misfortunes, the tyrannical " taxes with which we are loaded; no longer do we weep to ſee our- " ſelves ſtript of our paternal inheritances, by a power that does not even " ſeek to palliate its iniquities under the veil of laws. Theſe calamities, " which would create the moſt ſenſible affliction to other nations, affect " us no longer. The loſs of property is ſupportable, becauſe it may be " repaired; but there is no repairing the loſs of honour. Recollect the " odious contempt with which we are treated, by people who are in- " debted to our puſillanimity for the authority with which they lord it " over us. Does not this vile treatment, which will render us the diſ- " grace of mankind, excite thy courage? Shall we remind thee of thoſe " acts of violence, the very thought of which covers us with infamy? " Neither innocence, nor the ſacred matrimonial bands, are longer any

1708. " barriers againſt the unbridled licentiouſneſs of our barbarous maſters.
" Thou knoweſt it well: thou, O MIR-VAIS! whoſe birth and valour
" have raiſed thee ſo far above the common level; haſt not thou ſuffered
" ſuch treatment, as none but ſlaves can think of without indignation?
" What fatality holds thy arm? Doſt thou wait for freſh inſults, freſh
" outrages? Doſt thou wait till the tyrant makes thee ſtoop, a ſecond
" time, under the ignominious weight of chains[d]? Or wilt thou invoke
" his guards to fill up the meaſure of our ſhame, by raviſhing from the
" arms of thy wife, the young princeſs whom he demands of thee; not
" to indulge his amorous deſires with her, but to glut his hatred of thee.
" If valour does not ſupport us to oppoſe this tyranny, deſpair will direct
" our blows like thunder-bolts from heaven. Let us retire into the moun-
" tains; and if we muſt periſh, let us at leaſt wipe off the ſtain of infamy."

MIR-VAIS liſtened without any ſeeming emotion, and the whole aſſembly having fixed their eyes on him, waited with impatince to hear what reply he would make; when, raiſing his voice, he ſpoke to this effect: " I thank the Supreme, for the generous ſentiments with which he has
" inſpired your breaſts. The intereſt of the nation calls on us aloud to
" be of one common opinion; but there are many ways to attain the
" ſame end: let our greateſt dependance be on our courage and ſagacity.
" The ſerpent that lies awake, will overcome the lion when he falls
" aſleep: let us conceal our ſwords in beds of roſes; and if you think
" highly enough of me, to leave the revenge of your cauſe to my care,
" this glorious deſign muſt be kept an inviolable ſecret."

The AFGHANS anſwered with a general applauſe, and all promiſed the moſt ſubmiſſive obedience, and the ſtricteſt ſecrecy. " They ſwore to
" ſuffer their wives to be torn from them, and their ſlaves to be ſet at
" liberty, if they did not perform their engagements; and this they alſo
" confirmed upon bread, ſalt, their ſabres, and the khoran[e].

We all know, that it is the cuſtom of the eaſt, for women of condition, or even thoſe who are ſlaves to perſons of any rank, never to ſtir from.

[d] He is ſaid to have been ſent to ISPAHAN in irons.

[e] A cuſtom which is very ſignificative, as it may be preſumed to include their temporal as well as eternal life.

from a certain incloſure[f], which none but the maſter is permitted to enter. Young women remain there, till they are married, and conſequently are never ſeen by ſtrangers. MIR-VAIS now made his uſe of this circumſtance: as ſoon as the aſſembly broke up, he ſent for a girl who was young and handſome, and inſtructing her in the part ſhe was to act, he ordered her to be magnificently dreſſed, and conducted to GURGHIN-KHAN, as his daughter. After giving this deceitful teſtimony of his obedience to the governor, he made it his buſineſs to court the acquaintance of his favourites, and even of his domeſtics, whom he gained by bribes and fair promiſes, inſomuch that they all agreed to uſe their endeavours to reconcile their maſter to him. 1708.

GURGHIN-KHAN knew very well that MIR-VAIS had juſtified himſelf before the divan, and that the king had honoured him with the KHALAET: theſe circumſtances, which at firſt excited his anger, now prejudiced him in his favour; apprehending that he had no deſign to create any occaſion of freſh alarms. The ſolicitations of his creatures and domeſtics ſo far ſoftened his reſentment, that MIR-VAIS had leave to appear in his preſence. This artful AFGHAN was now to give a maſter-proof of his dangerous abilities. He pretended ſo much reſpect and ſubmiſſion at this interview, that the KHAN flattered himſelf with having abſolutely humbled the moſt powerful of his enemies.

MIR-VAIS did not ſtop there: for not ſatisfied with being thus reconciled in appearance to a man whoſe deſtruction he had vowed, he uſed all his endeavours to gain his confidence and friendſhip. He was oftener ſeen at the governor's levee, than in his own habitation: he no longer importuned him with repreſentations of the grievances of the nation: he ſeemed to have forgotten all paſt injuries, and to employ his time intirely in courting his favour. Such a behaviour, joined to the great authority he had among his country-men, with an eaſy addreſs, won the heart of GURGHIN-KHAN, ſo that he reckoned him among the number of his intimate friends.

As ſoon as MIR-VAIS ſaw his buſineſs brought thus far, he thought it a proper time to put the finiſhing ſtroke to his work. We have already mentioned,

[f] The harram.

1708. mentioned, that excepting the garriſon of KANDAHAR, there were no other troops in the province but GEORGIANS, whom the KHAN had kept near his perſon. And tho' theſe did not amount to one thouſand men, yet as they were the beſt troops in the eaſt, they were an invincible obſtacle to an open execution of MIR-VAIS's deſign: but this wary AFGHAN being fertile in ſtratagems, ſecretly engaged the chiefs of one of the tribes, named TIRIN, to refuſe to pay the uſual taxes; the KHAN was no ſooner informed of this rebellion, than he ordered the greateſt part of the GEORGIANS, in whom conſiſted his principal ſecurity, to march that way in order to ſuppreſs it.

1709. In the interim, MIR-VAIS had directed his tribe to approach within two or three leagues of KANDAHAR: and as ſoon as he heard that GURGHIN-KHAN had ordered troops to march againſt the TIRINS, he expreſſed the higheſt reſentment of the mutiny of thoſe people; ſo far was he from excuſing them, that he enlarged upon the puniſhment which they deſerved. This artful behaviour ſo totally defeated the warineſs of the governor, that he made no difficulty to accept of an entertainment, to which MIR VAIS had invited him, under a pretence of reconciling to his favour two leading men of his nation, who had not as yet appeared in his preſence. On the day appointed for the feaſt, MIR-VAIS had every thing ready for the execution of his deſign. It was cuſtomary to admit every day into the town a certain number of AFGHANS, who were employed by the garriſon and townſmen in laborious offices: that day he cauſed as many armed men, as might paſs unobſerved, to enter the town along with theſe labourers, and gave them orders, by all means to elude the prohibition which ſtrangers were under, of ſtaying in town after ſun-ſet, which was the time of ſhutting the gates. He left nothing untried that was capable of confirming the reſolution of the conſpirators; and having taken every other meaſure that his prudence ſuggeſted to him, he waited, not with the anxious fears that attend plots, but with ſanguine hopes, to ſee the ſpeedy iſſue of his undertaking.

The governor ſet out from KANDAHAR in the morning, and arrived at the camp, which was deſignedly pitched near one of his country houſes. There

There he was received with the greateſt demonſtrations of joy and reſpect. Soon after a ſumptuous repaſt was ſerved up: the plenty of wine, together with the heat of the day, having overcome the governor, he fell aſleep in the tent where the entertainment was given; while the officers and domeſtics of his retinue, took their reſt in the tents of the AFGHANS, who had invited them thither, to partake of the feaſt. No ſooner were theſe unſuſpecting gueſts aſleep, than MIR-VAIS at the head of fifty men armed with ſpears, ruſhed into the tent where the governor was aſleep. This had been appointed as a ſignal to the other conſpirators, who immediately entered the tents where the governor's retinue were ſleeping, and inſtantly maſſacred every PERSIAN and GEORGIAN they could find. Their unhappy chief underwent the ſame fate; but it is ſaid of him, that having had time to draw his ſabre, he ſlew ſeveral of his aſſaſſins before he fell. 1709.

When this treacherous ſlaughter was over, MIR-VAIS ordered the dead bodies to be ſtript, and their arms, cloaths, and horſes to be diſtributed among the braveſt of his tribe; and taking to himſelf the cloaths, horſe and arms of GURGHIN-KHAN, he marched towards KANDAHAR, in the ſame order as had been generally obſerved by the governor. It was about an hour after ſun-ſet, when the conſpirators arrived at the gates of the city. The guard, deceived by theſe falſe appearances, granted them admittance, and were cut in pieces before they were ſenſible of their error. The flower of the AFGHANS, that followed at a ſmall diſtance, arrived ſoon after; and dividing themſelves into different bodies, were ſoon joined by their country-men, who had been admitted that morning into the town; part of them marched towards the ſeveral poſts, and part advancing towards the head quarters, they ſurprized the garriſon, already weakened by the large detachment of the GEORGIANS, and made them an eaſy prey. MIR-VAIS with his uſual preſence of mind, now cauſed a proclamation to be made, that the townſmen ſhould keep within doors, where they would be intirely ſafe. By this piece of policy, the garriſon being deprived even of this precarious aſſiſtance, every ſoldier and perſon attached to the KHAN, were in a very few hours cut in pieces.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

MIR-VAIS *engages the inhabitants of* KANDAHAR *to join with him in the rebellion. Famous retreat of the* GEORGIANS. MIR-VAIS *makes himſelf maſter of the ſtreight of* ZEBIL. *The* PERSIAN *court orders troops to be levied, and ſends deputies to* KANDAHAR.

1709. THE day after the taking of KANDAHAR, MIR-VAIS yet depending more on cunning than ſtrength, cauſed the principal inhabitants to be ſummoned early in the morning; and after having quieted their fears by his ſoft and obliging behaviour, he proteſted to them, that ambition had no ſhare in his undertaking; that his only aim was to free his country from the yoke under which it had ſo long groaned: he then expatiated upon what the AFGHANS in general, and himſelf in particular had ſuffered for ſome years; and very artfully treating the intereſts of the aſſembly as his own, he thus continued: "You may judge from my "ſentiments, and every circumſtance of my conduct, that my deſign is "not to oppreſs, but to free you from ſlavery. The AFGHANS will al-"ways eſteem you as the companions of their paſt ſervitude, and preſent "felicity. Do not be afraid that the happineſs we are now going to en-"joy, will ever be interrupted. The tyrant GURGHIN-KHAN is no more; "he was the only perſon among the PERSIANS that deſerved the name "of a ſoldier: can you imagine they will ever dare to undertake what "the emperors of INDIA have attempted in vain, with more troops than "there are ſtones in our walls? 'Tis only by motion that water is puri-"fied; an enemy immerſed in luxury is far from being formidable. If "there are any amongſt you that have not the courage to enjoy this "precious gift of liberty, which is dropt down to you from heaven, "let him declare himſelf: no harm ſhall be done to him; he ſhall be "permitted to go in ſearch of ſome new tyrant beyond the frontier of "this happy ſtate." The inhabitants not expecting ſuch mild propoſitions, anſwered with loud praiſes and acclamations. They all concurred in offering to expoſe their lives and fortunes in ſupport of the com-

mon cauſe; they ſwore eternal fidelity to him, and begged him to continue his labours to terminate an enterprize, on the ſucceſs of which the public felicity depended. 1709.

MIR-VAIS now convened the chief men of his tribe: he made them ſenſible, that in ſuch conjunctures, unanimity is eſſential to ſafety, repreſenting to them what they had to hope or fear, from the good or bad underſtanding in which they might live with the inhabitants; and after joining authority to perſuaſion, he forbad them to give the leaſt offence or moleſtation to the people. In order to ſecure his conqueſt, he took every ſtep that prudence dictated; whilſt neceſſity ſupplied the place of experience. The arms which he found in the town, he diſtributed among the braveſt and beſt affectioned of his men; he gave orders for filling the magazines; for repairing the fortifications; and putting the artillery in order. Workmen were employed night and day, in making gun-powder and fire-arms: he ſent meſſengers to the different heads of the tribes, informing them of his ſucceſs, and inviting them to come and join him with all expedition.

Three days had elapſed ſince the governor's death, when the centinels deſcried from the ramparts a conſiderable body of cavalry; this was the detachment of GEORGIANS, who, ignorant of what had paſſed[s], were coming to the city, loaded with the ſpoils of the rebels. As their return was expected, proper orders were given for their reception; they were ſuffered to advance within muſket-ſhot, when the cannon of the town was diſcharged at them; ſo that they immediately conjectured that the place had changed maſters. MIR-VAIS thought this a good opportunity for eſtabliſhing the reputation of his arms; he accordingly marched out at the head of five or ſix thouſand horſe, intending to cut off the retreat of the GEORGIANS; but he ſoon perceived, that he had to do with troops better diſciplined, and more inured to war, than his AFGHANS.

The

[s] All the PERSIANS and GEORGIANS in the town having been maſſacred, and the PATENS or AFGHANS of the open country favouring the enterprize. Tho' this may appear improbable to an EUROPEAN, yet it is eaſy to be reconciled in a country but thinly inhabited.

1709. The GEORGIANS quitting their booty, forced their way ſword in hand, and paſſed the defile of ZEBIL. After fighting their way thro' the country for the ſpace of eight days, with an amazing intrepidity, they marched out of the province. What the GEORGIANS ſuffered in this retreat, as well through want of proviſions and forage, as the frequent attacks of their enemies, is hardly credible; but their courage was invincible. The AFGHANS made five different attacks upon them in one day, and notwithſtanding the great ſuperiority of their numbers, they were always repulſed; inſomuch that they loſt above two thouſand men in theſe different engagements. As an inſtance of the reſolution of the GEORGIANS, it is related, that they ſwam their horſes over a conſiderable river, within three leagues of the defile of ZEBIL, on the ſide of KANDAHAR: one of them, who was diſmounted, ſeeing an AFGHAN riding towards him in full ſpeed, turned back to meet him, and holding out to him, with one hand, his ſabre, as if he intended to ſurrender, with the other, he ſhot him thro' the head, with a piſtol; then leaping upon the dead man's *horſe, he plunged into the river,* which he croſſed under the inceſſant fire of the enemy, who were amazed at his reſolution. All the advantage that MIR-VAIS reaped from this expedition, was the making himſelf maſter of the defile of ZEBIL. This ſtreight is on the ſide of PERSIA, as that of CABUL is towards INDIA, and theſe are the only paſſes thro' the mountains with which the province of KANDAHAR is ſurrounded. The AFGHAN chief, who had now ſo lately experienced, that valour alone is not ſufficient in carrying on a war, left troops to guard theſe narrow paſſes, and applied himſelf to diſcipline his men, and alſo to gain the other towns of the province; in hopes, that by their means, together with the alliances which he intended to conclude with his neighbours, he ſhould be able to withſtand the forces that might be ſent againſt him.

In the mean time the GEORGIANS marching back into PERSIA, ſpread the news of this revolt, which ſoon reached ISPAHAN. The PERSIAN court being ſenſible of their own weakneſs, and of the difficulty of penetrating thro' the mountains with an army, had likewiſe reaſon to apprehend, leſt if they ſhould gain any advantage by force of arms over the

AFGHANS, theſe people might be tempted a ſecond time to ſurrender the country to the MOGHOL. In this critical conjuncture, new levies of troops were ordered; but before they proceeded to open force, they thought proper to try the ways of negotiation. 1709.

MAHOMMED GEANI KHAN was the perſon choſen for this deputation; accordingly he ſet out for KANDAHAR, where he uſed every art that the love of his country ſuggeſted to him, to prevail upon the rebel-chief to return to his duty; and having a particular intimacy with MIR-VAIS, he addreſſed him in this manner: "My friendſhip for thee would not permit me to ſee the ſtorm gathering over thy head, without endeavouring to avert it. I have proſtrated myſelf with tears in my eyes, and bitter grief in my ſoul, at the threſhold of the palace of their ſublime majeſties[h], who, reluctant to puniſh, have let fall the arm that was lifted up againſt thee in their wrath; they have given me leave to come and ſpeak to thee; and I am commiſſioned by them to tell thee, that tho' they are juſtly offended at the death of the KHAN; yet they forgive this crime, as thou only haſt anticipated a puniſhment which their juſtice was preparing for him: they conſider what is ſince paſt only as a neceſſary conſequence of that action: thus the ſtorm is blown over; do not therefore excite new troubles, but reſtore KANDAHAR to its true defenders; and by this mark of ſubmiſſion, merit the favours with which the crown is ready to diſtinguiſh thee."

MAHOMMED GEANI KHAN continuing his ſpeech, added menaces to promiſes, when MIR-VAIS, who was afraid leſt this diſcourſe ſhould make ſome impreſſion on the minds of the hearers, ſilenced him abruptly to this effect: "Deceitful man, what do all theſe artful ſubterfuges avail? Doſt thou imagine that wiſdom dwells only in the boſom of effeminacy, and hath never paſſed the mountains with which theſe ſtates are ſurrounded? Know then, that all thoſe who have here liſtened to thee, are as ſenſible, as myſelf, of the ſnares in which thou art endeavouring to entangle us. Let thy king either raiſe or let fall his arm, as he pleaſes; they are ſlaves, and not muſſulmen, who are afraid of the blow. If

 "he

[h] For his majeſty; the ORIENTAL way of expreſſing themſelves as a mark of greater reſpect to their prince. It may be obſerved, that the PERSIANS uſe the third perſon plural even to private perſons in common diſcourſe.

1709. " he were as formidable, as thou wouldſt make us believe, it is with " deeds, and not with empty words, he would oppoſe our juſt deſigns."

Having thus ſpoke, MIR-VAIS ordered the deputy to be ſent to priſon: whether he thought by this means to prevent the court from receiving intelligence, and to gain time for making greater preparations; or intended by this act of violence, to cut off all hopes of reconciliation with the PERSIANS; certain it is, that the detention of MAHOMMED GEANI KHAN, and the exactneſs with which all the paſſes were guarded, hindered the court from being informed of what had paſſed. The miniſters being uneaſy at not hearing the ſucceſs of this deputation, reſolved at length to venture upon a ſecond. As the lieutenant of MAHOMMED KHAN, governor of HERAT, had performed the pilgrimage to MECCA in company with MIR-VAIS, and had contracted a ſtrict friendſhip with him; they were induced to imagine that ſuch a perſon would be leſs ſuſpected, and more agreeable to him, than any other. The new deputy arrived, and explained the ſubject of his commiſſion: but MIR-VAIS told him in an angry tone, " Thou mayſt thank thy good fortune in being my fellow-" traveller; and the laws of hoſpitality, by which thou art intitled in my " houſe to bread and ſalt: were it not for theſe circumſtances, thou " ſhouldſt be no longer in a condition to make ſuch baſe propoſals to " men who are free. Slave to a king who is going to loſe his royalty, " liſten to what I declare to thee this day. THE VICTORY COMES FROM " GOD, AND THIS VICTORY IS NEAR[1]. The impure worſhip of the " followers of ALI, has too long infected the moſt fertile provinces of " ASIA. Heaven has at length declared againſt the PERSIANS: the AF-" GHANS, who are charged with the divine vengeance, will not ſheath " their ſwords, till they have deſtroyed this prince and extirpated his " nation." After this menacing ſpeech, which ſeemed in ſome degree prophetical, MIR-VAIS contented himſelf with detaining the deputy, but did not chuſe to violate, in the perſon of his old acquaintance and friend, thoſe laws which he had ſo little reſpected in that of the deputy of his ſovereign.

[1] A paſſage of the khoran.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

The PERSIAN *court raiſes troops, and ſends deputies to* KANDAHAR. *Defeat of the* KHANS *of* HERAT *and* TAVRIS. KHOSROFF KHAN *is ſent againſt the* AFGHANS: *obtains a victory over them, and lays ſiege to* KANDAHAR. *His defeat and death. Another* PERSIAN *army defeated. The province of* KANDAHAR *entirely ſubjected by* MIR-VAIS, *who dies in* 1715.

THE court at length perceiving that there were no hopes of recovering KANDAHAR by negotiation, gave orders to the KHAN of HERAT to march againſt the rebels, at the head of 15000 horſe. MIR-VAIS who was well acquainted with the difference between the PERSIANS and GEORGIANS, went to meet him with only 5000 horſe, which he had aſſembled in a hurry, upon the news of the enemy's approach. The AFGHANS having fired ſome field pieces, the PERSIANS were ſtruck with a panic, and did not wait for the firſt onſet, but flying before their enemies, gave themſelves up to ſlaughter; and after a grievous carnage, the AFGHANS returned to their camp, enriched with ſpoils. This action, which was followed by two or three others of the like nature, in the ſpace of 18 months, gave the rebels ſuch a contempt for their enemy, that they attacked them upon every occaſion, without regarding their numbers. Of this there was a melancholy inſtance in MAHOMMED KHAN governor of TAVRIS. This general by the king's orders, having marched in SEPTEMBER this year, againſt the rebels, at the head of 5000 horſe, met with ſuch a warm reception from their van-guard, conſiſting only of 500 AFGHAN cavalry, that he had above 1000 men killed and wounded, and was taken priſoner himſelf with three of his ſons. 1710.

The bad ſucceſs of theſe expeditions, induced the court to make preparations for the continuation of the war with more order and precaution. They had raiſed a conſiderable army, and had given the command of it to KHOSROFF KHAN [k] a GEORGIAN, which was a very natural piece of policy.

[k] This word is generally tranſlated lord or governor; but KAI in the antient PERSIC ſignifies a giant, and metaphorically a king, or great captain.

1711. policy. This prince, entruſted with the care of revenging the cauſe of his own country-men, as well as that of his ſovereign, marched into KHORASAN, and from thence advancing eaſtward, in the month of NOVEMBER, he pitched his tents in the neighbourhood of FARRA[1]; a city not far diſtant from the enemy's country. Valour without prudence does not merit the name of virtue in a general. KHOSROFF KHAN therefore reſolved to wait in this neighbourhood, in order to be informed of the progreſs and forces of the rebels. Accordingly he made inquiries into the ſtate of their troops, the nature of the country, and of their ſtrong holds; and ſacrificing his private reſentments to the public good, he agreed to a ſuſpenſion of arms, and entered into a negotiation, to try if any method could be found to prevent the effuſion of blood. The king's army, conſiſting of 30,000 PERSIANS and 1200 GEORGIANS, advanced in good order towards the ſtreight of ZEBIL; from whence part of theſe GEORGIANS had made the famous retreat already mentioned. The number of the AFGHAN army was inferior to that of their enemy. All theſe troops, according to the cuſtom of that part of the eaſt, were compoſed of cavalry. MIR-VAIS did not judge proper to make his men diſmount, and being ſenſible how difficult it would be for cavalry to act in theſe defiles, he reſolved to quit his poſt, and retire to the river BELESE, about three leagues diſtant, and there diſpute the paſſage.

The PERSIANS greatly ſurprized to find the paſſes unguarded, at length diſcovered the enemy, who bordered the oppoſite banks of the river. KHOSROFF KHAN was the firſt who plunged in, the reſt immediately followed the example of their general, and ſwam their horſes over; the AFGHANS aſtoniſhed at their reſolution, and being charged with equal intrepidity, gave way, and retired in diſorder. The GEORGIAN prince made a proper uſe of his victory: for his troops were ſcarce returned from purſuing the enemy, than he ordered them to march forthwith to inveſt KANDAHAR. The AFGHANS having had no time to recover their courage, nor accuſtomed to a regular manner of waging war, were amazed at this firſt diſgrace: what added to their confuſion was the abſence of MIR-VAIS,

[1] A ſquare town, about half a league in circumference, ſurrounded with a mud-wall. It ſtands in a fertile country, abundantly ſupplied with water.

MIR-VAIS, who not confiding in them ſufficiently to lock himſelf up in the town, kept the field with the ſhattered remains of his army. Things being thus ſituated, they ſent deputies to KHOSROFF KHAN, with propoſals to deliver up the place, on condition that he would preſerve their lives, their liberty, and fortunes. 1711.

This general had it now in his power with a ſingle word to terminate this deſtructive war; but his prudence forſook him. Tranſported by his reſentment, and elated with his ſucceſs, he thought it beneath his dignity to grant a capitulation to rebels, whom he had ſo lately vanquiſhed. He therefore gave them to underſtand, that they muſt ſubmit at diſcretion. Death appearing more eligible than ſlavery; the AFGHANS would not liſten to ſo dangerous a propoſal, and the KHAN began to attack the town.

In the mean time the impreſſions of fear were in a great meaſure worn out, and the number of MIR-VAIS's troops greatly augmented. There is a large country ſouth of KANDAHAR, which modern geographers diſtinguiſh by the name of MACKERAN; it is bounded by KERMAN on the weſt; a chain of mountains ſeparates it towards the eaſt from the MOGHOL's empire, and the reſt of it is incloſed by the INDIAN ocean. The BALOUCHES, a fierce and warlike people, deſcended, as already mentioned, from the AFGHANS, are diſperſed throughout theſe deſerts, which are reckoned a province of PERSIA. MIR-VAIS had ſent a deputation to theſe people, and found no difficulty in perſuading them to engage in a confederacy, on the ſucceſs of which their common liberty depended. At the ſame time, the TIRINS[m] enrolled themſelves in great numbers under MIR-VAIS's banners, who was now grown wiſer by his miſtakes, and reſolved not to expoſe himſelf again to the hazard of an unequal combat. Cunning and ſtratagem which had been ſo often ſerviceable to him, were now his laſt reſource; and he determined to deprive them of forage and proviſions, ſo as to ruin the PERSIAN army, or at leaſt oblige them to retreat. With this intent, he ordered his troops to lay waſte the country about KANDAHAR: his commands were ſo well executed, that the beſiegers ſoon began to feel the inconveniency of want. KHOSROFF KHAN being now vexed to the heart for having refuſed to ſign the capitulation, was

[m] One of the tribes of the CLIGIS already mentioned.

1711. was obſtinately bent upon taking the town, and daily renewed his attacks; but the garriſon defended themſelves with ſuch bravery, that the PERSIANS tired out with ſuch a long reſiſtance, and labouring under a want of all neceſſaries, ſoon deſerted in whole troops. The KHAN ſeeing his army at length reduced to 10,000 men, and not knowing any longer how to find ſubſiſtence even for theſe, reſolved to retire. This reſolution however was too late; for he had ſcarce begun to raiſe the ſiege, when MIRVAIS, who was marching with 16,000 horſe to the relief of the place, fell upon his troops, who were ſo diſheartened that they fled at the firſt onſet. Their general ſtrove to rally them, but fear had ſtifled every ſenſe of ſubordination; inſomuch that finding his efforts vain, and reſolving not to ſurvive the diſgrace, he ruſhed at the head of the few remaining GEORGIANS, into the midſt of the thickeſt ſquadrons of the AFGHANS, where fighting with a deſperate bravery, he was killed.

Such was the end of this prince, whom valour, military experience, and other virtues, rendered worthy of a better fate. He had been ſucceſſively honoured with the poſts of governor of ISFAHAN, and of DIVAN-BEGHI [n], and by the death of his father was juſt raiſed to the dignity of VALI of GEORGIA, when the king named him generaliſſimo of his armies. He, as well as GURGHIN KHAN his uncle, had the weakneſs to ſacrifice his religion to his ambition; yet in his heart he was ſtill a chriſtian; and the miſſionaries were always ſure to receive protection and aſſiſtance from him; he had even in that expedition two of thoſe religious people with him, one of whom was killed cloſe by him. It ſeems as if he intended to return to the religion of his anceſtors, yet he affected outwardly to paſs for a MAHOMMEDAN; from whence we may ſuſpect the report of his carrying a croſs in his ſtandard.

This was the moſt conſiderable ſhock which the PERSIANS had yet ſuſtained in their war with the AFGHANS; for of their whole army, only 700 men eſcaped death or ſlavery: ſuch was their diſtreſs for want of proviſions and forage, during their retreat for ſeveral days, through rivers and defiles, whilſt they were continually purſued by a numerous body of freſh cavalry.

The

[n] DIVAN-BEGHI, or lord of the council. He is lord chief-juſtice.

The PERSIAN court was greatly aſtoniſhed at ſo important a loſs, yet neceſſity ſeemed to dictate freſh efforts. Accordingly another army was raiſed, and the command given to MAHOMMED RUSTAN KHAN, who marched againſt the rebels: but whatever valour and abilities that general might have, fortune did not favour him more than his predeceſſor. His troops were beaten and put to flight; and after this engagement, all the towns and ſtrong holds, which had yet held out againſt the new government, ſubmitted to them, and the whole kingdom of KANDAHAR acknowledged no other laws than thoſe of the AFGHANS. 1713.

The GEORGIANS, incenſed at ſo many defeats, which they juſtly imputed to the cowardice and inexperience of the PERSIAN troops; made an offer to the king of ſubduing the rebels, on condition that their army ſhould be compoſed only of troops of their own nation; and that the neceſſary ſums for defraying the charges of this expedition, ſhould be paid at a certain time: but this weak prince HUSSEIN, afraid of their making a bad uſe of their ſucceſs, it is ſaid, rejected their propoſal. Be that as it may, the defeat of MAHOMMED RUSTAN KHAN, was the laſt remarkable tranſaction during the reign of MIR-VAIS. The court having loſt all hopes of reducing him by open force, ceaſed to arm againſt him; ſo that this prince died peaceably in his new kingdom in 1715. 1714.

It may be ſaid of this famous rebel, that he was as circumſpect in engaging in any enterprize, as he was reſolute in carrying it into execution; that his ſucceſs was owing as much to his prudence as to his valour; and if he did not ſubvert the throne of his lawful ſovereign, yet he gave the firſt blow to the PERSIAN monarchy, and formed the people, by whom it was afterwards ſubverted. He had for ſome time aſſumed the title of king, and ordered that the KHOTBAH[o], ſhould be made in his name, and arrogated to himſelf the other enſigns of ſovereignty. The inſcription round his coin was a PERSIAN diſtich, the ſenſe of which is, "The "celebrated MIR-VAIS, emperor of the world, a moſt juſt prince, has "cauſed this coin to be ſtruck at KANDAHAR, the place of his reſidence." 1715.

[o] A prayer read by the IMAN or prieſt of every moſque, every FRIDAY in the afternoon, for the health of the king; and this is an eſſential mark of the acknowledgment of his ſovereignty.

PART III.

THE REVOLUTIONS OF PERSIA,

FROM THE DEATH OF MIR-VAIS IN 1715, TO THE RETREAT OF PRINCE VACHTANGA FROM THE FRONTIERS OF DAGISTAN IN 1720.

CHAP. X.

MIR-ABDALLAH *brother of* MIR-VAIS *ſucceeds to the government of the* AFGHANS. MIR-MAGHMUD, *ſon of* MIR-VAIS, *diſcovers a deſign of ſubjecting* KANDAHAR, *murders his uncle, and is choſen king of that country. The* ABDOLLEES *diſſatisfied. The adventure of* EZADALLAH, *who defeats the* PERSIAN *army, and makes himſelf maſter of* HERAT. *Hoſtilities committed by the* KOURDS. *Incurſions of the* OUSBEGS. *Character of the* LESGEES, *and their motives to invade* PERSIA.

1715. THE effeminacy and weakneſs of the PERSIAN court ſeemed to devote the empire to ruin; ſo that inſtead of making a good uſe of the death of MIR-VAIS, SHAH HUSSEIN was diſpoſed rather to quit all pretenſions to KANDAHAR, than to bear any longer the inquietude that muſt attend all attempts to reduce this province: the emotions which he ſeemed to feel on this occaſion, aroſe only from the apprehenſion he was under that the divan would oblige him to make freſh preparations againſt the rebels.

In

In the mean time, the AFGHANS met to nominate a ſucceſſor to MIR-VAIS. This prince had left two ſons; the rights of nature and gratitude pleaded in favour of either one or other of them; but as their tender years rendered them incapable of holding the reins of a government hardly ſettled, MIR-ABDALLAH, whom MIR-VAIS, his brother, had appointed his ſucceſſor, was raiſed to the throne. This prince differed intirely from his predeceſſor: he had neither his genius, ambition, nor reſolution: a timid circumſpection, diſguiſed under the name of prudence, conſtituted the principal part of his character. He ſoon convinced the AFGHANS that he was not born to ſupply the place of ſuch a man as MIR-VAIS; for he was ſcarce inveſted with the ſupreme authority, when he formed a reſolution of reſtoring KANDAHAR to the crown of PERSIA. This ſcheme being communicated to the tribe, they were divided in their opinions. Thoſe of a timorous and peaceable diſpoſition, and ſuch as through age and infirmities, had leſs reſolution than caution, deſpaired of being able to hold out long againſt ſo formidable a power as PERSIA. They compared their forces with the great armies of this monarchy, and looking upon themſelves as already ſubdued, judged of the ſeverity of their puniſhment by the damage they had done to their enemies. Thus they longed for a reconciliation, which they conſidered as the only means of ſcreening themſelves from the reſentment of their ancient maſters. 1715.

On the other hand, the military-men, and ſuch whoſe youthful blood moved briſker in their veins, exclaimed againſt the project, the execution of which they concluded would plunge the whole nation into the extremeſt calamities, as they could no longer depend on any treaties with the PERSIANS; who would no ſooner take poſſeſſion of the ſtrong holds of the kingdom, than without regarding the articles of peace, the obſervance of which themſelves ſhould not be able to enforce, would take ſignal vengeance for the infamy of ſo many defeats: "And what," ſaid they, "ſhould induce us to ſubmit again to be ſhackled, after having ſo "bravely recovered our liberty? What diſgrace have we ſince ſuffered; "or what advantages have the enemy had over us? Are we diſheartened "by our victories? Have we not the ſame arm and the ſame head? Or

1715. " have we ſhaken off ſo odious a yoke, only to ſubmit our necks to it " again, at a time when our courage might ſecure our liberty? Let us " rather boldly advance and attack our enemy on their own frontiers, " ſince they no longer dare to carry on the war in our country: or if you " are afraid of this attempt, tho' the ſucceſs is far from being dubious, " permit us at leaſt to enjoy a tranquillity, which the terror of our arms " has hindered them ſo long from interrupting." The laſt opinion was not only the moſt noble, but likewiſe the moſt reaſonable. In the low ſtate to which PERSIA was fallen, there was no juſt grounds for hurrying the AFGHANS to a ſubmiſſion; and if they muſt abſolutely ſubmit to a maſter, it would have been more prudent to have choſen the MOGHOL, whoſe intereſt it would have been to uſe them well; than a nation whom they had ſo grievouſly offended.

MIR-ABDALLAH had however taken his reſolution, and finding it approved of by ſome of the chief men of the tribes, he bent his thoughts upon putting it in execution. His intention was to reſtore the city and the province to the crown of PERSIA on three conditions: The firſt, that the annual tribute which they paid before the revolt, ſhould be taken off; the ſecond, that no foreign troops ſhould be ſent into the province; and the third, that HUSSEIN ſhould grant him the government of the kingdom, which ſhould be hereditary in his family. In conſequence of this reſolution, they drew up the inſtructions of the deputies, whom they intended to ſend to ISFAHAN; and as there was no reaſon to doubt but their propoſals would be extremely welcome, every thing ſeemed to ſecure an approaching peace, when an accident happened which broke their meaſures. Though they endeavoured to conceal this intended negotiation, which they knew was diſagreable to the greateſt part of the tribes; it came to the knowledge of MIR-MAGHMUD, one of MIR-VAIS's ſons. This prince, who was about eighteen years of age, being provoked to ſee himſelf reduced to the condition of a ſubject, in a kingdom which he looked upon as his patrimony, had hitherto diſſembled his reſentment, from the expectation of a proper opportunity of ſhewing it. The averſion which the military part of the nation had to this treaty, made him

think that the time was now come to gratify his revenge; with this view 1715.
he aſſembed about forty of his father's friends, who went with him to MIR-ABDALLAH's palace, and made themſelves maſters of it. The young MAGHMUD, as a ſpecimen of that ſlaughter to which he afterwards familiarized himſelf, entered the apartment where his uncle was aſleep, and killed him. Immediately the forty conſpirators proclaimed the new ſultan with loud acclamations, and the people alarmed at the ſound of drums and other military inſtruments, with which the palace echoed, flocked thither to learn the cauſe of it.

MIR-MAGHMUD ſeeing the people aſſembled, made no ſcruple to acknowledge the parricide which he had juſt committed; but at the ſame time excuſed himſelf, by declaring his motive was the public good, as a proof of which, he read with a loud voice the inſtructions and other papers relating to the treaty which his uncle was on the point of concluding with the court of PERSIA. This treaty, as already mentioned, was odious to the greateſt part of the nation, without whoſe knowledge it was entered upon: beſides, MIR-MAGHMUD was ſon to the founder of their monarchy; and having been accuſtomed almoſt from his infancy to follow his father in all his expeditions, had on every occaſion given ſignal proofs of his courage. Theſe circumſtances determined the people in his favour. The military men were the firſt who declared for him; and their ſuffrages having been confirmed by the reſt of the tribes, he was with the general conſent proclaimed king of KANDAHAR, ſix months after the death of MIR-VAIS.

This young prince had ſcarce aſcended the throne, when ſeveral events happened, which ſeemed to preſage the troubles and deſolation which his reign was to produce; at the ſame time they removed a part of thoſe obſtacles which ſtood in the way of his ambition. The family, to whom 1717
ABAS the GREAT had given the government of HASARAI, being extinct, the kings his ſucceſſors had ſubjected this province to the authority of a khan or governor, who, in their name, commanded in the province of HERAT. The ABDOLLEES, who, it has been already obſerved, ſubmitted to PERSIA on condition of not being ſubject to foreign governors, were very

1717. very impatient under their yoke, when the circumſtances of the times determined them to follow the example of the AFGHANS of KANDAHAR. The ABDOLLEES are a wandering nation, and like the AFGHANS divided into particular tribes. MAHOMMED ZAMON KHAN, then governor of the province, pleaſed with the agreeable countenance of EZADALLAH, ſon to a chief of one of theſe tribes, demanded him of the father. Allured by the advantages which he expected, the parent uſed all his perſuaſion to engage his ſon to live with the KHAN. The young man heard the propoſal with indignation; ſo that the father determined to uſe his authority. This induced EZADALLAH, in conjunction with ſome young men, to kill his father, and cauſed himſelf to be acknowledged chief of the tribe in his ſtead.

MAHOMMED ZAMON KHAN was ſoon informed of this action; and determined to puniſh the delinquent, not only as a parricide, but leſt ſo bold a ſtep ſhould be followed by an inſurrection. The KHAN accordingly ordered five hundred horſe to march againſt EZADALLAH's party, who boldly met them, and routed the PERSIAN troops. The governor ſhocked at this diſgrace, thought ſeriouſly of preventing the ill conſequences of it. He therefore aſſembled his troops at HERAT, the capital of the province; and not chuſing to truſt the execution of an affair of this importance to any other perſon, he took the command of them himſelf, and marched towards the camp of the rebels. EZADALLAH, now at the head of two thouſand men, went to meet the PERSIANS: he divided his troops into two bodies; one he ordered to lie in ambuſh, and with the other he waited for the enemy on the banks of the river MORGA. At length the PERSIAN army appeared; and the KHAN ſeeing ſo ſmall a number of the ABDOLLEES, confident of victory, charged the enemy without precaution; when the troops that lay in ambuſh ſallied forth with loud ſhouts and cries, which ſurprized and terrified the PERSIANS, inſomuch that they turned their backs, and fled with the utmoſt precipitation to HERAT.

The young EZADALLAH, tranſported by his youth and courage, followed the enemy ſo cloſe, that he entered with them pell-mell into the

town. The inhabitants had formerly been of the ſect of the SUNNIS; ſeveral had ſtill preſerved their ancient religion; and there were ſome families deſcended from the ancient kings of the country. Theſe circumſtances, together with the lenity with which the inhabitants of KANDAHAR had been treated by MIR-VAIS, and the tyrannical extorſion of the PERSIAN governors, induced the people to declare in favour of the ABDOLLES; inſomuch that having joined with them in putting the garriſon to the ſword, the city was ſoon delivered from the PERSIAN yoke. This revolution happened in the year 1717. EZADALLAH in leſs than three months got poſſeſſion of the other ſtrong places in the province, whoſe fidelity had been ſhaken by the example of the capital; and HERAT became an independent republic, in which its deliverer held the moſt conſiderable rank. 1717.

This year, the KOURDS, a reſtleſs roving people, ſituated weſt of IRAC-AGEMI[p], appeared in arms at the gates of HAMADAN, and waſted the country round that city. They carried their inſolence ſo far, as to commit robberies under the walls of ISFAHAN, where they took away a number of horſes belonging to the king. 1719.

Theſe hoſtilities and the revolt of HERAT, were not the only incidents that alarmed the court. The OUSBEGS[q], a warlike tribe, whom their vicinity to PERSIA renders enemies to that crown, taking advantage of theſe circumſtances, carried terror and deſolation into the northern part of the vaſt province of KHORASSAN. At the ſame time, new troubles aroſe on the weſtern ſhores of the CASPIAN SEA.

The province of DAGISTAN[r], inhabited by the LESGEE TARTARS, are MAHOMMEDANS[s] of the ſect of SUNNI. The ferocity of their natural diſpoſition, joined to the ſterility of their hills[t], have induced them often

to

[p] This is part of the country of the ancient PARTHIANS. AGEM ſignifies barbarous or ſtranger, with regard to the ARABS. [q] This name ſignifies free and independent. They are generally underſtood to be the TARTARS of KHIEVA and BOKHARA, and take in alſo thoſe of SAMARCAND, which flouriſhed in the time of TAMERLANE. Theſe people are comely, well-ſhaped, and active; much given to robbery, but make good ſoldiers. See G. THOMPSON's account of them, Vol. I.

[r] DAGH, a mountain; DAGISTAN, a mountainous country. It is ſometimes wrote DAGHESTAN. I have given an account of theſe people in my 1ſt volume. [s] Formerly ſome of them were chriſtians. [t] Their vallies however are fruitful.

1719. to infeſt the neighbouring provinces. ABAS II. upon his acceſſion to the crown, came to an accommodation with them, and promiſed to pay annually, by way of ſubſidy, a certain ſum to each tribe. Each of them promiſed to ſend every year an embaſſador to the king, with a preſent of two calves ſkins, and two lambs ſkins; as an acknowledgment of his ſovereignty; and a peace was concluded on theſe conditions. As it was the intereſt of the LESGEES, they obſerved this treaty inviolate, as long as the ſubſidies agreed to were paid them; but the 1700 tomans[u], appointed for that uſe, having for ſeveral years been applied to other purpoſes, by the avaricious miniſters of HUSSEIN, theſe people had recourſe again to arms, and renewed their excurſions.

CHAP. XI.

The court prepares to attack the ABDOLLEES *and* OUSBEGS. SEFFIE KOULI KAHN *is made general. Battle between the* PERSIANS *and* ABDOLLEES. *The* MASCATS *take poſſeſſion of* BAHARAIN. LUTF ALI KHAN *is choſen general, and marches towards the* PERSIAN *gulf, and beats the rebels.* MIR-MAGHMUD *marches at the ſame time towards* KHERMAN. *The domeſtic enemies of the* PERSIAN *general cabal againſt him. The* ATHEMAT-DOULET *is confined, and his eyes plucked out.* LUTF ALI KHAN *is carried priſoner to* ISFAHAN, *and the* PERSIAN *army diſbanded.*

SHAH HUSSEIN aſtoniſhed to ſee ſo many provinces declare againſt him, at length rouzed from his lethargy. The ABDOLLEES and OUSBEGS having entered into a confederacy, appeared to be the moſt formidable of his enemies: he reſolved therefore to make an extraordinary effort againſt them; and having deliberated ſome time on the choice of a general, he choſe SEFFIE KOULI KHAN. This nobleman had been inveſted ſome years with the poſt of DIVAN-BEGHI[w] of ISFAHAN; but upon diſcovering, that the king was ſo far prejudiced by his enemies, as to look upon the rectitude with which he diſcharged his office, as an exceſſive ſeverity, he voluntarily reſigned it, and withdrew from court.

SEFFIE

[u] 4,200 *l.* [w] Lord chief-juſtice.

SEFFIE KOULI KHAN was now ſenſible of the difficulties he ſhould encounter in ſo dangerous a commiſſion, and of the oppoſitions he ſhould find in the execution of his office, from the prevailing faction, by whom he was not beloved. Theſe conſiderations engaged him to refuſe ſo delicate, though at the ſame time ſo glorious an employment: but the court hit upon a very artful expedient to engage him to accept of it: this was to ſend to his only ſon, a horſe richly capariſoned, a ſpear, a buckler, a cuiraſs covered with gold brocade, and a turbant enriched with diamonds. Such preſents are never made, except when the king intends to inveſt ſome perſon with an abſolute authority, ſuch as that of generaliſſimo. The father ſaw plainly the ſnare that was laid for him; but he who had preſumed to refuſe his ſovereign, could not withſtand the ſolicitations of a ſon whom he tenderly loved. This young nobleman, at the age of ſeventeen, was therefore declared generaliſſimo of the forces of the empire; and his father, as the court foreſaw, determined to accompany him in the expedition. He accordingly aſſembled a conſiderable body of troops, and both of them repaired to ISFAHAN to receive the king's orders. The young general met with the moſt flattering marks of diſtinction: the king made a public entertainment for him, and girt his ſword to his ſide, in preſence of the whole court; and in order to give him an opportunity of ſhewing his dexterity, he ordered tilts and tournaments in the MEIDAN[x], in which this young lord gained the applauſe of all the ſpectators. 1719.

After this kind of anticipated triumph, the general ſet out for the camp, in company with his father. His army conſiſted of 30,000 men, choſen troops; ſo that it was reaſonable to expect ſucceſs from ſuch a body of forces, conducted, tho' under another's name, by ſo experienced a general as SEFFIE KOULI KHAN. Theſe expectations ſeemed to be confirmed by an event, which ſoon after enſued; for ſcarce had the PERSIANS entered the province of HERAT, when they fell in with a body of 12,000 OUSBEGS, who were marching to the aſſiſtance of the ABDOLLEES; and attacking them briſkly, cut them in pieces.

This

[x] The principal ſquare in ISFAHAN.

1719. This firſt enterprize raiſed the courage of the victors, but EZADALLAH, more enraged than intimidated by this diſgrace, thought only of recovering his loſs by a new engagement, which was to decide the fate of the province of HERAT. EZADALLAH, at the head of only 15,000 horſe, was not afraid to offer battle to an army which had double the number of men, and had likewiſe the advantage of a formidable train of artillery. During the courſe of this war, there was not a more obſtinate engagement. The PERSIANS and the ABDOLLEES, equally animated, the one to avoid the ſhame of being vanquiſhed, and the other by the deſire of preſerving their liberty, fought without intermiſſion from ſun-riſe; and at one in the afternoon, the victory was ſtill undetermined, when the inattention of thoſe who commanded the artillery, decided the fate of the day. Theſe officers, not having obſerved that their own troops occupied a poſt which the ABDOLLEES had juſt quitted, fired upon them; and the PERSIANS, knowing that the enemy had no cannon, were ſurprized and thrown into confuſion. The chiefs themſelves apprehended treachery, and ſeemed irreſolute in regard to what ſtep they ſhould take; when EZADALLAH tried to avail himſelf of a circumſtance, the cauſe of which was perhaps unknown to him. He therefore renewed the charge with freſh vigour, and meeting with only a faint reſiſtance, from men who were uneaſy and intimidated, he pierced their ſquadrons, and obliged them to turn their backs.

EZADALLAH ſpurred on by his hatred to the PERSIANS, and his deſire of enjoying all the advantages of his victory, purſued the enemy a whole day. The PERSIANS loſt in the action and flight 8000 men, among whom was their general, and his father SEFFIE KOULI KHAN, who were killed in the retreat. Their baggage, the military cheſt, and 20 pieces of cannon fell alſo into the hands of the ABDOLLEES; who on their part loſt 3000 men; which, to an infant republic, could be compenſated only by the liberty obtained by that memorable engagement.

The PERSIAN armies being thus unfortunate, new enemies declared againſt HUSSEIN. The MASCATS are a tribe of ARABIANS [y], whoſe country is the promontory towards the iſle of ORMUS, which forms the ſtreights

[y] The country over againſt GOMBROON, on the northern coaſt of ARABIA.

ſtreights of the PERSIAN gulf. Theſe people are MAHOMMEDANS of a particular ſect, yet more conformable to that of the SUNNIS, than of the SCHIAS[z]: they are ſubject to an IMAN[a], who has an abſolute authority over them. This prince taking advantage of the melancholy ſtate to which the kingdom of PERSIA was reduced, had already made himſelf maſter of the iſle of BAHARAIN[b]; and, not content with this ſucceſs, he threatened to take poſſeſſion of BENDER ABASSI[c]. 1719.

The court of PERSIA, unable to face all her enemies at once, ſeemed to have taken the reſolution of arming only againſt thoſe who declared laſt. They determined therefore to make preparations in order to oppoſe the deſigns of thoſe ARABS; and as affairs were now reduced to an extremity by their late defeat at HERAT, FATEY ALI KHAN, at that time ATHEMAT DOULET[d], offered to march thither in perſon; but the king fearing leſt he ſhould be rendered too powerful, by adding the authority of generaliſſimo to his preſent employment, returned him thanks, and appointed LUTF ALI KHAN, brother-in-law to that miniſter, to command the expedition.

In the beginning of the year 1720, this general marched a body of twenty thouſand men to the neighbourhood of BENDER ABASSI; and as the PERSIANS have no ſhips in that ſea, he waited for the PORTUGUESE fleet, which, purſuant to the treaty concluded with the viceroy of that nation, was to ſail from GOA, in order to tranſport his troops to the iſle of BAHARAIN. This fleet, conſiſting of four large veſſels, fifteen pinks[e], and ſome other tranſports, arrived ſoon after, and met with a kind reception from LUTF ALI KHAN. But whether it was that he did not think this fleet ſtrong enough to engage that of the MASCATS, or whether his enemies at court had with-held the money deſigned for this uſe; 1720.

[z] PERSIAN ſect. [a] An eccleſiaſtical ſovereign. [b] BAHARAIN ſignifies the two ſeas. An iſland famous for the PEARL fiſhery; it takes its name from a province of ARABIA FELIX, ſituated near it, between the RED SEA, and the PERSIAN gulf. [c] This place was called GOMBROON, before ABAS I. had put it in the condition in which it is at preſent. To effect this, he made uſe of the materials of the city of ORMUS, which he had lately demoliſhed. BENDER is of the ſame ſignification as DERBEND, *viz* port or fence of iron; BENDER ABASSI being properly the ſtrong port of ABAS. [d] Prime miniſter, as already explained. [e] Veſſels of 1 or 200 tuns, commonly known by this name.

1720. he did not pay the ſum that had been ſtipulated: the officer who commanded the fleet propoſed to ſend for a reinforcement, if the KHAN thought it proper; but finding this alſo ineffectual to obtain the payment, he prepared to ſail back again to GOA. In the mean time the enemy apprehending leſt the PORTUGUESE fleet ſhould be reinforced, reſolved to attack them. Accordingly their veſſels ſailed from the port of MASCAT, and ſoon appeared at the mouth of the ſtreight; the PORTUGUESE weighed anchor, and prepared to receive them; but having loſt a ſmall veſſel in the engagement, which in other reſpects was not favourable to them, they retired in the night, and ſailed directly for GOA. LUTF ALI KHAN thus became deſperate, as this accident diſappointed all his projects; and he was reduced to the neceſſity of defending the coaſt againſt the inſults of the MASCATS, when a ſignal occaſion happened of diſtinguiſhing his valour.

No ſooner had MIR MAGHMUD deprived MIR ABDALLAH his uncle of his life and throne, than he ſeemed deſirous of juſtifying ſo daring an action by ſome ſignal exploit. The PERSIANS had made no attempt for a long time againſt KANDAHAR; and the incurſions of the LESGEES, the KQURDS, and the OUSBEGS, together with the uneaſineſs occaſioned by the taking of BAHARAIN, and the revolt of HERAT, left no room to apprehend the leaſt danger from that quarter. And with regard to INDIA, the domeſtic troubles of that empire ſecured him ſufficiently againſt the enterprizes of the MOGHOL, as will appear from the following relation:

MAHOMMED FURRUKHSIR, the GREAT MOGHOL, having advanced SEYD ABDALLAH KHAN to the title of vizir [f], and his brother HASSAN ALI KHAN being the general pay-maſter [g] of the army; by their intrigues they acquired an unlimited authority, and at length ſeized on the perſon of their ſovereign, and deprived him of his ſight. In FEBRUARY 1719, they accompliſhed their work, and put him to an ignominious death, after a reign of ſeven years: they then choſe RAFFEEIH AL DIRJAT, a prince of the imperial blood, who had been for ſome time confined in the

[f] He had alſo that of KOTEB AL MULUCK, or axis of the empire, and IAR-BA-VAFA the grateful friend [g] MIR BUKHSHI.

the caſtle of SELIMGUR, but this prince dying a natural death, a few 1720.
days after theſe miniſters proclaimed prince SUJAMBADOUR.

This new election was not attended like the former, with the unanimous conſent of the people; for the inhabitants of AGRA, then eſteemed the capital of the empire, proclaimed NASR O DIN MAHOMMED SHAH[h], a grand-ſon of the famous AURING-ZEBE; and both parties being obſtinately bent to ſupport the emperor whom they had choſen, this double election was ſoon followed by a civil war. After ſeveral battles, the grand vizir apprehending that it would be a long time before the diſpute could be determined by force of arms, reſolved to bribe the principal inhabitants of AGRA, who opened their gates to him, and delivered up NASR O DIN MAHOMMED SHAH. But this event produced a very different effect from what might have been naturally expected; for a report being ſpread ſome days after, that prince SAJAMBADOUR had been put to death at DEHLI, NASR O DIN MAHOMMED, who conſidered himſelf as a ſacrifice to the ſecurity of his rival, was not only ſet at liberty, but acknowledged as emperor by both parties. And though the report was falſe; as they were heartily tired of the war, both parties agreed to put SAJAMBADOUR to death.

It is very remarkable, that the grand vizir and his brother acted with ſuch cunning, as to preſerve their whole authority during theſe troubles, though they ſoon became great objects of jealouſy. By diſbanding the armies, they had reſtored peace, but neither their own power, nor that of the emperor, were ſufficiently fixed, to engage them in an enterprize, the iſſue of which had been always fatal to the MOGHOLS.

As MIR MAGHMUD[i] was free from any apprehenſion on this ſide, he employed his thoughts intirely about the execution of his favourite deſign. MIR VAIS during his confinement at the court of PERSIA, had diſcovered ſo much of the weakneſs of the government, that it has been thought he then aſpired not only at making himſelf maſter of the province of KANDAHAR,

[h] NASR O DIN ſignifies the ſupporter and aſſiſter of religion. This is the ſame prince whom the PERSIAN uſurper NADIR invaded 20 years afterwards. [i] He is often called alſo MAGHMUD only; MIR has been already explained, page 29. and for this reaſon the hyphen between the words I diſcontinue as unneceſſary.

1720. HAR, but likewiſe of ſubduing the whole monarchy. Be that as it may, MIR MAGHMUD now prepared for this great enterprize; but as his reputation was not yet ſufficiently eſtabliſhed, to venture to propoſe it to the AFGHANS, he reſolved to engage in ſome expedition, by the ſucceſs of which he might expect to gain their confidence. With this view, he aſſembled the chief men of the nation towards the year 1720, and having laid open his deſign to them, he cauſed a proclamation to be made, that whoever was willing to march with him againſt the enemy, ſhould repair with his horſe and armour to a certain place by him appointed. By this means he raiſed about 10,000 men, and putting himſelf at the head of them, he took the road to KHERMAN, while LUTF ALI KHAN was advancing with his army towards BENDER ABASSI.

That part of SEGISTAN, which ſeparates the province of KHERMAN from the kingdom [k] of KANDAHAR, is a country in which for fifteen days march there is nothing but ſandy plains, with very few inhabitants. Theſe difficulties did not deter MIR MAGHMUD; on the contrary he was deſirous on this occaſion to try the courage and reſolution of his troops: beſides, as he had laid a ſcheme to penetrate very ſoon by that road into the heart of PERSIA, it was a point of ſome importance to be acquainted with the nature of that country. He knew that water is ſcarce in thoſe parts, and what little is found is hardly potable; this induced him to take the ſmaller number of horſes and mules, and to mount his AFGHANS two or three on a camel, this animal being inured to thirſt. As ſoon as he arrived on the frontier, he ordered theſe camels to be loaded with water, and in the ſame manner every ſoldier to fill the ſheeps guts which they carried for this purpoſe like a girdle about their waiſts; and thus prepared, the army entered theſe deſerts. He met no oppoſition during his march: the difficulties which he defied by taking this rout, conſtituted his ſecurity; but as the want of water, proviſions, and forage, of which it was impoſſible to carry a ſufficient quantity with them, together with the ſcorching heat of the ſun, ſupplied in ſome meaſure the place of enemies, he loſt two thouſand men,

[k] The reader muſt obſerve, that kingdom and province are ſometimes uſed for the ſame country, not only according to the ORIENTAL expreſſion, but that by revolutions they are rendered independent ſovereignties upon many occaſions.

men, and a conſiderable number of beaſts of burthen. The AFGHANS, 1720.
however, encouraged by the promiſes and example of their prince, bore with all theſe hardſhips, and at length paſſed the deſerts. They had ſcarce appeared on the frontier of KHERMAN, when the khan of this province having no troops to oppoſe them, retired with his family. MIR MAGHMUD entered the country without fighting, and purſuing his march, came and refreſhed his army in the very capital [k] of the province.

Tho' that city had opened her gates to MAGHMUD, yet he behaved as a conqueror: he laid heavy contributions, as well on the merchants, as the citizens, and put numbers of them to cruel tortures; ſuffering his troops to live at diſcretion: ſo that theſe miſerable people experienced all the horrors and calamities of war, without having had the conſolation of attempting to defend their lives and properties. They had been now four months ſubject to this tyrannical yoke, when LUTF ALI KHAN came and reſcued them from oppreſſion. This general, who was obliged to wait for enemies whom he could not go in ſearch of, no ſooner heard of what had paſſed in the province of KHERMAN, than he marched thither with a body of choſen troops. Fortune, which had been ſo favourable to the AFGHANS, now deſerted them; for their little army was defeated and put to flight. The news of ſo important and unexpected a victory, being brought to TÆHIRAN, where the king was lately arrived, ſuſpended the uneaſineſs of this prince, as well as of the whole court.

In the mean time, LUTF ALI KHAN perceiving that KHERMAN was the only place that could ſtop MAGHMUD, on the ſide of theſe deſerts, fortified that part which is called the upper town, and ſerves as a citadel; after which he left a ſtrong garriſon in the place, and joined the main body of his army. Whether it was from a thirſt of revenge of his enemies at court, who had conſiderable eſtates in thoſe parts; or that he was obliged to have recourſe to this expedient, in order to maintain his army; LUTF ALI KHAN laid heavy contributions on the country, taking

[k] This city, which bears the ſame name as the province, is famous all over the eaſt for the beauty of the ſaſſ..s and ſtuffs manufactured there. The wool, of which they are made, comes chiefly from the neighbouring mountains: it is ſaid that when their ſheep brouze on new graſs, the whole fleece falls off, and leaves the ſheep as if they had been ſhorn. Their wool is certainly allowed to be the fineſt and beſt we know of, and draws thither a number of INDIAN merchants.

1720. king all their arms, horſes and camels; and dividing his forces into different bodies, he quartered them upon the inhabitants at diſcretion. This continued till the autumn, when the army marched for SHIRASS, the capital of FARSISTAN, which had been pitched upon as the general rendezvous. The troops aſſembled there in the month of NOVEMRER 1720, and a better appointed army had not been ſeen for many years in PERSIA. Their camp enjoyed great plenty; a vaſt quantity of proviſions and ammunition having been amaſſed by means of ſeveral thouſands of camels, which were employed for that purpoſe. The troops, encouraged alſo by the victory at KHERMAN, were impatient to be led againſt the enemy; and every thing ſeemed to preſage the ruin of the AFGHANS, againſt whom all theſe preparations were making. But in ſpite of theſe favourable circumſtances, PERSIA ſeemed devoted to ruin; for the general was arreſted and ſent a priſoner to court, and the whole army at once diſperſed.

This ſudden change was owing to thoſe lords, whoſe lands had been lately ravaged by LUTF ALI KHAN: incenſed at the diſregard which he had ſhewn them on this occaſion, they figured to themſelves how low their own intereſt would be reduced, if ſo great a piece of ſervice, as the reduction of KANDAHAR, were added to the credit which the general had already acquired with the king, on accoūnt of his firſt victory. They reſolved therefore to employ every engine of falſhood and malice, to prevent his marching upon that expedition; and deſpairing to ſucceed in their deſign, ſo long as FATEY ALI KHAN continued in his office, this miniſter was the firſt victim whom they undertook to ſacrifice to their own imaginary ſecurity.

The method which they took to attain their end, was as bold as it was wicked. The king's chief MULLAH[l], and the HAKEM BACHI[m], who were concerned in the plot, entered this prince's bed-chamber in the middle of the night, and imploring his pardon for ſo daring an intruſion, informed him of the imminent danger which he was in: they told him with all the appearance of the utmoſt conſternation, that they had juſt diſcovered a conſpiracy formed againſt his majeſty's crown and life: that

LUTF

[l] Either the PICHE-NAHMAZ, or great almoner; or the KHODAFA, the chaplain. [m] The chief phyſician.

LUTF ALI KHAN was to enter ISFAHAN with his army, and to ſeize on 1720.
the royal family; while the ATHEMAT DOULET[n], ſupported by a body of 3000 KOURDS, who were on their march, under the command of a prince of that nation, was to ſecure his majeſty's perſon: that there was not a moment to loſe, for this very night the conſpirators intended to execute their execrable deſign. In proof of what they had advanced, they produced a letter, which they pretended had been written by the prime miniſter to the prince of the KOURDS. This letter had the counterfeit of the royal ſeal upon it: SHAH HUSSEIN no ſooner caſt his eyes upon the ſeal, than imagining he knew it, he concluded he was undone, and his terror deprived him of his ſenſes. While he was coming to himſelf, a council was called in a hurry, compoſed of ſome of the principal eunuchs, who were accomplices with the two accuſers; and after a very ſhort conſultation, the king ſent for the KURCHI BACHI[o], and commanded him to go with what number of ſoldiers he could get together, to break open the prime miniſter's houſe, and to bring him his head.

This order however was not ſtrictly executed; for the eunuchs intending to oblige him to make a diſcovery of his effects, which they hoped would be confiſcated in their favour, repreſented to the king that it was not proper to put him to death if he made no reſiſtance; to which SHAH HUSSEIN acquieſced. The ATHEMAT DOULET, who was aſleep in his harram, made no ſcruple to obey: as ſoon as he was brought to the KURCHI BACHI, his eyes were plucked out, as if he had been convicted of high-treaſon; after which, under a pretext of extorting a confeſſion of his accomplices, and the circumſtances of the conſpiracy, but in reality to force him to diſcover his effects, he was put to the torture.

No ſooner was this wild reſolution taken of arreſting the ATHEMAT DOULET, than meſſengers were diſpatched on every ſide to ſecure the relations and friends of this unfortunate miniſter. The commiſſion however ſeemed difficult to execute in regard to LUTF ALI KHAN his brother-in-law;

[n] Prime miniſter.

[o] The general of the KURCHIS, one of the troops of horſe belonging to his majeſty's houſhold.

1720. in-law; and it would have been ſo indeed, if this general had been guilty of the crime with which he was charged. The governor of SHIRASS was ordered by the king to intice him into the town, and there to ſeize on his perſon, and ſend him under a proper guard to ISFAHAN. The governor found no difficulty in executing his commiſſion; for LUTF ALI KHAN, having no deſign but to march againſt the enemies of his country, ſuſpected no evil. Such was the reward which this general received for his ſignal ſervices. His diſgrace was followed with the diſperſion of the whole army; for the khans and other lords, who commanded the different bodies of which it was compoſed, apprehending from this example that they ſhould be called to an account for the depredations committed in KHERMAN, retired to their own eſtates; inſomuch, that of this flouriſhing army, which promiſed ſecurity to PERSIA, in a few days nothing remained, except the artillery, ammunition, and proviſions.

In the mean time every thing was in confuſion at TÆHIRAN, where they were making preparations to defend themſelves againſt the three thouſand KOURDS who were hourly expected; but as ſoon as it was day, and the king ſaw that no enemy appeared, and had alſo been informed by people arrived from different quarters, and by the ſeveral bodies of horſe which were ſent out as ſcouts, that every thing was perfectly quiet in the neighbourhood, this deluded prince began to ſuſpect that they had impoſed upon him. Under this ſuſpence he ſent for the HAKIM BACHI, and with a very ſevere tone, which he ſeldom aſſumed, he bid him take care that the wounds they had made in the ATHEMAT DOULET, by plucking out his eyes, did not endanger his life, for that his ſhould anſwer for it. This declaration in all probability ſaved the life of that unfortunate man; whoſe barbarous enemies would probably have taken his life alſo, from an apprehenſion leſt he ſhould ruin them by detecting the villainous falſity of all their impoſtures.

The ATHEMAT DOULET recovered; and the couriers, who had been ſent, bringing intelligence that the army had made no motion, the SHAH was confirmed in his ſuſpicions, and reſolved to examine the affair in a juridical manner.

CHAP. XII.

A divan is held, in which the king preſides, to examine into the conduct of the ATHEMAT DOULET. *Articles of accuſation brought againſt him; his anſwer and defence.*

THE day being fixed for the trial of this great cauſe, the king determined to preſide in perſon at the divan, which was compoſed of all the miniſters and great officers of ſtate. The priſoner being brought into the court, the ſeſſion was opened with a recital of the ſeveral articles of complaint. The crimes laid to his charge were chiefly theſe, *viz.* 1720.
" I. That he had written and ſealed with the royal ſeal, of which he " was the depoſitory in virtue of his office of prime miniſter, a letter by " which he deſired one of the princes of the KOURDS, to bring a body " of 3000 men with him to TÆHIRAN, in order to ſeize on the perſon " of the king. II. That he had maintained a correſpondence with the " LESGEES, from his attachment to the ſect of the SUNNIS which he " profeſſed; and that he had written a letter to one of their chiefs, which " was alſo produced, and by which he gave him intelligence that they " might continue their depredations with all ſecurity, provided they did " not advance towards ERIVAN, where one of his nephews commanded. " III. That he had ſaid one day, when he was in the city of KOOM, at " the tomb of SHAH SULIMAN, by whoſe orders his father had been put " to death; that the time would come, when he would revenge his " father's death, by that of SHAH HUSSEIN, his ſon, and all the royal " family." But this laſt accuſation had no other proof to ſupport it, than the depoſition of this miniſter's valet de chambre.

Beſides theſe three capital articles, ſeveral others were added, which ſeemed to be rather reproaches againſt his conduct, than ſubjects of accuſation. It was laid to his charge, that he had decided all affairs of himſelf, and without the advice of the council, and the other miniſters. That his orders were more reſpected in the provinces, than thoſe of the king. That he had married his daughters and nieces to the principal

1720. lords of the kingdom, from whence it was inferred that he intended to form a powerful party. That he had diſpoſed of the government of provinces to his nephews, who were but children: and laſtly, that as his eſtate by his own acknowledgment, amounted to the ſum of nine hundred thouſand tomans[p], it was impoſſible he could have amaſſed ſuch immenſe wealth, without extortion, or, at leaſt, embezzlement of the royal revenues.

Theſe were the articles of complaint againſt this miniſter: upon which the king having aſked him whether he had any thing to ſay in his defence, he turned towards the place from whence he heard the voice, and addreſſed the king with a heroic firmneſs, but in a reſpectful tone. "Great "prince, the juſtification which you require of your ſlave, would be "intirely uſeleſs, were it intended for no other purpoſe than to preſerve "his life, in the deplorable ſituation to which malice and impoſture have "reduced him: life is now become a load to him, undeſerving of ſuch "care. But ſince his honour, and the glory which his family has ac-"quired in the ſervice of your auguſt anceſtors, do not permit him to be "ſilent, while envy and malice are raiſing their batteries againſt him, he "will convince your majeſty, that if you had deigned to hear him be-"fore you pronounced his ſentence, it would have been as eaſy to con-"found the calumny of his accuſers, as to ward off the fatal blow with "which his innocence has been oppreſſed."

After this tacit reproach, the ATHEMAT DOULET ceaſing to addreſs himſelf in direct terms to the king, continued his diſcourſe to this effect:

"If the pretended conſpiracy had not been the means projected, by "which my enemies have ruined me, they would never have thought "of ſo abſurd, as well as heavy a charge againſt me. Does not this im-"poſture refute itſelf? When was it they intercepted this fatal letter, "which has ſerved as a foundation to this monſtrous ſtructure of ini-"quity? Was it ſent from TÆHIRAN; and intercepted before it came "to hand? Or returned to them from the KOURDS? The KOURDS were "to make their appearance that night; if the letter was intercepted, how "was that poſſible, for theſe rebels had twelve days march to make? "the

[p] 2,250,000 l.

" the letter muſt conſequently have been a long time in the hands of 1720.
" my accuſers, which renders them accomplices of my ſuppoſed crime:
" therefore the chief to whom I wrote, muſt have ſent it back: but if
" ſo, why ſhould they have been afraid of thoſe troops? And if they con-
" trived to take it from him upon his march, who is it that has hindered
" this prince from appearing before our gates? Let my enemies explain
" themſelves; how is this important piece come hither: and why have
" they waited for the very moment in which the conſpiracy was to take
" effect, before they ſhewed it to their majeſties?

" The circumſtances with which theſe informers corroborate their ac-
" cuſation, plainly ſhew their impoſture. They ſay that I intended that
" very night with three thouſand men to lay hands on the ſacred perſon
" of my ſovereign, ſurrounded by his courtiers, and by a guard of fifteen
" thouſand men; and yet they found me aſleep in my harram, with no
" other people about me than my own domeſtics. LUTF ALI KHAN,
" who is ſuppoſed to have intended at the ſame time to take poſſeſſion
" of the capital, we do not hear has made any motion at all with his
" troops; and the prince of the KOURDS, to whom I am ſaid to have
" ordered the gates of the city to be opened that night, is ſixty farſangs[q]
" diſtant from the frontier, and has not ſet his foot in the province. I
" ſhall not dwell any longer on the refutation of this part of the charge;
" their majeſties have too much penetration not to ſee eaſily into the ab-
" ſurdity of it. I ſhall proceed to the other crimes of which I am ac-
" cuſed."

" It is true, I am a SUNNI[r], as my anceſtors were; nor have I ever
" ſacrificed my faith to the ſecurity of my fortune; but I never kept it
" a ſecret from the king, nor from the reſt of the nation; and their
" majeſties, by entruſting me with the adminiſtration of affairs, plainly
" ſhewed that this difference of perſuaſion was no juſt reaſon for doubt-
" ing of my allegiance. But they have produced a letter, which they
" pretend I wrote to a chief of the LESGEES, encouraging thoſe people
" to continue their depredations. Is it not evident that this is an artifice

[q] A farſang is four ENGLISH miles. [r] Sect of the TURKS.

1720. " like the former? Is there any great difficulty in counterfeiting a BUL[a] " in a country, where the moſt experienced SARAF[b] can hardly diſcern " a piece of ſpurious coin from that which has paſſed thro' the royal mint. " Theſe dumb teſtimonies determine nothing, if they are not ſupported " by other proofs: and what other proofs have they to alledge againſt " me? Every one knows, that the king having enjoined me by a ſpecial " commiſſion to ſuppreſs the inſolence of thoſe mountaineers, I charged " my nephew with this expedition. Now this young man, whom I " loved as my ſon, and had publicly adopted as my heir, was ſlain by " thoſe very LESGEES, with whom they pretend I held a criminal cor- " reſpondence: and ſurely his unhappy cataſtrophe is a full juſtification " of my conduct in this particular. The depredations of thoſe people " ought not to be laid to my charge, but to thoſe who were the cauſe " of them, by converting to their own uſe, for ſeveral ſucceſſive years, " the ſubſidies granted by treaty to the LESGEES.

" With reſpect to the execrable menaces which they accuſe me of " having uttered at KOOM, ſurely it would be a matter of amazement to " all the world, if in ſo numerous a family as that of an ATHEMAT " DOULET, there was not one domeſtic to be found whom money could " corrupt. But tho' this teſtimony is not ſufficient, according to law; " yet there is the higheſt reaſon, ſince the ſacred perſon of the prince " is concerned, that no means ſhould be neglected that can confirm or " invalidate his allegation. Let this wretch be therefore put to the rack, " and he will declare the perſons by whom he has been corrupted; by " which means perhaps a complete diſcovery will be made of the ini- " quitous deſigns of my enemies. This," continued the miniſter, " is " what I have to anſwer to the former parts of my charge; and it will " be as eaſy to juſtify myſelf in the latter.

" During my whole adminiſtration, I never determined upon any af- " fair of moment without the king's expreſs directions: for the truth of " this I appeal to their majeſties, who know it beſt. As to the ordinary " buſineſs

[a] The BUL generally contains the name of the perſon, oftentimes with the addition of a moral ſentence, engraved on a ſeal, which they uſe with ink, as deſcribed in Vol. I. Chap. 47. in the manner as EUROPEANS ſubſcribe their names. [b] A money changer.

" buſineſs of my miniſtry, I always conſulted certain perſons who now 1720.
" make this complaint, till I found them diſaffected to my perſon, and
" too much attached to their own private intereſt, to give me any counſel
" capable of promoting the public good. If thoſe very perſons, who
" now ſeem ſo tender of the reſpect due to the ſupreme authority, had
" not often cauſed the orders ſent into the provinces, even in the king's
" name, to be revoked, they would not have the boldneſs to accuſe me
" of a fault of which they are conſcious of being guilty themſelves. For
" my own part, I obſerved a quite different conduct, by making it a
" rule never to retract, either through intereſt or ſolicitation, whatever I
" had once determined, after a thorough knowledge of the matter.

" I could not have expected, I own, that I ſhould be accuſed of having
" ſettled my daughters and nieces in a manner ſuitable to my dignity and
" their birth. Do my enemies imagine, that a miniſter ſo greatly fa-
" voured by his maſter, ſhould forget himſelf to that degree, as to ſeek
" huſbands for his daughters from among the dregs of the people; or
" diſhonour the blood of the ancient kings of DAGHESTAN, from which
" he has the honour of being deſcended? Would they have me court
" the protection of eunuchs, and ally my family with their creatures and
" domeſtics? But not ſatisfied with reproaching me for the advantageous
" ſettlement of my daughters; they require me to make an excuſe for
" the king's indulgence, in granting the government of ſome provinces
" to two of my nephews. It is true, I ſolicited that favour, but not
" without a precedent; ſince their majeſties had granted it to others who
" were never cenſured for it. Thus, great prince," continued he, " the
" fury of my enemies has tranſported them ſo far, that they are not afraid
" of challenging me for your goodneſs. They demand of me an account
" of my effects, and forgetting that I hold the greateſt part of what I
" poſſeſs from the royal bounty; can they pretend to be ignorant that I
" was born to a great eſtate, that I inherit my brother's fortunes, and
" that the good œconomy with which I have always lived, has increaſed
" my property. I intended to leave all to my nephews, and my daugh-
" ters; and ſo natural a conſideration might have juſtified my parſimony:
" but what pretext have my enemies for their inſatiable avarice! have

" they

1720. " they any ſuch relations, or are they capable of heirs[u]? What uſe would " they make of their riches, unleſs they would ſend every year to MECCA " and MEDINA camels loaded with wealth, and violate with impunity " the laws of the kingdom, by which ſuch pilgrimages are expreſſly " forbidden?"

The ATHEMAT DOULET having finiſhed his vindication; his accuſers alledged againſt him further, that the expedition of BAHARAIN had miſcarried by his colluſion with the officers of the PORTUGUESE fleet: that in conjunction with LUTF ALI KHAN, he had betrayed the intereſts of the ſtate, by not making a proper uſe of the conſternation of the rebels after the victory of KHERMAN by laying ſiege to KANDAHAR; charging him with all the violences committed upon the ſea coaſt towards the end of the campaign, and inſiſting on his declaring the motives that engaged his brother-in-law to march towards SHIRASS, inſtead of leading his army, as the court intended, againſt the AFGHANS.

" I might very eaſily," replied the miniſter, " avoid entering into any " diſcuſſion upon this ſubject; for it would be ſufficient for me to al- " ledge, that ſince no man is anſwerable for more than his own actions, " I cannot, without manifeſt injuſtice, be charged with any faults com- " mitted by my brother: but the conduct of this general has been ſo " prudent and ſo agreeable to the real intereſts of the ſtate, that I am not " afraid to be anſwerable for his military operations. All the world " knows, that the great SHAH ABAS having diſpoſſeſſed the PORTUGUESE " of the iſle of ORMUS, by the aſſiſtance of the ENGLISH fleet[w]; this " prince, in order to preſerve his conqueſt, without being obliged to " maintain a number of ſhips, concluded a peace with them, and con- " ſented to let them have the moiety of the duties collected in the iſland, " which was afterwards valued at a certain ſum. It is alſo well known, " that the funds appropriated to this uſe have been for many years applied " to other purpoſes: the embaſſador whom their majeſties appoint to " reſide

[u] Here he alludes to the eunuchs.

[w] ALFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE conquered the iſle and city of ORMUS in 1507; it was taken again by the PERSIANS in 1622, when the ENGLISH had a grant of duties at BENDER ABASSI the new town.

" reſide at GOA, could not therefore engage the viceroy to ſend his fleet 1720.
" into that ſea, without promiſing to pay part of the arrears. But LUTF
" ALI KHAN not being able to perform ſuch agreement, for want of the
" money, which was never remitted to him, as we can eaſily prove, the
" PORTUGUESE commander, incenſed at this breach of promiſe, not only
" refuſed to take our troops on board, but put back to ſea. This is the
" plain matter of fact, the truth of which will be atteſted, if neceſſary,
" by the commiſſary of this very fleet, who is now at ISFAHAN.

" But LUTF ALI KHAN, they pretend, ought to have made a proper
" uſe of his victory, by forcing the rebels in their own capital[x]. Is it
" poſſible that ſuch arguments as theſe ſhould come from perſons who
" concern themſelves in the adminiſtration of public affairs? Is it not
" well known, that this general had only a detachment of his army with
" him? Would it have been right in him, without ammunition or pro-
" viſions, to undertake, juſt after the harveſt, the ſiege of a place ex-
" tremely well fortified, and defended by an army double the number
" of his own? He was too prudent to take ſo raſh a ſtep, but contented
" himſelf, for that time, with putting the city of KHERMAN in a poſture
" of defence; and I am not afraid to own, that it was by my advice he
" afterwards joined the main body of his army. Having afterwards de-
" termined to carry the war into the province of KANDAHAR, he ſet
" about making the neceſſary preparations for this great expedition. He
" was then obliged to make the province[y] furniſh the money and pro-
" viſions for the ſubſiſtence of his troops; and if in the execution of
" thoſe orders, there was a mixture of prejudice or reſentment, this is a
" fault that ought not to be ranked amongſt crimes committed againſt
" the ſtate.

" Such was the real cauſe of thoſe irregularities which have been ſo
" greatly exaggerated. In regard to the motives which determined LUTF
" ALI KHAN to advance towards SHIRASS, it is eaſy to account for them.
" This general, grown wiſe by the fatal example of KHOSROFF KHAN,
" had

[x] KANDAHAR. [y] KHERMANIA.

1720. " had determined to ſurprize the rebels, leſt they ſhould deſtroy the " crop, which is gathered in that country two moons before the vernal " equinox. He could not therefore take a better meaſure, than to ad- " vance towards this city; becauſe here he was in a ſituation to traverſe " the deſerts by the ſhorteſt way: beſides, he conſidered that it was " much eaſier to form magazines in the center of a fruitful province, and " at no great diſtance from the capital, than on a barren coaſt. It is " notorious, that he ſpared neither money, ſolicitations, nor care, to " gather in thoſe proviſions; and that I even ſent, at my own expence, " 3000 camels loaded with rice. If we had any deſign, as our enemies " pretend, to march the army againſt ISFAHAN, the carrying away ſuch " a prodigious quantity of proviſions was an unpopular meaſure, and " tended to incenſe the people againſt us; for they were already irritated " by the burthens laid on them. But it is needleſs to ſpend any more " time in juſtifying a conduct, the rectitude and prudence of which are " evident: it is now time that their happy majeſties, who are the ſhadow " of GOD upon earth, ſhould determine the cauſe between innocence " and impoſture."

CHAP. XIII.

Death and character of the ATHEMAT DOULET. *Excurſions of the* LESGEES. *Magnanimity of* VACHTANGA; *he puts on the turbant, and is named* VALI *of* GEORGIA. *Preparations made by this prince againſt the* LESGEES, *whom he reduces to extremity. They are ſaved from deſtruction by a court intrigue.* VACHTANGA *takes an oath never to appear in arms in defence of* PERSIA.

FATEY ALI KHAN having thus finiſhed his apology, the king, far from being offended with the liberty with which he had delivered himſelf, could not help weeping at the misfortunes occaſioned by his precipitate judgment. And yet as this diſgrace was irreparable, and the court imagined they could no longer put any confidence in a man whom they

they had uſed ſo barbarouſly; after he had been a victim to malice and credulity, he fell a ſacrifice to policy, and was ſent a priſoner to the caſtle of SHIRASS: but SHAH HUSSEIN to ſoften in ſome meaſure the rigour of this ſentence, granted him a conſiderable penſion, and endeavoured to comfort him by repreſenting the inevitable neceſſity of fate [z]. The ATHEMAT DOULET died in priſon a little after the taking of ISFAHAN [a]. It was imagined that he made uſe of poiſon, fearing leſt MIR MAGHMUD ſhould oblige him to make diſcoveries prejudicial to the ſtate: but it is more probable that he fell under the weight of his own misfortunes, and thoſe in which his country was now involved, by the evil government of his enemies. 1720.

SHAH HUSSEIN thus loſt the wiſeſt of his miniſters. He had the nobleſt mien of any perſon at court; and as he mentioned in his juſtification, owed to his œconomy and good management, that great fortune of which he was poſſeſſed. As to the conſpiracy, it was undoubtedly a contrivance of his enemies; but tho' his integrity was untainted in this particular, his reputation was not without blemiſh. It is beyond diſpute, that after MIR VAIS was ſent priſoner to ISFAHAN, FATEY ALI KHAN took him under his protection, and ſent him back to KANDAHAR. Now, whether he was moved by compaſſion for that prince, who was a SUNNI as well as himſelf; or whether he acted from an averſion to GURGHIN KHAN; or laſtly, through the temptation of the great preſents he received from the priſoner; it was certainly a dangerous ſtep, and ſufficient to render his fidelity ſuſpected. Beſides, he was already appointed ATHEMAT DOULET, or of the ſame party as the perſon who then occupied that poſt, when KHOSROFF KHAN marched againſt the AFGHANS; and this cabal was charged with being the cauſe of the death of that prince, and of the total defeat of the army.

But theſe are not the only crimes with which ſome writers have ſtained the memory of this miniſter. A miſſionary, who was at SHAMAKIE at the taking of that city, aſſerts, that FATEY ALI KHAN, provoked at not having been able to obtain of SHAH HUSSEIN the abolition of the CA-

[z] Predeſtinarianiſm is a fundamental principle of the MAHOMMEDAN religion. [a] By the AFGHANS near two years afterwards.

1720. RACK [b], impoſed on the SUNNIS, and the cuſtom of uttering maledictions againſt the three firſt caliphs, with which the PERSIANS always end their public prayers, formed a project to ſubvert the government of the SCHIAS, and to aſcend the throne himſelf. Filled with this idea, he ſaw no nation on whom he could depend ſo well as on the LESGEES, becauſe he was deſcended from their ancient kings, and moreover moſt of their tribes are of this ſect. Hence he engaged them to take up arms, and to make incurſions into the province of SHIRVAN; not queſtioning but as a conſiderable number of the inhabitants profeſſed this ſame religion, the province would ſhake off the yoke, and join their forces to thoſe of the rebels.

Be that as it may, SHAH HUSSEIN remained ſo ſtrongly perſuaded of the innocence of this miniſter, that tho' he had the great weakneſs to pardon his accuſers, yet the conduct he obſerved towards thoſe who had been confined upon this account, ſufficiently evinces that he did not believe him guilty. All of them, without exception, had their eſtates reſtored to them; and if ſome who were poſſeſſed of governments had them taken from them, and others were detained at ISFAHAN, this was only thro' fear, leſt they ſhould be induced by their reſentments to juſtify the ſuſpicions conceived of them. It is even obſerved, that tho' the ATHEMAT DOULET's eſtate was confiſcated; yet the ſeveral portions were excepted, which belonged to his ſons-in-law, MAHOMMED KOULI KHAN, the prince of KAKET [c], and to the KOULLAR AGASSI [d], brother of the VALI of GEORGIA, as their wives portion. True it is, that as the fidelity of theſe lords was well known, they were not included in the number of thoſe whom the court was to have an eye over; and LUTF ALI KHAN, who had been conſidered as one of the chiefs of the pretended conſpiracy, and as ſuch had been removed to TAHIRAN, underwent no other puniſhment than that of reſtoring to the king the plunder he had taken upon the frontier,

[b] A poll-tax paid in MAHOMMEDAN countries by ſubjects who are of a different religion from that of the prince. [c] KAKET, a province, the government of which is ſometimes joined to that of KARABAGH, and ſometimes to that of GEORGIA. It has alſo had its general governors; from whence they have derived the name of prince. [d] The chief of the ſlaves: a body of cavalry, compoſed of men of diſtinction, who ſtile themſelves the king's ſlaves.

frontier, and of being watched at ISFAHAN, not as a ſtate-criminal, but as a man who had juſt cauſe to be diſaffected to the government. 1720.

This ſtorm was at length ſucceeded by ſome days of calm. The LESGEES, whoſe incurſions had given great uneaſineſs to the court, ſent deputies to ISFAHAN to ſue for a reconciliation. The anxiety with which this revolt had filled the minds of SHAH HUSSEIN and his miniſters, was well founded: for thoſe people having driven away the collectors and other officers belonging to the king, aſſembled towards the beginning of 1719 to the number of two thouſand men; and, commanded by MULLA ABDALLAH, and KANLU SABAN, their chiefs, they made incurſions, and ſpread terror and deſolation in ſome of the neighbouring parts of GEORGIA. Their reputation and forces having increaſed by their ſucceſs, they were joined by a body of near 30,000 of the inhabitants of SHIRVAN, who were of the ſect of the SUNNIS, and puſhed their hoſtilities to the gates of GANJA and SHAMAKIE. At length the khan, who commanded in the latter, having received orders to oppoſe theſe hoſtilities, marched at the head of forty thouſand men againſt the rebels, who were then incamped in a plain between GANJA and the borders of SHIRVAN. But juſt when he was preparing to attack them, they ſurprized him in the night, ſo that part of his army was cut to pieces, and the remainder diſperſed. The khan[e] himſelf periſhed on this occaſion, with moſt of his principal officers.

The fear of the reſentment of a power over whom they had obtained ſo ſignal a triumph, was not the motive which induced theſe people to ſue for peace. They were determined to take this ſtep by a more preſſing conſideration; which I ſhall explain by tracing matters ſomewhat higher.

After KHOSROFF KHAN was ſlain before KANDAHAR, VACHTANGA, as the eldeſt of the family, ought in courſe to have ſucceeded him in the dignity of VALI of GEORGIA; but as he refuſed to wear the turbant[f], his younger brother, tho' the patriarch of that country, offered himſelf in

[e] This being the firſt battle of any conſequence that was fought between the PERSIANS and LESGEES in HUSSEIN's reign, renders it probable, that this khan was the nephew of FATEY ALI KHAN mentioned in his vindication, page 78. [f] This is ſometimes uſed as an expreſſion to denote the MAHOMMEDAN religion; tho' the ARMENIANS, who are chriſtians, wear turbants in PERSIA.

1720. in his ſtead. Their father, then DIVAN BEGHI of ISFAHAN, tho' a MAHOMMEDAN himſelf, was ſo incenſed at this ſcandalous propoſal, that he ordered this irreligious prieſt to be baſtinadoed, and kept to his ſacerdotal function. The inveſtiture of this principality was then given to the third ſon, who being leſs ſcrupulous than the eldeſt, and ſomewhat leſs culpable than the ſecond, embraced the MAHOMMEDAN religion.

VACHTANGA, tho' baniſhed to KHERMAN, perſevered in his glorious reſolution many years; but at length the ſolicitations of the court, joined to the irkſomneſs of his exile, overcame his conſtancy: he renounced, or more probably pretended that he renounced, chriſtianity, and in conſequence thereof was named VALI of GEORGIA. This new prince repaired to TEFFLIS in 1719: he was ſcarce arrived there, when beholding with ſorrow and indignation, the devaſtations which the LESGEES had committed in his territories, he determined to revenge the cauſe of his people in ſuch a manner, as ſhould ſecure them for ages againſt their dangerous neighbours. Having obtained the conſent of the nobility, who were convened upon this account, he ordered every GEORGIAN that was able to bear arms, to join him in that capital; he alſo made every other preparation that was neceſſary, and the enſuing ſpring would have been ready to take the field at the head of 60,000 men.

The LESGEES ſaw into his deſign, and concluded they were undone: their only reſource was to implore the clemency of SHAH HUSSEIN, and to perſuade this prince to interpoſe his authority in their favour. Such was the motive of the deputation they now ſent: but the GEORGIANS were in arms, when the king's firſt MULLAH, and the phyſician [h], invoked their infernal genius to conjure up another ſtorm. Theſe treacherous courtiers, reflecting that a ſon-in-law of the ATHEMAT DOULET, who lately fell a ſacrifice to their impoſtures, was brother to this prince; were afraid leſt after having defeated the LESGEES, he might attempt to make uſe of ſo fine an army, to oblige the court to puniſh them for their iniquitous conduct. They availed themſelves therefore of the aſcendant they had gained over their weak and deluded ſovereign, and repreſented that VACHTANGA, after defeating

[h] HAKEM BASHI.

defeating his enemies, might occaſion great troubles in PERSIA, eſpecially as it would then be very eaſy for him to receive conſiderable ſuccours from RUSSIA by ſea: therefore the only way to prevent theſe misfortunes, would be to grant a peace to the LESGEES, and order the VALI to ceaſe all hoſtilities, which would oblige this prince to diſband his troops, and remove all apprehenſion of danger from his ambition; moreover, that this meaſure would prevent the depopulation of a province, which the vicinity of the ſea rendered very conſiderable, without expoſing PERSIA to any future invaſions from thoſe people; for the dread of being delivered up to the reſentment of the GEORGIANS, would neceſſarily contain them within the bounds of their duty. 1720.

SHAH HUSSEIN, perſuaded by this artful diſcourſe, made no difficulty to grant a peace to the rebels. And without keeping any meaſures with the VALI of GEORGIA, he forbad him in the moſt imperious and haughty manner to give them any further diſturbance. His orders were: "If "you have got your foot in the ſtirrup, alight immediately. If you have "drawn your ſabre, put it directly into the ſcabbard; and if you are in "purſuit of the LESGEES, ſtop the moment you receive our commands; "in a word, take the utmoſt care not to infringe the peace which they "have obtained from the clemency of him whom the univerſe obeys."

VACHTANGA was already in full march, and upon the point of cruſhing his enemies, when he received theſe ſtrict and unwelcome orders. It is generally believed that the only motive which induced him to ſtop his purſuit, and obey the imprudent orders of the PERSIAN court, aroſe from an apprehenſion leſt the chiefs of the nation ſhould deſert him, as they had formerly deſerted GURGHIN KHAN. Be that as it may, he declared he would obey, but it was in terms that clearly demonſtrated the height of his reſentment. After ordering the courier into his preſence, he drew his ſabre, and ſwore he would never fight again in the ſervice of the king, nor in the defence of PERSIA. He then diſbanded his troops, and withdrew to TEFFLIS, fully determined to obſerve his oath inviolate.

PART

PART IV.

THE

REVOLUTIONS OF PERSIA,

FROM THE

COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 1721,

TO THE

BATTLE OF GULNABAD IN 1722.

CHAP. XIV.

Pacific diſpoſitions of the AFGHANS.. *Uneaſineſs given to the court of* ISFAHAN *by the arrival of the* TURKISH *embaſſador.* HUSSEIN *ſends an embaſſador to the grand ſignior; and frightened by various preſages, returns to* ISFAHAN. *The* LESGEES *lay ſiege to* SHAMAKIE, *take it, and commit great cruelties; they make themſelves maſters of the reſt of* SHIRVAN, *beat the* KHAN *of* ERIVAN, *and lay ſiege to* GANJA. *The court in great conſternation.*

1721. AT the commencement of this year, things ſeemed to promiſe tranquillity. The ready ſubmiſſion of the VALI of GEORGIA, and the pacification of DAGISTAN, put an end to the anxiety which had been created by the formidable army of that prince, and by the excurſions of the LESGEES. Advice was alſo come, that the rebels of KANDAHAR, intimidated by their defeat, were ready to enter into an accommodation: and the peace and reſtitution of the iſle of BAHARAIN, which were negotiated by the king's orders, and actually concluded in

the courſe of this year, by means of eight thouſand tomans[i], gave room 1721.
to hope, that the monarchy thus delivered from its principal enemies, might ſubdue the reſt, whom fear and example would hereafter contain within proper bounds.

But there was one circumſtance which ſtill diſturbed the court. They had heard by letters from HASSAN BASHA, the governor of BAGDAT, that an embaſſador from the OTTOMAN port was ready to ſet out for TÆHIRAN: and as it was well known that the grand vizir[k], ALI BACHA[l], deſigned to declare war againſt PERSIA, when he was killed at the battle of PETERWARADIN[m]; they had reaſon to apprehend, leſt his ſucceſſor ſhould inſpire the grand ſignior with the ſame ſentiments, eſpecially at a time when the peace of PASSAROWITZ, and the inteſtine commotions of that kingdom, afforded a favourable opportunity for ſuch an undertaking.

Under theſe circumſtances, the timorous court of HUSSEIN concluded that this miniſter was come to demand the ceſſion of ſome province, and to declare war in caſe of a refuſal. And tho' the king had already reſolved to ſend an embaſſador to CONSTANTINOPLE, in order to ſound the diſpoſition of the port; and, if there ſhould be occaſion, to purchaſe the continuation of the peace, by offering to yield ſome extent of territory towards ERIVAN or KERKOUD; yet the uncertainty he was under, whether the TURKS would be contented with theſe terms, occaſioned great uneaſineſs.

As the king could not avoid giving audience to this miniſter, the governors of the places through which he was to paſs, had orders to receive him with all the honours and reſpect due to his character. He came by KERMANSHA, HAMADAN, DERGHESIN, and CASBIN to TÆHIRAN, where he arrived towards the beginning of JANUARY 1721, two months after his departure from the frontier, and the diſgrace of the ATHEMAT DOULET.

The

[i] 20,000 *l.* [k] Vazir or vizir, in the ARABIAN tongue ſignifies a porter. In TURKY this title is given to the counſellors of ſtate; and that of vizir-azem, or grand vizir, is firſt minſter. [l] This miniſter was remarkable for his integrity; but he was severe, and hated the chriſtians, whom he conſidered as the natural enemies of his maſter. [m] A ſtrong town of SCLAVONIA on the DANUBE, ſubject to the houſe of AUSTRIA.

1721. The embaſſador, whoſe name was DOURI EFFENDI[n], has given the following relation himſelf of the ceremony of his being admitted to audience. " In this order I went to the palace of TCHARBAG, where having " alighted from my horſe at the third gate, I entered the audience cham- " ber. The SHAH was ſeated oppoſite the door: at his right and left " were a great number of officers[o]: there were alſo thirty PERSIANS[p] " magnificently armed, and about ten miniſters or great officers of the " kingdom; the latter were ſeated. I paſſed through the midſt of them " with a ſtately gait; I wore a ſtiff turbant on my head, a gown lined " with ſable on my ſhoulders, and held the imperial letter as high as my " head. I walked on very gently till I came near the ſofa, on which " the SHAH was ſeated; and when I was within two ſteps of him, I " raiſed the imperial letter with my right hand; and with my left, I ſa- " luted him in the manner ſovereigns are ſaluted[q], and I ſpoke to him " thus:"

" May health reſide with thee[r]: GOD preſerve me from the SCHEI- " THAN[s] ALRAGIM. In the name of the moſt merciful GOD, this pre- " ſent writing tells thee the truth[t]. Behold the moſt happy and moſt " magnificent imperial letter of their majeſties, the moſt magnificent, the " moſt formidable, the moſt majeſtic, the moſt potent SULTAN ACHMED, " KHAN GAZI[u]; may GOD give glory to thoſe who aſſiſt him; ſovereign " of the two continents, emperor of the two ſeas[w]; who is a ſecond " ALEXANDER ZUL KARNEIN[x]; ſervant of the holy ORIENTAL cities[y]; " ſultan,

[n] Signifies ſkill'd in law. [o] Beglerbegs and khans. [p] Of thoſe who are called KUZZLEBASH, which ſignifies red heads; ſo called from the crimſon caps worn when they were firſt formed into a body under this name, by SHEICH HEYDR, father of ISMAEL I. of the SEFFIE dynaſty. They have been ſometimes conſidered as the janizaries, *i. e.* ingecherris among the TURKS, though this diſtinction is in a great meaſure loſt, for the ſoldiers in general wear crimſon caps; but the corps of every different nation are kept diſtinct. [q] I preſume he took the hem of his garment and kiſſed it. [r] The TURKS generally begin all their recitals and writings with an invocation. [s] SCHEITHAN or SATHAN, with us ſatan; whom the MAHOMMEDANS believe to have been curſed for having reſiſted the will of GOD, when he was commanded to proſtrate himſelf before ADAM. RAGIM, according to ſome commentators, ſignifies deprived of grace. [t] A paſſage of the khoran. [u] This ſurname is given to thoſe MAHOMMEDAN princes, who have made conqueſts over the enemies of their religion. [w] The BLACK SEA, and the ARCHIPELAGO. [x] With two horns, that is, whoſe empire embraces the eaſt and weſt, named by the eaſtern people the horns of the world. [y] MECCA and MEDINA.

7

" ſultan, ſon of ſultan. He wiſhes all health to the moſt fortunate pre- 1721.
" ſence of their majeſties, the SHAH GEMJA [z], whoſe crown glitters like
" the ſun, and deſires to be informed of his precious health.

" I made him this compliment in the tone in which we ſing the EZAN [a],
" throwing my words into a cadence. The prime miniſter [b], who was
" during this time on my right hand [c], attempted twice to take the im-
" perial letter from me; but I took no notice of him. The SHAH him-
" ſelf ſtretched out his hand with the ſame intent; but your ſlave [d] caſt
" his eyes on no ſort of object till he had finiſhed his harangue. Then
" I kiſſed the imperial letter; and raiſing it twice to my head, I pre-
" ſented it to the SHAH, who had already thrice offered to take it. He
" raiſed himſelf on his knees to receive it; and having kiſſed it, he made
" a ſign to the chief of his eunuchs [e], who came for it, kiſſed it, raiſed
" it twice to his head, and then held it in his hands. The SHAH or-
" dered me at the ſame time to ſit down; but your ſlave out of reſpect
" refuſed it. He commanded me a ſecond time; and as I continued to
" refuſe it, the chief maſter of the ceremonies [f] took me hold by the
" arms, and forced me to ſit down [g]."

The king aſked the embaſſador many queſtions; and after they had dined in the ſame hall according to cuſtom, he took his leave of the king, and retired. The 10th of MARCH [h] SHAH HUSSEIN gave audience for the third and laſt time to this embaſſador: on which occaſion a miniſter from RUSSIA, two envoys from the OUSBEGS, and ninety-four deputies of the LESGEES were introduced. The latter were come to demand, each in the name of his particular tribe, the ordinary ſubſidies,

[z] As great and as potent as GEM or GIAMSCHID, an antient king of PERSIA. [a] The EZAN is what they cry five times with a loud voice from their turrets, to give the people notice that it is the hour of prayer. [b] ATHEMAT DOULET. [c] GIAMSCHID, the antient king of PERSIA juſt mentioned, gave the preference to the left; though in general the right is eſteemed in the eaſt, as with us in EUROPE. [d] This deſcription was given to the grand ſignior. [e] The KISLAR AGA. [f] The ESIK AGASI BASHI, chief maſter of the ceremonies, whoſe office it is to hold the embaſſadors by the arm, while they pay their reſpects to the king. [g] From this extract we may form an idea of the formal manner of a TURKISH writer, as well as of the ceremonies of a TURKISH embaſſador at a PERSIAN court. [h] Vernal equinox, or PERSIAN new-years-day.

1721. the payment of which had been ſettled by the late peace. The king being pre-poſſeſſed with an opinion that the TURKS intended to take an advantage of the diviſions which had rent the kingdom, was agreeably ſurprized when the embaſſador of the port aſſured him, that his maſter was fully determined to obſerve the peace. The beginning of APRIL the TURKISH embaſſador ſet out on his return for CONSTANTINOPLE. MORTAZA KOULI KHAN, appointed embaſſador to that court, was alſo preparing to take the ſame rout, with a more explicit anſwer than that which the king had given to the TURKISH miniſter.

In the interim, the court received freſh alarms from the eaſtern parts of the empire: the governor of MESCHED [i] acquainted the court by a letter, that the ABDOLLEES of HERAT had made great incurſions; obſerving, that if ſpeedy meaſures were not taken to protect the city and its dependencies againſt the rebels, they muſt ſoon be obliged to ſubmit. This intelligence was ſoon followed by news of a more dreadful nature: the 26th of the ſame month, TAVRIS, the ſecond city of the kingdom, and capital of the province of ADERBEITZAN, was deſtroyed by an earthquake, in which very near a hundred thouſand of the inhabitants periſhed [k].

Under theſe melancholy circumſtances, SHAH HUSSEIN prepared to take his leave of TÆHIRAN, and return to ISFAHAN, where he arrived with his whole court the firſt of JUNE. Towards the end of this month, the conſternation of the people was increaſed by a phænomenon, which might be conſidered as ſuch in that climate. They were ten days without ſeeing the ſun; during that time it is ſaid the horizon was covered with a reddiſh cloud, with but little more light than when the ſun is totally eclipſed [l]. The aſtrologers pretended that all theſe ſigns preſaged great calamities to ISFAHAN; and the king having queſtioned them concerning the nature of theſe calamities, ſome of them predicted an earthquake like to that which had lately deſtroyed the city of TAVRIS; others, that fire would fall from heaven and cauſe a general conflagration; but not one of them had ſenſe enough to ſee, or not honeſty and courage enough to tell this

[i] Capital of KHORASAN. [k] The ſame fate happened in 1657. [l] This circumſtance, tho' ſeriouſly atteſted, the reader is at his liberty to believe: when mens minds are diſtempered with fear, they eaſily imagine they ſee ſpectres.

this monarch, that his effeminacy and weakneſs had rendered him contemptible; and that his own ſubjects, no longer reſtrained by fear, would be themſelves the cauſe of all the misfortunes with which he was menaced. The king, as a further mark of his imbecillity, frightened at theſe predictions, quitted his palace, and went to lodge in tents: part of the court and of the inhabitants having followed the example of the prince, the gardens and public ſquares were filled with people. 1721.

Things were in this ſituation, when a new diſgrace ſeemed already in ſome degree to verify the prediction. The LESGEES, reſtleſs and unmindful of their great obligations to HUSSEIN, remembered only the oath of VACHTANGA the VALI of GEORGIA; and being informed moreover that from a ſtrong perſuaſion of their not daring to break a peace, which had been granted as ſo high a favour, the neighbouring provinces were bare of troops, they were emboldened by theſe circumſtances, joined tō that of SHAH HUSSEIN'S removal to TÆHIRAN, to make an irruption into SHIRVAN, under the command of SULTAN IBRAHIM, and DAOUD BEG their chiefs.

The pretext with which they covered this revolt, was the diſgrace of FATEY ALI KHAN, who had been condemned, they ſaid, only becauſe he was deſcended from their antient ſovereigns. They ſoon made themſelves maſters of the flat country: but their aim was above deſtroying defenceleſs peaſants, and plundering villages. The riches of SHAMAKIE, the capital of the province, equally excited the ambition and the avarice of their generals; and tho' their army, which conſiſted only of 15,000 men, did not ſeem ſtrong enough for the execution of ſuch a project, yet they appeared the 15th of AUGUST before that city, in hopes that they ſhould be favoured in their enterprize by the SUNNIS, who were the moſt numerous part of the inhabitants. This conjecture was juſtified by the event. The governor, HUSSEIN KHAN, knowing how little he had to depend on the fidelity of the inhabitants, made no ſally, leſt he ſhould be deſerted by the people that followed him, or betrayed by thoſe who ſtaid behind in the town; ſo that he determined to make as good a defence as he could within the walls. This reſolution, which was the only one he could take, enabled him to withſtand the attacks of the enemy

1721. for the ſpace of 25 days; and perhaps the length of the ſiege would have tired out the LESGEES, if the SUNNIS, who kept a correſpondence with the enemy, had not found means, in ſpite of all the vigilance of the governor, to open one of the gates to them. The beſiegers ruſhed in immediately, making hideous ſhouts; but altho' the garriſon was ſurprized, they were not beaten. All the LESGEES could compaſs that day, was to force their way to the SUNNIS quarter, where they entrenched themſelves. Early the next morning they marched out in good order, intending to complete the conqueſt of the city. The governor made ſome ſtand againſt them; but perceiving that he was deſerted or betrayed by his people, he determined at length to provide for his own ſafety. His loyalty and courage had prevented his taking this reſolution in time; for the enemy having detached ſome cavalry after him, they ſoon came up with him, and brought him back to the town.

The ſituation of SHAMAKIE rendered it a ſtaple between the RUSSIANS and PERSIANS[m]; but the great plunder of it did not ſatisfy the avarice of the LESGEES: their generals were hurried by this baſe paſſion, to commit the moſt barbarous cruelties againſt HUSSEIN KHAN. They put him to the acuteſt tortures, imagining he had buried his treaſure; but whether it was that this nobleman had not concealed any, or indifferent about his life he did not regard their fury, he made no diſcovery; for which reaſon they cut him in pieces, together with his nephew, and another of his relations, and flung their bodies to the dogs.

About 4000 inhabitants were put to the ſword; and this maſſacre would have been greater, if many had not ſaved themſelves the night on which the enemy entrenched themſelves in the quarters of the SUNNIS: for we muſt likewiſe obſerve, that the LESGEES put none to the ſword of that ſect. They alſo ſpared the wives and children of the SCHIAS, not through any motive of compaſſion, but becauſe, according to their law, the right of conqueſt had made them their ſlaves. The SUNNIS and the SCHIAS were not the only inhabitants of that city. There was likewiſe a conſiderable number

[m] I have already remarked in Vol. I. the great loſs ſuſtained by YEURIINOFF, a RUSSIAN merchant.

number of ARMENIANS, JEWS, INDIAN idolaters, and ſeveral RUSSIAN merchants; and tho' the conquerors granted no quarter to the SCHIAS, whom they did not make ſlaves, yet they ſpared the lives and liberty of theſe different nations, conſidering them as ſtrangers; thus a ſenſe of juſtice hindered them from confounding them with their enemies. But this is to be underſtood only in regard to their property: for they ſtripped their habitations of every thing that was valuable. The RUSSIANS loſt a great value [n], which contributed to create new enemies againſt PERSIA, as we ſhall ſee hereafter. 1721.

So many misfortunes, upon the back of each other, completed the conſternation of the divan. SHAH HUSSEIN, who had neither reſolution enough to bear ſuch a reverſe of fortune, nor abilities ſufficient to prevent any further ill conſequences, was the firſt whom the weight of the burthen overcame. Being convinced that heaven had declared againſt him, he thought no longer of ſtruggling with his misfortunes, but bent his whole attention to appeaſe the divine wrath. All public diverſions were forbidden; harlots were expelled the town; faſtings and public prayers were ordained; and the miniſters of religion appeared in the public ſquares and market-places, exhorting the people to avert, by a ſincere repentance, the calamities impending over their heads. This conduct, if it was pious, was not politic, for it rendered the conſternation general; the people in every part of the town being heard to ſay in a mournful voice, "CHEIK "OGLOU [o] has finiſhed his career; the fatal period of his government is "come; his tottering throne is going to cruſh us under its ruins."

In the mean time the LESGEES, who had made themſelves maſters of SHAMAKIE, took poſſeſſion of the reſt of SHIRVAN; after which, knowing that the khan of ERIVAN had orders to throw himſelf into GANJA, they paſſed the KURA, and marched forward to meet him. Tho' this general was at the head of 40,000 men, yet he only contributed to increaſe the triumph of the rebels. Part of his army was cut to pieces in different engagements; the remainder fled towards ERIVAN: the LESGEES having

[n] About 100,000 *l.* [o] The king, who is the ſon of CHEIK, a name given to the kings of PERSIA of the SEFFIE dynaſty, becauſe they were deſcended from CHEIK SEFFIE.

1721. having made themſelves maſters of his camp and equipage, beſieged him in GANJA, whether he had retired after his defeat.

CHAP. XV.

MIR MAGHMUD *raiſes an army of* 15,000 *men. He marches towards* KHERMAN, *and makes himſelf maſter of that city; from thence he proceeds to* YEZD, *and lays ſiege to it, but is obliged to retire. He leads his army through deſerts towards* ISFAHAN, *and arrives at* GULNABAD. *The* PERSIANS *prepare to oppoſe him. Different opinions in the divan upon that ſubject.*

PERSIA thus ſaw herſelf threatened with a ſtorm from all ſides, when MIR MAGHMUD, the moſt formidable of her enemies, diſcloſed his ambitious deſigns. The AFGHANS diſheartened by the defeat they had met with before KHERMAN, conſidered themſelves as utterly undone, when they heard that LUTF ALI KHAN was making preparations for the ſiege of KANDAHAR. The prudence and valour of this general; the number and diſcipline of his troops; and the quantity of ammunition and proviſions with which his magazines were filled, made them conclude that their ruin was inevitable. In this ſituation, the whole nation ſeemed deſirous of a peace, and waited only for the approach of the enemy to ſue for it. But they no ſooner were informed of the impriſonment of LUTF ALI KHAN, and the diſbanding of his army, than ſecurity and joy ſucceeded their fear. MIR MAGHMUD, whoſe authority had been in ſome meaſure deſtroyed by theſe melancholy circumſtances, inſenſibly reſumed the command of his people.

The firſt uſe which MAGHMUD made of this change, was to put himſelf in a condition of making a vigorous reſiſtance, in caſe the PERSIANS ſhould determine to purſue their deſign. With this intent, he omitted nothing that might contribute to the ſecurity of the province; he raiſed troops, ordered arms to be made, and filled the magazines with every thing neceſſary to hold out a long ſiege. Theſe preparations were juſt com-

completed at KANDAHAR, when they heard of the extremity to which the city of MESCHED was reduced. The news of the deſtruction of TAVRIS, and of the irruption of the LESGEES, followed ſoon after; and theſe different events eaſed the minds of the people, and gave their chief an opportunity of forming new reſolutions. 1721.

MAGHMUD's apprehenſions being thus removed, he began to think of becoming formidable in his turn: the hopes of conqueſts, which his laſt defeat ſeemed to have ſtifled, now crowded again upon his imagination. To diſpoſe the AFGHANS to enter into his views, he reminded them of the ſeveral circumſtances that ought to diſſipate every thought of danger: he obſerved to them, that the provinces of KANDAHAR, HERAT, SABLESTAN, MECRAN, and DAGISTAN, had ſhaken off the yoke; that SEGESTAN, KHERMAN, and the greateſt part of the vaſt country of KHORASAN had been ravaged, and SHIRVAN invaded; that the diſperſion of the army which was under LUTF ALI KHAN, and the oath of the VALI of GEORGIA, rendered PERSIA entirely defenceleſs. He put them in mind of the advantages which he had obtained over this nation, at a time when her power was really great; and relating the ſucceſs of the KOURDS, the OUSBEGS, and the MASCATS, he made the AFGHANS believe, that the throne was ready to fall a prey to the firſt who would venture to ſeize on it.

Such diſcourſes as theſe, accompanied with ſeveral marks of his liberality, could not but make an impreſſion on the minds of a people, who were naturally inclined to war. Hence they talked of nothing but conqueſts; and the hopes of booty engaged 15,000 AFGHANS to liſt themſelves under the banners of their chief. But MAGHMUD being ſenſible that theſe forces were not anſwerable to the greatneſs of his deſign, applied himſelf to the means of increaſing them.

For this purpoſe he had no occaſion for long negotiations: the reſtleſs and turbulent ſpirit of the neighbouring nations ſoon determined them in his favour. At the firſt news of an intended expedition into PERSIA, the ABDOLLEES, BALOUCHES, the inhabitants of CABUL, and the neighbouring country flocked to him; and in a very ſhort time his army was greatly

1721. augmented by theſe adventurers of ſeveral countries and religions. But among the different chiefs who joined him, AMAN OLA brought him the moſt conſiderable reinforcement. This captain, whom ſome have imagined to be a prince of CABUL, was originally only a ſimple derviſe, but chuſing a military life, was now at the head of a conſiderable body of troops, and joined MACHMUD rather as an ally than as a ſubject: embarking in this enterprize, upon condition of making an equal diviſion of the fruits of their conqueſts. The union of their forces did not conſtitute an army of above 25,000 fighting men: they took with them a few elephants for burthen, with a conſiderable number of camels; theſe with their drivers, the ſervants of the ſoldiers, and the domeſtics of the chiefs, made this army appear much more formidable than it really was. MAGHMUD never had ſo many troops under his command before. They were ſcarce aſſembled, when this young chief full of ardour and hopes, began to carry his enterprize into execution. He entruſted the regency of KANDAHAR to his brother; after which he croſſed the deſerts of SEGESTAN with the ſame precaution and fatigue as he had done the preceding year;
1722. and entering KHERMAN towards the beginning of JANUARY this year, he ſat down before the capital of that province.

This city did not make any long reſiſtance. The PERSEES[P], and the INDIANS, who were ſettled there, having refuſed to fight againſt an army which conſiſted partly of troops of their own nation, ſoon obliged the remainder of the inhabitants, who in other reſpects were not prepared for a ſiege, to open the gates to the enemy. When MAGHMUD was maſter of the town, his next point was to take the citadel. He tried ſeveral times to carry it by aſſault; for as he had no cannon fit for a ſiege, this ſeemed the only way he could take it: but he met with ſuch a warm and gallant reception from the garriſon, which had been left there by LUTF ALI KHAN, that he ſoon began to deſpair of ſucceſs. Being thus provoked at a reſiſtance which he did not expect, he knew not what meaſures to take. He was ſenſible of the conſequences of his undertaking: he

[P] The PERSEES are the deſcendants of the antient PERSIANS, who worſhipped fire, and have preſerved their religion. Theſe people are beſt known in the eaſt, and even among us, by the name of GAUR or GEBER, which in the PERSIAN language ſignifies an infidel or an idolater.

he could not raiſe the ſiege without loſing his reputation, by acknowledging himſelf defeated, at the very commencement of the campaign. Beſides, how could he pretend, after miſcarrying before ſo inconſiderable a place, to attack the capital of a vaſt empire? But it was yet a greater difficulty by what means to take a citadel ſtrongly fortified, and provided with a numerous garriſon. Some of the braveſt of his men had thrown away their lives to no purpoſe; and ſeveral others, diſcouraged by the repulſe, had already deſerted him, and ſet out on their return to KANDAHAR; ſo that if he perſiſted in his deſign, it ſeemed to threaten the total diſperſion of his army. 1722.

His mind was occupied with theſe reflections, when the governor, frightened at ſuch vigorous attacks, or apprehenſive of the want of proviſions, offered to treat with the beſiegers. He required that the army ſhould raiſe the ſiege; and on his ſide he would pay, as an indemnity or ranſom, 2500 tomans [q]. Tho' the tendency of this extraordinary capitulation was to preſerve, and not to ſurrender the place, yet the preſent circumſtances were ſuch, that the propoſals were received with joy. As ſoon as the money was paid, the hoſtilities, which had been already ſuſpended, intirely ceaſed.

Fortune having thus favoured MAGHMUD, he now thought of purſuing his firſt deſign. He had loſt 4000 men in croſſing the deſert, and at the ſiege; but the preſent conjuncture gave him a fair occaſion of reinforcing his army. Many of the inhabitants of KHERMAN are PERSEES, who, from the remembrance of their paſt grandeur, being enemies of the reigning nation, were naturally inclined to eſpouſe the cauſe of a prince, whom they conſidered as the ſcourge of their tyrants.

A few days after the capitulation, MAGHMUD marched at the head of his army towards the north, taking the road to YEZD. This city is ſituate about ſeventy leagues from KHERMAN: the country between is very ſandy, and has only a few inconſiderable villages, at a great diſtance from each other. This circumſtance ſhews, that this prince's view was not to enrich himſelf with the ſpoils of the open country, in the fruitful plains of

[q] 6,250 *l.*

1722. FARS[r]: his thoughts were engaged upon another object; and he avoided every thing that might retard the execution of his deſign. He knew very well that he ſhould not meet on this road with any fortreſs that might ſtop him, or with towns where his troops might be incumbered with pillage. It was with this very intent he preferred the road through the deſerts, upon his firſt ſetting out, inſtead of taking the ordinary rout, which was much ſhorter and eaſier.

As ſoon as he arrived before YEZD, he attempted to take the town by aſſault, attacking it with all his troops on every ſide; but he was on every ſide repulſed with loſs. Being grown more circumſpect by his miſtakes, he reſolved not to perſiſt in the ſiege, the conſequence of which muſt be extremely dangerous. He therefore continued his march; and after having proceeded with all poſſible expedition through the plains[s], which ſeparate the city of PAHANAVENS from that of BIBEN, at length he entered the cultivated country. The people, terrified at his approach, deſerted the villages and towns that lay in his way; ſo that nothing retarded the rapidity of his march. At length, having diſperſed ſome troops that ſeemed to have been ſent rather to reconnoitre than to fight, he arrived within four days march of ISFAHAN; when two officers, who were deputed by the court, were conducted into his preſence.

MAHOMMED KOULI KHAN, then prime miniſter[t], not knowing how to avert ſo ſudden a ſtorm, had ſent theſe officers to treat with him: accordingly they opened their commiſſion, which was to offer him a ſum of 15,000 tomans[u], on condition that he would not proceed any farther, and that his troops ſhould commit no devaſtation in the territory of ISFAHAN. MAGHMUD judged from hence of the weakneſs and terror of the enemy, and diſmiſſing the deputies without making any anſwer, advanced with his uſual diligence, and pitched his camp at GULNABAD[w].

It is far eaſier to imagine, than to deſcribe the terror with which the king and his miniſters were ſeized, when they heard that MAGHMUD was marching

[r] FARSISTAN or PERSIA properly ſo called.
[s] This country abounds in nitre.
[t] ATHEMAT DOULET.
[u] 37,500 *l.*
[w] Signifies conſerve of roſes. This village is three leagues from ISFAHAN.

marching directly to ISFAHAN. They had lull'd themſelves into ſecurity, 1722.
from a perſuaſion that this prince would not leave behind him unconquered ſo vaſt a tract of country; and little thought that he would open the campaign in the very center of the empire; conſequently they had not made the neceſſary preparations to oppoſe him. Hence there was neither ammunition nor proviſions in ISFAHAN; and as the celerity of the march of the rebels, had not afforded time to collect the different bodies of troops, that were diſperſed on the frontiers, they were abſolutely at a loſs how to ſtem the torrent. However, as ſomething muſt be done, they collected the few troops that were at hand; to theſe they joined the militia, that was raiſed in a hurry in the city and the neighbourhood; and all the lords of the court, excepting thoſe whoſe profeſſion was inconſiſtent with arms, being ready to mount on horſe-back, the army waited only the king's orders.

As this monarch was incapable of forming any reſolution himſelf, he waited with impatience to hear what the divan would determine. In time of diſtreſs, when a union of counſels is moſt neceſſary, the puſillanimity of ſome, and the wickedneſs of others, generally create perplexity. The council was divided in opinion: the prime miniſter gave his advice not to hazard a general action, but to intrench their army, and cover the town. "By this means," ſaid he, "our new troops will be inſenſibly "accuſtomed to ſee the enemy; a few ſkirmiſhes will rouze a martial "ſpirit by degrees; if the rebels attempt to force our lines, we ſhall fight "them to an advantage; if this meaſure ſhould oblige them to continue "in their camp, it will be an eaſy thing to ſtarve them, by cutting off "their proviſions: thus the iſſue of the war will be protracted, and the "troops diſperſed in the provinces will have time to join us, and cut off "the retreat of the rebels."

This was the opinion of the ATHEMAT DOULET. On the contrary, ABDALLAH KHAN, VALI of ARABIA, now at ISFAHAN, maintained, "that it was beneath the majeſty of the empire to temporize with rebels "and ſlaves; that the grandeur of the king, and the honour of the nation, "were concerned to chaſtiſe their inſolence. Why," ſaid he, "ſhould

1722. ' the frontiers be expoſed to new invaſions? The king's troops are in-
" ceaſed; they long for battle; the beſt way therefore is to make uſe
" of this firſt ardour of the ſoldiers, and to cruſh an infatuated youth,
" who by the victory of LUTF ALI KHAN, and his miſcarriages at KHER-
" MAN and YEZD, ought to have learnt the difference between ſoldiers
" and robbers."

The ATHEMAT DOULET's advice was certainly the moſt prudent and ſafe; but that of the ARABIAN prince ſuited moſt with the pride and revenge with which the divan was animated. PERSIA devoted to ruin, had hardly a ſingle advocate devoid of paſſion, and whoſe mind was free from prejudice or treachery: the latter opinion was preferred by the plurality of ſuffrages, and as ſoon as they heard that the AFGHANS were arrived at GULNABAD, the army received orders to march and fight them. MAGHMUD was not ſurprized at this determination; for he never dreamt that the king would ſubmit to ſee his capital beſieged, without trying the iſſue of a battle; and therefore as he knew neither the number nor valour of his enemies, he intrenched himſelf in his camp.

CHAP. XVI.

The PERSIAN *army marches to fight the* AFGHANS. *The day of battle is fixed by the aſtrologers. Order of battle, and diſpoſition of both armies. The ſingular conduct of the two princeſſes of* LORISTAN. *Particular account of the battle of* GULNABAD. *Cauſe of the ſucceſs of the* AFGHANS. *Reflexion on the conduct of the* VALI *of* ARABIA.

THE ſeventh of MARCH the PERSIAN army appeared within ſight of the enemy's intrenchments; but SHAH HUSSEIN having, by the advice of his aſtrologers, fixed the eighth of that month for the engagement, there paſſed only ſome light ſkirmiſhes the firſt day. It was given out in the PERSIAN camp, that MAGHMUD, ſurprized at the number and beauty of the king's troops, propoſed to make his eſcape with a thouſand of his beſt horſe. The PERSIAN generals ſpread theſe reports in order to

encourage their ſoldiers; for they could not really think, that this prince 1722.
intended to ſacrifice, by an ignominious flight, his ſubjects and allies to the fury of an enemy, in ſearch of whom he had made ſo long and ſo extraordinary a march.

SUNDAY the eighth of MARCH, according to the vain prognoſtics of the aſtrologers, was to deliver the PERSIAN monarchy. The generals began early in the morning to range their troops in order of battle. On the ſide of the PERSIANS; the center, which ſeemed to be deſigned only for a body of reſerve, was given to CHEIK ALI KHAN, general of horſe. He had under him ſeveral khans with their troops, 4000 of the king's horſe, and the ſame number of his foot guards; the latter being armed with muſquets and ſabres: theſe were covered at ſome diſtance by a battery of 24 pieces of cannon, defended, and ſerved by 2000 cannoneers, under the command of MAHOMMED KHAN, grand maſter of the artillery[x].

The right wing was formed of 2000 of thoſe horſemen who are called the king's ſlaves[y], ſome of whom are armed with bows and arrows, and others with fuſils and piſtols; there were likewiſe ſome khans, and ſeveral other lords with their attendants. This wing was under the command of ROSTAM KHAN, the KOULAR AGASSI[z], brother of VACHTANGA, VALI of GEORGIA. The VALI of ARABIA, who ſhared the general command of the army with the ATHEMAT DOULET, had ſtrengthened this wing with a body of 3000 cavalry of his own nation, at the head of whom he intended to fight.

The ATHEMAT DOULET commanded in the left wing, which was compoſed of the king's houſhold; the lords belonging to the court, and the reſt of the nobility. ALI MERDAN KHAN[a], VALI of LORISTAN[b], joined them in perſon with 500 horſe. Such was the order of battle in the king's army. They had, beſides the forces above-mentioned, 18,000 infantry

[x] TOPCHI BACHI. [y] KULAMS. [z] General of the ſlaves. [a] It is affirmed that two daughters of this prince attended him in his former expeditions againſt the TURKS in mens habits, and now fought by his ſide. [b] The province of LORISTAN is a mountainous country, that formerly depended on CHUSISTAN, or the antient SUSIANA; but having been peopled by colonies of the KOURDS, it was afterwards comprized in KOURDISTAN. BERONGIERD, a place ſituate near HAMADAN, is its principal fortreſs. We muſt take care not to confound this place with LARISTAN, which is on the ſea coaſt.

1722. fantry of militia, raiſed upon this occaſion in the neighbourhood of the city, who were armed with muſquets. The different troops formed all together a body of near 50,000 fighting men.

There is no agreement in the accounts of thoſe who were at ISFAHAN during the ſiege, in regard to the number of ſoldiers in MAGHMUD's army: the moſt probable opinion is, that it was not above half the number of the king's troops. It conſiſted chiefly of cavalry; theſe were armed with a ſabre and lance, which thoſe people handle with equal dexterity: their defenſive armour are a buckler and cuiraſs, made of a double fold of hard leather, and many of them carry piſtols. Their whole army was divided into four unequal parts: the moſt numerous formed the right wing under the command of AMAN OLA. MAGHMUD was in the ſecond diviſion, which he placed in the center: he gave the command of the third to NASR ULLAH, a PERSEE, whom he had made one of his lieutenant-generals: and the fourth, and leaſt numerous of theſe bodies, were choice men of the PEHLEVANS or NÆSSAKHCHI [c]. The length and celerity of MAGHMUD's march, as we have obſerved, did not permit him to bring any cannon with him; but he ſupplied this defect in ſome meaſure by a very extraordinary artillery: theſe are a kind of harquebuſes, which carry a handful of muſquet balls; each of theſe pieces, with its ſtock, was mounted on a camel, which lay down at command; and from the backs of theſe animals, trained to this exerciſe, they charged and fired theſe arms [d].

The ſun had juſt appeared on the horizon, when the armies began to obſerve each other with that curioſity, ſo natural on theſe dreadful occaſions. The PERSIAN army juſt come out of the capital, being compoſed of whatever was moſt brilliant at court, ſeemed as if it had been formed rather to make a ſhew than to fight. The riches and variety of their arms and veſtments; the beauty of their horſes; the gold and precious ſtones with which ſome of their harneſſes were covered; and the richneſs of their tents, contributed to render the PERSIAN camp very pompous and magnificent.

On

[c] The name which the AFGHANS give to their forlorn hope, which go on the moſt deſperate actions. [d] NADIR SHAH afterwards uſed theſe kind of arms with great ſucceſs: they are long, and carry a great diſtance.

On the other ſide there was a much ſmaller body of ſoldiers, diſfigured wth fatigue, and the ſcorching heat of the ſun. Their cloaths were ſo ragged and torn, in ſo long a march, that they were ſcarce ſufficient to cover them from the weather; and their horſes being adorned with only leather and braſs, there was nothing glittering among them but their ſpears and ſabres. 1722.

The two armies ſtood in ſight of each other the greateſt part of the day, without making any motion on either ſide, but ſeeming rather to ſtand in mutual awe. MAGHMUD embraced this opportunity to ride through the ranks, and to encourage his ſoldiers. "He repreſented to "the PERSEES, that the hour was now come, which would free them "from the yoke of their tyrants; that liberty was now in their own "hands, if they would prove themſelves, on this occaſion, worthy heirs "of the valour of their anceſtors." Turning to the AFGHANS and the BALOUCHES, "he exhorted them to fight with that bravery which had "rendered them ſo often triumphant over their enemies; he reminded "them of thoſe glorious feats, and deſired them to look upon the riches "of ISFAHAN as the firſt fruit of an eaſy victory; a victory, without which "they muſt inevitably periſh, either by the ſword in their retreat, or by "hunger and thirſt in the deſerts."

While MAGHMUD was thus endeavouring to inſpire his troops with that ardour, which they ſtood in need of on ſo important a conjuncture, the PERSIANS were taken up in debates. Though the king had ſent poſitive orders to fight, yet the ATHEMAT DOULET, who ſhared the general command with the VALI of ARABIA, inſiſted ſtrongly that they ſhould avoid coming to an engagement: "It is true," ſaid he, "we may expect the "moſt generous efforts of the PERSIAN valour, on an occaſion in which "the ſafety of the empire, and the liberty of the emperor are at ſtake: "but what does valour avail, if it be not armed and directed by expe-"rience? Almoſt all our infantry, who are the principal part of our "forces, are novices in the duty of a ſoldier; they are entire ſtrangers "to the uſe of the muſquet; and have we then any reaſon to expect "that they will be able, in this undiſciplined ſtate, to ſtand the ſhock

1722. " of the enemy's cavalry, or to attack in ſuch order as to pierce thro' their " ſquadrons? Too much ſecurity is oftentimes the cauſe, that even the beſt " concerted undertakings miſcarry. Let us not deſpiſe an enemy whom " fortune favours: we have 4000 pioneers with us, let theſe cover the " army with intrenchments; and if you are abſolutely determined to hazard " a battle, theſe lines bordered with cannon and infantry will be a ſure " place of retreat, in caſe of a misfortune. But my opinion, is to wait till " famine compels the enemy to attack us in our entrenchments; then " our cavalry ſallying forth from the extremities, will take them in flank; " and will meet with ſo much the leſs reſiſtance, as they will have to deal " with troops already ſhattered and broken by the continual fire to which " they muſt be expoſed."

Thus the ATHEMAT DOULET endeavoured to bring them over to an opinion, which differed but little from that which he had openly declared in council. The propoſal was prudent, inaſmuch as it left very little to hazard, and ſecured all the advantage that ought to be expected from their infantry, which otherwiſe muſt be uſeleſs. The officers who commanded in the center[e], ſtruck with theſe reaſons, had already approved the project; when the VALI of ARABIA, and the KOULAR AGASSI, who were afraid leſt this opinion ſhould be followed by the reſt of the principal officers, cried out: " This is no time to debate, but to fight; it " would be an eternal ſhame to ſo numerous an army, in which is the " flower of the nobility of the empire, to be afraid of appearing before " a gang of robbers and rebel herdſmen." Saying this, they waited for no anſwer, but retired, and mounting led on their ſquadrons againſt the enemy: this ſerved as a ſignal to the troops, who all moved forward at the ſame time, and fell upon the left wing of the AFGHANS with ſuch impetuoſity, as flung them into diſorder.

MAGHMUD, who obſerved both armies from a throne raiſed on the back of an elephant, was ſurprized at this ſhock, and began to think that all was loſt. His alarm was cauſed by the VALI of ARABIA, who having made a long winding to the right at the head of a body of ARABIAN cavalry,

[e] The general of horſe, and the general of the artillery.

valry, overthrew all he met in his way, and made himſelf maſter of the camp of the AFGHANS. It is reaſonable to believe, that the affair would have been ſoon determined in favour of the PERSIANS, if he had returned directly and charged the enemy in the rear. MAGHMUD, terrified at the danger, was preparing for flight, and had ordered the lighteſt of his dromedaries to be made ready for him; when a circumſtance aroſe, that inſpired him with more courageous reſolutions. The ATHEMAT DOULET ſeeing both armies engaged, returned to his poſt, and charged the right wing of the enemy with as much bravery, as he had before given marks of prudence. AMAN OLA, who commanded that wing, made a feint of giving way, and retired gradually without breaking his ranks; but he had hardly let the enemy gain fifty paces upon him, when ordering his men to open their ranks of a ſudden, one hundred camels appeared kneeling, each of which had one of the harquebuſes above-mentioned on his back. The PERSIANS aſtoniſhed at this unexpected fight, and a general diſcharge of this little artillery being made, moſt of the fore-moſt rank were killed, and the AFGHANS making loud ſhouts, attacked the reſt, and obliged them to turn their backs. 1722.

AMAN OLA made the proper uſe of this ſtratagem: for without giving the PERSIANS time to recover themſelves, he purſued them up to their battery, which he came behind, and having cut the cannoneers in pieces that guarded it, he cauſed the cannon to be pointed againſt the center of the PERSIAN army, who were thus put to flight before they had fought a blow. This artful ſtep decided the fate of the day. The VALI of LORISTAN, who had loſt one of his brothers in the action, and had been alſo wounded himſelf, ſeeing every thing rendered deſperate by the defeat of the left wing, and of the center, went off directly with what ſoldiers he had remaining, and retired into his province. His example was followed by FEREZ OULLAH, KHAN of HAMADAN, and by ALI RIZA, KHAN of COHKILAN[f], who having called off their troops, retired each to his reſpective province.

In the mean time, the VALI of ARABIA having made himſelf maſter of MAGHMUD's camp, amuſed himſelf with plundering the baggage; and

[f] A country ſituate ten days journey from ISFAHAN towards BASSORA.

1722. tho' he had obſerved the enemy's motion, yet inſtead of attacking them in the rear, as was expected, he refuſed the ſuccours, that with repeated inſtances were demanded of him. The AFGHANS therefore had no enemy to oppoſe, except the KOULAR AGASSI. This general endeavouring to vindicate his opinion given in council, continued to fight with redoubled courage and reſolution. Being determined to conquer or die, he had already cut part of the oppoſite wing in pieces, and puſhed the remainder as far as their entrenchments, when MAGHMUD ſeeing the field almoſt clear of the enemy, advanced to take him in the rear. This motion diſperſed the PERSIANS, who compoſed the greateſt part of the troops of this gallant officer; but a body of 400 GEORGIANS refuſing to deſert him in this extremity, he defended himſelf on all ſides with the utmoſt intrepidity; till at length, after having had two horſes killed under him, he was overpowered with numbers, and with the companions of his glorious temerity, died ſword in hand. The defeat of this valiant troop completed the victory. The VALI of ARABIA loaded with MAGHMUD's treaſure, and with the plunder of the camp, had by this time taken the road to the town, which he entered by the oppoſite gate [g] to that [h] by which the army had marched out againſt the enemy.

Such was the fatal iſſue of the battle of GULNABAD, in which the PERSIANS, ſo long accuſtomed to blunders in politics, took two dangerous ſteps; one was, to divide the command between two generals who did not agree; the other, to plant their batteries ſo forward, that they could not be properly ſupported. This laſt circumſtance, and the ſagacious conduct of AMAN OLA, gave the victory to the AFGHANS: but we may ſay, that the treacherous conduct of the VALI of ARABIA decided the battle [i]. The king's army loſt 15,000 men; a number which will not appear exaggerated, if we conſider the circumſtances of the engagement. The greateſt

[g] The DER TOKCHI in the eaſt part of ISFAHAN. [h] The HAJAN in the weſt. [i] It has been much doubted, if the VALI of ARABIA was induced to act this baſe part, merely from the temptation of plunder, or from reſentment of the oppoſition which the ATHEMAT DOULET made to his propoſals; he might be indifferent, at that time, which ſide obtained the victory, but his conduct afterwards proved him a traitor; nor do we find that he attempted to vindicate his conduct, or acknowledge that he had been guilty of an error; nor even that the natural avidity of his ARABIANS was not to be reſtrained.

greateſt part of the troops under the command of the KOULAR AGASSI, fell in the field of battle; the infantry was in a great meaſure expoſed to the mercy of the conqueror; and the 2000 cannoneers, with their general, were all ſlaughter'd at their poſt. The loſs of the AFGHANS was inconſiderable; and the treaſure, the artillery, and baggage of the PERSIAN army, was an ample recompence for the plunder which the ARABIANS had taken in their camp. 1722.

PART

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PART V.

THE REVOLUTIONS OF PERSIA, FROM THE BATTLE OF GULNABAD, TO THE ABDICATION OF SULTAN HUSSEIN, AND THE TAKING OF ISFAHAN.

CHAP. XVII.

The king calls a council, and determines to remain in ISFAHAN. *Preparations to defend the city. Orders ſent to the kings of the provinces. The* VALI *of* LORISTAN *is declared generaliſſimo.* MAGHMUD *encamps at* CHEERESTAN. *Deſcription of* FARABAD; *the* AFGHANS *take poſſeſſion of it, and appear before* JULFA. *Deſcription of* JULFA, *and the ſituation of the* ARMENIANS.

1722. AS ſoon as the news arrived of the defeat of the PERSIAN army, which was commanded by the greateſt part of the nobility of the kingdom, the city of ISFAHAN was under a general conſternation. The PERSIAN troops, who fled from the field of battle, exaggerated the valour and conduct of the enemy, which ſerved to increaſe the panic; inſomuch, that the inhabitants of this great city already figured to themſelves the diſtreſſes which followed not long after, and imagined they ſaw the AFGHANS, with their drawn ſabres, practiſing all imaginable barbarities.

Under

Under theſe extremities the king called a council, in which he repre- 1722.
ſented the danger his perſon would be expoſed to, if he ſtood a ſiege in a city unprovided with ammunition and proviſions; and whoſe ruinous walls could be but a feeble barrier, when defended by troops diſheartened by their late defeat. His danger had however inſpired him with ſome degree of fortitude; and with an air of dignity, in a very pathetic ſtrain, he ſpoke to them to this effect: "It is not for my own ſecurity, that I "propoſe to remove; a prince, who is afraid to die with his ſubjects, is "unworthy to rule over them: but the greateſt part of the provinces ſtill "obey me; their fate is connected with mine; for the rebel will be "maſter of the empire, as ſoon as he has my perſon in his power."

The ATHEMAT DOULET confirmed the king's remarks; adding, that it would be very imprudent to expoſe the king's perſon to the hazard of ſuch an event; that it would be adviſeable for his majeſty to retire that very night to CASBIN, while the enemy, yet intoxicated with their victory, would take no meaſures to oppoſe his retreat; that when the SHAH ſhould be at full liberty, he might eaſily aſſemble an army, capable to raiſe the ſiege, and deſtroy the AFGHANS: that at all events, the loſs of ISFAHAN would be only the loſs of one city, which MAGHMUD could not keep with ſo ſmall a number of troops; whereas, if the king ſhould ſhut himſelf up there, the loſs of ISFAHAN would draw on that of the monarchy.

This ſpeech ſeemed to convince the greateſt part of the aſſembly; when the VALI of ARABIA, who had ſo baſely betrayed his truſt that very day, and yet, by a ſtrange fatality, was continued in his office, ſtood up, and ſpoke to this effect: "It is debating to a great diſadvantage, "juſt after the loſs of a battle. Whilſt men are affected with fear, in con- "ſequence of a recent misfortune, whatever their natural intrepidity and "diſcernment may be, they are but ill capable of diſtinguiſhing the real "magnitude of objects: even prudence loſes its very nature, and be- "trays itſelf A panic terror, cauſed by a trifling unforeſeen accident, "has ſnatched the victory out of our hands. Ought ſuch an accident, "which is not uncommon in war, to make us tremble before a weak

1722. " and contemptible enemy? Beſides, were it preſumed that their chief
" will undertake to lay ſiege to ſo large and ſo populous a city as this, he
" would hardly dare to enter it with the contemptible gang of robbers
" about him. What is there then to fear? If he ſhould be bold enough
" to appear before our walls, the preſence of the SHAH will encourage
" their defenders; and the whole empire, incenſed at this attempt, will
" fly to the aſſiſtance of their ſovereign. But if his majeſty ſhould de-
" prive theſe loyal inhabitants of the opportunity of exerting that va-
" lour, which his preſence inſpires, ſuch a ſtep will not only ſtain his
" honour, but diſhearten all his faithful ſubjects, and encourage the re-
" volted: ſuch a behaviour, much ſooner than the force of arms, will
" open ISFAHAN to the conqueror; and the reſt of the empire, amazed
" to ſee a baſe SUNNI [i] on the ſacred throne of the ſucceſſors of ALI,
" will not ſtir in defence of their prince, becauſe they will conclude
" his fate irretrievable."

The boldeſt opinion prevailed over the moſt prudent. SHAH HUSSEIN was aſhamed to abandon his capital, and therefore determined to defend it; ſo that nothing more was thought on, than to make a vigorous reſiſtance againſt the enemy. New levies were made; the ruinous parts of the walls were repaired; intrenchments were thrown up in thoſe places which were moſt expoſed, and eſpecially at the head of the bridges which open a communication with the ſuburbs; and every other precaution taken, that the proximity of the danger, and the inexperience of the miniſters would permit. The VALI of ARABIA was appointed governor of the town; and SHAH HUSSEIN ſent meſſengers to the khans of the different provinces yet under his dominion, ordering them to repair with all the forces of their governments to HONSAR [k], where they were to join the VALI of LORISTAN, whom he had declared generaliſſimo of his armies. In fine, this monarch, more ſenſible than ever of the miſtake he committed in treating the VALI of GEORGIA with ſuch imperiouſneſs, ſent magnificent preſents to this prince, and wrote to him in the moſt preſſing manner, to perſuade him to march to his aſſiſtance.

These

[i] It may be preſumed that he pretended to be a SCHIAS, tho' he was a SUNNI himſelf.

[k] This city is ſaid to be about five leagues from ISFAHAN.

Theſe regulations were prudent and ſuitable to the ſituation of affairs; 1722.
but in the interim proper care was not taken to provide for a ſiege. The inhabitants of the open country, flying from the cruelty of the conqueror, flung themſelves in crowds into the city; inſomuch that the public ſquares, the gardens, and the ſtreets, were every day filled with this uſeleſs multitude. The king, who did not conſider the difference betwen a common man and a ſoldier, not only neglected giving orders upon this ſubject, but ſeemed to forget that there were no magazines of proviſions in the city; and the dictates of fear ſuggeſting to him, that his ſecurity muſt ariſe from his numbers, he forbad upon pain of death, every perſon in ISFAHAN, whether inhabitant or ſtranger, to ſtir from thence. In the mean while, ſome ARABS who had been ſent upon the ſcout, having brought intelligence, that the rebels had left on the field of battle the 24 pieces of cannon, which they had taken in the engagement, a detachment of troops was ſent to bring back the artillery; which they executed without any obſtruction from the enemy, who continued quietly in their camp.

This inactivity was owing to the wavering diſpoſition of MAGHMUD: he, who had hitherto ſhewn himſelf active and enterprizing, now ſeemed aſtoniſhed at his own victory. The little ſucceſs he had at KHERMAN and YEZD; the vaſt extent of ISFAHAN, and the number of troops within its walls, gave him reaſon to apprehend, that the ſiege would be of long continuance; and that the governors of the provinces would have time to cruſh him with the joint forces of the empire: on the other hand, he could not with honour, nor common ſafety, abandon an enterprize, which had already coſt him ſo much labour. Thus his mind was agitated with theſe different thoughts, when the return of the ſpies, whom he had ſent into the city, removed his anxiety. By theſe he was informed of the great conſternation into which the PERSIANS were thrown; from whence he concluded, that if inſtead of giving the enemy time to recover themſelves, he had purſued them to the gates of ISFAHAN, he might have made himſelf maſter that very day of the king's throne and perſon. He reſolved therefore [illegible] his fortune. With [illegible] he

1722. began his march, and plundering every place by the way, he encamped the 12th of the ſame month with his whole army near CHEERESTAN, a town a little to the eaſtward of ISFAHAN.

The PERSIANS finding the AFGHANS had abandoned the artillery above-mentioned[1], began to think they had no intention to lay ſiege to the town; but this motion of the enemy's army undeceived them, as to the fond expectation they had entertained, concerning the retreat of the AFGHANS. The firſt ſtep they took in conſequence of this diſcovery, was to abandon FARABAD, a country-palace three miles from ISFAHAN. SHAH HUSSEIN, who had exhauſted the treaſures amaſſed by the kings his predeceſſors, to indulge his paſſion for building, had ſpared no expence to render this palace worthy of a great monarch. In fact, it was ſo ſpacious and magnificent, that he had often entertained thoughts of abandoning the capital, to make this his ordinary reſidence. The palace was encompaſſed with ſtrong lofty walls, flanked at ſmall diſtances with towers. In his preſent circumſtances, this place ought therefore to have been conſidered as a fortreſs which might incommode the enemy, or at leaſt retard their operations; but the rebels were ſcarce arrived at CHEERESTAN, when orders were ſent to abandon FARABAD; which was executed in ſo imprudent a manner, that altho' the PERSIAN garriſon might have eaſily carried off the cannon, they contented themſelves with burying them.

This was too groſs a blunder to eſcape the AFGHANS: ſome of their ſquadrons who were upon the ſcout, hearing what had paſſed, marched with all expedition, and took poſſeſſion of the caſtle and its artillery, the 19th of the ſame month, without meeting with any oppoſition: they were ſoon joined by the reſt of the army. MAGHMUD being now advantageouſly ſituated, and maſter of ſeveral pieces of cannon, determined to repair the loſs of time, occaſioned by his late irreſolution; accordingly he mounted on horſe-back, and appeared the ſame day before JULFA

This town is ſituated only a mile and a half ſouth of ISFAHAN, on the ſouth banks of the river ZENDEROUD, or freſh river, on the ſide of which it

[1] It is hard to reconcile this conduct, otherwiſe than by ſuppoſing that the AFGHANS might be ignorant of the art of rendering the cannon uſeleſs, and finding them cumberſome, choſe to neglect them.

it is extended for almoſt three miles. It was founded by ABAS the GREAT, on the following occaſion. The ARMENIANS having revolted againſt the TURKS, and ſubmitted to this prince, he removed part of the inhabitants of ARMENIA into different provinces of PERSIA. Thoſe of the antient JULFA, a town on the banks of the ARAS, were tranſported to ISFAHAN, from whence they afterwards removed, and ſettled in this place, to which they gave the name of their former reſidence. The people who had been drawn from ERIVAN, SHIRVAN [m], and the lower ARMENIA, had ſettled in the ſuburbs of ISFAHAN; but ABAS deſirous of improving this new colony, obliged them to remove to JULFA, together with ſome PERSEES of the neighbourhood of KHERMAN and YEZD; by this means, four new quarters were formed. Moſt of the PERSEES took occaſion to retire from thence, ſo that of fifteen hundred families, which were at firſt computed in their quarter, there remained only three hundred, all compoſed of artificers and labouring men. But the ARMENIANS being an induſtrious active people, applied themſelves to commerce, and by their care this colony ſoon aroſe to a flouriſhing condition. 1722.

ABAS I. was too great a politician, to neglect any meaſure that might contribute to the welfare of ſuch an eſtabliſhment. He lent them conſiderable ſums of money, without demanding any intereſt; he exempted them from all kinds of ſervitude; he granted them the free exerciſe of their religion; and in order to ſcreen them from the jealouſy and avarice of the PERSIAN officers, he allowed them a KALENTER of their own nation, to whom he aſſigned a place at thoſe celebrated feaſts, in which, purſuant to the cuſtom of remoteſt antiquity, the kings of PERSIA dine in public with the grandees of the realm.

Some of the ſucceſſors of this prince followed the ſame maxim, and JULFA in a very little time became a conſiderable place. It had the appearance of a republic, founded in the midſt of a foreign nation; no MAHOMMEDAN was permitted to ſettle there, and the rigor of the law of retaliation, cauſed the inhabitants to be reſpected even by the PERSIANS themſelves. The ARMENIANS of JULFA thus encouraged by ſo neceſſary a protection,

[m] Part of the antient MEDIA.

1722. were in a thriving condition for many years; and carried on in different parts of the world a conſiderable trade, which was very uſeful to the ſtate. But the court at length, forgetful of its own intereſts, grew tired of favouring them; and in SHAH HUSSEIN's reign, their privileges, which had ſuffered ſome diminution under his predeceſſors, fell into contempt. Under this government, no regard was paid to the law of retaliation. The eccleſiaſtics offended at the equality which this law eſtabliſhed between muſſulmen and chriſtians, introduced a cuſtom, that if a PERSIAN killed an ARMENIAN, he ſhould expiate the crime by giving a load of corn to the relations of the deceaſed. The ARMENIANS conſidered ſo ignominious and unjuſt a treatment, as a mark of ſervitude: but they had no relief, and were equally a ſport to the avarice of the great, and the inſolence of the people. While they groaned under theſe calamities, induſtry declined among them; and the ſpirit of commerce, for which they had been ſo much diſtinguiſhed, was in a great meaſure ſuppreſſed; ſo that they thought of little more than to preſerve their lives, and the property they had already acquired.

CHAP. XVIII.

The conduct of the PERSIANS *towards the* ARMENIANS *of* JULFA. *The* AFGHANS *make themſelves maſters of* JULFA; *their barbarities towards the* ARMENIANS. *Deſcription of* ISFAHAN. MAGHMUD *repulſed at the bridge of* SHIRASS.

THE ARMENIANS having been thus treated with great contempt, it was feared they would cheriſh a reſentment, which might induce them to change their maſters. The PERSIANS, at leaſt, tho' they now ſtood in ſuch need of their ſervices, were jealous; and in this, as in many other inſtances, prepared the way to their own ruin, for fear of being undone. For the ARMENIANS, who are brave, and tenacious of their property, it ought naturally to have been expected, would have ſtruggled hard to be delivered from a rapacious enemy: however, upon

the firſt news of MAGHMUD's arrival, the king enjoined them to ap- 1722.
pear with their military equipage before his palace, intending, as he ſaid, to entruſt them with the guard of his perſon, during the abſence of his houſhold troops, who were going to march againſt the rebels. The ARMENIANS, flattered with this teſtimony of benevolence, repaired to the place appointed in great numbers; but no ſooner were they drawn up, than they were commanded to lay down their arms, and diſmiſſed with ſtrict orders to deliver up what arms might be ſtill remaining among them. Tho' ſuch a mark of diſtruſt was more proper to provoke, than to ſoften the minds of a brave people; yet as ſoon as the ARMENIANS knew that the AFGHANS were advancing, they deſired ſuccour, offering to maintain the troops at their own expence. They repeated their inſtances, as the rebels approached; and finding that the VALI of ARABIA, who had promiſed to ſend them aſſiſtance, broke his word, they ſtill put themſelves in a poſture of making as good a defence, as their ſituation and circumſtances would permit.

Things were thus ſituated, when the AFGHANS appeared before JULFA: they attacked the place as ſoon as they arrived, which was in the night-time; and the aſſault laſted two hours. The beſieged, in order to make the enemy believe they had regular troops, called one another during the engagement by PERSIAN names; and tho' they were very indifferently armed, yet they defended themſelves with ſo much bravery, that the utmoſt the enemy could do, was to ſeize upon a little entrenchment, which had been thrown up in a hurry. The ARMENIANS, encouraged by this ſucceſs, waited for the VALI of ARABIA, deſigning to attack the AFGHANS in their turn, as ſoon as they had any ſuccour; but this general made them ſenſible of the indifference he bore to the common cauſe: for inſtead of keeping his word with them, obſerving that SEFFIE MYRZA [a] was marching during the attack at the head of a detachment of horſe, in order to make a diverſion, he hindered him from proceeding any further, by repreſenting that the king his father did not intend that the preſumptive heir of the crown ſhould expoſe himſelf to ſo dangerous an encounter.

This

[a] This was HUSSEIN's eldeſt ſon, who was of a martial ſpirit, and therefore an object of jealouſy among the eunuchs.

1722. This extraordinary proceeding, together with that of diſarming the ARMENIANS, induced people to think, that it was the king's intention to ſacrifice JULFA and its inhabitants to the ſafety of the capital. Nor is it altogether improbable, that this weak prince, through the inſtigation of his treacherous miniſter, the VALI of ARABIA, might imagine that the AFGHANS would be contented with the wealth they ſhould find in that town, without perſiſting in ſo hazadous an enterprize as the ſiege of ISFAHAN. This ARABIAN prince, by religion a SUNNI, and actuated with the ſame ambition as his father, who thirty years before had attempted to ſhake off the PERSIAN yoke, either held a correſpondency with MAGHMUD, which is moſt probable; or was governed by the pernicious maxim of thoſe generals, who, to prolong their own authority, do not chuſe to terminate a war, when it is in their power to bring things to a fortunate iſſue for their ſovereigns and their country.

The ARMENIANS had not time to refreſh themſelves after the fatigues of the firſt aſſault, but were preparing againſt a ſecond, when ſome of the beſiegers taking the advantage of the obſcurity of the night, went all round the town, to try if a breach was practicable in their walls of earth *. A PERSEE in their ſervice, undertook to pierce a hole through the wall; which having done to his purpoſe, an elephant was brought up to it, and by his means a part of thoſe feeble ramparts was broke down: NAZR ULLA, who commanded the party, took poſſeſſion of the breach; and the ARMENIANS perceiving that he waited only for day-light to enter, deputed the chief perſons among them, before the night was ſpent, to treat of a capitulation. The AFGHAN heard their propoſals, as one who was ſure of conqueſt: he obliged them to ſurrender at diſcretion, and to ranſom their lives and effects, by a contribution of 70,000 tomans P.

Hard as this condjtion appeared to the ARMENIANS, MAGHMUD added another more ſevere: for ſcarce had he been maſter of JULFA, when he demanded of the ARMENIANS a certain number of young virgins, which they ſhould pick out of the moſt conſiderable families of their nation. The

* Thoſe of ISFAHAN are of the ſame kind, as indeed are almoſt all the fortified places in the kingdom. P 175,000 *l.*

The AFGHANS were maſters of the town; ſo that the ARMENIANS had 1722.
no other reſolution to take than that of ſubmiſſion. All the young women therefore that could be found, who were remarkable for their beauty, and whoſe age exceeded nineteen, were brought before certain perſons appointed for this examination: theſe choſe fifty out of the number, and conducted them to FARABAD, adorned with their richeſt cloaths, and with all their jewels, where they were preſented to the conqueror. MAGHMUD kept part of them for his own harram, and diſtributed the remainder among his principal officers.

The ARMENIANS are very jealous of their honour, ſo that nothing could cut them deeper than to deliver up their daughters. The diſconſolate mothers made JULFA reſound with their lamentations; ſome of thoſe young maids were ſo ſhocked to ſee themſelves abandoned to the enemies of their country, that they died with exceſſive grief. The AFGHANS, whoſe hearts could not but feel, in ſome meaſure, the diſtreſs of theſe young women, and whoſe religion by no means allows of any violence, ſent thoſe home who were moſt afflicted; and others were ranſomed by their parents; ſo that in a few days, there remained but a very ſmall part of them in this kind of ſlavery.

The AFGHANS, humane in this reſpect, were inexorable in regard to the contribution. The ARMENIANS pretending that the chief part of their effects was in ISFAHAN, ſaid they were under an abſolute impoſſibility of paying ſuch a ſum. They offered, however, to enter into an obligation of paying it, as ſoon as they recovered their effects, that is, upon the taking of the city, or at the concluſion of a peace. This was making the fruits of the firſt ſucceſs depend upon a new event. MAGHMUD, pretended to be ſatisfied with the propoſal; but as ſoon as he had their bond in his hands, he ordered three of the principal men among them, who had ſigned it, to be arreſted as ſureties; and pretending that his treaſure was exhauſted, he inſiſted upon their paying immediately what money they had in their hands, as part of the ſum. In conſequence of this determination, he ordered their houſes to be ſearched.

1722. The ARMENIANS, whoſe avarice had cauſed them to overſhoot their mark[q], began to be ſenſible of the folly they had committed, in endeavouring to evade the payment; but it was too late to rectify the miſtake. The officers who made the ſearch, diſcharged their commiſſion with the utmoſt exactneſs; carrying off every valuable thing they could find, as gold, ſilver, jewels, moveables, rich ſilks, *&c.* ſo that the inhabitants, except the ſecurity of their perſons, experienced on this occaſion, almoſt every act of violence and barbarity, as when a town is taken by ſtorm.

All this wealth did not ſatisfy the avarice of the conqueror; recourſe was had to tortures, in order to increaſe it. The principal perſons among the ARMENIANS were moſt cruelly baſtinadoed, to compel them to diſcover the ſeveral effects, which they, and their friends, were ſuppoſed to have concealed. None of them could withſtand the ſeverity of the torture, except DOMINIC JAQUES KARDELANS, a man of weight and figure among his countrymen, and pretty far advanced in years, whom all the rigor of this puniſhment could not oblige to diſcover any other perſon. From this man and his brothers they took twelve thouſand tomans[r], in ready money, and ſeven thouſand[s] from SHERIMANS[t]; hence it is very probable, that what they got by plunder, greatly exceeded the ſum demanded: and yet it was valued at only twenty thouſand tomans[u], which he ordered to be ſtruck off from the ſeventy thouſand mentioned in the bond.

Such acts of violence flung the whole town into the utmoſt conſternation: the miſſionaries withdrew to ISFAHAN, each order leaving only one religious perſon in their houſe. The biſhop, and ſome of the inhabitants, took the ſame reſolution; and though the ARMENIANS were not ignorant, that the PERSIANS accuſed them of holding a correſpondence with the enemy, yet a great many of them had already thrown themſelves into the town, and others were preparing to follow their example, when MAGHMUD ordered guards to be poſted, to hinder any further deſertion.

While

[q] See remark, Vol. I. page 120. [r] 30,000 *l.* [s] 17,500. [t] Theſe are remarkable great traders to this day; NADIR in 1747, cauſed ſome of them to be burnt alive, to extort a confeſſion of their wealth. [u] 50,000 *l.* in part of 175,000.

While JULFA was thus a prey to the avarice and cruelty of the rebels; 1722.
their chief was preparing to begin the ſiege of ISFAHAN. This city is diſtinguiſhed, no leſs for the magnificence of its buildings, than for the vaſt tract it incloſes; the circumference being ordinarily computed at 24 miles, including its gardens and ſuburbs. It is ſituated in a plain to the north of the ZENDEROUD, which ſeparates it from JULFA. The ſource of this river is diſtant only three days journey: there are various accounts concerning the courſe of it, but it is agreed to be of very ſmall extent. ABAS the GREAT cauſed a channel to be cut thro' the mountains, thirty leagues diſtant, by which means the waters of the river MAHMOUD KER, were conveyed into the ZENDEROUD; which renders it as wide and deep, upon the melting of the ſnows in the ſpring, as the SEINE is in the winter at PARIS.

There is a communication between the two banks of the river by different bridges. The largeſt and fineſt is that of JULFA: it is 360 geometrical paces in length, and 13 in breadth; the two extremities of it are flanked by four round towers, with a covered gallery, which ranges on both ſides, the length of the bridge; the whole decorated with the richeſt ornaments of PERSIAN architecture. It is joined by two cauſeways, made with a gentle deſcent to a double row of trees above 3000 paces long. This delightful alley is lined with terraſſes and plane trees: it is called TOHERBAG, or four gardens, and is bordered with gardens which belong to the king. The length of it is terminated by a large pavilion towards the town, and on the oppoſite ſide by a building, in the royal garden, called HAZAR JERIB, or thouſand gardens. The town of JULFA on the one ſide, and the ſuburb of ABASABAD on the other, ſtretch along the ZENDEROUD: from the bridge of JULFA to the bridge ABASABAD is about a mile and a half: the laſt is ſo called from the neighbouring ſuburb, and ſerves as a communication to the weſtern extremity of the town.

The bridge of BARBAROUI, which is leſs diſtant than that of ABASABAD from the bridge of JULFA, is the third we meet with deſcending: like the latter it is lined with galleries, and is not ſo much inferior to

1722. it in architecture, as in length. About a mile further, advancing eaſtward, is the bridge of SHIRASS, ſo denominated, becauſe it is the roadway from ISFAHAN to that city; and near it is the village of CHEERESTAN. This city was now in its higheſt pitch of ſplendor, and eſteemed the largeſt and moſt magnificent in ASIA [x], with ſix hundred thouſand inhabitants, excluſive of thoſe crowds, who had fled thither for ſhelter from different parts of the open country, and were reckoned near an hundred thouſand ſouls.

Such was the importance of this city, which MAGHMUD dared to beſiege with ſo ſmall an army. This young prince, who was ſtill encamped at FARABAD, ordered entrenchments to be thrown up between the river and JULFA; and the ſame day he made himſelf maſter of this town, he commanded ſome ſquadrons to preſent themſelves before the ramparts of ISFAHAN, to obſerve the diſpoſition of the enemy. This detachment, ſupported by a conſiderable part of the army, began to execute their orders; but the PERSIANS, now recovered from their firſt panic, gave them ſo warm a reception, that they were obliged to retire, with ſome loſs.

MAGHMUD then marched himſelf in perſon, intending to make a general aſſault. The 21ſt of MARCH he appeared at the head of his army, upon the banks of the ZENDEROUD; but finding the river overflowr, and the bridges ſtrongly guarded, this action ended at the right, and in the center, in ſome random ſhots from their cannon, which were very ill ſerved: the affair was more ſerious to the left; for the officer who commanded that attack, giving way deſignedly, drew the troops that guarded the bridge of ABASABAD after him; upon which he faced about, and brought on an engagement, in which about 200 men on each ſide were ſlain. The PERSIANS ſtill continued maſters of the bridge; and a retreat being ſounded, the AFGHAN army retired to their camp, after riding and hollowing, rather than fighting, for the ſpace of ſix hours.

The beſieged, who ſaw what paſſed from the tops of the terraſſes, with which the houſes of ISFAHAN are covered, began to alter the opinion which they had conceived of the enemy's bravery. Their ſpirits were greatly raiſed upon.

[x] *It is probable ſome cities in* CHINA *exceeded it.*

upon reflecting, how ill this laſt attack had been contrived, and how weakly executed: they now looked upon the ſlowneſs of the AFGHAN chief in advancing after the battle of GULNABAD, and the great precaution he uſed in entrenching himſelf, as a certain ſign of a timorous diſpoſition; but they were ſoon obliged to fly again to the defence of their ramparts. For MAGHMUD being informed by his ſpies in the city, of the effect of his imprudent enterprize, had taken a ſudden reſolution to reeſtabliſh the reputation of his arms by ſome ſignal exploit. 1722.

With this deſign his army appeared in battalia the 23d of the ſame month, and while part of his troops were ſounding the river in different parts, as if they intended to ford it, the remainder fell ſword in hand upon the poſt which defended the bridge of SHIRASS. The AFGHANS behaved, on this occaſion, with ſo much reſolution and bravery, that they overthrew the PERSIANS at the very firſt onſet. Their impetuoſity carried all before them; they were already maſters of the bridge, and conſidering the confuſion into which the PERSIANS were thrown, the rebels might have entered the town pell-mell along with them, had not ACHMED AGA, a white eunuch, and a ſoldier of approved valour, whom the king had now deputed governor of ISFAHAN, come up with a body of veteran troops, and renewed the engagement. He drove the AFGHANS immediately back to the middle of the bridge; and while both parties were fighting there with equal obſtinacy, ſome pieces of cannon, that were in battery upon the banks of the river, were pointed [y] at the AFGHANS, which cleared the bridge, and put the rebels to flight. ACHMED AGA purſued them as far as their entrenchments, and made a terrible ſlaughter. MAGHMUD had been undone, if the VALI of ARABIA had fallen upon him at the ſame time with his troops; but this prince now confirmed his treachery, in the eſteem of thoſe who were not infatuated; and ſacrificed his reputation as a ſoldier, as well as the welfare of the ſtate, to his ſiniſter purpoſes [z].

[y] This ſignal piece of ſervice was performed by one JACOB a COURLANDER, who from a cartwright, was made an officer of the artillery. [z] As generaliſſimo he had fifty tomans, or 125 *l.* a day, but this motive only could not have induced him to make a ſacrifice of thoſe whoſe pay he received.

CHAP. XIX.

MAGHMUD ſends a deputation to ISFAHAN *with propoſals of peace, which are refuſed. He makes himſelf maſter of the bridge* ABASABAD, *and inveſts the city. The troops marching to the relief of the beſieged are defeated. Gallant behaviour of the inhabitants of* BEN ISFAHAN. *Treacherous conduct of the* VALI *of* ARABIA. *Defeat of the* KHAN *of* COHKILAN.

1722. MAGHMUD was greatly diſheartened at his diſappointment in the laſt action; the promiſes of the VALI of ARABIA were his chief dependance; and yet what ſecurity could he have of the fidelity of a traitor? Thus he was perplexed in what manner he ſhould proceed. The vigorous defence made by the beſieged, and the repulſes he met with in his ſeveral attacks, alarmed his fears, leſt his troops might become diſpirited, if his next attempt ſhould meet with no better ſucceſs. He knew, however, that ISFAHAN was deſtitute of proviſions, and that it muſt fall, if he could cut off all communication between that city and the country: but for this purpoſe, it was neceſſary for the communication of his troops, to throw a bridge over the river; or to make himſelf maſter of one of thoſe which had been ſo gallantly maintained by the PERSIANS: beſides, the greatneſs of the circumference rendered this project extremely dangerous, as the ſiege could not be turned into a blockade, without giving the khans of the provinces time to aſſemble; and the junction of any body of forces with thoſe in the city, muſt render his enterprize abortive. In order to obtain a peace, the king had ſome time before offered him a large ſum of money, with the ſovereignty of KANDAHAR, and conſented to yield up alſo the province of HASSARAI, but refuſed to grant him one of the princeſſes his daughters in marriage. This refuſal determined MAGHMUD to lay ſiege to ISFAHAN, at a time when he was thinking how to ſecure an honourable retreat.

But now he reſolved to try what he could do by negotiation, of which his enemies had ſet him the example. He therefore deputed one of his

principal officers, with a commiſſion to offer to raiſe the ſiege, and to agree to a peace, on condition that the king would give him one of the princeſſes his daughters in marriage, with a portion of fifty thouſand tomans[a]; and acknowledge him as ſovereign, not only of KANDAHAR and KHERMAN, which he already poſſeſſed, but likewiſe of the province of KHORASAN, which ſhould be yielded to him by the ſame treaty. 1722.

SHAH HUSSEIN was under great perturbation; but the conditions appeared very diſhonourable. The manner in which the AFGHANS had hitherto conducted themſelves, had flattered him into a belief, that the governors of the provinces, and the tributary princes would have time to march to his aſſiſtance, and there was then no reaſon to doubt but the enemy would be cruſhed; he therefore rejected theſe propoſals.

MAGHMUD being informed by the return of his deputy, of the little ſucceſs of his commiſſion, prepared to obtain by famine, what he no longer expected by force of arms. This enterprize, however, was extremely delicate. The PERSIANS had by advanced poſts, made a further addition to the largeneſs of the circumference, inſomuch that the AFGHANS could not divide themſelves into ſo many bodies, as there were places to occupy, without running the riſk of being beaten in ſeparate detachments: theſe difficulties did not retard MAGHMUD, who ſecretly renewing his engagements with the VALI of ARABIA, applied all his thoughts to the execution of his project.

After he had taken this reſolution, he detached different bodies of troops to ravage the diſtrict of ISFAHAN. This territory contained above one thouſand villages, built by the orders of ABAS the GREAT, who peopled them not only with the natives of IRAC AGEMI, but likewiſe with ſeveral families which he tranſported thither from other parts of the empire. The plain is very fruitful, and produces proviſions ſufficient to maintain both the inhabitants of the open country, and thoſe of the capital. The AFGHANS charged with this commiſſion, took poſſeſſion of ſome of theſe villages by main force, of others by cuttting off the waters, and many

[a] 125,000 *l.*

1722. many were abandoned upon their approach; inſomuch that the number of thoſe which by an obſtinate reſiſtance had tired them out, and eſcaped falling into their hands, was very ſmall, The AFGHANS, according to the barbarities of the eaſt, put moſt of the men to the ſword, and brought off great numbers of the women and children into ſlavery: it is ſaid that upon making a diſtribution of them, five or ſix fell to the ſhare of every private ſoldier. The AFGHANS then ſent home the ARMENIAN girls, that were yet left in their poſſeſſion.

This expedition ſerved not only to cut off all forage and proviſions from the city, but likewiſe to bring great plenty into their own camp. Their magazines being thus filled, they might now inveſt the place without being obliged to ſend out detachments for proviſions or forage. This was of the greater moment, as MAGHMUD had waited in vain for a reinforcement from KHERMAN and KANDAHAR; however, he augmented his forces by making ſoldiers of many of thoſe who had followed his army as menial ſervants, ſupplying their places with priſoners whoſe lives he had ſpared.

From the affair of the bridge of SHIRASS, till the latter end of APRIL, that is, during the whole time they were plundering the open country, MAGHMUD had amuſed the beſieged with different negotiations; but as ſoon as he had recruited his army, and his different detachments had joined him, he reſolved to break off this kind of truce. The great object he had in view for the preſent, was to open a paſſage over the river, which a particular accident gave him a favourable opportunity of accompliſhing. The head of the bridge ABASABAD was covered by an entrenchment, lined with ſome pieces of cannon. A detachment of GEORGIANS, to whom the defence of this bridge was entruſted, had obtained a ſupply of ſpirituous liquors: MAGHMUD was no ſooner informed of this incident, which happened the laſt day of APRIL, than he detached fifteen hundred men to attack them. The GEORGIANS, as he had foreſeen, were all ſtupified, or not able to ſtand, ſo that they were cut to pieces, hardly making any reſiſtance; and the AFGHANS having made themſelves maſters of this important poſt, ſecured the poſſeſſion of it, by turning the artillery againſt

the enemy. Part of the army filed off immediately over this bridge, and 1722.
ſpread themſelves all round the town. Guards were placed at the principal paſſages, and ſcouts ordered to march continually from one of theſe poſts to the other, ſo that ISFAHAN was that ſame day entirely inveſted.

This ſucceſs alarmed the beſieged; they had for ſome time made earneſt application for liberty to attack the enemy; but now their requeſt was changed into murmurs. They loudly declared that MAGHMUD dreading the bravery of the PERSIAN troops, which he had ſo lately experienced, was determined to avoid all occaſion of fighting, and endeavoured to deſtroy them by famine: that to temporize on ſo preſſing an occaſion was betraying the common cauſe; that it was no longer time to deliberate; that their only reſource was to march againſt the rebels, before hunger had deſtroyed part of the citizens, and rendered the reſt unable to make uſe of their arms. This generous and prudent reſolution, if it had been carried into execution, would in all probability have quaſhed their enemies, and it really was the only expedient left. The ATHEMAT DOULET and moſt of the grandees were of this opinion, and even the king thought ſo himſelf; but this unhappy prince ſoon changed his ſentiment. The VALI of ARABIA had ſo diſguiſed his treacherous purpoſes, as to have an abſolute aſcendant over his weak and fluctuating mind: and tho' after what paſſed, this fatal advice ought in all reaſon to have confirmed what might otherwiſe be only a ſtrong ſuſpicion of treaſon, yet he eaſily prevailed on HUSSEIN to temporize, in hopes of the ſuccours which he expected.

The inhabitants of ISFAHAN began now to feel the dreadful effects of famine; and all their hopes ſeemed to vaniſh. The governors of the provinces looking upon themſelves as able, each ſeparately, to beat the rebels, had refuſed to ſerve under ALI MERDAN KHAN, VALI of LORISTAN, who, in conformity to the orders of the court, appeared at the head of ten thouſand men at HONSAR, where he expected they would join him. CASSUM, KHAN of the BACTIARIANS [b], was the firſt who appeared with twelve

[b] BAKTHIAR, in PERSIC, ſignifies happy. Theſe are the BACTIARIANS ſituate weſt of ISFAHAN; the ordinary reſidence of whoſe KHAN, is ſaid to be the town of HONSAR. Theſe people inhabit

1722. twelve thouſand horſe, and advanced towards ISFAHAN; but as AMAN OLA kept the field with a flying camp, he fell upon the KHAN when he was leaſt expected. Two thouſand BACTIARIANS were killed in this engagement, and the reſt were diſperſed and put to flight.

The love which the VALI of LORISTAN bore to his country, gave him a quick ſenſibility of this misfortune; though it was an effect of the contempt ſhewn to his authority. This prince had been baniſhed for ſome time to KHERMAN, by the artifice of one of his brothers, who ſupplanted him in his command of VALI; but as ſoon as he knew that the AFGHANS were marching towards the capital, he came to offer his ſervices. His experience and valour, virtues ſo neceſſary in theſe circumſtances, were ſo well known, that he was reinſtated in his principality; and he juſtified this mark of confidence, by the bravery with which he behaved at the battle of GULNABAD. But not ſatisfied with having given this mark of fidelity; he had, ſince the commencement of the ſiege, amaſſed a quantity of proviſion, and deſigned to force one of the poſts belonging to the rebels, and to convoy it into ISFAHAN. He was juſt upon the point of making this attempt; when his brother defeated the deſign, by a new piece of treachery.

This wretch, who was ambitious of a dignity which he did not merit, and to which, as a younger brother, the order of birth gave him no right; took the opportunity to debauch part of his brother's troops, and to take the command himſelf, at a time when this prince was gone upon a journey of ſome days, in order to make new levies; and as he was now maſter of the convoy, and of a conſiderable number of ſoldiers, without waiting his brother's return with freſh forces, he joined the KHAN of HAMADAN, and marched with him to the relief of ISFAHAN. But his perfidy, tho' it might have a mixture of virtue, was attended with a ſignal puniſhment. Theſe two chiefs had 6000 men under their command, and expected to be able to join the troops of COHKILAN upon their march; but falling in with the body of AFGHANS commanded by AMAN OLA, within

inhabit the eaſtern parts of the deſerts towards BAGDAT: they live moſtly in tents, and are divided into two tribes, called CHAHAR-LING and EFH-LING. They pretend to have embraced chriſtianity under CONSTANTINE the GREAT.

within three days journey of ISFAHAN, they were attacked before they had time to recover their ſurprize; above 3000 of their men ſaved themſelves by flight, among whom was the brother of the VALI of LORISTAN: yet he did not long eſcape the fate he ſeemed to deſerve; for ALI MERDAN KHAN, provoked at an action which defeated the chief hopes of the empire, ſacrificed this unnatural brother to his own reſentment, and to the public vengeance. 1722.

AMAN OLA having taken poſſeſſion of this convoy, with all the baggage of the PERSIAN troops, was fully ſenſible of the great conſequence of his victory; but he ſtained the luſtre of it by his cruelty. Part of the PERSIANS had laid down their arms, upon promiſe of quarter; yet he paid no regard to his word, for he ſaved only thoſe from whom he expected a conſiderable ranſom, abandoning the reſt to the inhumanity of his ſoldiers, who killed them in cold blood.

Three miles from ISFAHAN, there is a town called BEN ISFAHAN[c], ſituated on the declivity of a hill, and fortified with the addition of ſome art, at the foot of which extends a plain, which ſeveral rivulets of running water contribute to render as fruitful as it is agreeable. After the battle of GULNABAD, many flocked thither from the neighbouring villages, ſo that there was a number of men capable to bear arms; and theſe had been extremely active in haraſſing the enemy. Having now received intelligence, that the AFGHANS were returning to their camp after their victory, much fatigued with the march, and without obſerving any order; they attacked them with great valour, and with an eager thirſt of revenging the death of their countrymen, inſomuch that they put them to flight, and ſeized on their baggage and convoy.

MAGHMUD was ſo much provoked at this affront, which might have been attended with dangerous conſequences in the preſent ſituation of his affairs; that he inſtantly mounted on horſe-back, and putting himſelf at the head of a body of cavalry, overtook the enemy as they were returning home with their booty. Fortune however favoured this prince

as

[c] In ARABIC as well as HEBREW, ſon of ISFAHAN.

1722. as little as it had done his general. Theſe peaſants gave him ſo warm and ſo reſolute a reception, that after cutting part of his troops in pieces, they obliged him to turn his back, and to leave them a conſiderable number of priſoners, among whom were his uncle, his younger brother, and two of his couſins.

The vexation cauſed by this freſh diſgrace, did not affect MAGHMUD ſo tenderly, as his fears for the preſervation of perſons whom he loved, and who were ſo nearly related to him. As ſoon as he returned to his camp, he ſent an officer to SHAH HUSSEIN, entreating him to interpoſe his authority in their behalf; and this prince glad of an opportunity of doing an act of humanity, and ſtill fondly expecting an accommodation, immediately diſpatched MIRZA RAHIM, one of the officers of his court. The AFGHANS eſcorted this meſſenger as far as BEN ISFAHAN: he made all poſſible expedition, but he arrived too late; for at his entering the town, he ſaw the dead bodies of the captives fixed upon ſtakes; when he complained at their having acted ſo precipitately, in an affair of that importance, they ſtopped his mouth by telling him; that barbarians who contrary to their promiſe, had murdered their priſoners in cold blood, ought not to be ſurprized, if they ſhould meet with ſuch treatment in their turn, when there was no promiſe given. Tho' MAGHMUD might naturally have expected theſe repriſals, they flung him into a kind of frenzy. He immediately ordered all the PERSIANS in his power to be maſſacred upon the ſpot; and not contented with ſo cruel a revenge, he forbid his men to grant any quarter hereafter to the enemy. His mind was agitated for ſome days with the emotions of grief and revenge; but as ſoon as he recovered, and began to reflect ſeriouſly, he fell into a ſtate of deſpondency. He had never flattered himſelf with the hopes of reducing ISFAHAN, but by the reputation of his arms; and when that was loſt, he could hardly expect, that the VALI of ARABIA would be able to prevent the beſieged from taking advantage of his diſgraces, by attacking him in their turn; or elſe, that this treacherous general, alarmed at his ill ſucceſs, would ceaſe to favour a party, which fortune ſeemed to have abandoned. In theſe embaraſſing circumſtances, he reinforced the guards of the

the bridge ABASABAD, and the other poſts; and leaving only a very 1722.
ſmall garriſon in JULFA, he ordered the remainder of his army to return to FARABAD, as if he intended to ſecure his retreat.

The fate of the empire was then in the king's hands. He might have eaſily forced ſome of thoſe poſts which were at too great a diſtance to be able to ſupport each other; and if he had done that, or even made a feint towards it, there was reaſon to preſume that the enemy would have abandoned their ſeveral ſtations; and inſtead of beſieging, would have been beſieged themſelves. The ARMENIANS of JULFA, who were accuſed of favouring the rebels, and yet continued always faithful to their ſovereign, to whom they gave exact intelligence of every thing that was paſſing, ſignalized their zeal on this occaſion. They gave notice to the court of the conſternation which had ſpread itſelf throughout the camp of the AFGHANS; and in order to induce them to make a proper uſe of it, they offered to put the garriſon of JULFA to the ſword, as ſoon as they could ſee the king's troops engaged with the enemy. This was ſuch a propoſal as no one in their right ſenſes could refuſe to accept, for there was great probability of its ſucceeding; and the AFGHANS would then have been inevitably undone. If the bridge of ABASABAD had been attacked on both ſides, at one and the ſame time, it could never have held out; the detachments placed at the ſeveral poſts, deprived of all hopes of ſuccours, or even of a retreat, would have been forced one after another; and the remainder of the army, inveſted at FARABAD, to all human appearance would have been reduced to the neceſſity of imploring the clemency of the PERSIANS: the leaſt benefit they could expect from ſuch an enterprize, muſt have been the opening a paſſage for the convoy which the inhabitants of BEN-ISFAHAN had recovered.

Theſe advantages were ſo evident, that the king could not help ſeeing them; and the troops received orders to act in conſequence: but the VALI of ARABIA their commander, preſerved the AFGHANS from this danger. This prince judging that his treacherous conduct would be diſcovered if the enemy raiſed the ſiege, marched out of the town, but with a full reſolution not to fight. He evaded coming to action for ſome

1722. days, under pretence that he waited for a body of troops, which, according to the advices he had received, was ſet out from one of the provinces, and could not be long upon their march; and having by this delay cooled the king's ardour in regard to his project, and given MAGHMUD time to provide for his ſecurity, he brought his army back into the city; alledging, that as the ſuccours did not come, he did not think it prudent to hazard an action, which was to decide the fate of the empire, upon the promiſe of ſo ſuſpected a people as the ARMENIANS of JULFA. This ſtep ſaved MAGHMUD, and a new event ſoon revived his hopes. The KHAN of COHKILAN, being ignorant of the defeat of the troops which were to join him, was in full march towards the capital, when he was attacked, as the others were before him, at a time he did not imagine the enemy ſo near; and after loſing two thouſand men in the engagement, he made the beſt of his way back to his province with eight thouſand men.

CHAP. XX.

SHAH HUSSEIN *applies in vain to the* VALI *of* GEORGIA *for aſſiſtance. He declares his ſon* TÆHMAS MYRZA *his ſucceſſor.* TÆHMAS *eſcapes from* ISFAHAN, *and endeavours to raiſe an army to march to the aſſiſtance of his father. Famine in* ISFAHAN. ACHMED AGA *makes a vigorous ſally to open a paſſage for a convoy of proviſions, but is defeated by the treachery of the* VALI *of* ARABIA. *Death of* ACHMED AGA.

THE affliction which this news cauſed in ISFAHAN, was increaſed by another piece of intelligence, received ſoon after it. The king depended upon the GEORGIANS as his deliverers; the valour of thoſe people was equally known to the PERSIANS, and the rebels; and there was no reaſon to doubt, but the enemy would raiſe the ſiege, upon the firſt notice of their march. From this perſuaſion, SHAH HUSSEIN wrote in the moſt preſſing terms to their prince, immediately after the battle of GULNABAD; but the proud VACHTANGA, not being yet able to overcome the mortification which this monarch had given him, by preventing his revenge

revenge on the LESGEES, adhered to the raſh oath he had made on that occaſion, and by his preſent refuſal to fight, ſacrificed the whole empire. 1722.

As ſoon as it was known, that no aſſiſtance could be expected from the GEORGIANS; the apprehenſions, which the inexperience of the rebels, and the advantages obtained over them, had in ſome meaſure ſuſpended, revived with greater force. All hopes of ſucceſs were now baniſhed; and the minds of the people were intirely filled with the ideas of their paſt misfortunes, and thoſe with which they were yet threatened. It was notorious, that the governors of the provinces were fully reſolved not to ſubmit to the authority of the VALI of LORISTAN; and the defeat of the KHANS of the BACTIARIANS, of HAMADAN, and COHKILAN, was a proof that no good was to be expected, ſo long as they refuſed to unite under the ſame commander.

As the danger increaſed every day, the king thought it high time to enter into ſome meaſures, to prevent the whole royal family from being involved in one common ruin. This monarch had fourteen ſons, and four daughters. Three days after the battle of GULNABAD, he had declared ABAS MYRZA the eldeſt, his ſucceſſor to the throne, and reſigned the care of the government into his hands. This young prince being of a very warm temper, and diſdaining to diſſimulate, began his adminiſtration with ordering the VALI of ARABIA, the firſt phyſician, and ſome other perſons of figure, to be put to death: however, they contrived to ward off the blow, by obtaining of the king to ſhut him up again in the ſeraglio; where, according to the policy of the ſtate, he had been hitherto confined with his brothers. SEFFIE MYRZA, who followed him in order of birth, was ſubſtituted in his ſtead, but did not ſucceed better; for the courtiers judging him too weak to govern, about a month after he underwent the ſame fate. The third brother was not choſen, becauſe the too ſcrupulous attachment which he profeſſed to the duties of religion, ſeemed to diſqualify him for ſuch an office; ſo that TÆHMAS [d] MYRZA, who was next to him in order of birth, was acknowledged towards the end of MAY, preſumptive heir of the crown.

The

[d] This prince's right name is TÆMA'HEB, which in the antient PERSIAN language ſignifies moſt pure.

1722. The latter end of JUNE, the king reſolved to ſend this young prince out of ISFAHAN. The deſire of ſecuring in his perſon a legitimate ſucceſſor, was not the only motive, which induced him to take this reſolution; he was alſo willing by this means, to deprive his generals of all pretence of diſobedience, hoping that the difficulty they made to unite the forces of their reſpective governments, would no longer ſubſiſt, as ſoon as they had orders to aſſemble under the command of the preſumptive heir of the crown. AMAN OLA, who had been ſent with ſome forces to attack the troops, which were marching to the relief of ISFAHAN, was not yet returned, and his abſence weakened the main army of the AFGHANS; inſomuch that they could hardly ſupply forces ſufficient to guard the different poſts, which ſhut up the ſeveral avenues to the town.

TÆHMAS MYRZA being determined to follow the directions of the king his father, ſet out from ISFAHAN the 21ſt of JUNE in the night, eſcorted by three hundred choſen horſe. MAHOMMED EMIR, ſurnamed ASHREFF[e] SULTAN, ſon of MIR ABDALLAH, whom MAGHMUD had deprived of his throne and life in KANDAHAR, commanded the poſt which intercepted the communication between the town and the country, the ſide of the gate TOKCHI. MAGHMUD's mother was extremely fond of this young lord, and had by her intreaties ſaved him more than once from the cruelty of her ſon. ASHREFF diſſembled the averſion he had conceived againſt the murderer of his father; and behaved with ſo much prudence and valour on every occaſion, at the ſame time giving ſuch demonſtrations of zeal for the intereſt of his chief, that at length he gained his confidence, as well as the eſteem of the whole army.

This poſt was the beſt guarded, as it was by the TOKCHI-gate the city could moſt conveniently receive ſuccours. TÆHMAS intended to ſurprize it, and to force his way through, in order to retire to CASBIN. He advanced by the favour of the night; but could not eſcape the vigilance of the enemy, whom he found under arms, and ready to oppoſe him. Tho' the AFGHANS were inferior in number to the troops of TÆHMAS MYRZA, yet the engagement continued very obſtinate and bloody, till ASHREFF,

[e] ASHREFF ſignifies moſt noble.

ASHREFF, after loſing a great part of his men, was obliged to retire to a neighbouring fort, to ſave the remainder of his people from the fury of the PERSIANS. 1722.

This event filled the beſieged with hopes: they flattered themſelves that the preſence of the prince would raiſe compaſſion in every breaſt; and that he would ſoon be in a condition to reſcue them from the miſeries in which they were involved. The AFGHANS on the contrary were in great conſternation to hear that the heir of the diadem had eſcaped, and might ſoon return at the head of an army. MAGHMUD in particular fell into a tranſport of rage; the captivity of the whole royal family being the greateſt advantage he had to expect from the taking of ISFAHAN. He was heard to ſay in the vehemence of his wrath, "that it would be to little purpoſe "now to reduce the capital, ſince there would be ſtill a prince able to "diſpute the throne with him." His paſſion prevailed over his reaſon ſo much, that though ASHREFF had behaved ſo gallantly, he accuſed him of holding a correſpondence with the enemy; and condemned him to death.

So paſſionate and unjuſt a ſentence however did not take place. ASHREFF appeared before an aſſembly of the principal officers of the army, to vindicate his innocence; he repreſented to them, that the poſt which he had guarded, was, like ſeveral others, weakened by the detachment made from the army under AMAN OLA, and conſiſted only of one hundred men when TAHMAS appeared: that this prince was at the head of a much more numerous body of troops, exceedingly well mounted, and compoſed of ſeveral perſons of diſtinction of the braveſt ſoldiers about the court: that notwithſtanding theſe circumſtances, he went out of his entrenchments to meet the prince; but ſo ſmall a number of ſoldiers as he had under his command, however gallantly they might behave, could not hinder the PERSIANS from forcing their way ſword in hand; and that, as a proof of his vigilance, thirty of his men were killed on the occaſion. There is little room to imagine that ASHREFF was falſe to his truſt; for MAGHMUD having neither children nor brother of a proper age to ſucceed him, this young lord might be conſidered as his heir. The divan pro-

1722. nounced in his favour; and MAGHMUD, diſguiſing his ſuſpicions, reſtored ASHREFF to his employments.

During this tranſaction in the camp of the rebels, TÆHMAS MYRZA, after a forced march of twenty-four hours, reach'd CASHAN, he then proceeded to KOOM, and from thence to CASBIN. This young prince had ſo great a ſenſibility of the danger, in which he had left the king his father, that he ſpared no pains to compaſs his delivery: but private intereſt, and the ſpirit of independency, intirely baffled an authority which had no force to ſupport it; ſo that neither his orders nor entreaties prevailed. The greateſt part of the people in the neighbourhood of ISFAHAN, had been diſperſed through fear; and want of reſolution now hindered them from uniting. Beſides thoſe bodies already mentioned, which found pretences to avoid coming to the aſſiſtance of the capital; the troops of GANJA excuſed themſelves, alledging they were occupied in oppoſing the incurſions of the LESGEES, who were endeavouring to take advantage of the troubles. The forces in TAVRIS had mutinied againſt their KHAN, lately ſent them from court, and conſequently refuſed to obey the orders of the prince: thus the king hardly received any aſſiſtance from near 50,000 regular troops, which were quartered on thoſe frontiers[f].

The feudatory princes of the empire, being leſs intereſted than the natural ſubjects, in the preſervation of the monarchy, ſhewed as little zeal on this occaſion; and many conſidered the extremity to which their ſovereign was reduced, as a proper opportunity to recover their independency. The VALI of LORISTAN, who kept ſtill in the neighbourhood of HONSAR, ſeeing the impoſſibility of aſſembling an army, marched back with his troops into his own country.

The only hopes which TÆHMAS had now left, was to find more ſubmiſſion in the SHAH SEVEN[g]. TÆHMAS having ſummoned this militia, moſt

[f] SHAH SULIMAN, the predeceſſor and father of HUSSEIN, maintained 130,000 men on the frontiers, without reckoning his houſhold troops, which were 14000 men.

[g] The well affectioned to the king; this is a name they give to a militia, very little different from that of the ZAIMS

moſt of thoſe lords pretended they were not obliged to march, unleſs the king commanded in perſon; and the ſmall number furniſhed by the reſt, conſiſted only of peaſants ill kept and ill paid; who, conceiving a diſlike to military ſervice, from the fatigues of their march, ſoon diſbanded, and returned to their home, before they had reached the general rendezvous. 1722.

In the mean while, the ſcarcity of proviſions increaſed, and the beſieged became deſperate. The grandees, as well as the common people, plainly ſaw that the only way to open a paſſage for a convoy of proviſions, was to attack the poſts of the enemy. The king, yet incapable of ſupporting any reſolution of himſelf, referred thoſe who came to him to the VALI of ARABIA. This general flattered them with the hopes of the prince's return; and when their importunities obliged him to march out of the town, he came back immediately without making any attempt, under the idle pretext, that his aſtrologers declared that the hour was not favourable. Whether the beſieged ſaw into his artifices, or the fear of ſtarving prevailed over their obedience, they grew tired of theſe evaſions; and in the beginning of JULY aſſembled in a tumultuous manner, demanding with loud cries that SHAH HUSSEIN ſhould come forth, and lead them againſt the enemy.

This prince, who had been ſo cowardly as to ſhut himſelf up in the ſeraglio ſince the beginning of the ſiege, was far from yielding to ſuch a propoſal. He ordered ſome of his officers to let them know, that he would give his anſwer the next day; but the populace inſiſting that he ſhould appear himſelf, the eunuchs diſperſed them by firing ſome muſquet ſhots from the palace. So extraordinary a behaviour, under ſuch circumſtances, might have occaſioned a general inſurrection, if ACHMED AGA,

ZAIMS and INSARIOTS in TURKEY It was eſtabliſhed by ABAS the GREAT, and conſiſted of perſons choſen among the nobility, to whom he gave lands, on condition of their leading a certain number of their vaſſals into the field, when the ſovereign ſhould have occaſion for them. This body, which amounted at that time to 300,000 men, was the laſt reſort in any extremity or ſudden danger; but as theſe employments were hereditary, and, under the late reigns, very little care had been taken to oblige the holders of theſe poſſeſſions to diſcharge their duty, they no longer looked upon them in any other light, than as legal eſtates. Of this a very melancholy experiment was made on the preſent occaſion.

1722. AGA, governor of ISFAHAN, had not prevented the ill conſequences of it. This gallant eunuch put himſelf at the head of a body of veteran troops, and joining as many of the people as offered themſelves, he marched out of the town at the head of near thirty thouſand men, who were ſoon followed by the VALI of ARABIA and his ARABS.

As ſoon as they got out of the gates, they fell with great impetuoſity on one of the principal poſts belonging to the enemy; the troops which guarded it were obliged to give way to numbers; and tho' part of the rebel army came immediately to their aſſiſtance, yet ACHMED AGA would have maintained his ground, if the VALI had not deſerted him. ACHMED, provoked at ſo infamous a behaviour, could not diſſemble his reſentment. He ordered his men to fire on the ARABIANS; and at the ſame time gave directions to TÆHMAS KHAN, one of his principal officers, to attack them. This diviſion flung the troops into diſorder; which the AFGHANS perceiving, charged them with new vigour, ſo that the PERSIANS being almoſt hemmed in, were obliged at length to abandon the poſt, and retire under their ramparts.

The intent of this ſally was to open a paſſage for the convoy abovementioned, which in all probability would have been followed with the raiſing of the ſiege. ACHMED, who had formed the project, ſpared no pains to render it ſucceſsful; but neither his valour nor conduct could ſcreen him from the diſpleaſure of the king, who ſeemed to have ſo little diſcernment, as to ſhew no reſentment againſt any but thoſe who were faithful to him. This monarch was ſo infatuated by the artful diſcourſe of the VALI of ARABIA, as to impute the misfortune intirely to ACHMED AGA: he blamed him openly for fighting in compliance with the importunity of the people, and without orders from the general: but above all, he condemned him for firing upon the ARABIANS: and refuſing to give ear to what he had to alledge in proof of his innocence, much leſs to give him an opportunity of proving the perfidy of the ARABIAN prince, he took the government of the city from him. The faithful ACHMED could not ſurvive this diſgrace, together with the approaching ruin of his country. Whether he took poiſon the night following, or

grief overwhelmed him, he died a few days after; and the king too late 1722.
regretted the loſs of a man, whoſe diſtinguiſhed zeal, bravery, and experience, might have ſaved his diadem.

CHAP. XXI.

Conſternation in ISFAHAN. *Treachery of* MELUCK MAGHMUD *governor of* SEGESTAN, *who makes himſelf maſter of* KHORASAN. *Deſcription of the famine in* ISFAHAN. *Capitulation for the ſurrender of that city. Ceremony of* SHAH HUSSEIN's *abdication.* MIR MAGHMUD *receives the diadem, and takes poſſeſſion of* ISFAHAN.

THE death of ACHMED cauſed as much joy in the camp of the AFGHANS, as conſternation in ISFAHAN. All hopes of ſuccours were now vaniſhed; and, to complete their miſery, even the fleſh of horſes and other beaſts of burthen was become very ſcarce. The beſieged, thus preſſed by famine, deſerted in crowds; and tho' the AFGHANS maſſacred every PERSIAN who fell into their hands, the deſertion augmented[h]. Whether ACHMED AGA had been the inſtrument of opening the eyes of the king, in regard to the VALI of ARABIA, or this monarch made an effort to change his fortune, by changing his general; he offered the command of the troops to LUTF ALI KHAN. This employment could not fall into better hands, if the choice had been made ſooner; but things were reduced to the laſt extremity, moſt of the inhabitants having deſerted in the manner related. A great number had periſhed for want, and the remainder, emaciated with hunger, had neither ſtrength nor courage to make any deſperate attempt; ſo that this lord not daring to rely upon them, and fearing if any miſchance ſhould happen, he ſhould fall a victim to thoſe ſecret artifices which had deſtroyed his brother-in-law the ATHEMAT DOULET, conſtantly refuſed every offer of that kind.

[h] About this time, father KRUSINSKI, the author of the memoirs, from whence part of this hiſtory is compiled, obtained leave to remove to JULFA. Two miſſionaries, of the ſame order, attempted to make their eſcape to SHIRASS, with the FRENCH conſul: one of theſe fathers was killed, with ſome other EUROPEANS. The conſul was wounded on this occaſion; however he eſcaped, with ſeveral others of his little troop.

1722. The VALI of ARABIA was therefore left to carry on his treaſonable practices; but SHAH HUSSEIN expecting no longer any ſuccours from abroad, and deſpairing of the ſucceſs of any attempt of his people within the walls, reſolved to renew the negotiation, which the enemy had opened at the beginning of the ſiege. He ſent the KURSHI BASHI to FARABAD, with orders to offer MAGHMUD the terms he had demanded; which were to give him one of the princeſſes his daughters in marriage, with 50,000 tomans [i], and to yield to him the provinces of KHORASAN, KHERMAN, and KANDAHAR, in full ſovereignty. How advantageous ſoever theſe propoſals appeared, MAGHMUD was too well acquainted with the ſituation of affairs, and rejected them with the ſame air of pride and diſdain, as ALEXANDER once affected on a like occaſion; the AFGHAN prince anſwered almoſt in the ſame terms as the GRECIAN hero: "The king of PERSIA," ſaid he, "offers me nothing that is in his diſpoſal; this prince, and the princeſſes "are already in my power; he is no longer maſter of thoſe three pro- "vinces, which he offers me; the fate of the whole empire is now to "be decided between us."

Things were thus ſituated, when news came that MELUCK MAGHMUD, governor of SEGESTAN, was advancing by forced marches to the relief of the capital. The king, touched to the heart at the arrogance of the AFGHAN chief, imagined that heaven had ſtirred up an avenger of his cauſe. Theſe deluding hopes were augmented, when he heard that this general, with 10,000 men under his command, was encamped at GULNABAD. This event flung the rebel chief once more into great inquietude. The ſiege had already coſt him above 2000 men; and he could not pretend to be a match for this army, which was compoſed of regular troops, and for the forces within the gates, who would certainly make ſome deſperate effort to relieve themſelves. Under this anxiety, he thought it more adviſeable to tempt the fidelity of his new enemy, than to expoſe himſelf to the hazard of an engagement with an officer, whoſe valour and military ſkill he had already experienced.

[i] 125,000 *l.*

NAZR ULLA was therefore appointed to repair to GULNABAD, with ſuch 1722.
magnificent preſents [k], as rather betrayed the fear, than expreſſed the liberality of the donor. NAZR ULLA executed his commiſſion like a man of abilities: he repreſented to MELUCK MAGHMUD, that the capital was reduced to the laſt extremity, and that the reſt of the empire being attacked on every ſide, could not avoid its approaching ruin: he made him ſenſible of the uncertainty of the iſſue of a battle, and that the friendſhip of MIR MAGHMUD might, in the preſent circumſtances, procure him advantages far ſuperior to his preſent expectations: he then laid before him the articles of his commiſſion, and offered him the alliance and aſſiſtance of the AFGHANS, if he inclined to accept the ſovereignty of one of the provinces of the kingdom.

The magnificence of the preſents had already dazzled the eyes of MELUCK MAGHMUD; the uncertainty of the iſſue of a battle alſo ſtaggered him; but the ambition of reigning determined his compliance. He made KHORASAN his choice, with a view of being ſupported in caſe of need by the provinces of KANDAHAR and HERAT, which their common intereſt gave him ſufficient reaſon to expect. Having therefore concluded the treaty, he ſet out on his march to take poſſeſſion of his new dominions.

MESCHED, the capital of that country, which the policy of ABAS the GREAT had raiſed to ſo flouriſhing a condition, was greatly fallen from its former luſtre. The ABDOLLEES and OUSBEGS, who made incurſions in this neighbourhood, at length took it by ſtorm, after a few days ſiege; and not ſatisfied with ſtripping it of the wealth which had been hoarded there by the ſuperſtition of the PERSIANS, the inhabitants felt the utmoſt effects of avarice and cruelty. ISMAEL KHAN, governor of the province, unable to oppoſe MELUCK MAGHMUD, took the reſolution of retiring to CASBIN. Whether the ABDOLLEES and OUSBEGS had no further view than to pillage, and conſequently had abandoned their conqueſt; or whether the thing was concerted with the AFGHAN prince, the new uſurper was received in MESCHED the 20th of NOVEMBER, and the other cities of the

[k] Seven horſes magnificently capariſoned, ſaddles, bridles, a poniard enriched with diamonds, rich ſtuffs, and gold callyans.

1722. the province knowing he was a SCHIAS, made no difficulty to acknowledge him for their ſovereign.

The joy which the approach of this general had occaſioned in ISFAHAN, ſerved only to heighten the forlorn condition to which they were reduced. The exorbitant pay of the military people, had exhauſted the SHAH's treaſure; ſo that the next expedient was to carry all the gold and ſilver plate in the palace, to the mint; and when this was all gone, the king borrowed conſiderable ſums on his jewels, of different merchants, but eſpecially of the ENGLISH and DUTCH[1]. At length, the latter end of SEPTEMBER, when there was neither money nor proviſions left, this unfortunate prince ordered his miniſters to go and treat for a capitulation.

MAGHMUD might at this time have regulated the conditions as he pleaſed; but this dangerous rebel had further views. He foreſaw that he could never be ſafe in ISFAHAN, ſo long as the inhabitants were greatly ſuperior in number to his troops; for which reaſon he took his meaſures, that a conſiderable part of thoſe who remained, might periſh with hunger, before he ſigned the treaty. It is true, he might have deſtroyed them at once, by ordering a general aſſault, which, in their miſerable condition, would have been the leaſt act of cruelty; his chief officers preſſed him to this for ſome time, giving for reaſon, that this action would not only facilitate the conqueſt of the reſt of the empire, by the terror which it would ſpread in all parts; but moreover, that it would juſtify his invaſion, ſince according to the law, there is no better title to a crown, than taking it by the ſword. Whether he was afraid of loſing part of his beſt troops, or intended to preſerve from the greedy hands of his ſoldiers, the great riches of this ſo late flouriſhing a city, he lay ſtill within his lines, during the laſt two months of the ſiege, amuſing himſelf with the idea of his future grandeur; whilſt the beſieged flattered themſelves with the hopes of an accommodation, which he never intended.

What heart can reflect without horror, on the dreadful circumſtances of the famine, cauſed by this artful conduct! In the month of AUGUST, horſes, mules, and other beaſts of burthen, were become ſo exceſſive dear,

[1] The DUTCH alone lent him 340,000 crowns.

dear, that none but the king, and the principal lords about him, or ſome of the wealthieſt inhabitants, could afford to eat of them. Notwithſtanding the averſion which the PERSIANS have from their religion for dogs, and ſome other animals, which they look upon as unclean, yet as many as they could find, were conſumed in a few days: the people afterwards fed on the bark of trees, leaves, and leather, which they ſoftened with boiling water; but when this ſad reſource was alſo exhauſted, they had no other ſupport than human fleſh. Never was ſo much of it eaten in any ſiege as this. What pencil can deſcribe their hollow eyes, their trembling knees, their emaciated bodies! Death, in his ghaſtly form, appeared in their livid countenances, whilſt they were cutting ſlices of human bodies to ſupport the feeble remains of life: ſome were even tranſported by the violence of hunger, to murder their fellow-citizens, or young children, to feaſt on their bodies. Under this lamentable neceſſity of periſhing by famine, or of ſupporting themſelves by means ſo contrary to nature, ſeveral poiſoned themſelves together with their whole family. The ſtreets, the public ſquares, and the very gardens of the palace, were ſtrewed with dead bodies, which no one had the heart or ſtrength to bury. The water of the ZENDEROUD was ſo corrupted by the number of carcaſes thrown into it, that there was no poſſibility of drinking of it; and in a leſs wholeſome climate [m], the air muſt have been infected to that degree, as to deſtroy what few inhabitants were left alive. Such was the miſerable ſituation of this unhappy city for above two months. The ARMENIANS were received in JULFA, excepting ſuch as had carried proviſions to the enemy, contrary to the prohibition of MAGHMUD; but if any of the PERSIANS were ſo deſperate as to go thither, they were ſure to meet with death: neither age nor ſex could protect them from the barbarity of the AFGHANS; the men were maſſacred, and the women and children thrown into wells. 1722.

The 21ſt of OCTOBER, SHAH HUSSEIN, clad in mourning, went out of his palace on foot, and walked thro' the principal ſtreets of ISFAHAN. This unfortunate monarch bewailed aloud the misfortunes of his reign,

[m] The air of ISFAHAN is remarkably rarified; it reſembles much that of MADRID, as I was aſſured by a Jeſuit, who lived many years in both cities.

1722. reign, imputing them to the bad counſels of his miniſters; he endeavoured alſo to comfort the multitude that ſurrounded him, with the hopes of their meeting with a better fate, under a new government. This ſpeech from a prince, whoſe gentleneſs of nature was the fault which had ever betrayed him, and by which he was now reduced to this ſtate of humiliation, after a reign of eight and twenty years, could not but make a ſenſible impreſſion on the people, who in ſpite of their own miſery, in the bitterneſs of their ſouls lamented the diſgrace of their ſovereign.

The king having thus taken his leave of his ſubjects the 22d of OCTOBER, ſent plenipotentiaries the day following, to ſign the capitulation. By this act, he obliged himſelf to reſign the empire to the conqueror, and to yield himſelf up into his hands, with the principal officers of his court. MAGHMUD on the other ſide, promiſed that no ill treatment ſhould be offered, neither to the king, the nobility, nor any of the inhabitants. This treaty being ſigned, the day following [n] MAGHMUD ſent horſes for the king and his court: this unfortunate prince having ſacrificed five camels [o], perhaps the only ones left, mounted on horſe-back, in company with about three hundred perſons, among whom were the VALI of ARABIA, the ATHEMAT DOULET, a brother of the VALI of LORISTAN, and the principal lords of the court; they moved on ſlowly, with their eyes fixed on the ground; the few inhabitants who had ſtrength to ſee this mournful cavalcade, expreſſed their grief by a gloomy ſilence, which preſaged the ſad effects of this melancholy event.

It was now paſt noon, when two couriers arrived, to give notice to the grand maſter of the ceremonies of MAGHMUD's court, that the king was drawing near. Theſe officers immediately entered MAGHMUD's tent, who to humble the PERSIANS ſtill more, diſpatched the ſame couriers back, with orders to the SHAH, to halt at the foot of a hill near the camp, under the pretence that MAGHMUD was aſleep. Thus the unhappy HUSSEIN was treated with marks of ſervitude, even before he had quitted the enſigns

[n] The 22d of October, 1722, was the day on which this cataſtrophe happened. [o] They were without any ceremony; I do not know for what purpoſe this ſacrifice was ordered; that of one camel, which ſeems to be preſcribed by the law, ſhould have been made at MECCA, the 10th of the preceding moon

ſigns of royalty; he tarried about half an hour at the place preſcribed, 1722.
and then obtaining leave to continue his march, he arrived at FARABAD, where the AFGHAN chief had his head quarters.

The grand maſter of the ceremonies introduced him into a hall, at the corner [p] of which MAGHMUD was ſeated, leaning on a cuſhion of cloth of gold. The king advancing towards the middle of the chamber, ſaluted him, ſaying, SELAM ALEIOCOM [q]. The AFGHAN then roſe up, and returned the ſalute, with the ſame compliment; after which, the ATHEMAT DOULET conducted the king to another corner, on the left of MAGHMUD, where a place was prepared for him, like that which was occupied by this rebel prince.

The king being ſeated, opened the converſation by ſaying: "Son, "ſince the great ſovereign of the world is no longer pleaſed that I ſhould "reign, and the moment is come which he has pointed out for thee to "aſcend the throne of PERSIA, I reſign the empire to thee with all my "heart: I wiſh that thou mayſt rule it in all proſperity." At the ſame time he took the royal plume of feathers [r] from his turban, and gave it to MAGHMUD's grand vizir; but this prince refuſing to receive it from the vizir, the king ſtood up, and taking it again, faſtened it himſelf to the uſurper's turban, ſaying, "reign in peace;" after which he retired, and ſat down in his place. MAGHMUD continued ſitting, while HUSSEIN was fixing this mark of ſovereignty on his turban. Coffee and tea were afterwards ſerved up; and the AFGHAN prince, taking theſe liquors, addreſſed himſelf to the king after this manner: "Such is the inſtability "of human grandeur: GOD diſpoſes of empires as he pleaſes, and takes "them from one nation to give them to another: but I promiſe to con"ſider you always as my own father; and I will undertake nothing for "the future without your advice." After theſe words, HUSSEIN was invited

[p] The corner is the moſt honourable place in ORIENTAL countries. It is alſo the moſt commodious, as it is the only one in which a perſon can lean on both ſides on the cuſhions, which are placed round the walls. [q] All hail: this compliment is ſeldom given but to people of the ſame perſuaſion in religion; it is the higheſt expreſſion of reſpect. [r] This plume of feathers is called the GIGA, and is the mark of ſovereignty. See Vol. IV. page 4.

1722. vited into another apartment, which had been appointed for him; and 4000 AFGHANS were ordered to take poſſeſſion of the royal palace, and of the gates of the city.

Thus the reign of the SEFFIES, after having laſted 223 years, ended at length in the perſon of SHAH HUSSEIN *, the tenth ſucceſſor of ISMAEL the firſt king, and founder of this dynaſty.

* We may with propriety ſay it ended, ſince his ſon TAHMAS was too weak or too unfortunate to re-eſtabliſh it.

PART

PART VI.

THE REVOLUTIONS OF PERSIA,

FROM THE ACCESSION OF MAGHMUD TO THE CROWN OF PERSIA IN 1722, TO THE TREATY CONCLUDED BETWEEN SHAH TÆHMAS AND PETER THE GREAT IN 1723.

CHAP. XXII.

ASHREFF *quits* MAGHMUD'*s army.* MAGHMUD *aſcends the throne, and receives the homage of* SHAH HUSSEIN, *and the grandees of* PERSIA. *He regulates the civil adminiſtration.* TÆHMAS MYRZA *takes the title of king.* MAGHMUD *orders new levies to be raiſed in* KANDAHAR. *He ſends* NAZR ULLA, *with a detachment of troops, to lay ſiege to* CASBIN. TÆHMAS *retires upon the approach of the* AFGHAN *army.* CASBIN *ſurrenders.*

THE tranquillity of the new reign was diſturbed by a ſudden event. ASHREFF SULTAN had not forgot the danger to which the eſcape of TÆHMAS MYRZA had expoſed him; but continued apprehenſive leſt that very protection which had ſaved him, ſhould be imputed to him as a new crime, by a prince who was upon the point of being abſolute maſter. As ſoon therefore as this AFGHAN prince received notice 1722.

1722, that SHAH HUSSEIN had ſubmitted, he deſerted his poſt, deſigning to retreat to KANDAHAR, under an eſcort of an hundred choſen horſe. MAGHMUD, ſenſible of the conſequence of ſuch a deſertion, ſent NAZR ULLA in purſuit of him with five hundred horſe: this general made ſuch haſte, that he overtook him at VERSENE, a village twenty leagues diſtant, from whence he brought him back to the camp. MAGHMUD had meditated his deſtruction, but he eſcaped the ſecond time. He was really more beloved by the ſoldiers, than MAGHMUD himſelf, and they talked openly of retiring to KANDAHAR, if any attempt ſhould be made to take away his life. MAGHMUD therefore thought it beſt to forgive him, at leaſt to diſſemble his reſentment.

His thoughts were now employed in regard to the ceremony of aſcending the throne, which had been juſt reſigned to him. The 27th of the ſame month, was the day appointed for this ſolemnity. AMAN OLA poſted centinels on the turrets, and other lofty edifices, to obſerve the motions of the people. The two kings marched out of the camp of the AFGHANS, and advanced towards the town. MAGHMUD, in order to ſhew himſelf to his new ſubjects, took his rout by the bridge of SHIRASS, ſo that he traverſed the city to reach the palace.

The proceſſion was opened by ten officers on horſe-back, and about 2000 cavalry, among whom were ſeveral lords of the court of PERSIA. Next came the maſter of the horſe to the AFGHAN prince, at the head of fifteen led horſes magnificently capariſoned; he was followed by ſome muſqueteers on foot, and theſe by 1000 common infantry. Immediately after came the grand maſter of the ceremonies, in the midſt of 300 negroes dreſſed in ſcarlet cloth. Theſe negros had been choſen from among the ſlaves of ISFAHAN, to compoſe the conqueror's guard. Forty paces from thence was MAGHMUD, mounted on a horſe [t], of which the VALI of ARABIA had made him a preſent, on the day of the abdication. The unfortunate HUSSEIN rode on his left ſide. Theſe princes were followed by about 300 pages on horſe-back. The MUFTI [u], and AMAN OLA [w], whom MAGHMUD had appointed his grand vizir; MULLAH SAFFRAN,

[t] It is ſaid that this horſe coſt 4000 crowns.

[u] The judge who decides on points of law.

[w] He is alſo called AMAN OLA KHAN, tho' his title of KHAN has not been obſerved.

FRAN[x], and NAZR ULLA[y], one of his generals; MOULA MOUSSA his high treaſurer, and MAHOMMED AGA ſteward of his houſhold, ſucceeded next; after theſe came the ATHEMAT DOULET, and the principal officers of the dethroned monarch, mixed with the crowd of AFGHAN officers. The whole was cloſed by 100 camels, each loaded with one of the harquebuſes already mentioned, preceded by 600 muſicians, and followed by near 6000 horſe. 1722.

As ſoon as they had paſſed over the bridge of SHIRASS, SHAH HUSSEIN was conducted croſs the gardens of the palace, to the place of his confinement. MAGHMUD ſeemed to think it impolitic to lead the conquer'd king in triumph, but continued his march, and ſoon arrived at the gates of the town. The inhabitants, notwithſtanding their grief, felt a relief from their miſery, in this change, in hopes of ſupporting their lives; which induced them to give ſome external marks of reſpect to their new maſter. They laid rich ſtuffs under his horſes feet, and filled the air with perfumes. The guns on the camels backs were often fired, as they marched along; and in the intervals, the ten AFGHANS who walked at the head of the proceſſion, pronounced loud imprecations againſt the followers of ALI.

In this order the new monarch came to the royal palace[z]; having ſeated himſelf on the throne, he was ſaluted the ſecond time, as king of PERSIA, by the captive HUSSEIN, who was brought here for that purpoſe; after which he received the oath of allegiance, of the princes, miniſters, grandees, chief officers, and principal citizens. Soon after, the artillery of the town and citadel proclaimed the news to the people; and the ceremony concluded with an entertainment, which the SULTAN[a], for ſo he was afterwards called, gave to the deputies who came in the name of all the citizens, to acknowledge his authority.

Notwithſtanding this great change of fortune, MAGHMUD did not forget himſelf; for it may be truly ſaid, that in the beginning he ruled like a

[x] This was MAGHMUD's chief eccleſiaſtic. [y] NAZR ULLA was alſo denominated NAZR ULLA SULTAN. [z] DEVLET KANE, the habitation of greatneſs. [a] SHAH HUSSEIN was alſo called SULTAN, which ſeemed to be an additional mark of honour, but SHAH is the proper title of the PERSIAN kings. This prince was frequently ſtiled SHAH SULTAN HUSSEIN, a writing which I have adopted.

1722. a prince born to the throne. As the moſt preſſing buſineſs was now to put a ſtop to the dreadful famine, which was ſtill conſuming the few inhabitants, he gave proper orders for a ſupply of proviſions; theſe were ſo punctually obeyed, that the very day he made his entrance, a batman [b] of bread coſt only one crown, which the day before was hardly to be had at any price. He then applied himſelf to the regulation of public affairs, in which he diſplayed the abilities of a conſummate ſtateſman. It was equally dangerous to commit the ſeveral ſubordinate branches of the adminiſtration to his own officers; or to continue them in the hands of the miniſters of the late ſovereign; for he could no more expect experience from the one, than fidelity from the other. MAGHMUD was ſenſible of this inconvenience; he therefore confirmed the PERSIANS in their employments, but aſſociated with each of them a collegue of his own nation.

By this piece of policy, he not only formed miniſters to his liking, but likewiſe prevented the jealouſy and averſion, which his new ſubjects would have conceived, from his diſcarding the old miniſtry. He left no other poſt than that of DIVAN BEGHI, entirely to an AFGHAN; preſuming that good ſenſe and equity, were ſufficient for the diſcharge of the duties of this office. Whatever was his motive, he had no reaſon to repent of his choice; for the PERSIANS themſelves were ſoon aſtoniſhed, to ſee juſtice adminiſtered with more rectitude and integrity by a foreign nation, than it had been during the reign of their natural ſovereign [c]. The people were ſcreened from violence by the ſevereſt prohibitions; and the ſafety of the conquerors was provided for by the ſtricteſt diſcipline. So prudent a conduct, inſenſibly diminiſhed the conſternation of the inhabitants, which was at length entirely removed, by puniſhing the treaſon of thoſe who had been inſtrumental to his conqueſt, verifying that common obſervation, that we hate the traitor, thô' the treaſon may be convenient.

MAGHMUD ordered all thoſe to be arreſted, who, contrary to the allegiance due to their ſovereign, had maintained a correſpondence with the AFGHANS

[b] 12 ⅕ pounds ENGLISH for five ſhillings. [c] This might well be under ſuch a reign as that of HUSSEIN, for it might be emphatically ſaid of it, "Woe be to thee, O land, whoſe king "is a child, and whoſe princes eat in the morning."

GHANS during the ſiege. They were all executed as guilty of high treaſon; 1722.
their memory was branded with infamy; their eſtates were confiſcated, and their bodies expoſed in the public market place. The VALI of ARABIA, though the moſt criminal, was the only one who was not put to death. It was imagined, that MAGHMUD had made an oath never to take away his life; but perhaps he was afraid of provoking the ARABS by the death of their chief; however his villainy did not eſcape with impunity, for MAGHMUD confiſcated his eſtate, and condemned him to perpetual impriſonment. His hereditary principality, which was that of CHUSISTAN[d], was given to one of his couſin-germans, who had ſerved in the rebel army; and MAGHMUD engaged to put him in poſſeſſion of it, as ſoon as the ſituation of his affairs would permit. The manner in which he behaved to the late ATHEMAT DOULET, was not leſs agreeable to the PERSIANS. This miniſter had the courage to put a reſtriction on the oath of allegiance, which he ſwore to the new ſovereign, by begging to be excuſed from ever bearing arms againſt prince TÆHMAS. MAGHMUD carried his policy on this occaſion ſo far, as publicly to commend the generous behaviour of that miniſter; and even affected to ſhew him a particular eſteem and confidence on that very account.

The PERSIANS were not the only people who had reaſon to commend the beginning of the new reign; the conſuls of EUROPEAN nations were confirmed in their privileges; and the miſſionaries obtained the free exerciſe of their religion in their churches in ISFAHAN and JULFA. Such appearances of equity in a prince, who had been hitherto conſidered only as a chief of banditti, drew part of the inhabitants to town, who had fled for ſhelter to the country. SHAH HUSSEIN was almoſt the only perſon in the empire, who had any occaſion to complain. MAGHMUD took from him a great number of young women ſlaves, who compoſed his harram, and diſtributed them among his principal officers. This monarch had carried his ſenſuality to ſuch a height, as to render all his ſubjects tributary to his pleaſures; the influence of his eunuchs, which was the ruin of the empire, aroſe from his boundleſs gratifications. However,

[d] Is the antient SUSIANA. The ARABS call this province after the name of its capital AHOUAS. It borders upon the PERSIAN gulph, and the banks of the EUPHRATES.

1722. ever, he was now reduced to the company of five of his women, and five domeſtics. The princes of the blood were ſhut up in another quarter of the palace, and guarded in the ſame manner as himſelf, by a hundred men. MAGHMUD, to all appearance, acted thus from a ſpirit of œconomy; for in other reſpects he ſhewed a great regard for this prince, conſulting him on every occaſion, and omitting nothing in his power that might ſooth his misfortunes. SHAH HUSSEIN, before his abdication, had married one of his daughters to the SEDR[e]: the new ſultan followed this example, and gave away the eldeſt of the remaining princeſſes in marriage to his MUFTI; and was married himſelf to the youngeſt with great ſolemnity. This reſpectful behaviour, joined to the neceſſity of obeying, induced the dethroned monarch at length to write a circular letter, by which he ratified his abdication, and enjoined all the inhabitants, both in town and country, to acknowledge the victor's authority.

During theſe tranſactions, TÆHMAS MYRZA, who was at CASBIN, having heard of the ſurrender of ISFAHAN, and the ceſſion of the crown, took the title of SHAH, and was acknowledged as ſuch by the provinces that continued true to their allegiance. This ſtep ſerved as a pretext to gratify the avarice of MAGHMUD; for he no ſooner heard of it, than he demanded 120,000 tomans[f] of the city, to defray the expences of the war. At the ſame time he laid a tax of 20,000 tomans[g] on the king's firſt phyſician: this man had been for a long time his maſter's chief favourite, and was juſtly charged with having made no other uſe of his credit, than to hoard up immenſe riches, and to deſtroy the prime miniſter FATEY ALI KHAN, by an artifice, which occaſioned, as we have related, the total ſubverſion of the ſtate. As theſe circumſtances had rendered him odious to his nation, the AFGHANS made no ſcruple of treating him with the utmoſt rigour. His treaſure, and the ſum which ISFAHAN was obliged to raiſe, having been carried to the prince's coffers, the great treaſurer, MOULA MOUSSAH, received orders to repair to KANDAHAR, and to employ theſe ſums in making new levies: accordingly he ſet out ſoon after. MAGHMUD hearing that CASBIN was one of thoſe cities

[e] SEDR AL SCHERIAH, chief juſtice. The TURKS call this officer MUFTI, and the AFGHANS MIANGI. [f] 300,000 *l.* [g] 50,000 *l.*

cities which had acknowledged prince TÆHMAS, he turned his thoughts that way. It is pretended that his deſign was to yield this city and its dependencies in full ſovereignty to AMAN OLA, as an equivalent for the throne and treaſures of SHAH HUSSEIN; which, according to their original compact, he ought to have ſhared with him. MAGHMUD now entruſted this general with a detachment of 6000 AFGHANS, and 4000 foreign troops; ASHREFF and NAZR ULLA having joined this little army, they marched from ISFAHAN towards the end of NOVEMBER. 1722.

TÆHMAS, preſuming that the AFGHANS would not open the campaign at the latter end of autumn, when the weather is pretty ſevere in thoſe parts, had, by the advice of his prime miniſter, put his troops into quarters: he was therefore in no capacity of making head againſt the enemy. As ſoon as he heard of their approach, he withdrew to ZENGAN, and from thence to TAVRIS, but in no circumſtances ſuitable to the dignity of a ſovereign. The cities of CASHAN, KOOM, and KIARE, which lay in the direct road, ſent deputies to meet AMAN OLA, and to ranſom themſelves from pillage. This general encamped the 20th of DECEMBER within three leagues of CASBIN. As ſoon as the inhabitants knew that the AFGAHNS were arrived within their diſtrict, they ſent deputies to meet them. AMAN OLA was conducted into the city with the ſound of drums, and other military inſtruments. He took up his quarters, with great part of his army, in the palace [h], whilſt the reſt of the troops were lodged in the houſes of the citizens.

The joy which this news occaſioned at MAGHMUD's court, was allayed by another piece of intelligence, which came ſoon after. MOULA MOUSSA, who was commiſſioned to convoy the treaſure to KANADHAR, had entered the province of SEGESTAN without any oppoſition; but MYRZA ISMAEL, governor of BANDA [i], having attacked him on his march, MOUSSA and his convoy were put to flight, and obliged to abandon the treaſure. It is affirmed that the money amounted to 150,000 tomans [k].

[h] See Vol. I. page 231. [i] A ſtrong fortreſs in that province. [k] 175,000 *l.* which ſome hiſtorians report to have been ſent to SHAH TÆHMAS by ISMAEL.

CHAP. XXIII.

PETER *the* GREAT *invades the northern provinces of* PERSIA. *Operations of the* RUSSIAN *army.* PERSIA *threatened by the* TURKS. *The inhabitants of* CASBIN *take up arms, and drive away the* AFGHANS. *Artful behaviour of* MAGHMUD *upon that occaſion.*

1722. MAGHMUD was not the only formidable enemy, that appeared in arms againſt the crown of PERSIA. PETER the GREAT being convinced that commerce is the only ſource of riches, and conſequently the baſis of the ſplendor of a ſtate, deſigned to open a communication between the CASPIAN and EUXINE ſeas, by joining the VOLGA and the DON[1]; as he had already opened a communication by a canal, between the VOLGA and the NEVA, which communicates with the BALTIC; by this means he had rendered ST. PETERSBURG, on the ſide of EUROPE, what ASTRACHAN was on the ſide of ASIA. As he was ſenſible, that the commerce of ASIA could not be conveniently carried on but by the CASPIAN ſea, he ordered a chart of it to be made; he likewiſe ſent prince BECKAWITZ [m] into TARTARY, where he was barbarouſly murdered. The cruelty with which the OUSBEGS maſſacred a whole caravan coming from CHINA in 1721, having revived the memory of this unhappy cataſtrophe, and of the outrages committed againſt the RUSSIAN merchants at the taking of SHAMAKIE[n]; the RUSSIAN emperor was induced to ſend an embaſſador into PERSIA. This miniſter was commiſſioned to make his complaints to SHAH HUSSEIN, if this prince was ſtill upon the throne, concerning what had paſſed in SHIRVAN; and if he no longer reigned, to inſiſt upon the uſurper's giving ſatisfaction for the behaviour of the LESGEES, the OUSBEGS, and his other allies.

It is very probable, that the real motive of the embaſſy was to examine the ſituation of the affairs of that kingdom, of which the RUSSIAN court had received but imperfect accounts. MAGHMUD, to whom the RUS-

SIAN

[1] See Vol. I. page 99. [m] See his hiſtory, Vol. I. chap. 29. [n] By the LESGEES. See page 93.

SIAN miniſter addreſſed himſelf, made anſwer, " That he was deſirous 1722.
" of living upon good terms with the CZAR, whom fame had repreſented
" as a wiſe and warlike prince; but as the people he complained of were
" neither his allies nor ſubjects, he could not preſcribe laws to them, nor
" be accountable for their conduct. He therefore recommended to him,
" to provide for the ſecurity of the caravans henceforwards by ſtrong
" convoys, unleſs he choſe to enter into an alliance with thoſe nations,
" through whoſe territories they were to paſs."

The CZAR was not ſatisfied with this anſwer; the opportunity was favourable to make himſelf maſter of the weſtern ſhore of the CASPIAN. For this purpoſe, he aſſembled in the neighbourhood of ASTRACHAN, an army of 30,000 men, compoſed of thoſe veterans who had ſerved in the war with SWEDEN; theſe were joined by a body of TARTARS, COSSACKS, and KHALMUCKS. The 29th of JULY, he embarked on the CASPIAN, and anchored the 4th of AUGUST at the mouth of the river of TERKI, on the frontiers of DAGHESTAN. From thence a lieutenant was diſpatched to TARKU, with orders to deliver to ALDI GHERAI, one of the princes of the LESGEES, a manifeſto, in which the CZAR pretended, according to the ordinary ſtile of ſuch writings, " That it was not any ambitious view of
" enlarging his dominions that brought him thither; but an intent to
" reſcue the king of PERSIA, and his loyal ſubjects, from the tyranny of
" the AFGHANS; and to chaſtiſe thoſe rebels, for the diſorders and exceſſes
" which they had committed againſt the RUSSIANS: he concluded, with
" threatening ſevere puniſhments againſt thoſe who ſhould perſiſt in their
" rebellion." Theſe manifeſtos were alſo ſent to DERBEND, SHAMAKIE, and BAKU.

During theſe tranſactions, a brigadier, who had been detached with a body of 6000 horſe to take poſſeſſion of ANDREOF, was attacked by 5000 of the inhabitants of that place; but he gave them ſo warm a reception, that he drove them back into the town, which was ſoon abandoned to pillage. The tenth of AUGUST the fleet landed the infantry at AHRAHIN near SULACK, where they threw up ſome entrenchments to cover themſelves:

1722. here the SHAMKALL ALDI GHERAI, the lords of GORSKI and AXAN, and the ſultan of a diſtrict, whoſe name was MAHOMMED, were preſented to the CZAR. ALDI GHERAI received the RUSSIANS into TARKU: the end of the month the army reſumed their march, paſſed the rivers MANAS, AHCHY, and BOYNAK, and encamped on the borders of the NITZI. The SULTAN MAHOMMED oppoſed their march with a body of 10,000 men; but after a ſharp encounter, his troops were put to flight.

The firſt of SEPTEMBER the army encamped on the banks of the BUHAN, where they received intelligence, that the inhabitants of BAKU earneſtly deſired the protection of the CZAR againſt the inſults of the LESGEES, who had vexed them with inroads for two years. As the army drew near to DERBEND [o], the governor marched out of the town, followed by the principal inhabitants, and preſented the keys to the RUSSIAN monarch. This prince was received with the ſound of a numerous artillery, and the acclamations of the people. Paſſing thro' the town, he encamped at a ſmall diſtance from the walls, on the ſouth ſide. The ſituation of this place, I have already obſerved, is ſuch as conſtitutes it the gate into ASIA. After this conqueſt, he reſolved to return home: having therefore confirmed the governor [p] in his office, and left a garriſon of two thouſand RUSSIANS in the citadel, he ordered part of his troops to march back: of theſe, ſome were re-imbarked, and others went by land to ASTRACHAN; thoſe remaining being ſufficient to extend his conqueſt the next year: he arrived himſelf in that city by ſea the middle of OCTOBER.

While the RUSSIANS were making themſelves maſters of the northern provinces of PERSIA, this unhappy empire ſaw a new ſtorm impending towards the weſt. The port having been informed by SHAH HUSSEIN'S own embaſſador, of the extremity to which his maſter was reduced, thought of reaping ſome advantage by his misfortunes. The opportunity was favourable, as ſhe was ſecured againſt her ancient enemy by the treaty of PASSAROWITZ [q]. The ſpirit of faction, which generally precedes

[p] DERBEND, in the PERSIAN language, ſignifies a ſtrong fortification; as in TURKISH DEMIR CAPI, by which name they call this place, is a gate of iron. [o] The city is conſidered as diſtinct from the citadel, in the latter a RUSSIAN officer commanded. [q] Concluded the 21ſt of JULY 1718 with the emperor CHARLES VI.

cedes the ſubverſion of monarchies, had diffuſed itſelf from ISFAHAN into 1722.
the weſtern provinces; ſo that the TURKS had all reaſon to expect that they might extend their conqueſt with a rapid progreſs. Things being thus ſituated, the PERSIAN miniſter was ordered to depart from CONSTANTINOPLE in the month of APRIL; and the grand vizir turned his whole attention to improve theſe favourable circumſtances to the advantage of the OTTOMAN empire. Such were the different motions of theſe powers to the end of this year.

We ſhall now ſee what was tranſacting in the center of PERSIA during the courſe of the enſuing year. The city of CASBIN had no reaſon to be long pleaſed with the change of government; for AMAN OLA was hardly maſter of the place, when his inſatiable avarice prompted him to treat the inhabitants with all the rigour which MAGHMUD generally ſhewed to conquered cities. Theſe extortions, and the unbridled licentiouſneſs of the ſoldiery, ſoon alienated the minds of the people. The yoke growing more intolerable every day, the leading men among them aſſembled privately, to conſult on the means of delivering themſelves from this oppreſſive tyranny. It was reſolved, that part of the inhabitants ſhould attack the royal palace at an hour appointed, while the reſt were to fall ſword in hand upon the AFGHANS diſperſed in different quarters of the town; and to the end that their ſignal might cauſe no alarm, it was agreed to ſtrike the firſt blow at the ſound of the horn, which they make uſe of a little after ſun-ſet, to give the people notice that the baths are ready.

The eighth of JANUARY was the day fixed for putting their deſign in 1723.
execution. The conſpirators had made all the neceſſary diſpoſitions, and were waiting only for the critical moment of taking their full revenge; when ſome ſuſpicious appearances determined them to anticipate the time. They had perceived early in the afternoon, that the AFGHANS abandoned ſome of their poſts, and took poſſeſſion of others; and that they were aſſembling in a body, in a manner which ſeemed to expreſs the fear of danger. Upon this the conſpirators took to their arms with great precipitation, and, without waiting for any other ſignal, fell upon the enemy on every ſide with the utmoſt fury.

AMAN

1723. AMAN OLA, alarmed at the report of muſquets, mounted on horſe-back, and hurried away to the great ſquare, whither the common danger had brought moſt of the AFGHANS together. Both parties were equally animated with the ſpirit of hatred and revenge, which rendered the victory for ſome time dubious. AMAN OLA, though wounded in the right ſhoulder by a muſquet ball, continued to encourage his troops by his example; but ſeeing them in danger of being overpowered by numbers, he was obliged at length to retreat to the palace, where not thinking himſelf ſecure, he went thro' the gardens by a private way, and got out of the reach of the enemy. The AFGHANS loſt 1600 men in this action; their flight was ſo precipitate, that they left all their baggage and treaſure behind them, and their ſlaves recovered their liberty.

No ſooner did this melancholy news reach the ear of MAGHMUD, by an expreſs meſſenger from AMAN OLA; than this prince reſolved upon an expedient, to prevent an inſurrection in ISFAHAN. He ordered the guns to be fired, giving out that his general had taken TÆHMAS MYRZA priſoner; and to confirm this report, he cauſed illuminations and other public rejoicings to be made, which ſerved as a pretext to double the guards, and to hinder any ſtranger from entering the city. This piece of policy could not be exerted upon a more proper occaſion; for as the ſending away the detachment under AMAN OLA had conſiderably weakened the army, there was room to apprehend, that the people of ISFAHAN, upon being informed of what had paſſed, might attempt to follow the example of the inhabitants of CASBIN.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIV.

MAGHMUD *orders the* PERSIAN *miniſters and lords to be maſſacred. Arrival of a* TURKISH *envoy.* ISFAHAN *is almoſt depopulated. Excurſions of* NAZR ULLA. *Heavy contributions laid upon the* EUROPEAN *traders.*

THE great uneaſineſs which the affair of CASBIN had created in the mind of MAGHMUD, was in ſome meaſure removed a few days after, by the return of the detachment under AMAN OLA. But how different was their appearance! When they ſet out upon the expedition, their numbers, their ſpirit, their intrepid countenance ſeemed to promiſe new victories; but the exceſſive cold, againſt which they were not provided, and the wounds which numbers of them had received, had rendered them rather objects of compaſſion than fear. The miſery and hardſhips they had endured, deſtroyed many of them on the road, and the remainder were harraſſed by their march, and diſpirited by their defeat. 1723.

ASHREFF, upon leaving CASBIN, had taken the road to KANDAHAR with 300 horſe, from an apprehenſion that this inſurrection would be followed by a general revolt; or from a deſire of freeing himſelf from the danger, to which the jealouſy of MAGHMUD continually expoſed him; ſo that this army, by no means appeared the ſame, as that which had left ISFAHAN two months before.

MAGHMUD now reſolved on a project which he had been meditating for ſome time. The inſurrection of CASBIN made ſuch an impreſſion on him, that he thought himſelf in great danger in the midſt of a numerous and diſaffected multitude, with only a handful of ſoldiers about him. The ordinary ſuggeſtion of his cruel mind under theſe circumſtances was that of murder; for by putting one part of them to death, he hoped to remain more abſolute maſter of the other. To prevent this barbarous expedient from cauſing the very inſurrection which he apprehended, he determined to begin with thoſe, whoſe credit, rank, or birth, might enable them to form or ſupport a faction. With this intent, the very ſame day that AMAN OLA arrived, he invited the miniſters, lords, and other PERSIAN

1723. SIAN chiefs, to a public entertainment. They came without any miſtruſt, to the number of three hundred; but as ſoon as they were ſeated, his guard fell upon them with their ſabres, and barbarouſly murdered them.

Among theſe victims to his infernal policy, were the great chancellor of the empire, the governor of ISFAHAN and his younger brother, both of them brothers of MAHOMMED KOULI KHAN, prince of GEORGIA; the KHAN of COKHILAN, the grand maſter of the artillery, and moſt of the principal perſons of note belonging to the court of HUSSEIN. The ATHEMAT DOULET was ſpared, in conſideration of his brother's having facilitated the eſcape of the AFGHANS at the affair of CASBIN. The horror of this cruel execution, was increaſed by the circumſtance attending the murder of a boy of twelve years of age. He was ſon to ROSTAM MYRZA prince of GEORGIA, and as he had been adopted by an AFGHAN, he fled for ſhelter during the maſſacre to the officers of that nation, whoſe protection he implored with tears; but neither his tender years, nor the ſollicitations of the officers could ſave him: he was torn from them and butchered.

The bodies of thoſe that were maſſacred, were expoſed on the MEIDAN before the palace. To prevent their poſterity from riſing up in revenge, MAGHMUD gave orders for all their children alſo to be murdered. The impious manner in which he relieved his daſtardly fears of theſe children, was yet more ſhocking. Two hundred young perſons of the firſt nobility of PERSIA and GEORGIA, were led together from the academy where they were educated, to an open field; and being there permitted to run for their lives, the AFGHANS galloped after them, and enjoyed the horrible ſport of chaſing them like ſavage beaſts, till they were all ſlaughtered. MAGHMUD, whoſe deſign was to ſecure the throne by the total extirpation of the nobility, to colour ſo flagitious a conduct, pretended that theſe young lords had formed a conſpiracy againſt his life. His barbarous policy did not ſtop here: he had picked out of SHAH HUSSEIN's guards, and other troops belonging to that prince, near 3000 men, and taken them into his pay. Theſe he aſſembled in an area within the palace, under the pretence of giving them an extraordinary allowance of PLEO; and while they were eating

it, a body of troops, which had been poſted there for that purpoſe, 1723.
fell upon them, and cut them to pieces, before they had time to recover themſelves.

MAGHMUD now imagined he might, without any diſguiſe, ſecurely deſtroy ſuch as were objects of jealouſy. Accordingly he gave general orders to his ſoldiers, to put every one to the ſword, who had at any time received pay from the exchequer, either by way of ſalary, or penſion. As the enquiry was committed to the ſoldiers, who were conſtituted in a great meaſure the judges of the ſentence which they were to execute, the intentions of their chief were extremely well anſwered; for during the fifteen days this maſſacre laſted, the deſpondency of the people was arrived to ſuch a pitch, that one might ſee a ſingle man leading three or four PERSIANS to execution. It was impoſſible to render ſuch a ſeries of barbarities excuſable. MAGHMUD however pretended that he had been informed the inhabitants of ISFAHAN, after the example of thoſe of CASBIN, intended to riſe up in arms, and to maſſacre all the AFGHANS. It is even believed, that he ſpared the lives of ſome PERSIANS of diſtinction, to give his conduct the air of juſtice, as if theſe had diſcloſed to him this pretended conſpiracy.

The third day of this tragedy, OSMAN AGA, whom the BASHA of BAGDAT had diſpatched into PERSIA by order of the grand ſignior, arrived at ISFAHAN. A detachment of two hundred men was aſſigned for his guard, with orders not to ſuffer any one to come into the palace where he was lodged. The ſubject of his commiſſion is not known: MAGHMUD ſuſpected from the diſcourſe he had with him, that he was a ſpy, who, under the ſanction of the law of nations, was come to pry into the ſtate of affairs. This prince, who was naturally of a proud and violent temper, would have paid but little regard to this law, if his miniſters had not repreſented the inconveniences which might attend the violation of it. He was therefore prevailed on, not only to diſſemble his reſentment, but alſo to permit that this TURKISH miniſter, in company with ſome AFGHANS who were appointed to watch him, ſhould ſee SHAH HUSSEIN.

1723. The TURKS not knowing what was tranſacting at ISFAHAN, had ſent OSMAN to this unfortunate prince; but he was ordered eighteen days after his arrival to depart. He had reaſon enough to think, that his preſence had been diſagreeable; for they ſearched both himſelf and his baggage twice at the city gates; and three miles from thence, upon viſiting ſome cheſts which had not been opened in the town, two young PERSIAN women were dragged out of them, and ſtabbed upon the ſpot, as alſo ſome ſlaves of the ſame nation, who were diſguiſed in a TURKISH dreſs, thinking to eſcape among the AGA's retinue.

MAGHMUD, in the mean time, uſed every endeavour to weaken the PERSIAN inhabitants of ISFAHAN. The blood which he had ſpilt, was not ſufficient to remove his anxiety. He ordered a proclamation to be made, that whoever was inclined to quit the town, ſhould be at liberty to retire; except a certain number of young PERSIANS whom he had choſen, in order to train them up to the manners and diſcipline of his own nation. In conſequence of which, all thoſe who were able to bear arms, and had not complied with the tacit orders implied in that permiſſion, were ſecretly put to death.

The few inhabitants that were left in the city could give him no further umbrage; he therefore applied his thoughts to thoſe in the open country. Encouraged by the inſurrection at CASBIN, theſe were every where in arms againſt the rebels; eſpecially the inhabitants of BEN ISFAHAN, who continued to ſignalize their hatred againſt the AFGHANS, ſo as to kill ſeveral of them at the very gates of the town, from whence they alſo carried off ſome pieces of cannon. The probable effect of ſuch an example, was not the only circumſtance that diſturbed MAGHMUD. The proviſions which he had cauſed to be brought into ISFAHAN were almoſt conſumed; and as the inſurrection of the open country hindered a freſh ſupply, the AFGHANS were in danger of being famiſhed in their turn.

To remedy theſe inconveniencies, MAGHMUD gave orders to NAZR ULLA to take the field with a detachment of 3000 men. This general was repulſed at ſeveral of theſe little towns; however, he took ſome by ſtorm,

and obliged others to ſurrender; ſo that at length he obtained a ſupply of 1723.
proviſions. Among other places KOOMSHA, a city ſituated fifteen leagues ſouth of ISFAHAN, ſubmitted to him. As this ſupply had been raiſed in a country ruined by the war, it was not ſufficient to maintain the AFGHAN army for any length of time: MAGHMUD therefore gave NAZR ULLA a reinforcement of 1000 men, with orders to make an incurſion into the northern parts of IRAC AGEMI. This general ſet out accordingly the 4th of APRIL, and directing his march thro' the deſerts to the ſouthward, the better to ſurprize the enemy, appeared ſuddenly in the neigbourhood of HAMADAN. The KHAN who was governor of that country marched out at the head of 3000 men to give him battle: but his troops were too raw to ſtand the fire of the AF - who, after putting them to flight, made three attempts to take the city - orm.

We have already obſerved, that the AFGHANS had neither patience nor ſkill to carry on a regular ſiege; ſo that a ſingle wall retarded their progreſs as much as the ſtrongeſt baſtion. NAZR ULLA being diſcouraged at the loſs he had ſuſtained in endeavouring to take the place, contented himſelf with ravaging the country. As things were ſituated, there was nothing difficult in this undertaking. The terror occaſioned by this ſudden incurſion, and by the apprehenſions of the cruelty of the AFGHANS, was ſo great, that wherever they turned their arms, they found the towns and villages deſerted. It is mentioned as a matter of aſtoniſhment, that during the whole courſe of this expedition, none but the keeper of the king's ſtuds in KHOUSISTAN, and the KHAN of HAMADAN, had the courage to oppoſe the rebels. The former indeed was more ſucceſsful than this general; for taking 2000 men with him, who were appointed to guard the king's horſes, he attacked a party of the rebels, and carried off a conſiderable number of camels loaded with plunder.

This little army had therefore leiſure and opportunity to pillage as much as they pleaſed; after which NAZR ULLA, willing to fulfil his maſter's intentions, led them towards DERGHEZIN, a town ſituate within three days journey of HAMADAN, on the ſide of CASBIN. This town and its neighbourhood, are inhabited by people of the ſame ſect as the AF-

1723. GHANS. It was the policy of ABAS I. to tranſport the inhabitants of conquered places from one country to another, with the view not only of preventing any danger from their diſaffection, but likewiſe of depopulating the frontiers expoſed to an enemy: this prince had removed theſe people from KOURDISTAN, to the territories of HAMADAN, about DERGHEZIN; where, according to their original cuſtom, they lived the greateſt part of the year in tents. This conformity of manners and religion, firſt gave the notion to NAZR ULLA of inviting them to ISFAHAN. He engaged their chiefs, and managed the affair ſo dexterouſly, that he perſuaded them to agree to this new migration. It is probable the chiefs themſelves might prefer the houſes of the capital to their cottages and tents; but NAZR ULLA had ſoon reaſon to think that this change was not agreed to with the unanimous conſent of theſe people, for numbers of them, biaſſed by their affection for their own habitations, deſerted, and returned home again.

While NAZR ULLA was ravaging this part of PERSIA, MAGHMUD did not act more humanely towards the people of ISFAHAN, not ſparing even the foreigners, as the ENGLISH factors there experienced; for beſides a conſiderable ſum in money, he took a large value in cloth and ſtuffs. The DUTCH EAST-INDIA company's factors were treated more ſeverely. The merchants of that nation had ſold, during the famine, a great quantity of bad ſugar at an exceſſive high price; and as the extravagant dearneſs of every kind of proviſion, had ſtripped even the wealthy of the greateſt part of their money, the DUTCH laid out their whole capital, in purchaſing at a very low rate the moſt valuable moveables and commodities in the city, as ſtuffs, ſilks, furs, jewels, &c. But they were at length obliged to refund; for MAGHMUD ordered their ſtandard [r] to be beaten down; and compelled them to diſcover where they had concealed their wealth. They had found the means of remitting ſome part of their treaſure at different times to BENDER ABASSI, yet the ſum ſaid to be extorted from them upon this occaſion amounted to near 400,000 crowns [s].

The

[r] A kind of enſign or banner, like that uſed on board of ſhips, which the conſuls of EUROPEAN nations put up before their houſes. [s] 100,000 *l.*

The INDIANS, whom commercial views had induced to ſettle in ISFAHAN, were alſo taxed at the rate of 27,000 tomans [t]. After this MAGHMUD made a freſh attack upon the ARMENIANS of JULFA. We have already mentioned that they had given a bond payable at the termination of the ſiege, and that nine of their chiefs had been arreſted as ſureties for the engagement, which ſtill amounted to 50,000 tomans. Whether it was thro' deſign or inability, theſe people had failed payment; but MAGHMUD ſent for the principal of them, and cauſed the heads of three of the ſureties to be cut off, among theſe was their CALENTAR or civil magiſtrate. After extorting ſome money from the reſt through the terror of this execution, he at length permitted them to return home. 1723.

CHAP. XXV.

ZEBERDEST KHAN lays ſiege to GHIEZ, and takes it. The inhabitants of BEN ISFAHAN ſurrender by capitulation. NAZR ULLA returns with a conſiderable booty and proviſions. A new colony of AFGHANS arrives from KANDAHAR. The VALI of GEORGIA depoſed. NAZR ULLA is ſent into FARSISTAN. MAGHMUD beſieges GHULPAIGAN. TÆHMAS marches an army to raiſe the ſiege; his army defeated, and GHULPAIGAN [u] taken. Reſolution and unhappy fate of LUTF ALI KHAN.

IN the mean time MAGHMUD carried on the war with great vigour againſt the ſeveral towns ſituated in the neighbourhood of ISFAHAN. He had committed the care of ſubduing thoſe places to ZEBERDEST KHAN, who was taken priſoner twenty years before by the AFGHANS, and had paſſed from the ſtate of ſlavery, to one of the principal poſts in their army. This officer maintained the reputation of bravery, by which he had made his fortune. Without amuſing himſelf, as his predeceſſor had done, in ravaging the open country, or in plundering a few defenceleſs towns, he ventured towards the beginning of MAY to lay ſiege to GHIEZ, a fortreſs before which the AFGHANS had miſcarried more than once. This

[t] 67,500 *l.* [u] This is a town near CASHAN.

1723. This place was ſituated within three leagues of ISFAHAN, upon an eminence which commands the country, and was eſteemed very ſtrong. The KHAN ſummoned the garriſon to ſurrender; upon the governor's refuſal, he ſent ſome PERSEES to break open the gates with their hatchets. But the reception his men met, ſoon convinced him that he muſt proceed with greater precaution. He therefore reſolved to undermine the walls, and open a ſubterraneous paſſage into the town. The work was directed by a PERSEE, whoſe profeſſion was to dig wells: when it was completed, he ordered a detachment to make their way through it ſword in hand. The beſieged, aſtoniſhed to ſee the enemy ſtart up from under the ground, a thing of which they had no conception, no longer reſiſted. Moſt of them were put to the ſword, and their wives and children carried into ſlavery. This conqueſt proved of great ſervice to the AFGHANS, for it not only ſecured the neighbouring villages, but likewiſe contributed greatly to engage the inhabitants of BEN ISFAHAN to ſubmit to their government.

It was againſt this town that ZEBERDEST KHAN turned his arms, after the taking of GHIEZ. We have already ſeen, how its inhabitants maintained the reputation, which they had acquired by the advantages gained over MAGHMUD and AMAN OLA: their example ſerved to keep up the ſpirit of reſiſtance in other neighbouring towns. Hitherto they had been deaf to every propoſal made by the uſurper, but their preſent circumſtances began to render them more docile: they conſidered that prince TÆHMAS, whoſe name was hardly any longer mentioned, was not in a capacity to lend them aſſiſtance; that the taking of GHIEZ enabled the enemy to blockade them more conveniently; and as it was now impoſſible for them to ſupport an independency, it would be expoſing themſelves to inevitable miſeries to no purpoſe, to hold out any longer. Theſe reflections inclined them to acquieſce to the ſolicitations of ZEBERDEST KHAN. On the other hand they were deterred by the apprehenſion that MAGHMUD might reſent the treatment ſhewn to his brother and his other relations, with the ſeveral damages they had done him. The KHAN however diſſipated their fears, by offering that the capitulation ſhould be ſigned

ſigned by the principal officers of the army, who were to engage their 1723.
hónours for the ſtrict execution of it. On theſe conditions, they ſubmitted at length to the yoke of the uſurper.

MAGHMUD ſoon juſtified their ſuſpicions: he could not forgive the damages they had done him, nor their having ſeveral times endeavoured to perſuade the inhabitants of ISFAHAN to deliver themſelves by a general inſurrection from the yoke under which they groaned. His intention was to engage them in ſome ſtep, which would juſtify his breaking the capitulation, and ſerve as a pretext to his vengeance. He therefore endeavoured by means of ſome perſons, who ſhould feign a deteſtation of himſelf and his government, to perſuade them to revolt; but theſe people were too wiſe or too virtuous to be caught in this ſnare. They were as religious obſervers of the oath they had taken to him, as of the allegiance they had ſworn to their lawful ſovereign; hence they ſeized thoſe emiſſaries, and ſent them to ISFAHAN in irons, that MAGHMUD might inflict what puniſhment he pleaſed upon them. This mark of fidelity at length reconciled him to them.

The return of NAZR ULLA, after an excurſion of three months, afforded no leſs pleaſure to MAGHMUD, than the reduction of thoſe two places. The apprehenſion he had been under, that the city would be depopulated by a ſecond famine, was intirely removed when he ſaw this general arrive ſafe in ISFAHAN, with a great number of camels loaded with proviſions and booty; alſo with many thouſand DERGHEZINS, who might be conſidered as a new colony, not ſubject to be ſuſpected, but intirely agreeable to the AFGHANS.

Towards the end of JUNE appeared a ſecond colony; this was a caravan of ſeveral thouſand camels, which arrived from KANDAHAR. Theſe ſuccours were owing to the prudence of MAGHMUD, at the very beginning of his reign. After the defeat of MOULA MOUSSA by MYRZA ISMAEL, by which a great treaſure was plundered, he ſent MAHOMMED NISCHAN, his grand maſter of the ceremonies[w], with a freſh ſupply of money into that Country, to make new levies: and as this prince perceived that his ſoldiers

[w] ESICK AGASSI.

1723. ſoldiers deſerted in bodies, and that whole companies had returned home, from the deſire of ſeeing their wives and children; he intruſted this officer with 8000 camels, to bring the families of thoſe AFGHANS who were already in the army, as likewiſe of thoſe whom he ſhould enliſt into the ſervice. This precaution, together with the fame which he had acquired of having aſcended the throne of PERSIA, rendered this caravan much more conſiderable than was expected.

MAGHMUD diſtributed part of the deſerted houſes and lands to the AFGHANS and DERGHEZINS * lately arrived; and finding that theſe colonies, tho' numerous, were not ſufficient to re-people the town, he raiſed a new fund out of the laſt taxes, and put it into the hands of MAHOMMED NISCHAN, with orders to lay it out in raiſing 15000 men more, and to bring them from KANDAHAR with their familes.

In the mean time SHAH TÆHMAS continued at TAVRIS, contriving means to recover his dominions; but gave no demonſtration of a capacity equal to the part he had to act. His conduct was but a natural conſequence of the manner in which he had been educated. According to the cuſtom eſtabliſhed by ABAS the GREAT, he was not permitted to go out of the ſeraglio, till the very day he was named ſucceſſor to the throne. The ſame prince, by an effect of his jealouſy, committed the education of the princes of the blood to eunuchs, whoſe principal care was to keep them in ignorance. TÆHMAS came ſo rude and unpoliſhed out of their hands, that he was obliged to rely intirely upon the information and fidelity of the people about him. The ſevere manner in which he was educated, was moreover productive of another inconveniency. He was hardly releaſed from the ſeraglio, when his favourite paſſions began to predominate. Thinking himſelf no longer accountable for his conduct, he abandoned himſelf intirely to his pleaſures, which neither reaſon nor experience had inſtructed him how to regulate. To purſue the true objects of pleaſure, as agreeable to the character of a prince, can only be the effect of wiſe inſtructions. What then could be expected from this heir of the PERSIAN diadem?

He

* Sometimes called DARGUZZIS.

He had already made one falſe ſtep in diſcharging his army at CASBIN; and now he made another no leſs injurious to his intereſt. Soon after he was declared king, he ſent a meſſenger to VACHTANGA, VALI of GEORGIA, with orders to repair forthwith to TAVRIS, and pay him homage. A reſentment of this prince's behaviour in refuſing to march to the ſuccour of ISFAHAN, or ſome falſe policy, occaſioned this ſummons to be couched in terms, which only ſerved to irritate a perſon who was naturally haughty, and very little inclined to obedience. The VALI provoked at this treatment, deſpiſed the orders; but foreſeeing danger from the diſaffection which the grandees of the country ſhewed to him; and having already fruitleſsly attempted to ſubject his territories to RUSSIA, he [n] now wrote to CONSTANTINOPLE, offering to pay the port annually twenty-four purſes, by way of tribute, on condition they would maintain him in the poſſeſſion of his government, and confirm the privileges which the kings of PERSIA had granted to the princes his predeceſſors, as well as to the nation in general. 1723.

The VALI had not time to execute this laſt project; for TÆHMAS depoſed him in MARCH following, and nominated in his place, MAHOMMED KOULI KHAN, prince of CAKET, who was alſo deſcended from the antient kings of GEORGIA. The new VALI preſented himſelf before TEFLIS not long after, in order to take poſſeſſion of his government; but not having a force ſufficient to contend with VACHTANGA, who, contrary to the advice of the grandees of the nation, had given arms to the people; he was obliged to return to his principality for ſuccours. As ſoon as he arrived there, he aſſembled all the military people that could be found, and entered into a treaty with his neighbours the LESGEES, who ſupplied him with a body of 7000 men; the junction of theſe forces augmented his army ſo conſiderably, that on the 8th of MAY he appeared again before TEFLIS.

VACHTANGA foreſeeing this ſtorm, had already concerted his meaſures. Finding that the inhabitants began to treat him publicly as a rebel, and that he could no longer depend on their affection, he quitted the town privately the preceding night, and carried with him his family,

[n] Towards the end of FEBRUARY.

1723. and the great treaſure which he had amaſſed during the courſe of a long reign. This proud GEORGIAN then felt the puniſhment of the miſchiefs cauſed by his diſobedience. Having wandered from place to place as a fugitive, in AUGUST 1725 he took refuge in ST. PETERSBURG; where, for reaſons of ſtate, and the connexion he had with the RUSSIAN court, he found a ſafe azylum. The new VALI meeting no longer with a competitor, made his entrance into TEFLIS. The grandees, and the inhabitants in general, were convinced of their former error, and received him with great demonſtrations of joy. He had not been long with them, when he taxed them with 50,000 tomans[y], part of which was paid immediately, and the remainder a few months after.

In this interval the AFGHAN army was increaſed by a body of 6000 DERGHEZINS, whom NAZR ULLA had collected before his return, and by a conſiderable number of TURKISH adventurers, whom MAGHMUD had taken into his pay, as likewiſe by the recruits arrived from KANDAHAR. This prince was now able to engage in ſome freſh enterprize, but apprehending that his abſence might cauſe ſome troubles in the capital, he reſolved to entruſt the execution of his deſigns to the experience of NAZR ULLA. Thus the army was again divided into two bodies: this general having the moſt numerous under his command, received the SULTAN'S directions to fall upon the province of FARSISTAN.

MAGHMUD was of too active a genius to be long idle: leaving a ſufficient garriſon in ISFAHAN, he led the remainder of his troops againſt GHULPAIGAN, a town ſituated in a plain weſtward of CASHAN. The inhabitants of this place were ſtrongly attached to TÆHMAS's party, and had neglected no precaution neceſſary to enable them to hold out a long ſiege. MAGHMUD cauſed his cannon to be fired againſt the walls, and then commanded his troops to ſtorm the town in three different places. The PERSIANS defended themſelves with great reſolution, but not without abandoning ſome of the works which they had thrown up.

Things were in this ſituation, when MAGHMUD received intelligence, that a new enemy had ſtarted up againſt him. The ſucceſs which TÆHMAS had

[y] 125,000*l.*

had in reducing TEFLIS, raiſed the courage of that prince; he appointed 1723.
FENDOUN, KHAN of the KOURDS, to command his troops; and having ordered the VALI's of LORISTAN and ARABIA, and the KHAN of COHKILAN to join that general with all the forces of their reſpective governments, he gave directions to him to march to ISFAHAN, and attack the uſurper. FENDOUN KHAN was prevented from drawing any ſuccours from thoſe provinces, by the motion of the OTTOMAN armies; who having invaded GEORGIA, as we ſhall have occaſion to mention more particularly, became maſters of that country, and threatened the frontiers of PERSIA on every ſide. This general had however 8000 men under his command, all choice troops, which TÆHMAS had aſſembled in the neighbourhood of TAVRIS, and with which he might have rendered ſome ſervice: but preferring plunder, he pillaged the quarter of the city where the ARMENIANS reſide, under a pretence that theſe people favoured his maſter's enemies; and adding impoſture to this act of villainy, he ſent the heads of ſome of thoſe who had been murdered on this occaſion to the SHAH, as if they belonged to the AFGHANS killed in battle; but the fraud was eaſily diſcovered, as the heads of ſeveral ARMENIAN prieſts were known by the tonſure.

A general ſo little a friend to juſtice, ſeemed to promiſe no great ſucceſs towards retrieving the affairs of the SHAH; however he determined to attack the enemy. He knew that MAGHMUD had marched out of ISFAHAN with only 10,000 men; and preſumed with good reaſon that this army, already harraſſed with the cold and continual rains, would not be able to withſtand the joint attack of his troops and of the inhabitants of GHULPAIGAN. Flattered with this notion, he marched againſt the AFGHANS, but was ſoon put to flight, with the loſs of 2000 of his forces. He then retired to his own country, whither he invited the TURKS, who, on condition of his fealty to them, left him in poſſeſſion of his government.

TÆHMAS was thus puniſhed for intruſting the command of his troops to a man who had no military abilities; and whoſe fidelity he ought to have ſuſpected, ſince he could not be ignorant that the KOURDS are of the

1723. ſame ſect as the TURKS their neighbours. This event was followed with the loſs of MACON. Theſe new rebels having entered that place by ſurprize the very ſame year, put the garriſon to the ſword, and made themſelves maſters of that fortreſs, which in thoſe countries is eſteemed impregnable.

The loſs of this battle was alſo attended with that of GHULPAIGAN. Some of the inhabitants endeavoured to throw themſelves into a fort contiguous to the town, but MAGHMUD cut moſt of them to pieces. The remainder no ſooner beheld a barbed elephant brought againſt their walls in order to make a breach, than they ſubmitted to the conqueror.

The SULTAN having thus routed an army, taken a town, and obliged a fortreſs to ſurrender, returned triumphant to ISFAHAN. He then entruſted the command of his troops to ZEBERDEST KHAN, who not long after made himſelf maſter of HONSAR, a large town ſituate within five days journey north-weſt of the capital. Towards the end of DECEMBER this general marched againſt CASHAN, whoſe inhabitants, contrary to the allegiance they had ſworn when AMAN OLA was upon his march towards CASBIN, had taken up arms in favour of prince TÆHMAS.

LUTF ALI KHAN, famous for the defeat he gave the rebels before KHERMAN, and afterwards for his diſgrace at a time when he might have ſaved the empire, was not included in the maſſacre of the nobles already mentioned. MAGHMUD was deſirous of gaining him over to his intereſt; and tho' this faithful ſubject had always avoided entering into any engagements prejudicial to his lawful ſovereign; yet the SULTAN, hoping to win him, continued to load him with favours. LUTF ALI KHAN being thus eſteemed and reſpected at court, might have ſpent his days in eaſe and tranquillity; but his loyalty would not permit him to be paſſive: he thought it his duty to ſerve TÆHMAS his lawful ſovereign. With this view he waited a favourable opportunity, and made his eſcape from ISFAHAN, deſigning to join the SHAH in TAVRIS.

The flight of LUFT ALI KHAN, flung the AFGHANS into freſh apprehenſions. They could not forget that this general, after the victory he had ob-

tained over them, was juſt upon the point of cruſhing them in their own country. They knew that he was acquainted with their weak condition; and ſhould he put himſelf at the head of an army, which his reputation might enable him to collect, it was hard to ſay what would be the conſequence. MAGHMUD cauſed diligent ſearch to be made for him, and promiſed conſiderable rewards to thoſe who ſhould diſcover him. They had not yet finiſhed their enquiries, when the unfortunate LUTF ALI KHAN appeared in ſight. The people of BEN ISFAHAN having diſcovered him in their town, brought him to the uſurper. MAGHMUD no ſooner approached him, than forgetting his own dignity, he fell upon him like a mad-man, and hewed him in pieces with his ſabre. How greatly the tyrant ſtood in fear of the virtues of this illuſtrious general, appeared by this barbarous and unprincely action; as well as by the privileges and favours, with which he rewarded the zeal and affection of the inhabitans of BEN ISFAHAN. 1723.

CHAP. XXVI.

The TURKS *ſend an army into* GEORGIA. *The* CZAR *ſubdues* GHILAN. *Uneaſineſs of the* OTTOMAN *port at the progreſs of the* RUSSIANS. TÆHMAS *ſends an embaſſador to the port, who miſcarries in his negotiation.* ISMAEL BEG *is ſent embaſſador to the court of* RUSSIA, *and concludes a treaty with the* CZAR. *Particulars of this treaty.*

DURING theſe tranſactions in the interior parts of the PERSIAN dominions; in the month of OCTOBER the preceding year, the OTTOMAN court diſpatched NISLI MAHOMMED AGA, as envoy to PETER the GREAT. As he paſſed through CRIM TARTARY, the KHAN informed him of the circumſtances of this monarch's expedition into PERSIA. He took the road to ASTRACHAN, where he expected to meet the emperor[z]; but hearing that this prince was ſet out for MOSCO, he changed his

[z] We uſe the word emperor and CZAR in common, the former is moſt proper, though the latter is moſt familiar.

1723. his rout. NISLI MAHOMMED AGA had received a ſtrict charge to make all poſſible expedition; but as ſoon as he arrived on the RUSSIAN territories, he was detained by the officer who commanded on that frontier, under a pretence that he could not permit him to proceed any further, without expreſs orders from his court. This difficulty, which ſeemed to ariſe only from too ſcrupulous an exactneſs in the officer, was not removed till the CZAR received news from NEPLEUIFF his reſident at CONSTANTINOPLE. This monarch being then informed of the diſpoſitions of the port, commiſſioned one of his officers to receive the TURKISH envoy upon the frontier, and to conduct him to court.

NISLI MAHOMMED AGA then proceeded on his journey, and arrived at MOSCO, where he made his public entry the ſixth of FEBRUARY. Some days after he was conducted to the audience of the CZAR, with the honours due to his character: he delivered his credentials, and begged that commiſſaries might be nominated to treat with him, concerning the affairs committed to his charge. The grand ſignior's letter to the CZAR was conceived in very ſtrong, tho' moderate terms. The OTTOMAN emperor intimated to him, that he had carried his reſentment to a ſufficient length againſt the LESGEES; and gave him to underſtand, that as theſe people were SUNNIS, and conſequently under his protection, he could not be an idle ſpectator, in ſeeing them reduced under the dominion of any chriſtian prince. This was ſignifying, that if RUSSIA intended to preſerve the peace inviolate, ſhe muſt give up TARKU and DERBEND, and demoliſh the fort of the holy croſs.

The AGA explained himſelf fully upon the ſubject to baron SCHAFIROFF, vice-chancellor of RUSSIA, and ſollicited ſtrongly for a quick diſpatch; but the CZAR, being informed from CONSTANTINOPLE that the TURKS were as deſirous as himſelf to avoid coming to a rupture, deferred giving an anſwer.

While the TURKISH envoy endeavoured to diſcover the motive of this affected delay, HAHDGEE DAOUD BEG, chief of SHAMAKIE, being alarmed to ſee DERBEND in the hands of a prince, who pretended he had taken

up arms with no other view than to chaſtiſe him for his miſdemeanours, 1723.
had ſent a meſſenger to CONSTANTINOPLE, offering to put himſelf under the protection of the grand ſignior. As this propoſal facilitated the views which the TURKS had upon GEORGIA, it was received with joy; and the HAHDGEE was aſſured by the grand ſignior, that to diſcharge the duties which his office of IMAM[a] impoſed upon him, he would ſoon reſcue him from the yoke of the chriſtians, and be revenged of the GEORGIANS, who had encouraged the enemy to invade their country. After which he nominated the HAHDGEE, KHAN of DERBEND, and in this quality he ſent him the ſtandards and horſes tails, with which BASHA's of the firſt rank are honoured in TURKEY.

This event confirmed the port in the reſolution of engaging the CZAR to abandon his conqueſts. In order the more eaſily to perſuade him into this meaſure, the grand ſignior publiſhed a manifeſto, ſetting forth, that as DERBEND formerly conſtituted a part of his empire, and as the protection which he owed to muſſulmen in general, obliged him to aſſiſt the LESGEES againſt the enterprizes of chriſtian powers, he could no longer continue the peace with RUSSIA, unleſs the CZAR would withdraw his troops from DAGISTAN, and particularly from DERBEND; which he could ſo much the leſs forſake, as there was ſtill a moſque there, which was formerly built by the port.

The laſt reaſon was ſo much the more plauſible, as the law forbids the MAHOMMEDANS to give up, either by capitulation or treaty, any of thoſe towns where ſuch temples have been raiſed. This manifeſto was hardly ſent into RUSSIA, and diſtributed among the foreign miniſters at CONSTANTINOPLE, when the port received letters, by which VAGHTANGA offered, under the conditions already related, to acknowledge the ſovereignty of the grand ſignior.

The port, inclined to make advantage of theſe different propoſals, gave orders to the BASHAS of the provinces of ASIA, to join all the troops of their reſpective governments to thoſe of the BASHA of ERZEROUM, who was named general in chief[b] of the army deſigned againſt GEORGIA.

And

[a] Chief and defender of the law, and ſovereign of the people who profeſs it. [b] SERASKIER.

1723. And in order to provide againſt any enterprizes of the RUSSIANS, the garriſons were reinforced, and the magazines of the frontier towns filled with proviſions. But the real deſigns of the port were againſt PERSIA: this is manifeſt from her refuſing the offer which the KHAN of CRIM TARTARY made to obſtruct the progreſs of the RUSSIANS on the ſide of PERSIA, by laying ſiege to ASTRACHAN.

PETER the GREAT was in the ſame diſpoſition, in this reſpect, as the port, and was making the ſame military preparations. He gave orders for putting DERBEND into a ſtate of defence, and for rendering the troops complete. He then aſſembled an army on the frontiers of DAGISTAN, under pretence that the LESGEES threatened to make an irruption into the kingdom of ASTRACHAN.

In the mean time he continued to amuſe the TURKISH envoy, and to inſinuate to this miniſter, that the intereſt of both courts was to agree concerning the conqueſts they were to make in PERSIA; that this was the way to avoid any obſtacles that might ariſe on either ſide; and that acting thus in concert, they might ſettle the government of that monarchy, in the manner moſt agreeable to their reſpective intereſts. And joining menaces to perſuaſion, he diſpatched NISLI MAHOMMED AGA home with an anſwer to this effect: that it was not his intention to make the leaſt infringement in the peace, which he had concluded with the port: but if this power ſhould attempt to oppoſe his views, he would take proper meaſures to croſs the deſigns which the grand ſignior might have againſt the countries ſituate between the two ſeas[c]. At the ſame time he gave orders to tranſport the artillery, with ammunition and proviſions, for taking the field; and leaving MOSCO, he ſet out the beginning of MARCH for ST. PETERSBURG.

It is evident that the CZAR's propoſals were equally advantageous to both empires: of this the port was convinced, but it was difficult to put them in execution. The RUSSIANS and TURKS had in ſome meaſure declared war againſt PERSIA, one by invading DAGISTAN, and the other by marching an army into GEORGIA; ſo that it did not ſeem

[c] CASPIAN and BLACK SEAS.

ſeem conſiſtent for TÆHMAS to commit his intereſts to neighbours who were ſtripping him of his dominions. 1723.

The port had ſtill greater obſtacles to ſurmount. As ſoon as MAGHMUD was become maſter of ISFAHAN, he enjoined the inhabitants, upon pain of death, to break off all epiſtolary correſpondence, and by the different precautions which he had taken on this occaſion, the ſucceſs of the ſiege had been kept a ſecret. Upon the return of OSMAN AGA from ISFAHAN, the court of CONSTANTINOPLE was informed that this prince had obliged SHAH HUSSEIN to reſign his capital and his diadem. This great event occaſioned new deliberations. MAGHMUD ſeemed poſſeſſed of the qualifications and fortune of thoſe conquerors, who in former ages had ravaged ASIA. The TURKISH miniſters however were not ſo much afraid of his power, as embaraſſed by his being of the ſect of the SUNNIS as well as themſelves. They concluded that their troops would refuſe to fight againſt a prince, who, by the deſtruction of the PERSIAN empire, appeared as a hero of their religion. This difficulty increaſed, as they were to enter into an alliance with a chriſtian power, not only to ſhare between them the different provinces of a monarchy ceded by the abdication of SHAH HUSSEIN to MAGHMUD, but likewiſe to dethrone him, and to ſubſtitute in his ſtead TÆHMAS, a prince of the ſect of ALI. Yet it ſeemed prudent to put a ſtop to the progreſs of a man, whoſe ambitious enterprizes already threatened the empire; and there was no poſſibility of effecting this with any ſecurity to the frontier, but by accepting the CZAR's propoſal.

The port was thus in ſuſpence between the fear of MAGHMUD's future ſucceſs, and the hope of reaping ſome advantage from the ſituation to which he had reduced the kingdom of PERSIA. The CZAR, who had prolonged the negotiation with the TURKISH miniſter upon the ſame principle, gave orders that he ſhould be conducted to the frontier by very ſlow journeys; ſo that he did not reach CONSTANTINOPLE till the end of MAY. As ſoon as he arrived, he aſſured the grand ſignior, that the CZAR had no other intention than to ſupport a good underſtanding with his highneſs; adding, that this prince had ſent full powers to his reſident,

1723. to act in concert with the port, that no umbrage might be taken on either ſide.

In the beginning of MARCH, GHILAN ſubmitted to the RUSSIAN troops. About the ſame time IBRAHIM, BASHA of ERZEROUM, was joined by the BEGLERBEGS of DIARBECK, TREBESONDE, and ſeveral others, who formed an army of 40,000 men. The BASHA put himſelf at the head of them, and ſent a meſſenger to MAHOMMED KOULI KHAN, VALI of GEORGIA, demanding the delivery of the city and caſtle of TEFLIS. The VALI wanted neither courage nor experience; but he had very few troops, and the taxes which he had impoſed, alienated the affections of the people from him, in the very beginning of his reign. Under theſe circumſtances he ſubmitted to the OTTOMAN dominion, on condition that the SERASKIER would confirm him in his principality. The TURKISH deputy promiſed him this upon oath, and returned to give an account of his negotiation to the general.

Agreeably to this convention, the TURKS marched to the walls of TEFLIS the 12th of JUNE. MAHOMMED KOULI KHAN met the SERASKIER with a numerous retinue in due form, and delivered the keys of the town and caſtle to him. This general received the VALI with great demonſtrations of benevolence, and as a mark of honour gave him a veſt lined with ſable; but as ſoon as he took poſſeſſion of the fortreſs, he ordered him to be arreſted, thus confirming a GEORGIAN proverb, "To truſt "an OTTOMAN is to lean upon a wave[a]." The depoſed KHAN found means a few days after to eſcape from priſon; and retired into his principality of CAKET. In the mean time the port had nominated BACCAR, VACHTANGA's eldeſt ſon, for his ſucceſſor. This prince was ſo averſe to the new government, that a few months afterwards he went out of TEFLIS, under pretence of diverting himſelf by hunting, and voluntarily retired from a place, where he enjoyed only the empty title of ſovereign.

In the mean time the SERASKIER, encouraged by the reduction of TEFLIS, caſt his eye upon GANJA, and marched his army the autumn following,

[a] TURKISH honour has had a reputation, but moſt modern writers mention it as an imaginary thing.

following, in order to lay ſiege to it. He made himſelf maſter of the ſuburb of the ARMENIANS; but the garriſon and inhabitants of the town recovering from their ſurprize, attacked him in his camp. The TURKS, being preſſed hard on every ſide, abandoned their artillery and baggage, and fled with the utmoſt precipitation: they loſt on this occaſion 3000 men. The SERASKIER, diſpirited by this diſgrace, retired with the ſhattered remains of his army to his government of ERZEROUM. 1723.

The reduction of GEORGIA had in ſome meaſure made the TURKS amends for the uneaſineſs occaſioned by the RUSSIANS taking poſſeſſion of GHILAN. The courts of ST. PETERSBURG and CONSTANTINOPLE ſeemed now to triumph ſucceſſively at the expence of the fugitive king of PERSIA. As their jealouſy of each other increaſed with their ſucceſs, they took ſuch meaſures as they judged moſt convenient for their mutual ſecurity. The CZAR marched freſh troops towards SHIRVAN; and the grand ſignior put AZOFF, and the other towns on the RUSSIAN frontiers, in a poſture of defence.

TÆHMAS SHAH being thus on all ſides oppreſſed, reſolved to try his ſucceſs in negotiation. With this view he confirmed the credentials which his father had given ISMAEL BEG, as embaſſador to the court of ST. PETERSBURG; and nominated another for that of CONSTANTINOPLE. They both ſet out at the ſame time. The perſon appointed for the OTTOMAN port was detained at CARS; but he diſpatched two of his retinue in a ſecret manner to notify the ſubject of his embaſſy. Theſe deputies took the opportunity of the grand ſignior's coming out of the moſque at the feaſt of BEIRAM, to preſent their memorial to him. They were then introduced to the grand ſignior and the mufti, to whom they delivered their diſpatches; the reſult of which was, that in OCTOBER following the PERSIAN embaſſador was permitted to come to CONSTANTINOPLE. His commiſſion was, to requeſt the aſſiſtance of the TURKS againſt the AFGHAN rebels. The grand vizir being informed that an embaſſador had been ſent into RUSSIA upon the ſame errand, not only made it a reaſon to evade a definitive anſwer, but reproached TÆHMAS for making any ſuch application to a chriſtian power. This behaviour was in ſome meaſure owing

1723. to the reception which had been given at CONSTANTINOPLE ſome months before to the envoy of MIR MAGHMUD. The court ſeemed deſirous at this time to humour the affection which the people ſhewed to the AFGHANS; as well as to purſue the projects which they had formed, in conſequence of the reduction of GEORGIA.

ISMAEL BEG, whom TÆHMAS had nominated as embaſſador-plenipotentiary to the court of RUSSIA, was more ſucceſsful. He arrived at ST. PETERSBURG the ſecond of SEPTEMBER. The CZAR, whoſe active genius was impatient of delay, fixed the audience for the fifth. This ceremony was performed before the ſenate, after the following manner: The embaſſador, with his retinue, left their ſabres at the hall-door. He made his entrance, holding up in his hand his maſter's letter, which, after he had made his harangue, he preſented to the CZAR. This prince gave it to his chancellor, who laid it upon the table, deſiring the embaſſador to draw nearer to the throne; which having done, upon his knees, he kiſſed the hem of the CZAR's garment, and afterwards his hand: at the ſame time the CZAR inquired after the king's health. The PERSIAN miniſter applying this to SHAH HUSSEIN, and believing he was dead, made no reply, but ſhed tears. The chancellor then informed the embaſſador, that his majeſty's miniſters would anſwer the letter which he had brought; upon which he withdrew to the hall, where he had left his retinue.

Soon after arrived news of the ſurrender of BAKU. The neceſſity of preſerving a communication by land with GHILAN, had determined the CZAR to make himſelf maſter of that coaſt; in conſequence of which, he had given orders to major-general MATUSKIN to embark with 3000 men at ASTRACHAN, and the 28th of JULY they arrived at BAKU. The general immediately wrote to the commanding officer, "That as the inhabitants "had ſued the preceding year for the protection of the emperor his "maſter, tho' his majeſty then ſhewed ſome repugnance to accept of "their allegiance, yet in conſideration of the friendſhip ſubſiſting between "him and the king of PERSIA, and through compaſſion to their lives, "he had reſolved to ſend a body of troops, with ammunition and pro-

"viſions;

" viſions; therefore they ought to render themſelves worthy of this favour 1723.
" by a ready ſubmiſſion, if they were willing to be conſidered as loyal
" ſubjects, and good citizens."

In paſſing through ASTRACHAN, ISMAEL BEG had left a letter, which was now delivered, exhorting the inhabitants of BAKU to a ſubmiſſion; but the governor anſwered, that he could not admit foreign troops into the town, without the expreſs orders of SHAH TÆHMAS. As he perſiſted in this reſolution, general MATUSKIN began to cannonade the town, and employed the two galliots, which he had brought with him for that purpoſe, in bombarding it. The garriſon of BAKU was very numerous, and the commandant ſeemed determined to make an obſtinate defence; but on the 7th of AUGUST he demanded to capitulate, and ſent a deputation of the principal inhabitants to acquaint the general that he would ſurrender up the town.

This conqueſt created no difficulty in the negotiation with which ISMAEL BEG was charged. He was well acquainted with the melancholy ſituation of his maſter's affairs, and knew that he could not obtain any ſuccours upon better conditions: he took no notice of the hoſtilities which he had in ſome meaſure authorized by his letter, but ſollicited the CZAR's miniſters in ſo ſtrong a manner, that they ſigned a treaty of alliance with him the 23d of SEPTEMBER, on the following conditions:

I. That the CZAR ſhould pacify the troubles of PERSIA, drive out the AFGHANS, and re-eſtabliſh the government.

II. That TÆHMAS, as lawful ſovereign of that kingdom, ſhould yield in perpetuity to the RUSSIAN monarchy, the towns and dependancies of DERBEND and BAKU, with the provinces of GHILAN, MAZANDERAN and ASTRABAD.

III. That he ſhould furniſh, at the prices ſtipulated in this public act, camels and proviſions for the RUSSIAN troops.

IV. That hereafter there ſhould be full liberty of commerce between both nations.

V. In fine, that this alliance ſhould be mutually defenſive.

PART

PART VII.

THE REVOLUTIONS OF PERSIA,

FROM THE

TREATY CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA AND TÆHMAS SHAH IN 1723,

TO THE

DEATH OF MIR MAGHMUD IN 1725.

CHAP. XXVII.

Pretenſions of AMAN OLA *to the crown, compromiſed. Surrender of* CASHAN. *Death and character of* NAZR ULLA. *He is ſucceeded by* ZEBERDEST KHAN, *who takes and plunders* SHIRASS.

1723. WHILE TÆHMAS was thus obliged to yield to neceſſity, MAGHMUD was in danger of being ſtripped of the ſovereignty by the very man who had moſt contributed to his conqueſts. We have already mentioned that AMAN OLA followed him in this expedition as a confederate, and not as a ſubject. This general, jealous of the ſuperiority which the partner of his victories had acquired over him, diſſembled his reſentment in hopes of indemnifying himſelf by the wealth which he expected to draw from CASBIN. It is pretended that MAGHMUD had conſented to his being declared ſovereign of that city and its

 diſtrict;

diſtrict; but the bad ſucceſs this general met with in that expedition ir- 1723.
ritated him ſo much, that he was hardly recovered of his wounds, when he inſiſted boldly on MAGHMUD's ſharing with him the treaſure and ſovereignty annexed to the PERSIAN diadem, purſuant to the compact which he ſaid they had entered into upon their ſetting out from KANDAHAR.

Regal power, divided between two perſons, is abſolutely inconſiſtent, even in a limited monarchy; and conſequently impracticable in deſpotic governments: as to the treaſures, they were neceſſary to the ſupport of the ſtate. MAGHMUD therefore could not agree to theſe propoſals; it was his intereſt however to carry it fair with an experienced general, who had moreover brought a conſiderable body of troops with him, which would obey only his orders. This circumſtance ſeemed to preſage the downfal of their uſurped power. MAGHMUD amuſed him with different promiſes; till AMAN OLA perceiving that he was trifled with, reſolved to keep no further meaſures. One of SHAH HUSSEIN's daughters, whom MAGHMUD had given him in marriage, contributed to inflame his temper, which was naturally fierce. She reminded him of the perfidy and ambition, of the avarice and cruelty of MAGHMUD; ſhe made him alſo ſenſible of the danger to which his life was expoſed, if he did not immediately remove out of the power of the tyrant; and at length prevailed on him to join his forces to thoſe of TÆHMAS SHAH, in order to drive away the uſurper, and divide his ſpoils between them.

With this intent, towards the end of DECEMBER, AMAN OLA left ISFAHAN. As ſoon as he was out of the gates, he put the royal plume upon his turbant; and, in order to deceive MAGHMUD, he took the road to KANDAHAR. MAGHMUD did not venture to oppoſe his march; he was afraid of increaſing the number of his enemies; and perhaps was not ſorry, though at the expence of part of his army, to be diſengaged from a man who had the preſumption to declare himſelf his competitor. But as ſoon as he heard that this general had altered his rout, he was ſo affected with a ſenſe of the danger that might enſue, that he ſet out immediately in purſuit of him with what forces he could collect, order-

ing.

1723. ing the reſt of his army to follow him with all poſſible expedition; and, in four days he came up with him.

It was preſumed, that AMAN OLA would not venture himſelf again into the power of a man, to whom he had given ſuch ſubject of offence, but rather decide the quarrel by the ſword. Inſtances of caprice and inconſtancy are very frequent among the eaſtern warriors: as ſoon as they came in ſight, they ran and embraced each other. Whether the remembrance of paſt friendſhip ſtifled all reproaches, and opened their eyes to a mutual intereſt; or that AMAN OLA did not depend on the fidelity of his troops, to meaſure his ſtrength with that of the young conqueror; theſe marks of affection were followed by a reconciliation; and AMAN OLA was won once more by MAGHMUD's promiſes.

This prince artfully ſoothed the ruling paſſion of his diſguſted friend, and made him the compliment of his own horſe: they embraced each other, and renewed their former oaths on the points of their naked ſabres. MAGHMUD ſent him back to ISFAHAN, eſcorted by a body of horſe; with orders to the governor of the city to pay him all the deference he could deſire, except granting him his full liberty.

MAGHMUD having thus prevented the danger of his friend's reſentment, obliged the troops belonging to that general to ſwear allegiance to him, and had the judgment to incorporate them with his own. He then joined the forces under ZEBERDEST KHAN. This general had lately raiſed his reputation by a new conqueſt. He blockaded CASHAN, the inhabitants of which, intimidated by the taking of GHULPAIGAN and HONSAR, ſurrendered by capitulation. The KHAN paid a religious regard to his promiſe, ſo that there was neither any diſorder nor plundering in the town; but it is ſaid that he afterwards maſſacred a conſiderable number of thoſe fit to bear arms, in order to ſecure a conqueſt, which he had not otherwiſe ſufficient force to garriſon.

It was not till after this barbarous execution that MAGHMUD joined the victorious army: the news he had received from FARSISTAN, was the cauſe of this motion. NAZR ULLA, who had been intruſted with the

4 reduction

reduction of that province, made himſelf maſter of all the towns and villages in his way, without meeting with any reſiſtance. The terror of his name induced them to make a ready ſubmiſſion. Thus he arrived in the neighbourhood of SHIRASS, without ſhedding any blood. Here his fortune changed. In the firſt attack at the ſiege of this place, he was wounded by a muſket-ball, which put an end to his life. The loſs of this general, who had the higheſt reputation as a ſoldier, plunged his army into the greateſt grief. Of this they gave the moſt melancholy tokens, by the bloody funeral rites with which they honoured his memory. For after the whole army had marched round his body, with colours trailing on the ground, they obliged their ſlaves and priſoners to perform the ſame ceremony, and then ſacrificed them at his feet; according to the barbarous ſuperſtition which they had learnt of the INDIANS[e]. They killed alſo the fineſt of his horſes, the fleſh of which, agreeably to the cuſtom of the AFGHANS, was divided among the ſoldiers, in order to make a funeral entertainment. 1723.

NAZR ULLA was in ſtature very tall, but ill ſhaped. The cuſtom he had contracted of keeping one eye ſhut, procured him the name of the one-eyed lord[f], by which he was often diſtinguiſhed. He was fond of the ARMENIANS, whom he took openly under his protection. The incurſions and robberies in which he had been exerciſed from his youth, had formed him early to military exerciſe, in which he acquired great reputation, and was eſteemed by his own people as a conſummate general. His great prudence, and the ſeries of ſucceſs attending it, made him ſuſpected of having learnt the magic art, aſcribed to the INDIANS. It was perhaps this prejudice that created an extraordinary confidence in his ſoldiers, who thought him invincible.

He was of a mild and humane temper, behaving towards thoſe who ſubmitted to him, with a ſtrict regard to his word, and with a certain degree of clemency, to which the other rebel chiefs were utter ſtrangers. All nations reverence virtue, tho' it is not always attended with ſucceſs, nor

[e] See Vol. IV. Chap. XVII. [f] KIOR SULTAN.

1723. nor always the object of vulgar attention. Humanity in a ſoldier, whoſe duty calls him into ſcenes of blood, is an illuſtrious quality. The good inclinations of this AFGHAN, tho' of the religion of the MAGI, gained him honour even after death. MAGHMUD erected a ſtately monument to him, near the burying place of the ARMENIANS. The AFGHANS looked upon him as a ſaint, and expreſſed a high veneration for his memory. This was the more extraordinary, as they could not plead ignorance that he was a worſhipper of fire; ſince there were two prieſts hired by the ſultan, who kept the ſacred flame near his tomb.

MAGHMUD choſe ZEBERDEST KHAN to ſucceed that general; accordingly he ordered him to ſet out immediately for SHIRASS; after which he returned himſelf with the army to ISFAHAN, where he arrived towards
1724. the end of MARCH.

As he entered the city, he was ſtruck with ſurprize and admiration, at an extraordinary event. A woman diſguiſed in man's apparel, ſeeing his troops upon their march, rode up to them in full gallop, and falling ſword in hand upon the firſt that fell in her way, ſhe is ſaid to have killed about twenty, before ſhe was ſeized. This woman was a native of GEORGIA, and poſſeſſed the military diſpoſition of that nation in ſo eminent a degree, that ſhe had formed the deſign of revenging on the firſt AFGHANS ſhe could meet, the death of her huſband, who was ſlain at the bridge ABASABAD, when ISFAHAN was taken. For this purpoſe, ſhe committed the care of her effects, and of her two children, to her brother; and without being daunted at the rigor of the ſeaſon, or the length of the journey, ſhe ſet out from GEORGIA in a ſecret manner, in man's dreſs, well armed and equipped. She was brought before MAGHMUD covered with wounds; this prince, upon being informed of her ſex, admired her reſolution, and gave orders that ſhe ſhould be treated with all the care and attention, which the greatneſs of her courage deſerved[s].

In

[s] Military courage is a virtue much in eſteem in the eaſt, among people who live by the ſword; but women are no where more defenceleſs than in ASIA. This ſeems to be a ſtronger inſtance of female reſentment than that of the SPANISH lady, who dug up the body of one who had been falſe as a lover, and whom ſhe had cauſed to be murdered; in order to enjoy the pleaſure of tearing his heart in pieces with her teeth.

In the mean time, the news of NAZR ULLA's death being ſpread, ſome of the cities and towns of FARSISTAN, which had ſubmitted, took up arms again, as if this ſingle event ſecured them from any further danger. ZEBERDEST KHAN had therefore ſome difficulty to join his army, whom he found deſirous of revenging the death of their late general. The glory of ſucceeding a man ſo much regreted, was a new ſubject of emulation to him; and indeed he omitted nothing that might contribute to the ſucceſs of this new enterprize. 1724.

The KHAN of the province remained in the town: he was a man unpractiſed in the military art, but loyal and honeſt; and from a conſciouſneſs that he was not poſſeſſed of ſkill ſufficient to extricate himſelf out of ſuch a difficulty, he had by preſents and promiſes engaged MIR BAGHIR, brother of ABDALLAH, VALI of ARABIA, to come to his aſſiſtance. This prince was eſteemed a very good general: he repaired to SHIRASS with as many of his own people as were diſpoſed to follow him; and took upon him the command of the town under the KHAN. The walls were in a good condition; the parts moſt expoſed were covered with entrenchments; and frequent ſallies from the town had induced the AFGHANS almoſt to deſpair of ſucceſs; when the KHAN was ſo ill adviſed as to check the ardour of the garriſon, by not permitting them to ſtir any more from the walls: this was the fault which had occaſioned the misfortunes and ſurrender of ISFAHAN.

This ſtep was ſoon followed by the inconveniencies naturally attending it. The ardour of the troops abated; a ſcarcity of proviſions enſued; and the ſoldiers were ſo diſheartened, as to think only of making their eſcape, to prevent being ſtarved. The enemy being ſenſible of the advantage of ſuch a deſertion, favoured it, by granting a free paſſage. The ſcarcity increaſing, MIR BAGHIR undertook to ſave the town, by making a vigorous ſally. Accordingly he marched out at the head of 6000 men, who ſurprized and diſperſed the beſieging army: but ſuch fortune did not attend him long. Soon after, he endeavoured to re-enter the town with a convoy which he brought with him, but was oppoſed by a body of troops, who, tho' inferior in number, attacked him with ſuch reſolution, that

1724. his army was put to flight. This brave ARABIAN, whoſe character was the reverſe of his brother's, who occaſioned the loſs of ISFAHAN, ſtood his ground with only 200 men, who, imitating his example, died like him, fighting glorioufly to the laſt gaſp.

The cutting off ſo neceſſary a ſupply, was not the moſt conſiderable advantage which the AFGHANS reaped from this victory. The country was ravaged, and the neighbouring towns kept ſo much on their guard, that the ſcarcity was greater in their camp than in SHIRASS; inſomuch that ZEBERDEST KHAN was upon the point of raiſing the ſiege, when the taking of the convoy enabled him to wait at his leiſure, till the enemy, overcome by famine, would be obliged to implore his mercy. He was not deceived in his expectations; for SHIRASS was ſoon reduced to a very melancholy ſituation, numbers of the inhabitants dying with famine; ſo that the KHAN determined to capitulate. On the 13th of APRIL he ſent his brother to treat with the enemy.

This reſolution was followed by an eaſy and imprudent ſecurity. The AFGHANS perceiving that the beſieged had neglected their poſts, detained the deputy, and made a general aſſault. The PERSIANS, ſurprized and diſconcerted, made very little reſiſtance. The AFGHANS put every one they found in arms to the ſword; and this unhappy town was under theſe dreadful circumſtances, when the officers reſtrained the fury of the ſoldiers. The maſſacre being over, the conquerors plundered with their ordinary licentiouſneſs. One remarkable incident is recorded of the puniſhment of covetouſneſs: ſome of the ſoldiers having found in the houſe of a private man a conſiderable quantity of corn, which he had concealed in prejudice to the other inhabitants, they tied him to a ſtake in his granary, where he died with hunger; revenging the death of many, whom this wretch had ſacrificed to his avarice.

Thus one of the moſt celebrated cities of the eaſt was taken and ſacked, after a blockade of near eight months: the AFGHANS having deſpaired to reduce it otherwiſe than by famine, confined themſelves to their ſeveral poſts. They loſt before it 2000 of the troops of their own nation, and

a conſiderable number of DERGHEZINS. The number of PERSIANS who 1724.
died by the ſword, was not ſo great as that which periſhed by famine. ZEBERDEST KHAN exacted no more of the inhabitants by way of tribute, than what they annually paid to the kings of PERSIA. He then ordered them to collect proviſions from all the neighbouring parts, that he might ſend a ſupply as ſoon as poſſible to ISFAHAN, where it was greatly wanted.

CHAP. XXVIII.

ZEBERDEST KHAN's *expedition againſt* BENDER ABASSI. MAGHMUD *marches into* COHKILAN, *and loſes great part of his army. Imprudent conduct of* SHAH TÆHMAS *towards the* ARMENIANS. *The* TURKS *take* ERIVAN. *The* ARMENIANS *of* NACHIVAN *invite the* TURKS *into their country.* TAVRIS *beſieged by the* TURKS, *and taken. Siege of* HAMADAN.

ZEBERDEST KHAN was animated by the taking SHIRASS, a place of ſuch conſequence; and began to meditate new conqueſts. He had hardly ſettled the government of that city, when he ordered HUSSEIN AGA, one of the officers of MAGHMUD's houſhold, with four hundred men, to make an incurſion into the ſouthern part of the province. This detachment penetrated without any obſtacle as far as LAR, the capital of LARISTAN, a province formerly governed by its own kings. HUSSEIN AGA plundered the city with his ſmall body of men, but the caſtle held out, and the governor of it refuſed to capitulate. The AFGHAN commander then puſhed on as far as BENDER ABASSI [h]. This was the ſecond time during the war that this city was expoſed. In JANUARY 1722 it was pillaged, without making any reſiſtance, by 4000 BALOUCHES; but upon their attempting to break into the fortreſſes, where the ENGLISH and DUTCH EAST INDIA companies had their compting-houſes, they were repulſed with conſiderable loſs.

The AFGHANS ſucceeded ſtill worſe. Upon the firſt report of their march the inhabitants retired with their moſt valuable effects: but the EUROPEANS

[h] GOMBROON.

1724. PEANS were prepared to give them a warm reception. The AFGHANS therefore thought proper to accept a ſupply of proviſions, without making any attempt on them. The greateſt part of this detachment died: the malignity of the air, and the bad quality of the water not agreeing with them, inſomuch that they were reduced within two months to a very ſmall number, who rejoined the army without making any acceſſion by the plunder of this city, to the riches they had amaſſed in their expedition.

During this interval, the news of the taking of SHIRASS having reached ISFAHAN, the AFGHANS were animated with freſh ardour. MAGHMUD reſolved to lead them himſelf in perſon to new conqueſts. Accordingly he ſet out in JUNE with an intent of ſubduing COKHILAN, a country ſituate within ten days journey of the capital, towards BASSORA[1]. His army was near thirty thouſand men: ſo that he had all the reaſon to promiſe himſelf undoubted ſucceſs; but the event did not anſwer his expectation. His troops were not only harraſſed continually by the ARABS who inhabit the neighbouring country, but alſo diſtreſſed for want of proviſions; whilſt the air had the moſt pernicious effects on his ſoldiers, inſomuch that he did not bring half of his men back to ISFAHAN. His diſaſter would have been ſtill greater, if CASSIN KHAN, a PERSIAN, who was poſſeſſed of a government in thoſe quarters, had not given him all the aſſiſtance in his power.

MAGHMUD compounded with the ARABS to return back, on condition of being furniſhed with proviſions; but theſe people perceiving his inability to withſtand them, broke their word, and harraſſed his army to the greateſt degree. Thus was the formidable MAGHMUD by too great confidence, and the efforts of ſome bodies of roving ARABS, reduced to the utmoſt ſtreights. He was ſo ſhocked at his loſſes, that he made his entrance into ISFAHAN without thoſe honours which it had been cuſtomary to pay him on the like occaſions. His army being thus diſcouraged, prudence ſuggeſted to him the expedient of diſtributing fifty thouſand tomans[k] among his troops, to indemnify them for the loſs of their

[1] This is part of CHUSISTAN, whoſe capital is AHOUAS.

[k] 125,000 *l.*

their baggage; and he employed them the reſt of the ſummer in repairing this accident, as far as the melancholy ſituation of his affairs admitted. 1724.

In this ſtate of weakneſs and deſpondency, to which MAGHMUD was reduced, TÆHMAS SHAH might have entertained great hopes of recovering the diadem, and taking ample vengeance of the AFGHANS; but this prince was entangled in inextricable difficulties: forgetting that his imprudent reſentments had the preceding year occaſioned the revolt of TEFLIS, he loaded the ARMENIANS with exceſſive taxes, which were levied with the utmoſt rigour. So ſevere a proceeding, contrary to his natural diſpoſition, alienated the affections of theſe people in the very beginning; and things were ſoon carried to an extremity. Neceſſity being without law, he entered ſome of their principal towns by force, and plundered them, eſpecially ſuch as refuſed to obey the orders he had ſent them to join his troops, though by law they were exempted from all military ſervice.

The ARMENIANS of CAPAN and CHIAVA, finding they were treated as enemies, took up arms. TÆHMAS, who ſeemed to exert his reſolution only where prudence was wanting, intended to reduce them by force; but they gave him ſo warm a reception, that he became more circumſpect, and determined at length to enter into a treaty with them. He gained by gentle meaſures, what he could not obtain by force; and thoſe people having returned to their duty, gave the greateſt proofs of their fidelity. But it was not in the nature of things, that TÆHMAS ſhould recover his dominions at this time.

The TURKS being jealous of the advantages ſecured to the CZAR by the treaty of ST. PETERSBURG, endeavoured to counterbalance them by their conqueſts. With this view, they provided for the ſecurity of GEORGIA; built a new fortreſs near TEFLIS; and aſſembled different bodies of troops on the frontiers of the PERSIAN dominions. ABDALLAH, BASHA of VAN[1], entered this province the beginning of the year. MAHOMMED

[1] His ſurname was KOUPRUL OGLOU, or the ſon of KOUPROLI. This family is deſcended from the grand vizir KOUPROLI MAHOMMED BASHA, ſon of a country parſon in the neighbourhood of BELGRADE in ALBANIA. This is almoſt the only family in TURKEY that has a proper name.

1724. MAHOMMED KOULI KHAN, the ſame who had ſurrendered TEFLIS, made a ſtand at the head of a body of troops. The BASHA having reinforced the garriſons of the ſeveral towns in GEORGIA, marched againſt him with 35000 men, and ſoon put him to flight. After this, in FEBRUARY, he penetrated into ADERBEITZAN, and laid ſiege to KHOI, which held out two months, and was then taken by ſtorm, and plundered.

ARIFIE ACHMED, BASHA of DIARBEKIR, whom the port had nominated SERASKIER, now projected a more important expedition. This general paſſed the ARAS the end of JUNE, and entered the province of ERIVAN with an army of above 30,000 men. In order to intimidate the inhabitants, he treated them with great cruelty. The towns and villages upon his march, were intirely ſacked; and he made ſlaves of above 20,000 perſons of both ſexes. After theſe barbarous hoſtilities, in the middle of the ſame month he arrived before ERIVAN, the capital of the province.

This city, the capital of ARMENIA, is diſtant about ſix leagues from mount ARARAT [m]. In 1635 it was ſituated a mile from the ſpot where it now ſtands. SHAH SEFFIE having taken it from the TURKS, made choice of the preſent ſituation. The caſtle is built on a ſteep rock, inacceſſible towards the weſt; and on the other ſides it is defended by a triple wall of brick. At the foot of this rock runs the river ZENGUI, which deſcends from the lake SEVAN [n], and mixes its waters three leagues lower with the ARAS. The KHAN of the province reſided in the caſtle. The town is encompaſſed by a double wall, and abounds more in gardens and vineyards than houſes. The adjacent country is a large fertile plain, terminated by the mountains, of which ARARAT makes a part; and the whole forms a moſt delightful proſpect. This advantage, however, is counterbalanced by great inconveniencies. The water and fruits are very unwholeſome; the country is ſubject to frequent earthquakes; their winters, notwithſtanding their latitude, are long and ſevere; and they have exceſſive heats in ſummer. During the months of JULY and AUGUST, moſt

[m] I have already had occaſion to mention, that according to the tradition of the ARMENIANS the ark reſted on this mountain. [n] This lake is about 70 miles diſtant northward of the city.

moſt of the inhabitants leave their houſes, and retreat to breathe a more temperate air in the mountains. It is computed, that in the heat of ſummer there are often 20,000 tents in their neighbourhood; for not only the KOURDS travel thus far northward, but likewiſe the people from the extremity of CALDÆA, come hither with their flocks. 1724.

The OTTOMAN army had with them a numerous artillery, with which they ſoon made a breach in the walls. The SERASKIER then attempted to ſtorm the town; and tho' his troops behaved with great courage, they were as bravely repulſed by the garriſon. They met with the ſame reception at three general aſſaults; and the air being in ſome meaſure infected with the number of dead bodies; the TURKISH general deſired a truce of three days, in order to bury the dead.

In the interim, the BASHA of CUTAYA joined the army. This determined the SERASKIER to try his fortune once more. The 10th of SEPTEMBER he ordered the fourth general aſſault; but with ſo little ſucceſs, that he ſuffered more on this occaſion than in any of the former attacks. The TURKS having loſt near 20,000 men by the ſword, and the unwholeſomeneſs of the air, were diſcouraged. They had indeed received frequent ſuccours, and their bombs had reduced great part of the town into ruins; but the PERSIANS as well as the ARMENIANS, actuated by the double motive of rage and ſelf-preſervation, ſtill ſhewed the ſame courage and reſolution. The beſiegers, almoſt exhauſted with the fatigue of ſo long a ſiege, threatened openly to retire; when the arrival of a reinforcement of freſh troops from EGYPT, changed the ſcene. SARI MUSTAFA, BASHA of ERZEROUM, alſo brought a conſiderable reinforcement with him towards the end of the month; ſo that the murmurings of the ſoldiers began to ceaſe, and they thought of nothing further than bringing this enterprize to a happy concluſion.

The KHAN, who commanded the town, began to be intimidated at the ſight of ſuch large reinforcements. The garriſon was already in diſtreſs for proviſions; and a great number of the ſoldiers and inhabitants had periſhed with hunger, ſickneſs, or the ſword. They expected no ſuccours

1724. from TÆHMAS, and were reduced, for want of lead, to new-caſt the few balls that were remaining, and thoſe which they found in the breaches and ditches, by putting a pea in them; an expedient which might conceal their want of this kind of ammunition; but yet it diminiſhed the weight of the ball, which muſt conſequently do leſs execution. Theſe circumſtances, and the preſſing ſollicitations of his brother, whom the TURKS had taken priſoner near the ARAS, determined the KHAN to enter into a capitulation.

The firſt of OCTOBER he ſent deputies to the TURKISH camp, and after ſome difficulties it was agreed, that the governor and the garriſon ſhould be ſafely conducted with all their effects to the frontiers of KARABAGH [o]: that the inhabitants of the caſtle, and thoſe who had retired thither during the ſiege, but had no ſhare in defending the town, ſhould quit it and retire to the old ERIVAN: that none of them ſhould be moleſted, either in their perſons or effects: and that the town, the caſtle with the artillery, and ammunitions, ſhould be immediately ſurrendered to the grand ſignior.

Theſe articles were punctually executed. The BASHA of KARA HISSAR conducted the garriſon to the frontier, from whence the KHAN proceeded to AHR, where TÆHMAS then reſided.

During this interval, the troops under the command of the BASHA of VAN, were not idle. This general having defeated MAHOMMED KOULI KHAN, as already related, and taken the fortreſs of KHOI, had formed a deſign upon TAVRIS. As he had not troops ſufficient to attempt a place of that importance, he acquainted the court; and the BASHAS of CARAMENIA and ALEPPO, with ſome others were ordered to join his army.

Towards the beginning of AUGUST, he received a deputation from the ARMENIANS of NACSIVAN [p]. The inhabitants began to deſpair of ſuccours from the PERSIANS, and were afraid of the cruelties of the TURKS; the ſubject therefore of their deputation was, to recommend the conqueſt of their

[o] A diſtrict ſouth of the ARAS, full of inacceſſible mountains. DE LISLE has a place called CARACHABAN. [p] NACSIVAN ſignifies the firſt made. The ARMENIANS pretend it was the firſt city that was built after the deluge.

their country to the BASHA. Upon this he ordered the chiefs [q] of KOURDISTAN to march thither with 12,000 men, and to theſe he joined a detachment of 1000 TURKS, commanded by IBRAHIM AGA. Theſe troops no ſooner appeared in the province, than the ARMENIANS roſe up in arms. The PERSIANS were driven from NACSIVAN and ORDOUBAD [r]. This expedition, together with the taking of ERIVAN, reduced the greateſt part of ARMENIA MAJOR under the TURKISH yoke. 1724.

In the mean while, the BASHA of VAN marched with an army of twenty-five thouſand men towards TAVRIS. Tho' a great part of this town had been deſtroyed by the earthquake already mentioned, it was ſtill one of the fineſt cities in the eaſt; but it had neither walls nor artillery, ſo that like antient SPARTA, its only bulwark conſiſted in the number and ſtrength of its inhabitants. The TURKS, crowding upon one another, had already made themſelves maſters of a whole quarter of the town, when the inhabitants flocking from all parts, barricadoed the ſtreets by which the enemy had entered; and their communication with the main body of the army being cut off, four thouſand of their men were ſurrounded, and cut in pieces.

The BASHA was not diſcouraged by this diſaſter: he made ſeveral attacks, but his troops were conſtantly repulſed. He began to waver in his reſolution, when his ſpies informed him, that the inhabitants were preparing to attack him the next night in his entrenchments. Finding the valour of his troops unequal to his deſign, he ordered fires to be made in his camp as uſual; and the 21ſt of SEPTEMBER in the night he marched off ſilently, leaving his tents ſtanding, the better to deceive the enemy. Some hours afterwards the inhabitants came out of the city, to the number of twenty thouſand: finding that the TURKISH army was retired, they followed them till the next day at noon, but could not come up with them. In revenge they maſſacred not only all the ſtragglers that fell in their way, but likewiſe the ſick and wounded, which the enemy had been obliged to leave to their diſcretion.

The OTTOMAN army, conſiderably reduced, retired to TASSOU, a town ſituate within twenty leagues of TAVRIS, on the north bank of the lake

[q] BEES. [r] This place is noted for its trade in ſilken and other manufactures.

1724. CHAHI. Here the TURKISH general added to his diſgrace, by attempting to be revenged of the PERSIANS for the gallant defence they had made. Tho' the neighbouring villages had ſubmitted without making any reſiſtance, yet he carried the women and children with him as ſlaves, and put the men to the ſword. The inhabitants of TAVRIS were ſo provoked at this cruelty, that they took the reſolution of purſuing him, and preventing his retreat. The BASHA having notice of their approach, marched out at the head of eight thouſand men; moſt of theſe were killed in the engagement, and he retired to KHOI with the few who ſaved themſelves by flight.

Theſe were not the only armies which the TURKS had in PERSIA. HASSAN, BASHA of BAGDAT, and ACHMED his ſon, BASHA of BASSORA, entered this country with the troops belonging to their reſpective governments, and laid ſiege to HAMADAN. TÆHMAS, encouraged by what had paſſed before TAVRIS, ſent part of his troops under the command of FLAGELLA KHAN, one of his principal officers, to the relief of this town. But the ſucceſs did not anſwer his expectations: his general was defeated, and put to flight.

The OTTOMAN army being thus free, continued the operations of the ſiege without interruption. In the mean time, the enemy defended themſelves with the ſame reſolution; and it was now two months ſince the opening of the trenches, when a GERMAN renegado ſprung a mine, of which he had the direction. The effect determined the fate of the beſieged. The TURKS mounted the breach with loud ſhouts, and carried all before them: a ſlaughter of the inhabitants enſued, till ſome of the TURKISH generals, moved by a ſenſe of humanity, facilitated the eſcape of great numbers, by giving them a paſſage out of one of the gates of the town.

The taking of ERIVAN and HAMADAN, and the repulſe of the BASHA of VAN, concluded the campaign on the ſide of the TURKS. The army under the SERASKIER, together with the remaining forces of the BASHA of VAN, were reduced to forty thouſand men, including the garriſons of GEORGIA. The troops of EGYPT and the KOURDS ſeparated, and took up their

their winter quarters in ERIVAN, NACSIVAN, and ORDOUBAD. Thoſe of BAGDAT and BASSORA, retired to their own country, after leaving a ſufficient garriſon in HAMADAN, to ſecure their conqueſt. 1724.

CHAP. XXIX.

Rejoicings at CONSTANTINOPLE. *The port is diſſatisfied with the conduct of* PETER *the* GREAT. *The conferences renewed by the mediation of the* FRENCH *miniſter to the* OTTOMAN *port. Concluſion of the treaty between the* CZAR *and the port. Articles of that treaty.*

THE TURKS having extended their conqueſts ſo far as HAMADAN; this event ſeemed to quiet the minds of the people, already uneaſy concerning the ſucceſs of a war hardly commenced. This circumſtance added to the ſatisfaction of the miniſters of the port. The public rejoicings laſted nine days, and were ſcarce finiſhed, when they were ordered to be renewed on the following occaſion. MAHOMMED KOULI KHAN, who ſtill thirſted after revenge, had paſſed the KURA near GORI, and laid ſiege to the fort by which that little city is defended. He was carrying on the attack with great vigour, when REGEB, BASHA of TEFLIS, marched with 6000 men to the relief of the place: this, together with the defection of the principal GEORGIANS, who were gained by the port, obliged the KHAN to retire with great precipitation. The TURKS came up with him as he was paſſing the river; and he loſt a thouſand men in the action. He then retired with the reſt of his troops into the mountains.

The FRENCH embaſſador* thought proper to diſtinguiſh himſelf, upon the occaſion of theſe rejoicings, for the accompliſhment of one of the articles of the treaty, concluded by the mediation of the court of FRANCE. To explain this, we muſt trace matters ſomewhat back.

It has been already mentioned, that the port being informed of the ſucceſs of ISMAEL BEG, the PERSIAN embaſſador at the court of ST. PETERSBURG, puſhed on her conqueſts in PERSIA without reſerve. Whether the CZAR ſlighted the reſentment of the port, on account of this

* The marquis de BONNAC.

1724. this treaty; it was ſcarce concluded, when he ſent copies of it to his reſident NEPLUEOFF, but without any inſtructions to him or to the FRENCH embaſſador; at the ſame time, he made it public in all the courts of EUROPE. This cauſed a general ſurprize at CONSTANTINOPLE. Neither the embaſſador, nor the RUSSIAN reſident, expected ſuch an event. They were greatly confounded, whilſt their enemies laid hold of thoſe circumſtances to decry their conduct. This was not difficult to effect. The TURKISH commiſſaries having opened the conference in the beginning of JANUARY this year, with bitter reproaches, declared in the name of the grand ſignior, that ſuch a prince as TÆHMAS, wandering from place to place, without ſuccour or ſupport, could not with any validity conſent to the diſmembering of his dominions; therefore ſuch engagements were void: that the grand ſignior would not ſuffer any foreign power to extend his dominion in PERSIA: conſequently, that the only method to preſerve the peace ſubſiſting between the two empires, was to relinquiſh all pretenſions derived from this treaty, and likewiſe to abandon the conqueſts made on the borders of the CASPIAN ſea.

After ſo explicit a declaration, the TURKISH commiſſaries broke off the conferences abruptly. It was thought the port would declare war againſt the CZAR, and ſend the RUSSIAN reſident to the caſtle of the ſeven towers. This miniſter having no inſtructions, refuſed to yield to the ſollicitations of the FRENCH embaſſador, to enter into a negotiation; which ſerved to increaſe the diſguſt of the TURKISH miniſters; ſo that the ſtorm ſeemed to be gathering, when the embaſſador ventured to take the conſequence of negotiating upon himſelf.

With this view he waited on the miniſters of the port, and entered into a cloſe conference with them; in which he reconciled all matters ſo well, that they were ſoon agreed upon almoſt every article[t]. The grand vizir, who preſſed the concluſion of this affair under-hand, found it very difficult to make the divan come into it; eſpecially as the point was to enter into an alliance with a chriſtian power, in order to ſhare the dominions of a MAHOMMEDAN prince. There was no time to loſe: they muſt either

[t] This relation being made by a FRENCHMAN belonging to the embaſſador's miniſtry, we muſt allow for ſome partialities as to the abilities of his maſter.

either conclude the treaty entered upon with RUSSIA, or ſtop the progreſs of that power, by declaring war againſt her. IBRAHIM, the grand vizir, laid this before the divan, which he convened in the name of the emperor his maſter. After very warm debates, the divan declared for the continuation of the peace: upon which, the FRENCH embaſſador diſpatched monſieur D'ALION [a], a relation of his, to the court of RUSSIA, with the preliminaries of the treaty; who arrived at Mosco the middle of MARCH. 1724.

The firſt article in his commiſſion was, that SHAH TÆHMAS ſhould be obliged to ſend a ſolemn embaſſy to CONSTANTINOPLE, to beg of the grand ſignior that he would ſet limits to his conqueſts, and conſent, as far as was conſiſtent with the glory and intereſts of his highneſs, to the execution of the treaty concluded the year before at ST. PETERSBURG. The others contained a project of accommodation, in regard to the limits of the conqueſts made, or which were to be made in PERSIA, by either of theſe contracting powers.

Theſe preliminaries having been agreed to, the RUSSIAN reſident received new inſtructions, and the 19th of MAY the conferences were renewed. The vizir had made it an eſtabliſhed rule, to live in peace with the chriſtian powers, as neceſſary to his ſecurity. How favourable ſoever his diſpoſition might have been, there were great obſtacles to ſurmount, before they could come to a concluſion of the treaty. DAGISTAN, and part of SHIRVAN, inhabited by MAHOMMEDANS of the ſect of the SUNNIS, were to continue under the dominion of the CZAR: moreover, this monarch required that the port ſhould acknowledge TÆHMAS as king of PERSIA: that ſhe ſhould join her forces to thoſe of RUSSIA, in order to put this prince in poſſeſſion of the throne: and laſtly, that ſhe ſhould engage to receive neither propoſals nor miniſters from MAGHMUD, or any other uſurper. Theſe articles were contrary to their religion, which the MAHOMMEDANS conſider as the baſis and primum mobile of political government.

Part of theſe difficulties were removed in a long conference, which the grand vizir had the fifth of JULY with the FRENCH embaſſador; and the general

[a] This perſon was miniſter at the court of ST. PETERSBURG, for ſome time after the marquis DE CHETARDIE.

1724. general conferences being renewed, the ſeveral articles of the treaty were agreed to. They were ſix in number, preceded by a preamble, ſetting forth in a ſummary way, the ceſſion which SHAH TÆHMAS made to the CZAR, of the provinces ſituated on the borders of the CASPIAN SEA.

The firſt article determines, that the barrier betwixt RUSSIA and TURKEY ſhall be regulated by a line, to begin within twenty-two leagues of the CASPIAN SEA on the confines of DAGISTAN, to paſs within the like diſtance of DERBEND, and afterwards within ſeven leagues of the coaſt, including SHAMAKIE, after which it is to be drawn in a direct line to the conflux of the KURA and the ARAS. It is likewiſe ſtipulated, that the contracting parties ſhall nominate commiſſaries, and deſire the mediation of the court of FRANCE with regard to the regulation of thoſe limits. That either party ſhall be free to erect forts upon their own territories, on condition of giving notice thereof to each other, and of building them at the diſtance of three leagues at leaſt from their frontier.

The ſecond, that SHAMAKIE, the capital of SHIRVAN, ſhall not be fortified, nor receive a TURKISH garriſon; and that if ſome unforeſeen accident, ſuch as a revolt, ſhould oblige this monarch to ſend any troops thither, they ſhall acquaint the RUSSIAN officers before they paſſed the KURA, and retire from thence as ſoon as the troubles are appeaſed. The grand ſignior promiſes, that his armies ſhall not paſs this river in any part of GEORGIA, without giving notice of the reaſons of ſuch motion to the officers appointed by the CZAR, along the coaſt of the CASPIAN SEA.

The third eſtabliſhes the barrier which is to ſeparate TURKEY from PERSIA. This line commences where the other finiſhes, that is, at the conflux of the KURA and ARAS; it paſſes within three miles of the walls of ARDEVILLE towards TAVRIS, and from thence to HAMADAN, which city, together with the territority belonging to it, falls to the grand ſignior's ſhare; after which it turns off towards KHERMANSHA, the new conqueſt of this monarch, where it terminates.

By the fourth, the CZAR promiſes the grand ſignior, to employ his mediation, that the provinces aſſigned him in the preceding article, ſhall

be voluntarily ſurrendered to him, or recovered for him, by a joint effort. This article concludes with a reciprocal guaranty of thoſe provinces of PERSIA, which theſe monarchs adjugded to themſelves. 1724.

Theſe powers declare, that if SHAH TÆHMAS ſhould refuſe to agree to the treaty, they will jointly endeavour to conquer the reſpective places aſſigned to each; after which, the reſt of the kingdom ſhall be intirely given up, without any foreign dependance, into the hands of SHAH TÆHMAS.

In the fifth, the grand ſignior engages, as ſoon as the places aſſigned him by the third article ſhall be voluntarily delivered up, to acknowledge TÆHMAS for king of PERSIA; to give him full ſecurity of his reſtoration, and afford him all proper aſſiſtance: that in caſe the uſurpers ſhould by any hoſtility reduce him to the neceſſity of declaring war againſt them, he will join his forces to thoſe of RUSSIA, in order to place this prince on the throne of his anceſtors.

The ſixth article declares, that if TÆHMAS ſhould refuſe to conform to the treaty, the contracting powers, after having made themſelves maſters of the provinces aſſigned to them, ſhall appeaſe the diſturbances of PERSIA, and reſtore this kingdom to the PERSIAN moſt deſerving of it, towards whom they ſhall conduct themſelves as they have done towards the kings his predeceſſors. That they ſhall not in any manner interfere in the government of his dominions, but jointly take every meaſure neceſſary for his tranquillity, without liſtening to any propoſal on the part of MIR MAGHMUD.

This treaty was ſigned the eighth of JULY, and the ratification of the CZAR being arrived, the exchange was ſolemnly made ſome days after in the apartment of the grand vizir. The peace being thus confirmed, the KHAN of the CRIM TARTARS, and the generals of the OTTOMAN troops, who were on the frontier of the UKRAIN, received orders to retire, the one to CRIM TARTARY, and the others towards the DANUBE.

1725. In the mean time TÆHMAS, who was at ARDEVILLE, received an embaſſador from the CZAR; but this miniſter had ſo little reaſon to be ſatisfied, that he returned home without taking leave of this prince.

TÆHMAS had lately ſent an embaſſador to the OTTOMAN port, who was arreſted at ERZEROUM: at firſt they treated him in a manner ſuitable to his character[w], but ſoon after he was confined as a cloſe priſoner in the caſtle, and his effects were confiſcated.

The unhappy SHAH TÆHMAS ſaw his country thus torn from him: the PERSIAN monarchy was become a prey. He ſoon learnt the tenour of the treaty concluded between the RUSSIANS and the TURKS. The paſſive conduct of his miniſter ISMAEL BEG[x] gave him great offence; but in his circumſtances what leſs was to be expected? He immediately ordered the CZAR's reſident to withdraw from his court: but this mark of reſentment did not hinder the RUSSIAN monarch from ordering the embaſſador-extraordinary, whom he had ſent to TÆHMAS, to continue his journey. It is preſumed that PETER the GREAT would have been contented with GHILAN only, could he have thus prevented the progreſs of the TURKS, and reſtored TÆHMAS to his dominions, in which the RUSSIANS were more ſincere than the TURKS.

CHAP. XXX.

MIR MAGHMUD *raiſes new troops. A caravan arrives from* KANDAHAR. *He marches an army, and lays ſiege to* YEZD; *but is obliged to raiſe it.* ASHREFF *returns. Diſpoſition of the* AFGHANS *in his favour. Uneaſineſs of* MAGHMUD *upon that account. He undertakes a religious penance. Reports concerning* SEFFIE MYRZA.

WHILST this partition of the PERSIAN dominions was negotiating, MAGHMUD was employed in repairing the breach, which the expedition of COKHILAN had made in his troops. With this view, he en-

liſted

[w] Sixty dollars a day were ordered for his maintenance. [x] He remained at ASTRACHAN and was there ſtill in 1744, and had a guard appointed him, with a daily allowance, not chuſing to truſt himſelf at home.

liſted a great number of DERGHEZINS: he alſo levied ſome new companies of TURKS; and knowing how important a matter it was to conceal his weakneſs, he not only renewed the prohibition of correſponding by letters, but moreover made it death for any ſtranger that ſhould attempt to leave the town[y]. 1724.

Things were thus ſituated, when the caravan which he expected, arrived at ISFAHAN. It was not near ſo numerous as that of the preceding year; owing, in a great meaſure, to the complaints of ſome of the AFGHANS, who at their return to KANDAHAR, accuſed their ſovereign of avarice, and a partial neglect of thoſe who had performed the braveſt actions. MAGHMUD, however, perceiving he had now as ſtrong an army as that which had raiſed him to the throne, was ambitious of effacing the memory of his late diſgrace.

After ſome time, he reſolved to lay ſiege to YEZD, which he had in vain endeavoured to take upon his march to ISFAHAN. The inhabitants of this city had lately routed a reinforcement of 2000 men, who were coming to him from KANDAHAR. The neceſſity of ſecuring a communication with that province, as well as the deſire of retrieving the reputation of his arms, engaged him to turn the greateſt part of his forces that way.

Towards the end of DECEMBER, he ſet out upon this expedition, with an army of 18000 men. Such a number of troops, together with a good train of artillery, which he carried with him, and the correſpondence he held with the PERSEES, who inhabit a particular quarter of the town, ſeemed to render him confident of ſucceſs; but Providence had otherwiſe ordained. The inhabitants of YEZD diſcovered the treachery of their fellow-citizens, and put them to the ſword. Having taken this ſtep, they laid the country waſte for ſeveral leagues round, deſtroying, or carrying off every thing that might be of any ſervice to the enemy. After this they prepared to defend themſelves.

This precaution of the inhabitants, obliged MAGHMUD to puſh on the ſiege with the utmoſt vigour. His artillery was ſcarce mounted in bat-

[y] This confined the merchants during theſe troubles.

1724. tery, when he ordered a general aſſault. The AFGHANS attacked the town on every ſide with great bravery, in confidence of the promiſes of the PERSEES; but they were received with ſo much reſolution and courage, that they were ſoon convinced there was no dependance to be made on any aſſiſtance from that quarter.

This aſſault was followed by ſeveral others, which proved equally unſucceſsful. In the mean time, the ſeverity of the ſeaſon very much diſtreſſed the AFGHANS; they were alſo ſtraitened for proviſions; which reduced them to the neceſſity of raiſing the ſiege a ſecond time, or of weakening the army conſiderably, by ſending out large detachments to ſome diſtance, in ſearch of proviſions. MAGHMUD determined upon the latter; but he had ſoon reaſon to repent his choice. The garriſon had been increaſed by a number of people who had fled for ſhelter from the open country; finding the AFGHANS weakened, they fell ſuddenly upon their principal quarters, and confounded them by ſo briſk and unexpected an attack; inſomuch that they put ſeveral parties of them to flight, and killed near 3000 men, before the main body of the army could be aſſembled. MAGHMUD himſelf was in danger of being ſurrounded, and obliged to abandon his baggage and artillery, and ſave himſelf by flight.

The uneaſineſs occaſioned by this new diſgrace, was augmented by the mutinous diſpoſition of the army. The ſoldiers declared loudly, that their defeat was a conſequence of the change of manners introduced into the nation; that they were upon the brink of being ruined by that very effeminacy and luxury, which had deſtroyed their enemies; that MAGHMUD was already a PERSIAN in his apparel, and his luxurious diet, but ſtill more ſo by the exceſſive number of concubines with which he had filled his harram; adding, that no further hopes of ſucceſs remained, ſo long as they were governed by a chief, who, not ſatisfied with adopting the manners of the conquered, affected likewiſe to eſpouſe their ſentiments in matters of religion. This laſt reproach was owing to ſome words which MAGHMUD had let drop, perhaps with a deſign to vex the TURKS, or to render himſelf more agreeable to the PERSIANS.

Mean while the danger increaſed by the impunity of theſe murmurings. 1724.
ASHREFF was alſo come back with the laſt caravan from KANDAHAR: and the army, who had been always extremely fond of him, now behaved in ſuch a manner, as plainly ſhewed they thought him the fitteſt to reign. He had retreated only to avoid the jealous eye of MAGHMUD; and the expreſſions of eſteem and affection of the AFGHAN army, had been the chief inducements of his return from KANDAHAR. While he remained there, he lived intirely in the country, in purſuit of rural pleaſures, and his own domeſtic affairs. But ſuch tranquillity was not his lot; he ſeemed born to move in a higher, tho' leſs happy ſphere. During his abſence, the ſoldiers expreſſed a great deſire for his return. The principal officers conſidered the dangers to which the army would be expoſed, if MAGHMUD, who had but indifferent health, ſhould die without male iſſue capable of holding the reins of government; thus, in ſome meaſure; they obliged this prince to recall ASHREFF, in order to declare him his ſucceſſor to the empire.

ASHREFF having quitted his ſolitude, MAGHMUD was obliged to diſſemble his jealouſy, and entertained him for ſome days with all the appearances of the moſt tender friendſhip; but he was no ſooner informed of the murmurings of the troops, than he ordered ASHREFF to lodge in the palace, where he was ſtrictly guarded. This prudent ſtep checked the ſoldiers; but did not make the ſultan eaſy in his mind. The diſgrace he lately met with in COHKILAN, and before YEZD, had weakened his power and authority. He began to be in as great fear of the mutiny of his troops, as of the revolt of the PERSIANS.

To extricate himſelf in this ſituation, required more ſteadineſs and virtue than MAGHMUD was maſter of. This prince, who had been ſo bold in projecting, and ſo brave in executing, was frightened at the thought of a danger to which he had not been accuſtomed. Under theſe circumſtances, he tried to obtain from heaven that light and aſſiſtance, which he no longer expected from thoſe who had been the followers of his fortunes. A deſign of this nature, however commendable in itſelf, ſeemed

1724. ed in his condition to argue the troubled ſtate and weakneſs of his mind, rather than a ſenſe of religion.

With this intent, MAGHMUD undertook to perform the ſpiritual exerciſes[z], which the INDIAN MAHOMMEDANS, who are more addicted to them than thoſe of other countries, have introduced into KANDAHAR. This ſuperſtitious practice is obſerved, by ſhutting themſelves up for fourteen or fifteen days in a place where no light enters; the only nouriſhment they take, is a little bread and water at ſun-ſet. During this retreat, they employ their time in repeating inceſſantly with a ſtrong guttural voice the word HOU, by which they denote one of the attributes of the deity. Theſe continual cries, and the agitations of the body with which they are attended, naturally unhinge the whole frame. When by faſting and darkneſs the brain is diſtempered, they fanſy they ſee ſpectres, and hear voices. Thus they take pains to confirm the very diſtemper of mind which puts them on ſuch trials. They preſume to pry into the ſecrets of providence, from an opinion, that during this penance, the devil is compelled by the agency of a ſuperior power, to let them into the knowledge of futurity.

1725. Such was the painful exerciſe which MAGHMUD undertook in JANUARY this year, and for this purpoſe he choſe a ſubterraneous vault. In the beginning of the next month, when he came forth, he was ſo pale, disfigured, and emaciated, that they hardly knew him. But this was not the worſt effect of his devotion: ſolitude, often dangerous to a melancholy turn of thought, had, under the circumſtances of his inquietude, and the ſtrangeneſs of the penance, impaired his reaſon. He became reſtleſs and ſuſpicious; often ſtarting, as if the very perſons moſt attached to his intereſt, had an intent to deſtroy him. He was in one of theſe fits, when it was rumoured in ISFAHAN, that SEFFIE MYRZA, ſon of SHAH HUSSEIN, had found means to make his eſcape from the ſeraglio, and had retired towards TURKEY. Whether the PERSIANS ſpread this alarm in order to intimidate the tyrant, or himſelf cauſed it to be reported; he made it a pretext to cover a new ſcene of the moſt execrable barbarity.

CHAP.

[z] They call it the RIADHIAT.

CHAP. XXXI.

Cruelty of MAGHMUD *in murdering* SHAH HUSSEIN's *children. Numerous offspring, and great voluptuouſneſs of* SHAH HUSSEIN. MAGHMUD *falls into a delirium. Ceremony of the* ARMENIAN *prieſts in reading the red goſpel over him. Conſpiracy of the* AFGHANS *againſt him, in favour of* ASHREFF. ASHREFF *is elected ſultan. Miſerable death of* MAGHMUD. *Character of this prince.*

HITHERTO MAGHMUD, amidſt all his cruelties, had not imbrued his hands in the blood of his ancient ſovereigns. Many princes of SHAH HUSSEIN's family were confined with him in the ſeraglio, as the ſad companions of his captivity: among whom were ſeveral brothers, three uncles, and ſeven nephews of that unfortunate monarch. 1725.

The tyrant's heart being now rent with anxiety for the ſupport of his declining power, regardleſs of his more declining health, and approach to eternity, he reſolved to ſacrifice all the royal family, except HUSSEIN SHAH. The ſeventh of FEBRUARY was the day appointed for the execution of this bloody purpoſe. Theſe victims to cruelty and a diſtempered mind, were aſſembled in the palace-yard with their hands tied behind their backs. The tyrant, attended only by a few of his moſt intimate confidents, began himſelf this horrid butchery with his ſabre. There were only two ſons of SHAH HUSSEIN remaining, when this unfortunate prince, hearing their cries, came running to the place of ſlaughter. Theſe princes, the eldeſt of whom was only five years of age, flung themſelves into the arms of their father. Nothing but the tenderneſs of a parent could have ſupported this prince at the ſight of ſo ſad a ſpectacle: he bathed his children with his tears, and put himſelf in the way to receive the fatal ſtroke. MAGHMUD, now drunk with ſlaughter, ſtepped forwards to murder theſe royal infants, tho' ſheltered in their father's boſom: the SHAH ſtretched out his arm, and received the blow. Here the horrid ſcene was ended. At the ſight of blood guſhing from the wound of a king, and a man of whom this tyrant had been uſed to think

1725. with ſome reverence, heaven ſtopped his murdering hand. As theſe children were yet of ſo tender an age, and incapable of giving umbrage, he determined to leave them to their parent, now oppreſſed with ſuch an accumulated load of misfortunes.

It is not agreed what number of princes were murdered on this occaſion, but they are reckoned above an hundred. It is eaſy to reconcile their being yet more numerous, if we attend to the circumſtances of eaſtern courts. Few men have carried their voluptuouſneſs, however permitted by a particular faith, further than SHAH HUSSEIN. The year 1701, was called in PERSIA the year of virgins [a]. This prince then ordered a ſearch to be made through the whole extent of his dominions, for all the young virgins of diſtinguiſhed beauty: and the commiſſioners appointed for this inquiry, brought all thoſe whom they thought worthy of the harram. The governors of the provinces, knowing their maſter's predominant paſſion, paid their courts in the moſt prevailing manner, even till the ſiege of ISFAHAN, by ſending him the fineſt girls in their province. This ſtrong paſſion, or rather appetite for the ſex, was ſufficient to render the royal family extremely numerous; inſomuch, that in the ſpace of a month, thirty cradles were carried into the ſeraglio. Beſides, this monarch being more humane than any of his predeceſſors, put none of the princes of the royal blood to death [b]. All thoſe princes, excepting TÆHMAS and the two children already mentioned, periſhed on that day.

This bloody execution, inſtead of diſpelling the fears of MAGHMUD, only contributed to increaſe the terrors with which he was tormented. His mind was perpetually agitated with the moſt frightful ideas; and the remorſe of this laſt act of barbarity gave him no repoſe. His intellects, which had been ſo much weakened by the auſterity of his ſpiritual retreat, appeared to be yet more impaired; and beſides this, he had an inſupportable pain in his bowels. The moſt ſkilful phyſicians of the court, endeavoured

[a] KISVERAN. [b] It was common in later times to kill them all, inſomuch that I never heard that NADIR had any children alive, at leaſt no males, except his two ſons RIZA KOULI MYRZA and NESR ALI MYRZA, who were born long before NADIR was made king.

endeavoured in vain to reſtore him to his ſenſes. They then had recourſe 1725.
to a religious remedy.

In caſes of the like nature, the ARMENIANS had been wont to engage one of their prieſts to read over the head of the patient, what they call the red goſpel [c]. This cuſtom was received not only by thoſe chriſtians, but alſo by the greateſt part of the MAHOMMEDANS of the country, who together with the ARMENIANS affirmed, that ſeveral PERSIANS affected with the ſame degree of madneſs as MAGHMUD, had been cured by this means: ſo that they reſolved to try to work a miracle. In the beginning of APRIL, the clergy of JULFA being dreſſed in their ſacerdotal habits, and with wax tapers lighted, went in ſolemn proceſſion to the palace [d], where they were received with great reſpect. They paſſed thro' the apartment between two rows of courtiers and guards, whoſe modeſt countenance, and profound ſilence, expreſſed ſuch a reverence for theſe prieſts, as could hardly be expected from perſons of their religion. After the ceremony was performed, the clergy retired in the ſame order to JULFA, attended by a great number of the lords of the court.

In one of the lucid intervals of his diſorder, MAGHMUD having been informed of the relief which the ARMENIANS had endeavoured to give him, he ſent them two thouſand tomans in ſpecie [e], and as much in effects, promiſing to reſtore the remainder of what he had exacted from them, if he recovered his health. He did the ſame in regard to the DUTCH and the INDIANS. A ſenſe of the danger he was in, having excited ſome ſentiments of piety in his breaſt, he recommended himſelf alſo to the prayers of thoſe different nations. After ſome hours of eaſe, he relapſed into a more terrible condition: his body was covered with leproſy, his fleſh rotted, and ſeemed to fall from his bones.

Such

[c] Probably ſome paſſage relating to the miracles of our Saviour. Exorciſing without the uſe of the ſcriptures, it is pretended, is common in PORTUGAL. [d] The late king of PORTUGAL, at different times, cauſed the ſeveral bodies of the clergy in and about LISBON, to walk in proceſſion through his chamber; and a book was publiſhed, giving an account of the manner and ceremonies of each fraternity. Whether the king's life was protracted by any miraculous interpoſition, is a point about which the ROMISH clergy will be moſt ready to determine. [e] 5000 *l.*

1725. Such was the frightful condition of MAGHMUD, when news was brought that SHAH TÆHMAS had advanced at the head of a body of troops, and defeated a party of AFGHANS near KOOM, as they were marching towards CASBIN, under the command of their general SEIDAL. It was not merely the deſire of taking advantage of the preſent conjunctures, that drew the PERSIAN army ſo near to ISFAHAN. Since the beginning of MAGHMUD's illneſs, ASHREFF had been no longer watched with the ſame ſtrictneſs; ſo that he found means to enter into a correſpondence with TÆHMAS. As ſoon as he found that things were ripe for his purpoſe, he ſent him word that now was the time for him to aſcend the throne of his anceſtors; that he needed only to advance towards ISFAHAN, where every thing was in confuſion by the ſickneſs of MAGHMUD; that upon the firſt rumour of his approach, his friends would join him in a body; and that this ſtep would induce part of the rebels to return to their duty, and put it out of the power of the reſt to withſtand him.

ASHREFF had imparted this deſign to the PERSIAN lords, who had been ſpared at the time of the maſſacre, with a deſign to enſnare them, and it was by their intervention that this correſpondence was carried on. Accordingly they wrote to acquaint TÆHMAS, that the only condition ASHREFF inſiſted upon for himſelf and his party, was, that their lives, their liberty, and their effects ſhould be ſacred: thus the treaty met with no difficulty. TÆHMAS ſent him a deed[f], in which he engaged under the moſt ſacred oaths, to obſerve his word inviolably: after which, he advanced as far as KOOM, where meeting a body of AFGHANS commanded by SEIDAL, he put them to flight.

This new diſgrace greatly alarmed the rebels. So many defeats began to weaken that reputation of bravery and ſucceſs, in which their ſecurity chiefly conſiſted; it behoved them to ſtop the progreſs of a prince, who, taking advantage of the preſent conjunctures, threatened to drive them from ISFAHAN; but the confuſion occaſioned by MAGHMUD's illneſs, was an inſuperable obſtacle to the execution of any military projects. Theſe circum-

[f] This is called NACHLATHEMA, probably reſembling the anathema of the HEBREWS.

circumſtances renewed their former ideas of revolting; hence their whole 1725.
diſcourſe ſoon turned on the neceſſity of chuſing another maſter.

AMAN OLA, tho' conſidered as prime-miniſter and generaliſſimo of the ſultan, became the moſt active of all the conſpirators. He was hardly returned to ISFAHAN, when he perceived that he was ſtrictly watched; which affronted him ſo extremely, that when MAGHMUD returned from his expedition into COHKILAN, he obſtinately refuſed to go and meet him. That which confirmed his opinion of being an object of jealouſy, excited his revenge alſo. It was not long before this time, that he was inſulted to a great degree. He went out upon a common occaſion, with a numerous retinue, to perform his devotions at his brother's tomb: MAGHMUD, apprehenſive leſt und[illegible] pretexts he ſhould eſcape a ſecond time, ſent one of his offi[illegible]ders to pierce with his lance the horſe on which the general [illegible]

AMAN OLA was too proud to put up with ſuch an affront. As ſoon as he returned, he took the opportunity of killing ſeveral fine horſes belonging to MAGHMUD's ſtables; ſo that this prince was obliged to come himſelf in perſon to appeaſe him. At this interview, they ſeemed to be again reconciled.

The general however meditated the ſultan's deſtr[illegible]ion, and it was impoſſible for him to find a better opportunity. H[illegible]ermined the generality of the AFGHANS; ſo that the cou[illegible]ne army unanimouſly agreed on the neceſſity of chuſing a ne[illegible]gn. This choice, according to nearneſs of blood, ſhould hav[illegible] on HUSSEIN KHAN, brother of MAGHMUD, who was at that ti[illegible]KANDAHAR, and commanded in the name of the ſultan: b[illegible]airs were ſo critically circumſtanced, that they could not wait till his arrival from ſo diſtant a country, had the army been diſpoſed to it. ASHREFF was the moſt beloved, and was now choſen with an unanimous conſent.

* This ſeems to be a capricious action, yet ſuch as the genius of the people, and the temper of MAGHMUD renders credible.

1725. The moment this election was proclaimed, the troops ran to their arms, in order to take the new king out of cuſtody. The ABDOLLEES, who guarded him, diſputed the entrance for ſome time, but at length yielded.

ASHREFF, being at liberty, was proclaimed king of PERSIA by the AFGHANS on the 22d of APRIL. This prince, under the ſpecious pretence of revenging the death of his father MIR ABDALLAH, would not accept the enſigns of royalty, till they brought him the head of their late ſultan. The miſerable MAGHMUD, who had hardly many hours to live, ſuffered the execution of this ſentence, without knowing the additional misfortune into which he was fallen [n].

Thus periſhed, at the early [illegible]cy-ſeven years, this deſtroyer of one of the faireſt monarch[illegible]aving [illegible]e world a ſad monument of human miſery in the character of a prince and a conqueror. Nature had refuſed him thoſe external advantages, by which great men are ſometimes diſtinguiſhed. He was middle-ſized and clumſy; his neck was ſo ſhort, that his head ſeemed to grow to his ſhoulders; he had a broad face, a flat noſe, and his beard was thin, and of a red colour; his looks were wild, and his countenance auſtere and diſagreeable; his eyes, which were blue, and a little ſquinting, were generally down-caſt, like a m[illegible]ed in deep thought.

He had made [illegible] from his earlieſt youth, to ſupply by habit and cuſtom his natural [illegible]s for bodily exerciſes. In this he ſucceeded ſo well, that very fe[illegible]elled him either in horſemanſhip, or in the uſe of the lance. He ap[illegible]d himſelf to military exerciſes; and that he might not loſe his dexterity in wielding the ſabre, he often cauſed ſheep

[n] It is ſaid that ſuch a horrid frenzy had ſeized him, that he tore his own body with his teeth; that this rage continued upon him for ſeven days, and he was juſt ready to expire with the wounds which he had given himſelf, when they put an end to his life and his miſery. The Jeſuits and eccleſiaſtics, who have had the greateſt ſhare in collecting this account, might aggravate this part of the ſtory; but as Providence does, I believe, interpoſe ſometimes to puniſh ſuch murderers, we may ſuppoſe that he was marked out as an example of divine vengeance.

ſheep to be brought to him with their feet tied, and after they had been hung up, he cut off their heads at a blow [1]. 1725.

To theſe talents, which were common to the generality of his nation, he joined ſome virtues more worthy of a ſovereign. Tho' his ſoldiers in their diſcontent reproached him with an immoderate love of women, which ſeems to prove how far prejudices may tranſport men, he was very chaſte; and is reported to have had only one wife, to whom he was ever conſtant. He ſlept little; and in his campaigns ſuffered hardſhips with great indifference. He was ſo vigilant, as often to viſit the centinels in the night, not only in the field, but alſo in ISFAHAN. In labour he was indefatigable, in danger intrepid; and what is properly the characteriſtic of the man of honour more than of the conqueror, he was a ſtrict obſerver of his word towards thoſe for whom he ever profeſſed a friendſhip: he ſhewed a great regard for AMAN OLA upon that account, even when he was convinced that this general was contriving his ruin.

Theſe qualities procured him reſpect, but he was too much feared to be beloved. His ſoldiers accuſed him of a ſeverity in military diſcipline; they charged him alſo with avarice, and that he had deprived them of the booty for which they had bravely encountered the greateſt dangers: but above all they could not forgive his having ſaid in the firſt emotions of his reſentment after the defeat of YEZD, that he wiſhed they were as great beggars as when they firſt came into PERSIA, that they might fight as bravely as they did then. They could perhaps with more reaſon have reproached him with want of conduct, which was the chief cauſe of his miſcarrying. To this might be added his cruelty to his enemies; his want of fortitude under his diſgraces; and if ſucceſs had not in ſome meaſure juſtified his enterprize of conquering ISFAHAN, it would have appeared raſh and extravagant.

Such was the man, whom poſterity will hardly number among the eaſtern heroes, tho' the blood he ſpilt, and the miſchiefs he created, will give

[1] He is repreſented alſo ſo ſtrong, as to cut the body of a ſheep in two at a ſtroke; but theſe ſtories are generally exaggerated.

1725. give him a rank among the ravagers of the earth. He ſat only two years and a half on the throne of PERSIA: but this ſhort time was too long for his reputation as a conqueror, and he died very ſeaſonably for the intereſt of his nation. That inconſiderate temerity, which conſtituted the chief part of his character, was fit only for making conqueſts; to ſecure them, other qualifications were neceſſary, which he did not poſſeſs.

PART

PART VIII.

THE

REVOLUTIONS OF PERSIA,

FROM THE ACCESSION OF ASHREFF TO THE THRONE OF PERSIA IN 1725,

TILL THE PEACE CONCLUDED BETWEEN THIS PRINCE AND THE TURKS IN 1727.

CHAP. XXXII.

Character of ASHREFF: *his hypocriſy and artful behaviour to* SHAH HUSSEIN. *The princes of the blood, who had been murdered, buried at* KOOM. ASHREFF *puniſhes the conſpirators who placed him on the throne. His behaviour towards the mother of* MAGHMUD. *His cruelty to his own brother. He endeavours to render himſelf popular, by the mildneſs of his adminiſtration in general.*

THE qualifications wanting in MAGHMUD, were for the moſt part united in the perſon of ASHREFF, who was juſtly conſidered as the propereſt perſon to poſſeſs the throne. He was naturally ſober, courageous, active, and vigilant. He had been inured to hardſhips from his earlieſt life; and having acquired the accompliſhments of a ſtateſman, he had learnt at the ſame time the art of diſſimulation, and affected being moderate and upright: among the eaſtern war- 1725.

1725. riors he alſo paſſed for a conſummate general. Upon the whole it may be ſaid, that in ASHREFF were joined the valour and military virtues of MIR MAGHMUD, to the moderation and cunning of MIR VAIS.

The reſiſtance which the partiſans of ASHREFF met with at the royal palace, ſerved as a pretext for this new ſultan to remove ſome of his enemies. The very ſame day he cauſed the guards of the late ſultan to be put to the ſword; and the miniſters and intimate confidents of that prince underwent the ſame fate.

The KOULAR AGASSI [k], named ALMAS, was too much attached to MAGHMUD's intereſt to expect he ſhould be excepted out of the number of the proſcribed; therefore he endeavoured to ſave himſelf by flight. He was overtaken, and brought back to ISFAHAN, where they put him to the rack, in hopes of obliging him to diſcover the treaſures which he was ſuppoſed to have concealed. The unfortunate ALMAS bore theſe torments with great conſtancy; but as ſoon as the executioners left him, he ſlew his wife, and then ſtabbed himſelf, to avoid the repetition of ſuch unworthy and cruel treatment.

Of all the officers whom MAGHMUD favoured with his confidence, none had done ſo much honour to his choice as ALMAS. He never uſed the aſcendant which he had over his maſter, to any other purpoſe, than to ſoften the ferocity of his natural diſpoſition, and divert him from barbarous reſolutions. He had a ſoul generous, compaſſionate, and liberal, of which he gave repeated inſtances. Far from endeavouring to accumulate riches, he even refuſed to accept of preſents, tho' this method of acquiring wealth is authorized by the practice of ASIA. The EUROPEANS conſidered him as their protector, and joined the AFGHANS and the PERSIANS in bewailing his death. Even ASHREFF himſelf was moved at it, or affected to appear ſo, in order to avoid the cenſure, which the fate of a man ſo generally eſteemed muſt have thrown upon him in the beginning of his reign.

The firſt impreſſions in disfavour of ASHREFF, were in ſome meaſure effaced by his ſubſequent conduct. He had hardly received the enſigns of royalty,

[k] Chief of the ſlaves.

royalty, when he waited on SHAH HUSSEIN, and expatiating on the ill 1725
conſequences of MAGHMUD's ambition, preſſed him to re-aſcend the throne, which none but himſelf could lawfully fill. This monarch, naturally of a timid diſpoſition, was rendered more circumſpect by his preſent ſituation, and quickly ſaw into the artifice of this new TIBERIUS. He therefore made anſwer, "That he had too deep a reſpect "for the decrees of Providence, which had obliged him to abdicate the "ſupreme power, to accept of ſuch offers, though ſuggeſted by an un-"exampled generoſity; that ſince he had deſcended from the throne of "his anceſtors, heaven had opened his eyes in regard to the vanity of "human grandeur; and therefore he now preferred the ſweets of an "obſcure retreat, to the ſplendor of his former condition, in which he "had always experienced an alloy of bitterneſs and ſorrow." He took this occaſion however to complain of the little regard which MAGHMUD ſhewed to his perſonal wants, and of the great cruelty exerciſed towards his family; then begging the new ſultan to be kinder to him, he invited him, after the example of his predeceſſor, to marry one of the princeſſes his daughters.

SHAH HUSSEIN having thus ſollicited his enemy to poſſeſs his throne, without heſitation granted him a formal act of abdication. ASHREFF then took the title of king, and to convince SHAH HUSSEIN of the regard he paid to his repreſentations, he allowed him fifty tomans[m] a week for his houſhold; whereas, in the former reign, no more had been paid monthly. He likewiſe gave him the direction of the buildings, which were carrying on within the incloſure of the palace; and after repudiating his wife, he married one of the princeſſes his daughters, whom MAGHMUD had left in the harram, together with other females of the royal blood.

To render the memory of his predeceſſor odious, as well as to alleviate the affliction of the unfortunate HUSSEIN, ASHREFF cauſed the dead bodies of the princes, who were ſtill left above ground in the court where they had

[m] 125 *l.*

1725. had been maſſacred, to be put into coffins, and conveyed at his own expence[n], with a funeral pomp to KOOM, the antient burying place of the PERSIAN kings. With this melancholy caravan, he ſent ſome rich carpets to decorate the mauſoleums, and a thouſand tomans to be diſtributed among the derviſes, and poor of the place. The caravan was received at the gates of the palace by great numbers of people, who attended the proceſſion, with all the tokens of the deepeſt ſorrow, to the further end of the ſuburbs: after which, it was conveyed under an eſcort of AFGHANS to KOOM, where the ſcene of lamentation was again renewed.

The officer who commanded at KOOM, depoſited the bodies in the moſque, and ſhewed a great regard to the AFGHAN officer who had attended the convoy; but in compliance with the PERSIAN cuſtom of abuſing the meſſengers of bad news, a GEORGIAN of the company was very ill treated[o].

ASHREFF had not been eight days upon the throne, when he ſhewed by a bold ſtroke of politics, that he looked upon his authority as perfectly eſtabliſhed. He ordered thoſe who were concerned in the conſpiracy which placed him on the throne, to be arreſted; and affecting the appearance of juſtice in preference to gratitude, he confiſcated all their eſtates, put ſome of them to death, and impriſoned the reſt.

Under the colour of juſtice, this prince thus endeavoured to eſtabliſh his own ſecurity; but he had alſo a further aim. By this blow, he removed ſeveral of the principal officers, whoſe turbulent and enterprizing ſpirit rendered them objects of jealouſy; he likewiſe filled his coffers with the riches which the conſpirators had acquired ſince the taking of ISFAHAN.

The proud AMAN OLA, who had pretended to ſhare the throne with MAGHMUD, was among the number of thoſe who periſhed; the conſideration of his daring intrepidity, as well as of his riches, haſtened his fate. He had been generaliſſimo and prime miniſter of the uſurper, and theſe employments

[n] They were carried on camels. [o] Some accounts ſay his eyes were cut out, which ſeems to be ſo unjuſt and barbarous an action, as hardly to be credible, ſince this perſon was in no degree faulty.

2

employments afforded him an opportunity of glutting his avarice; ſo that his treaſures were hardly inferior to thoſe of the crown. This will not appear improbable, if it be conſidered that the very preſents which he received at his entering upon the miniſtry, amounted to nine thouſand tomans [p], and that he obtained the confiſcated eſtates of moſt of the PERSIAN lords who had been maſſacred under the laſt reign. 1725.

An INDIAN of CABUL, formerly governor of the late ſultan, and afterwards raiſed to the dignity of high prieſt [q], was, next to AMAN OLA, the richeſt man at court. By his prudence, and the ſtrength of his genius, he paſſed for a ſecond ZOROASTER among the credulous vulgar, who attributed the greateſt part of the ſucceſs of the war to his ſorcery. The reſpect which MAGHMUD paid him, increaſed his credit; for this prince uſed to do nothing without his advice, continuing to behave towards him in the ſame reſpectful manner as when he was under his tutition: he always advanced half way to meet him, with his arms croſſed on his breaſt; he then kiſſed his hands, and never attempted to take his place till this INDIAN was firſt ſeated.

From theſe circumſtances, there was no room to believe that the MIANGI was concerned in the conſpiracy; he was not indeed ſuſpected of any ſuch deſign; but his great poſſeſſions, ſo much out of character for a prieſt, rendered him guilty. ASHREFF however went no farther than the confiſcating of his eſtate; he even promiſed to ſend him back by the firſt opportunity to KANDAHAR, with as much money as he ſhould have occaſion for, to ſpend the remainder of his days in eaſe and quiet.

The reputation which ZEBERDEST KHAN had acquired by the ſiege of SHIRASS, and his prudent conduct in the government of that city, which had been conferred on him by MAGHMUD, exempted him alſo in ſome degree from the fate of the reſt. His perſon however was ſeized, and his goods confiſcated: but the ſultan being ſenſible of his moderation and military abilities, ſent him ſoon after to his government, with a liberty of taking twenty thouſand tomans [r] out of his own confiſcated eſtate.

[p] 22,500 *l.* [q] The perſon whom the TURKS call MUFTI, and the PERSIANS MULLAH BASHI, the AFGHANS nominate MIANGI. [r] 30,000 *l.*

1725. This general was the only one that had his liberty reſtored to him; and of all the perſons of note either in the army or at court, none but SEIDAL, the ſame whom SHAH TÆHMAS had lately routed, and MAHOMMED NISCHAN, grand maſter of the ceremonies, remained unmoleſted, either in their perſons or effects. The latter had been always upon terms of friendſhip with ASHREFF, and was the chief perſon who ſollicited his return from KANDAHAR.

MAGHMUD's mother had ſtooped to marry a ſimple officer of the guards, and could not be prevailed upon to quit her own country, till her nephew ASHREFF was upon the point of ſetting out for ISFAHAN. The deſire of ſeeing her ſon in all the ſplendour of his regal power, then determined her to undertake the journey. The PERSIANS, ſo much accuſtomed to pomp and ſhew, were greatly ſurprized to ſee the widow of the famous MIR VAIS, and the mother of their ſovereign, mounted on one of the camels of the caravan, and entering the capital of a kingdom, ſubject to her ſon, without attendants.

The entreaties which this lady had uſed, to prevail on ASHREFF to return to ISFAHAN, were not the only marks of her affection towards him, it was chiefly at her ſollicitation that MAGHMUD ſpared his life. Gratitude for benefits received, ſeldom makes ſuch deep impreſſions, as to prevent our reſentments, when thoſe benefits ceaſe. On the contrary, among men of baſe minds, it adds a poignancy to real or imaginary injuries. No ſooner was ASHREFF ſeated on the throne, than he cauſed this lady to be confined a whole night in the palace-yard, where the dead bodies of the princes, maſſacred by her ſon, ſtill lay above-ground. It was preſumed this puniſhment was inflicted for her having refuſed to ſollicit his releaſement. He did not however intend to carry his reſentment farther: for after this wanton penance, he treated her with kindneſs, and in a manner ſuitable to her rank, promiſing to ſend her with a conſiderable treaſure to KANDAHAR.

The ſeverity, which ASHREFF ſhewed to his younger brother, was much greater. This prince, being apprehenſive that according to the

cuſtom of PERSIA he ſhould be confined in the ſeraglio, tried to make his eſcape to KANDAHAR. Being taken, he was deprived of his ſight, and then ſhut up in the very place to which he had ſhewn ſo great an averſion. A ſon of MAGHMUD, yet in his cradle, was treated in the ſame manner; and as the mother, who was then pregnant, ſurvived the ſultan her huſband only eight days, it was preſumed that this princeſs was poiſoned by the orders of the new king. 1725.

Such a ſeries of cruelty, did not alienate the minds of the people. They looked upon the misfortune of thoſe princes, with the maſſacre of the guards, miniſters, and favourites of MAGHMUD, as an act of prudence, authorized by cuſtom. The juſtice which appeared in puniſhing the conſpirators, made this conduct paſs for an act of generoſity. Thus the new ſultan ſecured his power, and took poſſeſſion of almoſt all the riches that had been amaſſed in the pillaging of ISFAHAN, without forfeiting his reputation for moderation and equity.

ASHREFF was indeed ambitious of the affection, not only of his own nation, but likewiſe of the PERSIANS. For this purpoſe, immediately upon his acceſſion to the throne, he diſtributed money among his ſoldiers; and eſtabliſhed ſo exact a diſcipline, that the ſhops were all kept open by his orders, from the very evening of MAGHMUD's death.

He impoſed no new tax, neither on the natives nor foreigners, but contented himſelf with cauſing the ſums which MAGHMUD had reſtored during his illneſs, to be brought back to the exchequer; pretending, that as this prince was then delirious, he was incapable of making any ſuch donations.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIII.

ASHREFF endeavours to obtain the acknowledgment of his ſovereignty in KANDAHAR. *He forms a deſign of ſeizing the perſon of* SHAH TÆHMAS[s]; *who makes his eſcape into* MAZANDERAN. ASHREFF *takes* KOOM. *He maſſacres the* PERSIAN *lords, who had diſcloſed his deſigns upon* TÆHMAS.

1725. ASHREFF having thus ſettled affairs in the capital, began to eſtabliſh his authority in the more diſtant parts of the empire. His firſt care was to obtain an acknowledgment of his ſovereignty in the kingdom of KANDAHAR. With this view, he privately ſent ſeveral officers with orders to join all his party in the country, in order to excite ſome diſturbance, by means of which they might ſeize or deſtroy HUSSEIN KHAN, the brother of the late uſurper MAGHMUD. What ſteps thoſe emiſſaries took on this occaſion are not known; but it is certain that the attempt proved abortive.

Nor did he ſucceed better in a ſcheme of greater importance. He had hardly paſſed from the priſon to the throne, when this ſudden change of fortune induced him to avail himſelf of the correſpondence into which he had entered with SHAH TÆHMAS, to make a vigorous effort to ſeize the perſon of his competitor. For this end, as he could not impoſe on the father by an offer of the diadem, he ſent a magnificent embaſſy to the ſon, making almoſt the ſame propoſals. The deputies had orders to explain to him what had paſſed relating to this ſubject; to perſuade him that their maſter perſiſted in theſe ſentiments; and that he deſired a place might be appointed for an interview, to regulate their reſpective intereſts, ſo that they might jointly engage in ſuch meaſures as were moſt ſuitable to re-eſtabliſh peace and good order in the empire. Theſe deputies were charged with a preſent for TÆHMAS, of ten beautiful horſes richly capariſoned, like thoſe which the kings of PERSIA uſually ride.

At

[s] TÆHMAS is called SHAH and prince indifferently; he had taken the name of SHAH, tho' his regal authority can hardly be ſaid to have been eſtabliſhed.

At the ſame time, the artful ASHREFF diſpatched circular letters to every place, which acknowledged the authority of TÆHMAS, to notify his pacific meaſures to the commanding officers, and to aſſure them that the AFGHANS would commit no act of hoſtility before this interview. 1725.

While the embaſſadors were upon the road, TÆHMAS not knowing of the death of MAGHMUD, was advanced as far as CASHAN. Here he met with SEIDAL, who flattering himſelf with the hopes of revenge, had marched with a more numerous body of forces than he had with him at his former defeat. Theſe two armies attacked each other with great vigour; but fortune having declared a ſecond time againſt the AFGHANS, they were compelled to give way, and at length were totally routed.

ASHREFF however determined to purſue his political ſchemes. The PERSIAN lords, of whom we have made mention, ventured to write jointly to TÆHMAS, informing him of the death of the uſurper, and of what had paſſed ſince that time at ISFAHAN. And as they were apprehenſive, that the real motive of the propoſed interview was to draw this prince into a ſnare, they recommended to him to be upon his guard.

Unluckily for TÆHMAS, the bearer of this letter was ſtopped by ſome of the AFGHANS that were retreating after the engagement, and carried before SEIDAL; this general ſecured him, and upon his arrival at ISFAHAN, delivered him into the hands of ASHREFF, together with the letters he had found upon him.

In the mean while, the embaſſador ſent by ASHREFF returned with an anſwer, that TÆHMAS, who had retired towards CASBIN, had choſen the plains of VARAMI [t] for the interview. ASHREFF having received this intelligence, ſet out immediately with a body of 12000 men; and arrived firſt at the place of aſſignation.

TÆHMAS was advancing, on the firſt of AUGUST, without any miſtruſt, with no more than 3000 men; when he received advice, that ASHREFF was followed by a much greater number of troops than they had mutually

[t] This place is between KOOM and TÆHIRAN.

1725. tually agreed to take for their eſcort. This intelligence having opened TÆHMAS's eyes, he conſidered what meaſures to purſue. He had no reaſon to doubt of the ſuperior number of the AFGHANS; but the deſire of being revenged of their perfidy, and the confidence he had acquired by his late victories, almoſt tempted him to try the fortune of a battle.

The troops he had with him, were of two different ſorts, PERSIANS* and KHAJARS. The latter, who were the moſt numerous, inſiſted, that in conſideration of the ſervices which they had already rendered, and ſtill were diſpoſed to render, the prince would promiſe, that in caſe of ſucceſs, the ATHEMAT DOULET ſhould be always choſen from their body. The KEZELBACHS oppoſed ſuch an innovation. This diſpute, which ſeemed to be very ill timed, divided this little army into two oppoſite factions. TÆHMAS perceived that his authority was too feeble to quaſh the diſturbance, and therefore reſolved to retreat. But curioſity ſeeming to prevail over fear, he kept only a thouſand men with him, and ordered one of his general officers to march with the other two thouſand, to reconnoitre the rebels. AMUR ASLAN KHAN*, his general, had ſoon demonſtrative proofs of what he was ſent to diſcover. The AFGHANS having already paſſed the limits agreed upon, were in full march; and the number and diſpoſition of their troops plainly ſhewed that their deſign was to ſurround the SHAH. The KHAN perceiving their intention, diſpatched ſome horſemen to acquaint this prince, that nothing but a ſpeedy flight could ſave him from the treachery of the enemy.

This advice arrived at the very interval that ASHREFF, having been informed by his ſpies of the place where this prince then was, had detached a body of two thouſand five hundred men, with orders to make a long winding, and cut off the prince's retreat. TÆHMAS perceiving the danger into which his credulity had engaged him, abandoned his troops, and fled to TÆHIRAN, attended only by two hundred men.

AMUR ASLAN KHAN, who was ſoon hemmed in by the AFGHANS, put himſelf in a poſture of defence. The engagement was obſtinate: this brave

* KEZELBACHS.

* The man by whoſe orders the BRITISH factory was pillaged in RESHD in 1748.

brave general twice repulſed his enemies, but at length gave way to num- 1725.
bers; he was in the utmoſt danger of being cruſhed, when the approach of night preſerved him, and as many of his ſoldiers as could ſave themſelves by flight, and the favour of the neighbouring mountains. In a few days he arrived at TÆHIRAN.

TÆHMAS, who had retired thither, being apprehenſive leſt the enemy ſhould follow him, continued his march with great expedition towards MAZANDERAN. The ruggedneſs of the mountains, which ſurround this province, has often rendered it the azylum of the PERSIAN kings: here this prince took ſhelter, followed by his general AMUR ASLAN KHAN, and thoſe whoſe horſes could bear the fatigue of ſo precipitate a march.

The prudence of this conduct was ſoon proved by the event. ASHREFF, being perſuaded that TÆHMAS was ſtill at TÆHIRAN, reſolved to ſurprize him before he could have time to remove from thence. With this intent, he compelled the peaſants to ſerve him as guides, and ſoon appeared with his army before the walls of the town. Upon diſcovering that TÆHMAS was fled, he ordered his troops to attack the place; but the beſieged behaved ſo well, that he was obliged to abandon his enterprize.

Being greatly irritated at his diſappointment, and the laborious march he had made in vain, he directed his courſe ſouthward towards SAVA, which ſurrendered by capitulation. He afterwards marched to KOOM, a city of great importance, and before which he muſt in all probability have miſcarried, had the inhabitants been prepared for his reception; but the want of proviſions obliged them to capitulate, after a ſiege of eight days. The ſultan, more politic than his predeceſſor, obſerved the conditions of his treaties very ſtrictly. By the reduction of KOOM, he became maſter of twenty pieces of cannon, and three elephants. He alſo found ſome treaſure belonging to TÆHMAS, together with the wife, and part of the court of this prince. However, his fortune here did not compenſate for the failure of his plot; and he returned to ISFAHAN greatly vexed at his diſappointment, and uneaſy at the accounts he now received of the new enterprizes of the OTTOMAN court.

1725. The apprehenſion of being charged with cruelty, which had rendered the memory of his predeceſſor ſo odious, was the only motive which had induced the ſultan to ſpare the lives of the authors of the letter already mentioned; and though this had been intercepted, it was preſumed that others of the ſame nature might have raiſed a ſuſpicion of his deſigns. Now he was returned, he thought it eſſential to his preſervation to exterminate this remnant of the nobility; eſpecially, as he would be ever ſubject to their treaſonable correſpondency. Accordingly he aſſembled them at his country-palace of FERHABAD, under pretence of a hunting match; and having convicted them of holding a correſpondence with his enemies, he condemned them to be beheaded; which ſentence was executed upon the ſpot.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Death of PETER *the* GREAT. *Deplorable ſtate of the* PERSIAN *monarchy. The* TURKS *take* TAVRIS *and* GANJA. ACHMED BASHA *marches an army, and takes poſſeſſion of* LORISTAN. *Diviſion among the* BACTIARIS. *The* VALI *of* LORISTAN *makes an incurſion into the territory of* BAGDAT.

THE conqueſts which the TURKS had made the preceding year, and the indolence into which the RUSSIANS ſeemed to have fallen, with reſpect to PERSIA, gave the port a ſuperiority, at which theſe new allies began to take umbrage. The inconveniencies which the TURKS apprehended in waging war againſt the AFGHANS, of the ſect of SUNNI, and the very name of the emperor of RUSSIA, kept the TURKS in the reſolution of adhering to their engagements, when they received advice of the death of that monarch. General ROMANZOFF [x], envoy extraordinary of RUSSIA for the ratification of the treaty, and commiſſary for regulating the limits in PERSIA, was ſenſible of the difficulties which this accident would create in the execution of his commiſſion. However, he kept his own

[x] I am not ſure that he was at this time a general, tho' he was ſo afterwards.

own counſel, and endeavoured to perſuade the TURKS, that the empreſs 1725.
CATHARINE had adopted ſuch meaſures, as would prevent the death of his much lamented maſter from making any alteration in the ſyſtem of affairs in the RUSSIAN empire.

The grand vizir pretended to be convinced of the truth of what he ſaid; and declared, that the intention of the grand ſignior was to conform exactly to the engagements, which he had entered into with the deceaſed monarch; and therefore, he would immediately diſpatch the commiſſaries, who were to regulate the limits upon the ſpot.

This miniſter, nevertheleſs, under the pretence of putting the port in poſſeſſion of the provinces, which were fallen to her ſhare by the partition treaty, had no other view than to extend the frontiers of the OTTOMAN empire. For this purpoſe, he made extraordinary preparations, that the armies which were to act this year againſt PERSIA, might be in a condition of making new conqueſts.

This diſtreſſed monarchy was thus a prey to ſeveral different enemies at one and the ſame time. The port had ſtripped her of GEORGIA, almoſt of all ARMENIA, and part of ADERBEITZAN. The CZAR had made himſelf maſter of the weſtern coaſt of the CASPIAN, except SHAMAKIE, which was in the hands of the LESGEES. KHORASAN, KHERMAN, KANDAHAR, and the governments of ISFAHAN and SHIRASS, were in the power of the AFGHANS or their aſſociates. The authority of SHAH TÆHMAS was acknowledged only in MAZANDERAN, ASTRABAD, and ſome few places of IRAC AGEMI. The reſt of the provinces which had not openly revolted, either deſpiſed the orders of this prince, or formed independent armies, which attacked indiſcriminately the RUSSIANS, the TURKS, and the AFGHANS.

Theſe troubles ſoon reached ſome of the provinces lately conquered by the TURKS. The ſovereign [y] of the LESGEES, who had put himſelf under the protection of the port, ſhook off this new yoke, and attacked HADGEE DAOUD, who held SHAMAKIE under the OTTOMAN dominion.

[y] OUSMAI.

1725. nion. The province of SHIRVAN was thus divided between theſe two parties, and the SHEMKALL, who had ſubmitted to the authority of the RUSSIAN emperor, pillaged at large.

Whilſt the LESGEES gave proof of their inconſtancy, the Janiſſaries of the garriſon of ERIVAN, mutinied againſt ARIFI ACHMED. In conſequence of this revolt, they plundered his palace, and the grand ſignior's cheſt. This general was wounded in the fray, and ſaved himſelf by flight.

This inſurrection was not however attended with thoſe conſequences, which might naturally be apprehended. The troops ſoon repented of the violences they had committed, and returned to their duty. They recalled their general; they ſacrificed the authors of the diſorder; and brought him home in triumph. The port, however, always diſpoſed to ſhew a particular regard to the Janiſſaries, appointed ARIFI ACHMED governor of ERIVAN; but gave the command of the army to SAVE MUSTAFA, BASHA of ERZEROUM.

The campaign was opened in MAY, and ABDERRAHMAM BEG, ſon of ABDALLAH KOUPROLI, BASHA of VAN, gained ſome advantages over the PERSIANS, on the ſide of TAVRIS. After which, he made himſelf maſter of the city of MARAND, and of the fortreſs of ZONOUS, without any reſiſtance.

About this time, LATIF KHAN, a nephew of SHAH HUSSEIN, upon the credit of his aſtrologers, appeared before HAMADAN with ſome troops, and according to their prediction he entered the town, but in a different manner from what he expected; for he was carried off by a detachment belonging to the garriſon, and led into the city as a priſoner of war.

Theſe advantages were followed by conqueſts of greater importance. The port, not having yet ſucceeded againſt TAVRIS, determined to ſend a ſufficient number of troops to reduce that place, where the number of the inhabitants fit to bear arms was very large, and who, from a generous reſolution of defending themſelves to the laſt extremity, had ſent

their families and moſt valuable effects into the mountains of GHILAN. 1725.
The command of the army deſigned againſt this city was given to ABDALLAH KOUPROLI, BASHA of VAN: eleven thouſand TARTARS, who paſſed over into ASIA, by the way of CONSTANTINOPLE, were ordered to join him; and alſo the BEGLERBEG of NATOLIA, with the troops of his government. This general having collected a body of ſeventy thouſand men, did not think it neceſſary to wait for theſe reinforcements; but put himſelf at the head of his army, and appeared before this great city the thirtieth of JULY.

The PERSIAN general did not wait within ruinous walls, but took the field as ſoon as the TURKS appeared in ſight. His army conſiſted chiefly of the inhabitants, who underſtood the uſe of arms, but had not been accuſtomed to military diſcipline; however, they determined to force their enemies to an engagement, before they had time to entrench themſelves.

The BASHA ſaw into their deſign: as ſoon as he perceived that the number of thoſe who had marched out of the town amounted to twenty or thirty thouſand men, he fell upon them with the fury of an enraged enemy, in reſentment of what had paſſed the preceding year. The PERSIANS ſtood their ground; and freſh ſuccours continually pouring in, they fought on both ſides with equal bravery till night, when the PERSIANS, being routed on every ſide, flung themſelves in the utmoſt confuſion into the town.

The TURKS were ſo eager in the purſuit, that they entered pell-mell with them, where the fight was renewed again with incredible obſtinacy. The inhabitants had thrown up intrenchments in the nine different quarters, of which this great city is compoſed, and defended themſelves with the ſame bravery and reſolution, which they had hitherto diſplayed on all occaſions *. The TURKS were four days and nights before they made themſelves maſters of ſeven of thoſe entrenchments, notwithſtanding they made repeated aſſaults: at length, on the third of AUGUST, about twenty thouſand

* The taking of TAVRIS, as related by the TURKS, ſeems to be exaggerated with regard to the number and bravery of the PERSIANS, as if they meant by this circumſtance to render the conqueſt the more diſtinguiſhed.

1725. thouſand men, who had retired to the two laſt entrenchments, finding themſelves unable to hold out any longer, offered to capitulate; in conſequence of which, they were permitted to retire to ARDEVILLE, with what effects they could carry along with them.

Few ſieges have been ſo bloody as this. The PERSIANS loſt near thirty thouſand men, and the TURKS about twenty thouſand; among whom were OSMAN BASHA of OURFA, who commanded the right wing of the army, the BASHA of CARAMANIA, and many other officers of diſtinction.

The news of ſo important a conqueſt, was an agreeable ſurprize to the grand ſignior; and the more, as it was hardly believed that ABDALLAH KOUPROLI had as yet undertaken the ſiege. Soon after, the fortreſs of LORE ſurrendered to SAVI MUSTAFA. The BASHA of BAGDAT made himſelf maſter of ſeveral ſmall towns[a], ſituated within a few days journey of HAMADAN, in the road to the capital.

Nothing more was wanting to complete the proſperity of the OTTOMAN court, than to be revenged of the affront which one of her generals had received before the walls of GANJA in 1723. SAVI MUSTAFA, who had conquered LORE, was charged with this new expedition. Towards the end of AUGUST, he beſieged the place with an army of forty thouſand men, and after two days reſiſtance, the commanding officer ſurrendered by capitulation.

SAVI MUSTAFA then marched into SHIRVAN, in hopes to ſubdue the LESGEES; but he did not ſucceed in this expedition: for the weather ſetting in very ſharp, his ſoldiers deſerted in ſuch numbers, that he was obliged to retire. To make amends for this diſappointment, AHR ſubmitted voluntarily to ABDALLAH BASHA, who confirmed the governor in his office.

Whilſt this general and SAVI MUSTAFA were carrying on their conqueſts in the northern provinces, a third army was ordered by the port to

[a] Theſe are called ASSITAN, GEANGERE, FIROUZABAD, places which I do not find in any map, ſo imperfect are theſe with reſpect to PERSIA.

to force their way to ISFAHAN. This was commanded by ACHMED, now BASHA of BAGDAT, who availing himſelf of the preſent circumſtances, had entered LORISTAN, and was advancing towards HOROMABAD, capital [b] of the country. 1725.

ALI MERDAN KHAN, VALI of this province, was in no condition to make head againſt the enemy, for all his troops did not exceed fifteen thouſand men: he therefore retired into CHUSISTAN. His example was followed by the inhabitants of HOROMABAD, inſomuch that when ACHMED appeared before this town, he found it intirely abandoned. He entered without reſiſtance, and with the ſame facility ſubdued the reſt of the province.

In the mean while [c], the BASHA of MOSUL made incurſions into the country of the BACTIARIS, with a body of troops ſubject to the orders of ACHMED. Theſe people are divided into two tribes, one called CHAHAR LING, and the other EFH LING; they pretend, that under CONSTANTINE the GREAT they embraced the chriſtian religion, which they have ſince renounced. They live all the year in tents. It is ſaid, that the BACTIARIS joined to the LORIANS, would have been able to raiſe the ſiege of ISFAHAN, in the late revolution by the AFGHANS, if the antipathy which reigns between theſe two neighbouring people, had not prevented their acting in concert upon that important occaſion: this ſpirit of diſſenſion brought on the diſgrace of both nations. We have ſeen how the VALI of LORISTAN abandoned his country upon the approach of the TURKS. SEFFIE, KHAN of the BACTIARIS, took a leſs prudent ſtep, tho' in appearance more generous: he marched with all the troops he could collect to meet the enemy; the fortune of the day was for a long while dubious;

[b] DE L'ISLE calls the capital by the ſame name as the province, viz. LORISTAN. [c] AHOUAS ſeems to be the proper name of the capital of this country, if it is neighbouring to LORISTAN; tho' in page 112. HONSAR near ISFAHAN is repreſented as the capital. BACTIARIA is a country, which does not appear in maps under that name. It is ſometimes confounded with the antient BACTRIA, a country quite remote, bordering on INDEPENDANT TARTARY, on the eaſtern ſide of the CASPIAN SEA. DE L'ISLE has a BACTRIANI to the north of GEORGIA. We ſeem to be left pretty much in the dark with reſpect to the countries bordering on ARABIA; but this in queſtion may probably be meant of that country, of which AHOUAS is the capital, according to DE L'ISLE.

7

1725. dubious; but the PERSIANS at length gave way to numbers, and ſaved themſelves by flight.

After this victory, the BASHA of MOSUL advanced within four and twenty leagues of ISFAHAN; and would doubtleſs have approached nearer, if he had not met with the advanced poſts of the AFGHANS on the road, againſt whom, as there was no declaration of war, he did not preſume to commit any act of hoſtility. The BACTIARIS, who were retired with their flocks into the mountains, ſought for an opportunity to revenge their defeat; and harraſſed the TURKS by frequent and ſudden attacks. The BASHA, unaccuſtomed to this method of fighting, was more diſpoſed to retreat than purſue his victory, when he was informed that the VALI of LORISTAN, tho' unable to ſtand againſt the TURKISH army, carried the war into their country, by which means he ſoon obliged them to abandon this province. The KHANS of AHOUAS and SUSTER, convinced of the facility of plundering a country, which by the BASHA's excurſions was left defenceleſs, joined him, and formed an army of near 20,000 men. They entered the territories of BAGDAT, and ſpread terror and deſolation over all the country, as far as the capital. The two daughters of the VALI, who fought by his ſide at the battle of GULNABAD, were induced by their filial duty and military genius to attend their father in this expedition; as they had alſo done in a late incurſion towards BASSORA, from whence their father returned loaded with a conſiderable booty.

The prudent conduct of the VALI produced the effect which he expected. As ſoon as ACHMED PASHA heard that the enemy were ravaging his government, he ſent orders to the BASHA of MOSUL to re-join his army, and left the VALI at liberty to return home by another rout. The TURKS loſt a great number of men in this expedition: all the advantage they reaped from it, was the empty glory of having marched within three days journey of ISFAHAN.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXV.

The RUSSIANS *uneaſy at the conqueſts made by the* TURKS. *Succeſs of the* RUSSIAN *arms in* PERSIA. *The* TURKS *evade ſettling the limits of their conqueſts with the* RUSSIAN *reſident.* ASHREFF *ſends an embaſſador to the port. Character of this miniſter. He is admitted to an audience of the grand vizir. His conferences with the* TURKISH *miniſters.*

THE rapidity of theſe conqueſts gave great uneaſineſs to the RUSSIAN miniſters. Since the taking of TAVRIS, the grand ſignior affected leſs condeſcenſion towards that court; and now the important ſucceſſes of the laſt campaign, together with the ſlow progreſs of theſe new allies, greatly diminiſhed the regard which had been ſhewn them before the death of the RUSSIAN emperor. 1725.

The inaction of the RUSSIANS in PERSIA, was owing to the circumſtances of the court of ST. PETERSBURG. There was ſome reaſon to fear, that the throne was not ſo ſecurely eſtabliſhed, as to venture upon the purſuit of conqueſts in ASIA, by which nothing could be gained; and which, it is probable, were never meant on any other account than to check the TURKS. And as for the SWEDES and other neighbouring powers, being no longer reſtrained by the reputation which the CZAR had acquired, they might be the more diſpoſed to ſeize the firſt favourable opportunity to renew or form pretenſions; for which ſovereigns are never without reaſons.

The RUSSIANS, however, during this time had obtained ſome advantages in PERSIA. MATUSKIN, one of their lieutenant-generals, having been informed, that the former vizir of RESHD had built a fort on the confines of GHILAN towards MAZANDERAN, with a deſign of moleſting his foragers; he ſent a body of troops thither in the month of JUNE, and drove the enemy into MAZANDERAN.

The vizir afterwards aſſembled his forces, and marched in order to fight the enemy; but the RUSSIAN infantry ſoon put them to flight. The

1725. demolition of the fort, and the taking of LAHIJAN [e], were the fruits of this victory. The SHAMKALL of TARKOU, having ſubmitted with reluctancy to the yoke impoſed on him by the CZAR, engaged ſome of the neighbouring princes in his quarrel: he took the field at the head of an army, but ſoon had reaſon to repent this ſtep; for a body of RUSSIANS attacked him the twenty-ſixth of SEPTEMBER, defeated, and drove him into the mountains. TARKOU, and ſeveral villages belonging to its dependancy, were pillaged and burnt; and his allies loſt on this occaſion one of their princes, with four of their chiefs.

But theſe advantages could enter into no compariſon with the conqueſts made by the TURKS, who being now become maſters of the ſeveral provinces adjudged to them by the partition treaty, reproached the RUSSIANS for keeping on the defenſive, when, according to the treaty, they ought to have acted with vigour, in order to drive the AFGHANS out of PERSIA.

ROMANZOFF, the RUSSIAN miniſter at the port, was too expert a politician not to foreſee the uneaſineſs he ſhould be expoſed to: he therefore ſollicited to go and ſettle upon the ſpot the reſpective limits. At length he had a conference upon this ſubject, when the REYS EFFENDI repreſented, that the ſeaſon was too far advanced; and moreover, that as the principal articles of the partition treaty were to be performed in SHIRVAN, it would be requiſite to give time to SAVI MUSTAFA to ſubdue the people of that province, who had lately blockaded SHAMAKIE. Thus the general ROMANZOFF had the mortification to ſee his journey poſtponed till the next year.

The port, not chuſing to carry things to extremity, affected a condeſcenſion towards the RUSSIANS. The inhabitants of ARDEVILLE had ſent deputies to ABDALLAH BASHA, ſolliciting the protection of the grand ſignior. The TURKISH general knowing that this city was beyond the limits preſcribed by the treaty, would not ſend any troops thither without orders. The grand vizir communicated this affair to the envoy and reſident of RUSSIA, aſſuring them that theſe propoſals ſhould be rejected. This appearance of ſincerity, already contradicted by the invaſion of LORISTAN

[e] See Vol. I. Page 324.

RISTAN and other conqueſts, did not laſt long. ABDALLAH BASHA received 1725.
ſecret orders, in conſequence of which he took poſſeſſion of ARDEVILLE, as it were proviſionally, and under a pretence that the rebels had a deſign upon it. OUROUMI, a city in the neighbourhood of TAVRIS, had lately imitated the ſame example, by ſubmitting voluntarily to the TURKS. The irregularity of this proceeding, occaſioned freſh complaints. The RUSSIANS alledged moreover, that the port had committed a new violation of the treaty, by receiving an embaſſador from the rebel AFGHANS.

ASHREEF was ſo terrified at the progreſs of the OTTOMAN arms, that he addreſſed a manifeſto to the inhabitants of MIANA, and ſome other frontier towns, exhorting them to ſubmit to his dominion; after which, he attempted to reconcile by treaty, what he could hardly obtain in the field. The negotiation was committed to ABDUL AZIZ KHAN an AFGHAN, who from a ſimple mule-driver, had, by his courage and reſolution, attained to the poſts of colonel and commandant of JULFA. He ſet out from ISFAHAN in SEPTEMBER; but having been detained twenty days at HOROMABAD by ACHMED BASHA, and twelve at HAMADAN, he did not reach SCUTARI till the twentieth of JANUARY this year.

1726.

The arrival of this embaſſador, induced the OTTOMAN court to believe, that the AFGHANS, intimidated by the ſucceſs of the TURKISH arms in the laſt campaign, would acknowledge the grand ſignior as IMAM[f], and ſue for peace at any rate. However, it was determined in council, that this miniſter ſhould be received only as a ſimple meſſenger, deputed by a prince of the ſame religion as the TURKS. ABDUL AZIZ expected an audience as an embaſſador from a king of the ſect of the SUNNIS; but perceiving that the court did not intend to acknowledge him in any public character, he pretended to be ill, and deſired to be removed to CONSTANTINOPLE. As it was the intention of the port to grant him an audience, they eaſily conſented to his requeſt, which perhaps had been ſuggeſted to him; but inſtead of a galley, according to the cuſtom obſerved towards embaſſadors, he was ſent in a gondola.

[f] The ſupreme head, both in ſpirituals and temporals, of the MAHOMMEDANS. See page 1[illegible]

1726. The ninth of FEBRUARY, he was conducted to the audience of the grand vizir, with more ceremonies than he could reaſonably expect, as the agent of a chief, whoſe ſovereignty was not acknowledged by any crowned head. He perſiſted in vain that he would deliver ASHREFF's letter to none but the grand ſignior himſelf; which as the caſe ſtood, was not practicable. The TURKS, who are not very ſcrupulous in regard to the privileges even of the moſt authorized miniſters, finding they could not prevail upon him to deliver up the letter, reſolved to take it from him.

ASHREFF's propoſals were very bold, and far from being couched in the moſt reſpectful terms. This prince in his letter aſſumed the pompous title of king of kings; he concluded it with four ARABIAN verſes, the ſenſe of which ſeems to be very romantic, as well as imperious, *viz.*

" The ſabre and the lance are our ſweet baſil;
" We deſpiſe the daffodil and myrrh;
" Our drink is the blood of our enemies,
" And their ſkulls ſerve us for our cups."

The ſentence on the ſignet[s] was of the ſame nature. " The faithful " obſerver of the commandments of the moſt high; the duſt of the feet " of the four friends, ABUBEKER, OMAR, OSMAN, and ALI, is ASHREFF, " by the divine permiſſion become the moſt illuſtrious of the ſovereigns " of the earth."

The apprehenſions which had been entertained at CONSTANTINOPLE, concerning the humiliation of the AFGHANS, were changed into indignation. As they looked upon the haughtineſs of ASHREFF as unpardonable, the miniſters were very deſirous that the people ſhould approve of the war, ſo that they ſpared no pains to inflame their reſentments.

In the mean time, ABDUL AZIZ ſupported his maſter's intereſt, with a confidence anſwerable to the pompous title which that prince had aſſumed. The negotiation ſeemed to tend more to mortify the TURKS, than

[s] They give this ſignet the name of BUL. It is an impreſſion in ink, which ſerves inſtead of a ſignature. See Vol. I. page 317.

than the refuſal of the OTTOMAN court to acknowledge ABDUL AZIZ as embaſſador, had humbled this AFGHAN. He behaved, under theſe delicate circumſtances, with great intrepidity, and as much confidence, as if he had been acknowledged in a public character; inſomuch, that the miniſters of the grand ſignior began at length to be embaraſſed. In the anſwer which the MUFTI, and the expounders of the law at CONSTANTINOPLE, gave to a letter written to them by the MIANGI and the expounders of the law at ISFAHAN, we find the principal points on which theſe conferences turned. 1726.

Religion was the object on which the AFGHANS founded their pretenſions. ABDUL AZIZ reproached the TURKS, with having failed in an eſſential point of their faith, in not making all their efforts, as the AFGHANS had done, to deſtroy the monarchy of the SCHIAS. He allowed, that the grand ſignior was lawful IMAM in TURKEY; but he added, that this did not hinder ASHREFF and his ſucceſſors from being IMAMS in PERSIA; eſpecially, as a ſingle chief is not ſufficient to govern countries ſo vaſtly extended, as thoſe poſſeſſed by muſſulmen. He maintained, that a conqueror, acknowledged by the grandees of a kingdom, was the lawful ſovereign of it; and as ſuch had a right to claim the towns and provinces which had been torn from it; ſince his ſovereignty extended to thoſe provinces and towns, as well as to places where his authority was eſtabliſhed.

The TURKISH commiſſaries appointed to treat with him, made anſwer, that the wars which the grand ſignior had been obliged to maintain againſt the different chriſtian powers, had prevented his deſtroying the empire of the SCHIAS; that he had deprived the SCHIAS of many conſiderable provinces, and as ſoon as the peace concluded with the princes of EUROPE afforded him leiſure, he would accompliſh the work. They added, that according to law and tradition, there could not be more than one IMAM at a time, unleſs their dominions were ſeparated by the ſea, which might prevent all communication: that this was not the caſe with reſpect to PERSIA; nor was ISFAHAN at ſuch a diſtance, as to render the nomination of another chief neceſſary; ſince under the reign of OMAR, whoſe empire

1726. pire extended from MECCA to HAMADAN, a plurality of Caliphs had never been acknowledged: that the ſovereignty of the conqueſts made by the AFGHANS, as well as of thoſe made by the grand ſignior, belonged of right to this monarch, in quality of IMAM, while the AFGHANS could pretend to nothing further, than the moveable goods of the people whom they had vanquiſhed; and they defied ABDUL AZIZ to prove the contrary.

CHAP. XXXVI.

The TURKISH *miniſters propoſe queries to the* MUFTI, *relating to the conſiſtency of a rupture with* ASHREFF. *Anſwer of the* MUFTI. *The port declares war againſt* ASHREFF. *The* AFGHAN *embaſſador ſets out from* CONSTANTINOPLE, *and is arreſted on the road by orders from the grand ſignior.* CASBIN *ſurrenders to* ABDALLAH BASHA. *Diſpute between the* TURKISH *generals. Miſunderſtanding between the* RUSSIANS *and the* TURKS. ABDALLAH BASHA *defeats* TÆHMAS'*s troops before* ARDEVILLE.

THE TURKISH miniſters perſiſted in maintaining that there could be only one IMAM, and that this IMAM ought to be the grand ſignior, not only on account of his hereditary ſovereignty, but becauſe he had in his power the principal places of worſhip of the three written religions[h]. This diſpute, the deciſion of which ſeemed to reſt on the longeſt ſword, was however ſupported by ABDUL AZIZ, who anſwered undauntedly; that if the muſſulmen of the two empires could acknowledge only the ſame head, this title was due to ASHREFF, as deſcended from the illuſtrious tribe of CORAICH[i], to whom the dignity of Caliph by right belongs, and as deſtroyer of the monarchy of the SCHIAS; and not to a prince born among a nation of an obſcure original, who, not ſatisfied with granting peace to heretics, had, by a treaty contrary to the law, delivered into

[h] MECCA, becauſe of the temple, which they ſay ABRAHAM, father of the JEWS, built there, and as the place where MAHOMMED was born: JERUSALEM, reſpected by the JEWS, and much more ſo by the chriſtians: and MEDINA, the ſeat of the empire, and burying place of their prophet, and of the firſt Caliphs his ſucceſſors.

[i] The tribe of MAHOMMED, one of the moſt illuſtrious of MECCA, who were diſtinguiſhed by their care of the temple which was intruſted to them.

into the hands of infidels, ſeveral cities [k] in which moſques had been erected. 1726.

Theſe conferences ſerved to increaſe the animoſity of both parties. The port was deſirous of war; but as the MAHOMMEDANS look upon it as vile and diſhonourable to declare war againſt a people of their own ſect, the TURKS would have been glad at leaſt, that ASHREFF ſhould lay them under a neceſſity of breaking with him, or to find ſome proper reaſon for a rupture: the moſt plauſible ſeemed to ariſe from the very nature of the negotiation, eſpecially as the AFGHAN, in the courſe of the argument, pretended to prove his maſter ſuperior in birth and dignity to the grand ſignior.

The letters which paſſed between the MUFTI of CONSTANTINOPLE, and the MEANGI of ISFAHAN already mentioned, were made public, and ſerved as a manifeſto; and perhaps had a ſtronger effect, than if it had borne that title; for it was made uſe of to conciliate the minds of the people to a rupture with the AFGHANS. The port then demanded the FETFA [l] of the MUFTI, propoſing the following queries:

" 1. Whether it be permitted by the law, for the true believers to ac-
" knowledge and obey at one and the ſame time two different chiefs?

" 2. In what manner they ought to act againſt a muſſulman, who
" after ſubduing the capital of PERSIA, and ſome other towns contiguous
" to the conqueſts made by the OTTOMAN arms, ſhould conteſt the grand
" ſignior's ſovereignty, annexed to the dignity of IMAM, and ſend letters
" demanding thoſe conqueſts, under pretence that they conſtitute part of
" an empire which belongs to him of right, as poſſeſſor of the capital, and
" of the throne of the SCHIAS?"

The MUFTI anſwered the firſt of theſe queries, " That a plurality of
" chiefs was declared unlawful by the aſſembly of the ASHABS [m], unleſs
" there ſhould be ſome barrier betwixt their territories, ſuch, for inſtance,
" as

[k] BELGRADE ceded in 1718 to the emperor by the treaty of PASSAROWITZ, and DERBEND to the empire of RUSSIA. [l] See page 36. [m] A name given to the companions of MAHOMMED.

1726. " as the INDIAN OCEAN, which might hinder them to conſult, and to " aſſiſt each other."

On the ſecond query he determined, " That if the muſſulman in " queſtion deſiſted from his pretenſions, and ſubmitted to the authority " of the head of the faithful, every thing would be right; but if he " perſiſted in his rebellion, his death was declared neceſſary by a precept " of the law, which enjoined the deſtruction of him."

Theſe FETFAS were followed by a declaration of war. The grand ſignior being affronted at the inſolence of ASHREFF's ſeals, cauſed a ſignet to be made, with an inſcription of the ſame romantic nature as that of ASHREFF's already related.

" The defender of juſtice, zealous for the four friends [n],
" Is ACHMED, ſon of the warlike MAHOMMED, ever accuſtomed to
" ſubdue his enemies.
" By the eternal truth, ASHREFF is not the moſt illuſtrious of the
" kings of the earth:
" He is a paſte kneaded with the leaven of MIR VAIS, a rebel, and
" ſymbol of ignominy."

If we conſider with what a blind enthuſiaſm ſome religious wars have been carried on in EUROPE, we ſhall not be ſurprized at theſe romantic preludes to the ſhedding of MAHOMMEDAN blood. After theſe conteſts, ABDUL AZIZ had his audience of leave from the grand vizir on the laſt day of MARCH, with very little ceremony. This miniſter however preſented him with ten purſes [o] for himſelf, one for his nephew, who had accompanied him in his journey, and another for his chaplain. He alſo ſent a very fine watch for ASHREFF's ATHEMAT DOULET, in acknowledgment for a ſtring of pearls which he had received from that miniſter. The next day ABDUL AZIZ took his leave of the mufti, and departed for BAGDAT under the conduct of a TURKISH AGA.

This AFGHAN embaſſador had ſcarce entered the province of DIARBEKIR, when he was arreſted by the commandant of KERKISIA, a fortreſs near

[n] ABUKERKER, OMAR, OSMAN, and ALI.

[o] 500 dollars of 4 l. each purſe.

near the EUPHRATES. The port, in order to authorize ſuch a proceeding, 1726.
gave out that ASHREFF had ſet the example, by confining, in the common jail, an officer whom ACHMED BASHA had ſent to him; but it may be preſumed, that the grand ſignior was unwilling this envoy ſhould inform ASHREFF, of the repugnance which the TURKISH army ſhewed to the war.

In the mean time, the inhabitants of CASBIN made an offer to ABDALLAH BASHA, of ſubmitting to the OTTOMAN dominion, on condition the grand ſignior would be ſatisfied with ſending them a TURKISH governor, but no troops. This general, however, ſent 12000 men under the command of ALI BASHA, one of his principal officers, who took poſſeſſion of the town in the name of the grand ſignior. MARAGA alſo fell under the dominion of the port; but this conqueſt had like to have proved fatal, by the jealouſy which aroſe between the BASHAS ABDALLAH and ACHMED, who both pretended to the government of that place. This town had always been in the diſtrict of TAVRIS, a circumſtance which ſeemed deciſive in favour of ABDALLAH; and yet the reputation of ACHMED prevailed over every other conſideration. ABDALLAH would have retired to OURFA, the capital of his government, if the grand ſignior had not recommended his ſacrificing his private reſentment to the intereſt of the empire.

The RUSSIAN miniſter at the port having learnt that a body of TURKS had advanced towards GHILAN, made his complaint, and was anſwered, that the RUSSIANS ought to repel any troops who ſhould diſturb them, contrary to treaty. It could not however be ſuppoſed, that this detachment had acted without orders; hence it was inferred, that the TURKS had entered GHILAN, only to feel the pulſe of the RUSSIANS, who were conſidered as enjoying the choiceſt province in the whole country, tho' in fact they drew but very little, if any advantage from it. It is reaſonable to preſume, that the curioſity of the TURKS was excited by the ſolicitation of both the ENGLISH and FRENCH embaſſadors: the ARMENIANS, who were wont to bring ſilk to them from GHILAN, on account of theſe troubles diſcontinued their caravans, which was by no means ſatisfactory to the merchants of theſe nations.

1726. The OTTOMAN armies had in the mean time taken the field, and their firſt operations ſeemed to promiſe as much ſucceſs as the preceding years. ABDALLAH BASHA received advice, that the PERSIANS had aſſembled troops near the conflux of the ARAS and the KURA, deſigning to attack ARDEVILLE. Upon which he detached 10,000 men againſt them, under the command of his ſon ABDERRAHMAM, and put them to flight.

CHAP. XXXVII.

TÆHMAS SHAH endeavours to negotiate a treaty with the RUSSIANS *and* TURKS. ASHREFF *fortifies* ISFAHAN. *He marches an army to meet* ACHMED BASHA. *Stratagem uſed by* ASHREFF *to evade a battle with the* TURKS. ACHMED *reſolves to give the* AFGHANS *battle. The* TURKS *are defeated.*

TÆHMAS SHAH was now a fugitive in the province of MAZANDERAN, after his eſcape from the ſnare which had been laid for him by ASHREFF. That eſcape convinced him, that the throne of his anceſtors was recoverable only by force of arms; and ſeeing himſelf betrayed or deſerted in every quarter, he determined to agree to the execution of the treaty of CONSTANTINOPLE. In conſequence hereof he ſent an embaſſador to the court of RUSSIA; and at the ſame time he wrote to ABDALLAH BASHA, deſiring this general to acquaint the port of his reſolution.

His letter, among other particulars, contained as follows: "The vileſt "of our ſubjects, ſome miſerable tribes of AFGHANS, have by the per- "miſſion of the Supreme, revolted againſt their lawful ſovereign, and "made themſelves maſter of part of our dominions. You have taken "advantage of this fatal conjuncture to attack us, and theſe hoſtilities have "prevented our ſtopping the progreſs of the rebels. Such a behaviour we "did not expect. Who could have imagined, that an OTTOMAN ge- "neral

" neral would have had recourſe to artifice, to make himſelf maſter of 1726.
" TEFLIS?

" How can we diſcover an enemy diſguiſed under the veil of friend-
" ſhip? Does the bird know that the ſpray on which it perches, will
" one day make its cage [h]?

" The RUSSIANS have offered us their aſſiſtance, but we refuſed it
" from a nation who are enemies to our religion. Being therefore under
" a neceſſity of puniſhing our rebellious ſubjects, we earneſtly beg you
" will engage our illuſtrious father, the PADISHAH [i], who is the refuge
" of the univerſe, to grant us a truce of three years; and we agree that
" the countries which he has conquered, ſhall always remain in his
" hands."

How advantageous ſoever theſe propoſals might appear, the port wavered in her determination. If ſhe granted the truce, TÆHMAS might be enabled to recover his dominions, which he now yielded by neceſſity. On the other hand, if ſhe continued deaf to his petition, he might throw himſelf intirely into the hands of the RUSSIANS. Under theſe circumſtances, the grand ſignior commiſſioned MUSTAFA EFFENDI, a man, who by his extraordinary abilities had raiſed himſelf early in life to very conſiderable employments, to go and examine upon the ſpot into the ſituation of affairs, under the ſpecious pretext of negotiating the treaty which this prince had propoſed.

TÆHMAS's propoſals to the court of RUSSIA did not meet with greater ſucceſs. Prince DOLGORUKI, who commanded this year in the conquered provinces, detained the embaſſador; and we do not find that any regard was ſhewn to the propoſals: indeed it was not probable that the RUSSIANS ſhould appear in behalf of the fugitive king of PERSIA, when they remained inactive with regard to their own conqueſt.

Theſe negotiations of TÆHMAS did not create ſo great uneaſineſs at ISPAHAN, as the neighbourhood of the OTTOMAN armies. ASHREFF,

conſidering

[h] ARABIAN or PERSIC verſes.

[i] A title which the grand ſignior aſſumes, and which is explained by that of emperor, but carries with it alſo a different meaning, as the chief of the MAHOMMEDANS both in ſpirituals and temporals.

1726. conſidering that all his forces would be inſufficient to defend ſo large and ill fortified a town, had formed a project of a very ſingular nature. This was to build a ſecond city within the incloſure of the firſt. The walls were made of earth, and about forty feet high; they were flanked with towers near fifty paces diſtant from each other, and ſurrounded with a large deep ditch. This new city included the old citadel, the great ſquare, and the king's palace; and what is moſt ſurprizing, it was finiſhed in leſs than three months, tho' it was above four miles in circumference.

ASHREFF having thus prepared a place of retreat, thought of rendering it more difficult of acceſs to his new enemies. With this deſign, he detached ſome troops, who ravaged the open country from this capital to the very gates of CASBIN.

ACHMED BASHA, who was marching towards ISFAHAN at the head of a formidable army, was therefore obliged to change his rout. He was not advanced far, when the inhabitants of CASBIN, excited by the emiſſaries of ASHREFF, declared for this prince, and drove away the garriſon which ABDALLAH KOUPROLI had quartered in that city, contrary to the treaty which they had made.

ASHREFF, depending more on his cunning and politics, than on the ſtrength of his armies, publiſhed ſeveral manifeſto's upon this occaſion, by which he exhorted ſome other towns to follow the example of CASBIN: and in order to perſuade them to it the more eaſily, he promiſed to exempt them from all impoſts during the ſpace of three years, if they would voluntarily ſubmit to his dominion.

This prince, after the example of his predeceſſor, uſed all his endeavours to prevent the inhabitants of the capital knowing what paſſed abroad: yet they received ſome imperfect accounts concerning the motions and deſigns of the TURKS, which flung the city into a general conſternation. The OTTOMAN army were apprehended to be very numerous, ſo that the fall of the AFGHANS was conſidered as inevitable. The PERSIANS and chriſtians were equally deſirous of changing maſters, the one thro' averſion, and the other from views of commerce; but the recent remembrance

remembrance of the miſeries they had ſuffered, and the notion they had entertained of the cruelty of the TURKS, made them conſider this new revolution as a misfortune, in which they were in great danger of being involved. 1726.

ASHREFF was not without anxiety, but he concealed all emotions of fear, with a ſeeming indifference. That he might not riſk his whole fortune at once, by waiting for the enemy under the walls of his capital, he put himſelf at the head of his troops, and went forward to meet them. His firſt camp was at SHAH BAGHI, a place diſtant five or ſix leagues from ISFAHAN. Here he ſpent ſome days in making the neceſſary preparations; after which he marched towards HAMADAN, by the ſame road which he knew ACHMED BASHA had taken.

The TURKISH army was advanced about twenty leagues from that city, when his ſcouts brought him word, that the AFGHANS were within ſight. Towards the 20th of NOVEMBER, the two armies incamped within three leagues of each other; they had been in this poſition ſome days, when ACHMED BASHA reſolved to try the mettle of an enemy, with whoſe manner of fighting he was not acquainted. With this view, he ordered two thouſand horſe[k], ſupported by four thouſand Janiſſaries, to advance before the main body of his army; but this detachment having been conducted by guides not well acquainted with the road; within half a league of ASHREFF's camp, were ſurrounded by the AFGHANS, and cut in pieces; almoſt in ſight of their general, who was in full march with his whole army to their aſſiſtance.

ACHMED, diſcouraged at this misfortune, ordered his army to entrench themſelves. ASHREFF, in the mean while, had recourſe to art and ſtratagem. The ſmall number and the inexperience of his troops not permitting him to expect any advantage over his enemy by nobler methods; he endeavoured to ſow the ſeeds of ſedition in the TURKISH camp. He ſpared neither money nor promiſes to tempt thoſe officers whom he thought leaſt mindful of their duty; whilſt his partiſans in the TURKISH army handed writings about in form of manifeſto's, wherein he proteſted, "That

[k] ASIATIC cavalry.

1726. "That it was with the greateſt concern he ſaw muſſulmen bent upon "the deſtruction of each other; that this war, unlawful in itſelf, and "diſhonourable to religion, had already laſted too long. In regard to "himſelf, he called GOD and MAHOMMED to witneſs, that he wiſhed "for nothing with ſo much earneſtneſs, as to enter into a reaſonable ac- "commodation." To this he added another expedient of a more public kind, but not leſs artful: He choſe from among his nation four CHEIKS[1], the moſt venerable for their age and knowledge; and ordering them to put on their ceremonial habits, he ſent them as embaſſadors to the BASHA'S camp.

Theſe old men preſented themſelves unarmed, and were conducted to the general, who treated them with reſpect. After the uſual compliments, the eldeſt of them addreſſing himſelf to the BASHA, in an audible but modeſt tone of voice, ſpoke to this effect: "ASHREFF, our ſovereign "lord, has ſent us to deſire you not to draw your ſabre againſt muſſul- "men, who have obeyed the precept of the law in ſubverting the throne "of the SCHIAS. He is ſurprized that the OTTOMANS ſhould treat him "as an enemy, and make an alliance with chriſtians, with a deſign to "ſtrip him of a kingdom, to which his being a deſcendant of the pro- "phet's own tribe, his religion, and his conqueſts, give him ſuch juſt "rights. He proteſts before GOD, that he lays all the blood that ſhall "be ſpilt in this iniquitous war to your charge, if you oppoſe his eſtabliſh- "ing the true worſhip in his dominions, and reduce the AFGHANS to the "hard neceſſity of defending themſelves againſt their own brethren."

This audience was given, according to cuſtom, in full aſſembly. The TURKISH general perceiving that this diſcourſe made an impreſſion on the minds of ſome of his ſoldiers, who were already influenced by the age and character of the deputies, made anſwer immediately; "That he "was come into PERSIA in conſequence of the orders of the emperor his "maſter; that muſſulmen could not, according to law, have more than "one head in ſpirituals, as well as temporals; and that the grand ſignior "being

[1] This ARABIAN word ſignifies not only an old man, but [illegible] a doctor, or the head of a community.

" being poſſeſſed of this title as ſucceſſor to the Caliphs, ASHREFF muſt 1726.
" acknowledge him in that quality, or he ſhould ſoon feel the effects of
" the ſtrength and courage of the OTTOMAN forces.

The general had ſcarce finiſhed, when the callers to prayer [m] gave notice that it was noon. The CHEIKS, attentive to the purpoſe of their commiſſion, as well as their duty in point of religion, roſe up immediately without making any reply, and joined in prayer with the TURKS. By this act they gave proof of the conformity of their religion; they concluded their prayer, begging with a loud voice, that the Almighty would pleaſe to open the eyes, and to touch the hearts of theſe muſſulmen their brethren.

After this they withdrew, making freſh proteſtations that their maſter was innocent of the blood that was going to be ſhed. This artful conduct, ſtrengthened by the ſecret intrigues of ASHREFF, ſoon began to produce its effects; for the deputies were hardly out of the camp, when they were followed by a prince of the KOURDS, with five thouſand men of his nation.

The BASHA being informed, that the CHEIKS were attended by more troops than he had ſent to eſcort them, ſuſpected ſome treachery, and diſpatched a large body of horſe after the deſerters: part of this detachment joined the KOURDS, ſo that the reſt being inferior in number, were obliged to ſuffer them to proceed unmoleſted to the enemy's army.

ACHMED being ſtruck with this event, which might prove of a very dangerous conſequence, reſolved to give the enemy battle. ASHREFF, grown braver by neceſſity, and the reinforcement of the KOURDS, who came over to him, marched immediately out of his camp, and advanced towards the enemy. The TURKS quitted their lines, and ranged themſelves in battalia. Their army conſiſted of between ſeventy and eight thouſand men. The right wing was formed by twenty thouſand KOURDS who were all cavalry, under the orders of BABEC SOLIMAN OGLOU their prince. The left was commanded by [illegible]ELICTAR MAHOMMED, and five other BASHAS among whom were ABDERRAHMAM, ſon of the SERASKIER

[m] Theſe are called MOEZINS.

1

1726. KIER ABDALLAH, and HUSSEIN alſo, of the celebrated family of KOPROLI. This army was alſo attended with a train of ſeventy pieces of cannon.

ASHREFF's army conſiſted of ſeventeen thouſand foot, among whom were twelve thouſand AFGHANS, with coats of mail[n]; ſixteen thouſand horſe, AFGHANS, PERSEES, and DERGHEZINS, with forty harquebuſſes mounted on camels backs. This prince, ſurrounded by his principal miniſters, was ſeated, according to the cuſtom of the INDIAN kings, on a throne carried by an elephant.

The TURKS gave the ſignal of battle at ſix in the morning, by firing ten pieces of cannon. The AFGHANS returned it with five: upon which the SERASKIER charged them briſkly at the head of the right wing, and repeated the attack three ſeveral times with great bravery, during which time his artillery kept an inceſſant fire; yet he was repulſed on every ſide, and obliged, towards three in the afternoon, to retire in diſorder to his entrenchments. The TURKS loſt twelve thouſand men: their defeat would probably have been more complete, if ASHREFF had not forbid his men to purſue them.

This conduct might alſo be imputed to a new piece of policy. The greateſt part of the OTTOMAN army had not engaged, and an eagerneſs of purſuit might have ſnatched the victory from him; eſpecially as there was little reaſon to believe that the enemy, contrary to their cuſtom in ſuch caſes, would keep the field.

[n] This is a light iron net-work about the head and ſhoulders, and ſometimes they wear the ſame kind of armour on their bodies under their cloaths.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Artful behaviour of ASHREFF *towards the* TURKS. *Situation of the port in regard to other powers. Great preparations in* TURKEY *againſt the* AFGHANS. *The* TURKS *unſucceſsful againſt the* ARMENIANS. *Prudent adminiſtration of* ASHREFF. *The* TURKS *ſend commiſſaries into* PERSIA *to treat with* ASHREFF. *A treaty of peace concluded in the camp of* HAMADAN, *between the* TURKS *and the* AFGHANS *in* 1727.

ASHREFF, after his victory, removed his camp to the field of battle. The event juſtified the prudence of his meaſures; for the next night, the KOURDS ſpread themſelves along the lines of the TURKS, crying out, that as part of the army was gone over to the AFGHANS, they would alſo retire immediately; after which, taking an advantage of the diſorder which they had occaſioned, they began to plunder the baggage. 1726.

Theſe ſeditious clamours produced the effect, which the authors of them intended. The SERASKIER perceiving that he ſhould expoſe himſelf to no purpoſe, in venturing a ſecond engagement, while his troops were thus diſheartened and mutinous, decamped ſilently in the night; and leaving his baggage and artillery behind him, he retired to KHERMANSHA.

The AFGHAN prince did not interrupt his march: it was not his deſign to demoliſh an army which might be eaſily replaced, but to baffle the projects of the port, by increaſing the repugnance which the TURKISH nation in general ſhewed to this war. The ſame religious zeal, which has ever created ſuch bloody conteſts between the TURKS and the PERSIANS, was now a reaſon not to fight with the AFGHANS. ASHREFF accompanied rather than purſued them as far as the walls of this city. But not ſatisfied with having defeated his enemies, and driven them from his frontiers, which was acting merely on the defenſive, he uſed other gentle expedients to diſarm the

He was [illegible] KHERMANSHA than this artful AFGHAN ſent de[illegible] who, upon the approach of the PERSIAN

1726. SIAN army, retired with his ſcattered forces towards BAGDAT. Inſtead of propoſing a negotiation, as was expected, theſe deputies declared to him publicly to this effect: "It is the opinion of our ſovereign ASHREFF, that "the ſpoils taken from people of the ſame religion, cannot be kept as a "fair booty: as he is poſſeſſed of his dominions as a lawful prince, he "does not think fit to act as a robber, by detaining the property of his "brethren; for which reaſon he has commiſſioned us to acquaint you, "that you may ſend for your treaſure and baggage, and, except arms, in "general for whatever your troops left in their camp." To this act of generoſity, ASHREFF added that of returning the priſoners he had taken. Doubtleſs this prince intended to create friends of people, whom he had no further reaſon to fear, at leaſt in the preſent campaign.

The TURKS were the more affected with it, as they had other troubles upon their hands. The death of PETER the GREAT, had not been attended with any of thoſe changes, which they expected. This monarch's laſt will, ſupported by the grandees, and by the whole army, eſtabliſhed the empreſs CATHARINE on the throne without any competition. VACHTANGA, the GEORGIAN prince, who was driven from TEFLIS, and retired to ST. PETERSBURG, was now ſent to ASTRACHAN. The RUSSIAN empreſs being affronted at the little regard which the port ſhewed to the repreſentations of her miniſters, required of this prince to take up his reſidence in that city, in the neighbourhood of his own country. This circumſtance, joined to the inconſtancy of the GEORGIANS, alarmed the TURKS.

SULTAN DELI, a nephew of the KHAN of the CRIM TARTARS, now headed a body of male-contents, and gathered new ſtrength and courage, by a great number of CIRCASSIANS and other TARTARS, whom he drew to his ſtandard. The reputation of his arms, and the deſire of plunder, had lately tempted them to make an expedition towards AZOPH, from whence they returned loaded with ſpoils, before the KHAN had time to oppoſe them.

In the mean time, things continued in ſome ſituation on the weſtern coaſt of the CASPIAN SEA. Prince [illegible] on the ſide

ſide of SHIRVAN: the LESGEES were maſters of great part of that province, and were intereſted to oppoſe the intended partition; ſo that the RUSSIAN and TURKISH deputies had no opportunity to execute their commiſſion. Towards the ſouth, the ARABS, naturally fierce and impatient of any foreign yoke, would not ſubmit without the utmoſt reluctancy. The title of CORAISH, which ASHREFF aſſumed, joined to the deſire of novelty, might engage them in that prince's party; and with ſuch aſſiſtance he might eaſily become maſter of MECCA and MEDINA, and cauſe himſelf to be proclaimed head of the MAHOMMEDANS°. The troubles, which had lately broke out in EGYPT, were not intirely pacified. The court endeavoured to inſinuate for ſome time, that ASHREFF had embraced the religion of the PERSIANS; but this artifice was eaſily ſeen thro' by the people. A war, undertaken againſt a nation of the ſame faith, was conſidered as odious and unlawful; and the moſt zealous attributed the loſs of the battle to the divine juſtice, which had confounded the temerity of thoſe who oppoſed the propagation of the faith, by declaring againſt the deſtroyers of the monarchy of the SCHIAS. 1726.

Under ſuch circumſtances, a perſon of leſs eſteem than ACHMED BASHA, might have had the diſaſter imputed to his miſconduct, and, according to the uſual policy of eaſtern countries, under this pretence been ſacrificed to the public reſentment. But this general was the ſon of a man, whoſe head the port had demanded ſeveral times to no purpoſe; and they were now to behave towards him with deference, that he might not declare in favour of ASHREFF, by which means he might aſſume an independent ſovereignty in this province.

The republic of VENICE had not forgot her rights to the MOREA, nor the emperor of the ROMANS his to BOSNIA: this prince, already diſſatisfied with the ALGERI[illegible]ES, who had taken one of the ſhips belonging to the EAST INDIA comp[illegible]y of OSTEND, was not only in peace with all EUROPE, [illegible] alſo cloſely [illegible]onnected with the RUSSI[illegible]NS.

With regar[illegible] to [illegible] [illegible]ÆHMA[illegible] they [illegible]id not treat him with ſuc[illegible] contempt [illegible]s to neg[illegible] [illegible]g of him the ceſſion [illegible] the provin[illegible]

 they

1726. they had conquered; yet all the abilities of MUSTAFA EFFENDI, could not prevail on him to agree to the conditions propoſed. So that the TURKS, tho' maſters of great armies, and ſtrongly inclined to reduce PERSIA to their obedience, ſaw themſelves in danger of being forced to relinquiſh this favourite object.

The grand ſignior, ſenſibly diſguſted at his late diſgrace, opened his treaſures, and employed all his miniſters in making diſpoſitions for the next campaign. They embarked twelve thouſand men at ALEXANDRETTA. Six thouſand men of EYDIN received orders to join them, as alſo a body of troops drawn from the ſtanding forces of EGYPT: and concluding there was better reaſon to depend on chriſtian ſubjects, who could not be worked upon by the artful inſinuations of ASHREFF, they ordered the BASHA of NISSA, with twenty thouſand ALBANIANS, and the BASHA of BOSNIA, with ten thouſand BOSNIANS, to take the ſame
1727. rout towards PERSIA. The beginning of APRIL this year, ten men of war were alſo ſent to SALONICA for freſh reinforcements.

Theſe powerful ſuccours were ſent to ACHMED BASHA. The winter had paſſed without any action worth notice, except that of SAVI MUSTAFA, who marched out of GANJA, of which town he was governor, and diſperſed the ARMENIANS in the neighbourhood of SHAMAKIE. Theſe people, laying hold of the preſent circumſtances, formed themſelves into a kind of republic, which, as we have mentioned, diſtinguiſhed itſelf by the total defeat of a body of ſix thouſand men, whom ABDALLAH BASHA had ſent againſt them the preceding ſummer. It was not long before they had their revenge alſo of the governor of GANJA. It was their cuſtom to aſſemble in great numbers during Eaſter, in a plain in that neighhourhood. Having received intelligence that the TURKS, who could not purſue them into their mountains, had formed a deſign to ſurprize them on this occaſion, they took their meaſures, and not only defended themſelves, but alſo drew the TURKS into their defiles, where they obtained an entire victory over them.

ASHREFF ſaw
he had kept

had hardly any other ſupport than his own abilities to maintain himſelf upon the throne. His great point was to increaſe his reputation for piety and religion. With this deſign he obliged his miniſters and principal officers to give him an exact account of their conduct and adminiſtration: at the ſame time, to demonſtrate how much he meant to govern as a juſt prince, he ſent to all his governors and great officers, a detail of his military operations, and of the manner in which he had governed ſince his acceſſion to the throne. 1727.

This piece of policy was leſs neceſſary than he imagined. The vaſt preparations, which ſeemed to threaten his utter deſtruction, vaniſhed of themſelves. The new raiſed troops in TURKEY, who had been deceived with regard to the place to which they were at firſt ordered to march, obſtinately refuſed to paſs the frontiers of the empire. The deſertion was ſo much the greater, as the apprehenſion of a general inſurrection ſecured them from puniſhment. The people and the ſoldiers murmured alike againſt a war, which their honeſt, tho' ſuperſtitious, prejudices, taught them to look upon as unjuſt and impious.

The port, alarmed at an oppoſition which defeated her projects, did not heſitate long upon what meaſures to take. She diſpatched orders to the SERASKIER, ACHMED BASHA, to enter as ſoon as poſſible into a negotiation, and to conclude a peace with ASHREFF on the moſt honourable conditions he could obtain.

How preſſing ſoever theſe orders were, ACHMED was in no hurry to comply with them. This general having received freſh ſuccours from the KOURDS and ARABS, had formed an army of 60,000 men; with theſe he hoped to repair his loſs in the laſt campaign, the diſgrace of which could not be imputed to him. The temper of this general was too well known by the [illegible]KISH miniſters, to depend on an abſolute compliance on his ſide. [illegible]fore they ſent RICHIDI EFFENDI, a man of abilities and [illegible]buſineſs; he arrived in [illegible]EMBER at the army, [illegible]ch h[illegible]d the r[illegible]MADAN. ACHMED BASHA had a leaf[illegible]fat[illegible]a numerous body of forces

The

1727. The AFGHAN army was not far off, when the BASHA ſent to ZOULA, prime-miniſter and general of ASHREFF's troops, that now was the time to decide their quarrel; therefore he had only to accept of the conditions which he was commiſſioned to propoſe to him, or he muſt prepare for battle; when he hoped to ſhew what an OTTOMAN general, at the head of a faithful army, was capable of performing.

This blunt manner of opening the conferences, contributed to haſten the concluſion of a peace, now become equally acceptable to both parties. The negotiation being referred to men of abilities and moderation, towards the beginning of OCTOBER a treaty of peace was at length ſigned in the camp of HAMADAN.

The articles were as follows:

I. The grand ſignior ſhall be acknowledged head of the muſſulmen, and the true ſucceſſor of the Caliphs.

II. In this quality, the public prayer [P] ſhall be made in his name throughout all PERSIA.

III. The provinces, cities, and towns, which he poſſeſſes in PERSIA, ſhall be ceded to him in perpetuity.

IV. He ſhall re-enter into poſſeſſion of CHUSISTAN, retaken from him during the war.

V. He ſhall take poſſeſſion, and hold in like manner, the cities of ZENGAN, SULTANIE, EBHER, TÆHIRAN, and their dependancies.

VI. The artillery, arms, and ſtandards, taken from the OTTOMAN army in 1726, ſhall be reſtored.

VII. ASHREFF ſhall be acknowledged by the grand ſignior as lawful ſovereign of the kingdom of PERSIA.

VIII. He ſhall be named as ſuch after the grand ſignior in the public

IX. He ſhall appoint an EMIR HAHDGEE to conduct the PERSIAN ca- 1727.
ravan, which goes every year in pilgrimage to MECCA[q]. This caravan ſhall, according to cuſtom, take the road of BAGDAT; and the governor of that city ſhall not have a power, as formerly, to appoint a chief over it; nor ſhall it be ſubject to the authority of any of the grand ſignior's officers.

The treaty being ratified on both ſides, the peace was proclaimed by circular letters through the OTTOMAN empire; and the grand ſignior, by a ſolemn embaſſy, acknowledged ASHREFF as the lawful ſovereign of PERSIA.

[q] This cuſtom, as I have obſerved, had been diſcontinued by the PERSIANS, though the SUNNIS make a point of it.

The END of the THIRD VOLUME.

ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BOMBAY

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